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 century, laws on copyright, which were statutory in form, have developed into a branch 
of legal science. Copyright statutes have the contemporary purposes of either promoting the creation 
of new works by giving authors exclusive rights to copy them and thus receive profits from them, or 
establishing respect for expressions of the author’s personality. From its beginnings, the protection 
granted by copyright statutes had been territorially limited in its legal effect, i.e. the exclusive copying 
privileges granted to authors did not extend beyond the territory of the state that granted them. 
However, also starting in the late 19
th
 century and continuing to 1995, treaties such as Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work (hereinafter Berne Convention),
1
Universal 
Copyright Convention (hereinafter UCC)
2
  and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs)
3
 were concluded with the aim of granting copyright protection to 
authors beyond national frontiers. These treaties establish the conditions for how foreign authors or 
foreign literary and artistic works can be protected in another treaty state. To reach this goal, the 
treaties implicitly acknowledge that each of the state adhering to them has its own legalisation on 
copyright. Based on this assumption, such treaties endorse two main principles: 1. national treatment 
for foreign creators, i.e. the prohibition of any discrimination against foreign originators; and 2. 
imposing minimum standards of substantive law protection that are to be adopted by member states. 
For the latter, the treaties merely harmonize but only to a certain level and as to certain aspects of 
material protection among adhering states. As a result there are still differences existing in national 
copyright laws and such differences will continue to exist for a rather long time. That is also to say 
that, given the differences in national copyright laws, in the context of copyright protection, there may 
be conflicting findings when copyright infringement disputes are at stake in different states. 
 
Another consideration raised in the course of exercising copyright at an international level is the 
involvement of private international law issues. Private international law (hereinafter PIL) deals with 
three sets of questions. The first concerns jurisdiction. Jurisdiction rules determine which national 
court is competent to resolve a given claim. The second is choice-of-law. These rules designate which 
law is applicable to a given dispute. And the last question concerns the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. Those rules lay down under what circumstances judgments that are delivered by a 
court of another state can be recognized and enforced. Although analytically, these three sets of 
questions are different, in practice, they are inter-related, because e.g. the decision to sue in a court of 
a particular country will be based on the application of the choice-of-law rule or the practice in that 
country, and it will also be anticipated that the decision rendered in that court should be recognized 




As a legal science, PIL has a much longer history than copyright law. However, the study on the 
interplay of copyright and PIL only began half a century ago.
5
 This was due to the fact that national 
legislatures, in comparison with regulating copyright protection in the aspects of material law or of 
PIL, preferred the former, because material copyright protection provided in copyright law reflects 
economic and cultural interests involved in the various sectors of copyright business in their individual 
countries, while the latter is less predictable since the goal of PIL is to pursue justice in individual 
                                                          
1
 Signed on 9 September 1886, as last revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 (as amended on 28 September 1979), S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
2
 Signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952, revised at Paris on 24 July 1971. The PRC became the member on 30 
October 1992. 
3
 The TRIPs Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
4
 Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer 1993) 3-4. 
5
 Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws (Kluwer/Commission of the European 
Communities, Deventer 1978). 
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 2 
cases or legal harmony, i.e. to provide legal certainty, uniformity and predictability.
6
 Another reason 
was that the two fields of legal science are so remote from each other that legal scholars in either field 
did not have a full understanding of the other. There was a misconception by copyright law scholars 
that the territoriality principle laid down in international treaties supposedly provided the only choice-




Increased attention to the interplay of copyright and PIL is related to globalization and the rapid 
technology development that occurred in the past several decades. In the era of the digital information 
society, communication of copyrighted works has become more instantaneous and occurs on a 
worldwide level. So have infringements of copyrights. Under such circumstances, more evident and 
larger scales of cross-border infringements pose challenges to the traditional territoriality principle of 
copyright protection, and in turn call for  more modern PIL solutions in that regard. 
 
How choice-of-law problems arise in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes 
The conditions giving rise to the need for PIL rules are two-fold: legal diversity and involvement with 
cross-border judicial matters.
8
 As discussed below, national copyright laws still differ from one to the 
other. As a result, when a relevant foreign element is involved in copyright protection, a choice-of-law 
problem will arise. Looking into a choice-of-law problem in a cross-border copyright and related 
rights dispute needs to be from two separate perspectives: from the perspective of substantive 
copyright protection in the international context and from the perspective of choice-of-law 
classification. 
 
International copyright protection 
Although copyright treaties have set up certain standards of copyright protection internationally, some 
distinct features still prevail in each national copyright law. These features reflect the economic and 
cultural policies of each country. The following, just to name a few, can briefly demonstrate the 
differences that exist in national copyright laws. 
 
The European Term Directive
9
 aims at establishing a single duration for copyright and related rights 
across the entire European Union.  The chosen term was 70 years from the death of the author (post 
mortem auctoris, [pma]), which is longer than the 50 year pma required by Article 7(1) of the Berne 
Convention and other Union states to the Berne Convention, e.g. the PRC (Article 21 of PRC 
Copyright Law
10
). Under such circumstances, the works that fall into the public domain after 50 year 
pma in the PRC will still be protected in the Netherlands, where a term of 70 years pma has been 
adopted. Consequently, if such works are exploited without the permission of the right owner in the 
Netherlands, it will still constitute infringement of the owner’s copyright according to the Dutch 
Copyright Law, but it would not be the case in the PRC under the PRC Copyright Law.  
 
                                                          
6
 Stig Strömholm, Copyright and the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Survey (Heymann, Cologne etc 2010) 3-
4. 
7
 Stig Strömholm (supra n 6) 4; see also Haimo Schack, ‘The Law Applicable to (Unregistered) IP Rights After 
Rome II’, in Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law Geistiges 
Eigentum und Wettbewerbsrecht 28 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009) 79. 
8
 M.H. ten Wolde, K.C. Henckel and J.N. de Haan, European Private International Law: A comparative 
perspective on contracts, torts and corporations (Hephaestus Publishers, Groningen 2011) 3-4. 
9
 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of October 29 1993 on term of protection [1993] OJ L290/9, codified version 
Directive 2006/116/EC [2006] OJ L372/12 (Term Directive), proposal for amending the Term Directive, COM 
(2008) 0464 final, for details, see Michel M Walter, ‘Commentary on Term Directive’ in Michel M Walter and 
Silke von Lewinski (eds), European Copyright Law: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford 2010) 499-677. 
10
 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) on 7 September 1990, and amended at the 24
th
 Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Ninth NPC on 27 October 2001 and amended at 13
th
 Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Eleventh NPC on 26 February 2010, entered into force on 1 April 2010. (PRC CRL). 
Introduction 
 3 
As will be discussed in chapters One and Three of this dissertation, the treatment of moral rights 
constitutes one of the important differences between the countries adopting the copyright system and 
those adopting the author’s rights system. Moral rights are only granted to authors, but in the case of 
cinematographic work they were usually granted to the producer. Thanks to the EU harmonization of 
copyright law, the director of a film is deemed a co-author of a film under European Union national 
laws, but he is not an author under the PRC Copyright Law or the US Copyright Law. As disputed in 
the famous John Huston
11
 case, the choice-of-law issue arose as to the authorship of the work when 
heirs of the director of an American film attempted to stop the release in Europe of a colourised 
version of that film. Additionally, since the scope of moral rights protection differs among national 
copyright laws, when there is a finding of infringement of moral rights according to the law of one 
country, it would probably not be an infringement pursuant to another country’s law. 
 
Initial ownership is normally granted to an author who is the actual creator of the work. However, in 
certain national copyright laws, e.g. US Copyright Law and Dutch Copyright Law, an exception has 
been adopted for works made during an employment relationship, the so-called work-made-for-hire 
doctrine. According to this doctrine, initial ownership of such works is granted to the employer rather 
than the employees who actually created the work. Thus, there will be difference in terms of who is 
the initial owner of such works under different national laws. When such works cross borders, 
concerns about which law shall apply to initial ownership of such works may then be raised.  
 
Furthermore, network technologies easily make copyrighted works co-created by creators having 
various nationalities, such as in making a film or conducting a research project that involves specialists 
from different countries. In such works, it is difficult to separate and apportion the labour in and actual 
contribution to the creation of copyright. Since national laws differ with regard to the initial 
acquisition of such a copyright, issues of co-ownership therefore also give rise to choice-of-law 
considerations. 
 
The matters of the existence, scope, ownership, validity, duration and termination of copyright are 
closely related to infringement claims of copyright. The initial ownership issue is critical to an 
infringement claim because to decide the infringement claim the judge has to determine whether a 
party who claims copyright protection is actually entitled to such protection. In addition, in such 
disputes, the question of initial ownership may often arise as a preliminary issue. So may the matters 
of the existence, scope, validity, duration and termination of copyright: an infringement dispute is 
adjudicated based on the existence of a valid copyright and within the scope of the right i.e. what 
exactly has been granted. They will also be examined when determining whether there is an 
infringement. 
 
The choice-of-law perspective 
When faced with a choice-of-law problem, one needs to begin with classification, i.e. to look at the 
legal issue or legal relationship involved in the dispute and decide whether the particular law or issue 
at hand fits into that category. If so, one then needs to determine the connecting factor that goes with 
that category, by which the law of a certain national legal system will be designated. 
 
To identify the law applicable to cross-border copyright disputes one encounters the problem of 
classification. Copyright is one of the categories of intellectual property rights (hereinafter IP rights). 
As the second word states, an intellectual property right is a form of property. In addition, the 
economic importance involved in IP rights, including copyright and related rights, highlights the 
property elements. As a result, it has been argued that property choice-of-law rules should be applied 
to intellectual property. Such arguments require attention to discern whether the specific 
characteristics that copyright has would distinguish it from the standard type of property, not only in 
terms of substantive law but also choice-of-law rules. 
                                                          
11
 French Cour de Cassation, Huston v. TV5 28 May 1991, 149 RIDA 197-99 (1991). For details, see infra 
3.3.6.2.4.1 Moral rights.  
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The matters that are dealt with in this dissertation, existence, scope, duration, termination, initial 
ownership and infringement of copyright, are non-contractual in nature. In this context, the ideas that 
these matters can be further classified into two categories within the realm of choice-of-law: matters 
related to the right itself – the property right aspect - and the matter of infringement – the tort aspect- 
and apply a choice-of-law analysis to them accordingly lead to a question whether this will be a proper 
solution. 
 
For the former category, the situs rule - the law of the situs of the property - has always been important 
for choice-of-law rules in the field of property law, be it movable property or immovable property. 
However, differing from patent and trademark, which depend on registration, identifying a situs for 
copyright and applying the law of the situs are complicated in cross-border copyright disputes. 
Literary and artistic works have a ubiquitous character, because they are not dependant on physical 
links with any territory and cannot be situated in a given country, but are in all places where an act of 
exploitation has been undertaken or has come into question. Moreover, copyright is created without 
registration or any other formality.
12
 One can, therefore, not locate a copyright at one particular place 
for the purpose of applying a choice-of-law approach. In fact, the application of the traditional 





The latter category applying the general tort choice-of-law rules to infringement of IP rights is also 
based on the consideration that IP infringement is indifferent to the tortious act that occurred as to 
traditional types of property. Due to the differences in national copyright laws, a choice-of-law 
problem will appear when a given act is construed as infringing copyright in accordance with one law, 
but not so under another law. In particular in the digital era, when multi-state copyright infringements 
will appear more often, the question of how to deal with such disputes deserves discussion. 
 
Potential disputes 
In practice, choice-of-law issues in international copyright cases have been largely ignored in the 
reported decisions. In a great number of cases, the issue of choice-of-law was not expressly 
adjudicated.
14
 The statutes and the case law of most countries simply do not address those issues in a 
conclusive manner. Along with the increased global exploitation of copyright and related rights works, 
courts and scholars have been forced to reconsider the choice-of-law question in cross-border 
copyright and related rights claims.  
 
In the past several decades, this topic has drawn some attention from academics in the international 
arena.
15
 And in more recent years, not only national but also regional legislators – in the European 
                                                          
12
 Art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention. 
13
 James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2
nd
 edn OUP, 
Oxford 2011) paras 13.31-13.40. 
14
 Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual Property Law—Cases and Materials (2nd edn Foundation Press 
&Thomson West, New York 2008) 46. PRC’s cases see infra n 1204. 
15
 See Eugen Ulmer (supra n 5); James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, Oxford 1988); Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘The private international law of 
copyright in an era of technological change’ (1998) 273 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 
239; Marta Pertegás Sender, Cross-Border Enforcement of Patent Rights (OUP, Oxford 2001); Mireille van 
Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights- Alternatives to the lex Protectionis (Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague 2003); J. Drexl and A. Kur (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law, 
Heading for the Future (Oregon, Oxford and Portland 2005); Jürgen Basedow, J. Drexl and A. Metzger (eds), 
Intellectual Property in the Choice-of-law Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 
44 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2005); Dário Moura Vicente, ‘La propriété intellectuele en droit international 
privé’ (2008) 335 Recueil des Cours de l’ Académie de Droit International 105; Stefan Leible and Angsar Ohly 
(eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law, the series of Geistiges Eigentum und 
Introduction 
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Union - have prescribed specific rules in this field,
16
 for another example, a recent codification of the 
PRC’s choice-of-law rules provides explicit rules for IP rights, including copyright and related 
rights.
17
 Although the rules prescribed therein, as will be discussed later in this dissertation, are 
traditional with contemporary elements, these rules still have drawbacks and limitations in how they 
can be applied. 
 
Object of this study 
Given the rules prescribed in the People Republic of China (hereinafter PRC) on IP rights and the 
choice-of-law rules in its PIL Statute, this dissertation questions whether those rules will fit into the 
picture of enhancing cross-border exploitation of copyright and related rights from the perspective of 
choice-of-law. In answering this question, the dissertation will propose choice-of-law solutions 
concerning copyright and related rights claims to the PRC legislature and judiciary. 
 
To reach such a goal, several sub-questions need to be addressed, more specifically:  
- what specific characters do copyright and related rights have that give rise to conflicts in 
international protection, and that distinguish copyright and related rights from other registered 
IP rights and standard property rights in tangible things in terms of identifying the law 
applicable to such disputes?  
- do international copyright and related rights treaties provide any choice-of-law solution to 
cross-border copyright and related rights disputes? 
- how do European Union law and the laws of major European states designate the law 
applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, and what inspiration can they 
bring to PRC legislators and its judiciary? 
- what approaches do academic contributors provide and how can they inspire PRC law? 
- how does PRC law and judicial practice deal with the choice-of-law issue in cross-border 
copyright and related rights disputes? 
 
Plan of this study 
In view of the objectives of this dissertation, the five chapters of this work may be introduced as 
follows.  
 
Since a basic understanding of the sources and the different concepts applied at a substantive law level 
is indispensible for understanding the choice-of-law issues, Chapter 1 will analyse the rationales of 
copyright and related rights, and briefly describe the philosophical backgrounds of two traditions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Wettbewerbbsrecht 28 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009); S. J. Schaafsma, Intellectual eigendom in het 
conflictenrecht: De verborgen conflictregel in het beginsel van nationale behandeling (Kluwer, Deventer 2009); 
Jürgen Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono and Axel Metzger (eds), Intellectual Property in the Global Arena Max-
Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 49 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010); Stig 
Strömholm (supra n 6); Fawcett and Torremans 2011 (supra n 13); Rita Matulionytė, Law Applicable to 
Copyright: A Comparison of ALI and CLIP Proposals (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and others 2011); Toshiyuki 
Kono (ed), Intellectual Property and Private International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2012) as 
well as numerous articles on this subject. 
16
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40 (Rome II Regulation); Art. 110 of Swiss 
Federal Statute on Private International Law of 18 December 1987 (Swiss PIL); Art. 93 of the Law of 16 July 
2004 the Belgian Code of Private International Law, Moniteur Belge of 27 July 2004, English translation in 
RabelsZ 70 (2006) 358, 384 (Belgian PIL); Art. 54 of Italian Private International Law Act 31 May 1995, No. 
218. (Italian PIL); Art. 34 of Austrian Private International Law Act of 15 June 1978, BGB1 1978/304, most 
recently amended by BGB1 I 2009/109. (Austrian PIL); Arts. 48-50 of Law on the Application of Law in 
Foreign-related Civil Relations of the PRC, adopted at the 17
th
 Session of the Standing Committee of the 
eleventh NPC 28 October 2010, enter into effect as of 1 April 2011 (PRC PIL Statute). 
17
 Arts. 48-50 of the PRC PIL Statute. 
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“copyright” and “author’s right” and their reflections on the most important issues such as initial 
ownership, moral rights, scope of economic rights, duration, infringement and so on. It will further 
explain the impact of technology on international copyright protection, notably with the advent of the 
Internet, and analyse the interplay of international copyright protection and the choice-of-law issue. 
 
Chapter 2 will examine how current international copyright and related rights treaties, namely the 
Berne Convention, the UCC, the Rome Convention 1961, the TRIPs Agreement, the WCT, WPPT and 
WAPT, protect foreign works and authors. In addition to describing the substantive law protection 
prescribed therein, Chapter 2 will analyse the frequently-debated issue: whether these treaties contain 
or entail any choice-of-law rules in terms of international copyright and related rights protection. 
 
Chapter 3 will deal with law and practice in Europe. It will first discuss the “Europeanization” of PIL 
rules, and examine a series of EU directives that aim at harmonizing copyright matters in the laws of 
the Member States so as to see whether these directives prescribe any choice-of-law solution to cross-
border copyright and related rights disputes. Subsequently, an analysis of the Rome II Regulation, in 
particular its Article 8, will be carried out. As to the matters that fall outside the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation, a comparative analysis of the laws of selected European states will be conducted. The 
inspiration that EU law, European states’ national laws and judicial practices can bring to the PRC 
legislature and judiciary will be listed at the end of the chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 will describe the efforts that have been made by academic institutions with regard to the law 
applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes. In this respect, the modern and 
pragmatic approaches taken by these institutions will be studied and compared. On this basis, the 
chapter will discuss how they can inspire the PRC legislature and judiciary. 
 
Chapter 5 will examine the law and judicial practice in the PRC. It will describe the PRC legal system 
and the development of its PIL rules. Additionally, the sources of choice-of-law rules in cross-border 
copyright and related rights disputes and judicial practice at People’s Courts will be analysed. The 
newly-adopted choice-of-law rules for IP rights and their possible impacts on Chinese judicial practice 
will also be evaluated.  
 
Proposed solutions will be presented in the chapter of Conclusion. 
 
Terminology 
“copyright” v “author’s right” 
As this dissertation is conducted in English language, the term “copyright” is generally used 
throughout the study. And the term of “author’s right” will be used in the circumstances referring to 
the rights granted by the laws of the countries having the author’s rights system. 
 
Jurisdictional issues 
Given the scope of this study, this work will focus only on choice-of-law issues, more particularly, the 
law applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes. Thus, in the course of this study, 
the analyses and descriptions carried out will presume that the international jurisdiction of courts has 
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CHAPTER 1 – RATIONALES OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 
 
For effective copyright enforcement, rules that determine choice of applicable law are important. 
Additionally, for determining such rules, the legal characteristics of a particular copyright, together 
with justifications for legal limitations on it, have special importance.  
 
The philosophical underpinnings of most legal orders determine their unique copyright policies, 
which lead to different degrees of national copyright protection throughout the world. Because of 
these legal characteristics, a single international copyright law has never materialized, nor has there 
been any creditable harmonization of substantive copyright laws on a worldwide level. 
Furthermore, in the global milieu, the shift to a knowledge-based economy combined with increases 
in trade in copyrighted products and in cultural exchanges has magnified the importance of 
copyright and expanded the role of copyright law. Moreover, advanced technology, primarily the 
Internet, has changed the methods of reproduction and dissemination of products protected by 
copyright. That has made some of copyright law problematic insofar as regulation and enforcement 
are concerned. Under these circumstances, more attention has had to be drawn to choice-of-law 
issues in cross-border copyright disputes. An understanding of the nature, characteristics and 
justifications of copyright provided in this chapter will be helpful for a study on how to determine 
the law applicable to copyright disputes. 
 
In summary, this background chapter begins by describing the general idea of copyright and related 
rights; secondly, it overviews the four legal rationales for copyright; thirdly, it analyses the legal 
justifications for copyright, including the justice argument, the utilitarian argument, and the 
argument based on economic efficiency; fourthly, it describes limitations to the scope of copyright 
protection and exceptions from it, including justifications for the limitations on the scope of 
copyright for fundamental rights and freedoms, regulation of competition and industrial practices, 
promotion of culture and knowledge, as well as responses to market failures. Its fifth section 
examines the impact of new technology on copyright protection, notably after the Internet became 
widely used. While the sixth section returns to the basic subject of the dissertation by exploring 
ways in which copyright with its unique characteristics, as distinguished from other kinds of 
property rights, say tangibles, specially interacts with rules on choice of applicable law.   
 
1.1 Concept of copyright and related rights 
In general, the concept of copyright encompasses legally protecting from unauthorized use of the 
works that resulted from an author’s own intellectual creation by granting that author, or the 
author’s assigns, the exclusive right for a specified time period on making copies of what the author 
has expressed in those works.
18
 The Berne Convention, adopted by 165 countries, lists the 
categories of such works as  
“books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the 
same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic 
works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; 
works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic 
works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; 
works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works 
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science”.19  
Classes of rights-owners outside the class of authors, i.e. performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations are the concern of “related rights”. They protect performances, 
                                                          
18
 J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law (3
rd
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008)  para 1.01; see also 
analysis in Chapter 2 infra. 
19
 Art. 2(1) of the Berne Convention,. 
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phonograms and broadcasts, respectively. Related rights differ from copyright in that they belong to 
classes of owners regarded as intermediaries, rather than authors. Rights of intermediaries are 
created by use of means in the process of protecting, recording, or distributing works. Nevertheless, 
related rights are closely linked with copyright. That linkage forms the reason why copyright and 
related rights are often considered and used together. Since related rights owners often provide 
assistance to copyright owners in the communication of the latter’s works to the public, their roles 




The excavations that would hold the foundation pillars of later concepts of copyright consisted of 
the privileges and legal monopolies that European rulers and ruling bodies, sovereigns if you will, 
conferred on printers and bookbinders beginning in the second half of the 15
th
 Century CE - 
spurred on by the proliferation in Europe of the historic invention that enabled simultaneous 
copying of both sides of a page and copying, i.e. printing, in a relatively short time of many pages, 
something that could be done regardless whether or not such copying would have been 
authorized.
21
 Conferring those privileges and legal monopolies converted printer/publishers into 
participants in the control, censorship, and prohibition of controversial books, for the purpose of 
protecting their pecuniary interest.
 22
 The privileges and legal monopolies granted were in the form 





Attempt to reinstate such privileges, which in England had expired, developed into the first statute 
that recognized a general right of authors, namely the British Statute of Anne 1709 (1710).
24
 It 
provided monopoly rights to copy certain works for a limited number of years.
25
 A Danish 
Ordinance of 1741 prohibited printing not authorized by either the author or the first publisher.
26
 
Near the end of the 18
th
 century, on the Continent of Europe, there was developed an “author’s 
right” system, widely held to be linked to the concept of an author’s personality.27 This system 
stemmed from the French Revolutionary Decrees of 1791 and 1793,
28
 and was passed on to 
Belgium, Holland, Italy and Switzerland under the influence of Napoleon Bonaparte.
29
 In 1847, the 
Spain’s original Copyright Act was passed, 30  and the newly formed German Empire’s first 
copyright statute was enacted in 1871.
31
 Across the Atlantic, the British model was followed in part 
                                                          
20
 G. Gregory Letterman, Basics of International Intellectual Property Law (Transnational Publishers, New 
York 2001) 257.  
Related rights are also called neighboring rights. Some countries distinguish them from authors' rights, and 
others do not, while international protection of them under the Berne Convention and other treaties is 
separate from that of authors.  
21
 Jane C. Ginsburg 1998 A (supra n 15) 257-58. 
22
 For some of the histories of the development of copyright law in England, see John Feather, ‘Authors, 
Publishers and Politicians: The History of Copyright and the Book Trade’ (1988) 10(12) EIPR 377-80; P. 
Prescott ‘The Origins of Copyright: a Debunking View’ (1989) 11(12) EIPR 453-55;  and generally, J.A.L 
Sterling (supra n 18) paras 1.03-1.08.  
23
 Jane C. Ginsburg 1998 A (supra n 15) 257-58. 
24
 8 Anne, c 19 (1709). As Sterling notes, the queen signed it in 1710, see J.A.L Sterling (supra n 18) para 1.08. 
Sterling’s book contains a copy of the Statute of Anne, see  J.A.L Sterling (supra n 18) para 80.04. 
25
 Simon Fitzpatrick, ‘Prospects of Further Copyright Harmonization’ (2003) 25(5) European Intellectual 
Property Review (EIPR) 215, 216. 
26
  Ordiance of 7 January 1741, referred from J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) paras 1.09 and 80.05. 
27
  J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) paras 1.01, 2.17. 
28
 The Decree of January 13/19, 1791 and July 19/24, 1793. Referred from J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) 
paras 1.11, 2.17 and 80.07. 
29
 Simon Fitzpatrick (supra n 25) 216. 
30
 The Law of June 10, 1847, referred from J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) para 80.11. 
31
 German Empire of the Laws of 1871 (literary, musical and dramatic works), referred from J.A.L. Sterling 
(supra n 18) paras 2.18 and 80.09. He also notes that in 1837 the Kingdom of Prussia had enacted a 
comprehensive author’s right code. 
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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) first promulgated a copyright law, as such, in 1990, followed 
by amended copyright laws in 2001 and 2010. China has a tradition of being universally recognized as 
the birthplace of two significant processes: paper making and printing. They became closely connected 
to the substance and development of early copyright law. Copyright regulation in China can be traced 




Before the establishment of the PRC, three modern copyright statutes had been promulgated in China, 
namely the Copyright Law of the Great Qing adopted by the Government of the Qing Dynasty in 
1910, the Copyright Law adopted by the Northern Warlord Government in 1915, and the Copyright 
Law of the Republic of China adopted by the Guomindang Government in 1928. With the founding of 
the PRC, the Communist Party repealed all then-existing laws and started to construct a legal order 
from scratch.
34
    
 
The history of the development of copyright law in the PRC reveals that it resulted from the PRC’s 
adoption of its Open Door policy and economic reform that began in 1979. From the time the PRC had 
been founded until 1990, it had no legislation that could be called “copyright law”. The protection that 
was provided for authors was mainly laid down in a number of resolutions, such as the Resolution on 
the Development and Improvement of Publishing, which set forth basic principles concerning 
copyright protection.
35
 The first PRC law that in any way dealt with IP rights protection was the PRC 
Criminal Law 1979,
36
 in which criminal sanctions were specified only for trade mark infringement, 
rather than violation of copyright. Subsequently, in 1986 when the General Principles of the Civil Law 
of the People’s Republic of China (GPCL)37 was adopted, IP rights, including copyright, were for the 
first time defined in the PRC’s basic civil law as a civil right applicable to its citizens and legal 
residents, and for the first time the citizens’ and legal residents’ rights of authorship (copyright) were 
affirmed.   
Unlike IP law development in other countries, the PRC’s legislative development as to IP, including 
copyright, followed a reverse course, i.e. acceding to international obligations prior to setting up a 
                                                          
32
 Simon Fitzpatrick (supra n 25) 216; J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) para 1.10. 
33
 In the Northern Song Dynasty, in order to protect the JiuShu (Nine Chinese Classics) that were used by the 
Imperial College, the superior authority declared that the unauthorized engraving and making of plates from 
these books was forbidden. Those who wanted to engrave or print those books had to apply to the Imperial 




 century Europe had some similarity to 
this, since it was a measure for the protection of the exclusive right of the Imperial College to print, publish and 
control its own edition of the JiuShu. (see Chengsi ZHENG and Michel Pendleton, Copyright Law in China 
(CCH International, Australia 1991) 12) In the Southern Song Dynasty, a book named Donghu Shilue (The 
Summary of Events in the Eastern Capital) even contained a copyright notice which reads, “Registered with the 
superior authorities – no reprints allowed” (see Shulin Qinhua (Quiet Talks Among Bookstack) [in Chinese] 
(Ancient Books Publishing House, Beijing 1957) 36-8), which could be considered as the earliest declaration for 
protecting copyright. (see Handong WU, Intellectual Property Law 知识产权法 [in Chinese] (2nd edn Law 
Press, Beijing 2007) 35) 
34
 For the legal history of Chinese copyright law, see Chengsi ZHENG and Michael Pendleton (supra n 33); 
Stephen M. Stewart and Hamish Sandison, International Copyright and Neighboring Rightsvolume 2 (2
nd
 edn 
Butterworths, London 1989) 1-3; Handong WU (supra n 33) 35, 38. 
35
 Adopted at the First National Conference on Publishing and issued by the State Council on 28 October 1950; 
for details, see Stewart and Sandison (supra n 34) 3; Handong WU (supra n 33) 38-9. 
36
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the 2nd Session of the Fifth NPC 1 July 1979 and 
amended by the 5
th
 Session of the Eighth NPC 14 March 1997. The 1979 version of the PRC Criminal Law 
provided only a fine or a maximum 3 years imprisonment, or both, for trade mark infringement. 
37
 Adopted at the 4
th
 Session of the Sixth NPC, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the PRC on 12 
April 1986 and effective as of 1 January 1987. 




 In 1979, the PRC started to realize the importance of strengthening IP 
protection for its new Open Door policy and economic reform. Due to the increasingly urgent need to 
develop cultural exchange and trade with foreign countries, the PRC took steps to participate in 
activities organised by the relevant international organizations. It signed the 1979 Sino-US Trade 
Agreement, which obligated both countries to recognize the other’s copyright. In 1980, the PRC 
submitted its application for accession to the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (hereinafter WIPO), and it became a member of WIPO as of 3 June 1980. The PRC’s 
WIPO membership obligated it to establish IP protection in domestic laws, despite the fact that at that 
moment no conventional IP law was in effect in the PRC.    
 
1.2 Legal characteristics of copyright and related rights 
Since the nature and characteristics of a private-law subject will in a particular case be influential in 
making the determination as to the governing law, it is not only relevant but important to look into the 
character of, and theories justifying copyright and related rights. The character of copyright has been a 
subject of long-standing debate. In general, the theories are as summarized in the next four 
subsections. Given the focus of this book, those subsections describe the four differing theories of 
copyright and related rights only in a general way. 
 
1.2.1 Property right theory 
Among the four types of theories, it is generally accepted that the copyright/author’s property right 
implies a narrower concept of property than what is referred to by the usual private-law meaning of 
“property”. The property theory of copyright originated from John Locke’s theory that copyright is 
derived from natural law.
39
 According to Locke, it is “man’s labour which is the essential constituent 
factor in property”. Based on a legal concept that the author is   naturally entitled to the property 





Like real property, copyright is an absolute subjective right, operating erga omnes. As a result, a 
copyright owner, by having an exclusive entitlement to a work, can prohibit others from using that 
work until the time period of the copyright expires. This characteristic intertwines also with the theory 
of monopoly right.
41
 In addition, the idea that an intellectual creation generates a property right led to 
the adoption of the commonly-accepted general concept of “intellectual property”.42 In ways similar to 
other types of property, the exclusive rights conferred by copyright can also be transferred to others. A 
transfer can either be effectuated by law, by a will, or by means of licensing or assignment, and it is 




                                                          
38
 Chengsi ZHENG, ‘Chinese IPR Law and International Treaties’ in China Intellectual Property Law Guide (1st 
edn Kluwer Law International, Den Haag 2005) §10-200. 
39
 To summarize John Locke’s “natural rights” on property: “1. God has given the world to people in common. 2. 
Every person has a property right in his own person. 3. A person’s labour belongs to him. 4. Whenever a person 
mixes his labour with something in the commons he thereby makes it his own property. 5. The right of property 
is conditional upon a person leaving in the commons enough and as good for the other commoners. 6. A person 
cannot take more out of the commons than they can use to advantage.” This is discussed in Matthew Fisher, 
‘Classical Economics and Philosophy of the Patent System’ (2005) 1 I. P. Q. 6-7.  
40
 The fourth indent of the Preamble to the TRIPs Agreement states that it is “[r]econgniz[ed] that intellectual 
property rights are private rights.” 
41




 The United National Commission on International Trade Law working group VI (Security Interests) is drafting 
a “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions dealing with security rights in intellectual property”, 
more information, see  
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Nonetheless, copyright has some characteristics that are not compatible with standard (tangible or 
corporeal) property. The rest of this subsection summarizes two of them.  
 
1) The nature of the subject matter that copyright protects differs from that of a standard property 
right. The material subject of a standard property right, a thing or an object, may generally be 
possessed by a specific person, while copyright protects “the expression of ideas”, which is intangible, 
even though the expression is fixed in a material medium, such as a book or a computer chip. This 
intangible nature of copyright imparts a ubiquitous character to the right, i.e. it is not constrained in 
space: as has been stated, “intellectual property rights in a single object can simultaneously exist, and 
be exploited, in dozens of countries”44 and possessed by countless people. 
 
2) Unlike rights to real property which are perpetual, copyright protection is limited in temporal 
duration, at least in relation to economic rights. In addition, statutory copyright and related rights are, 
to a certain extent, more limited than the legal rights associated with an interest in standard property, 
for example, property law hardly ever restricts the sale or modification of physical parts of what is 
subject to a standard property right, while copyright law, in general, does impose restrictions.  
 
Still further, the property theory is not compatible with the concept of droit moral (discussed infra), 
which is a common argument made in civil law countries. 
 
1.2.2 Personality right theory 
The theory that an author’s right is a right of personality has great influence in civil law countries. 
This theory puts special emphasis on the moral rights of an author by including a somewhat broader 
concept that moral rights and similar personal protection cannot be bought or sold. It is of note that 
this theory did not gain any place in Anglo-American legal systems, and as will be shown in the 
coming paragraphs, it has never been a popular theory due to the economic importance of copyright, 
nor will it be in the future. However, just because of the moral rights aspect, this theory has been used 




1.2.3 Sui generis right theory 
Sui generis means in a class by itself. As to copyright, it would be a right of its own kind or which is 
unique in its characteristics. When a copyright/author’s right is involved, the sui generis theory 
implies two meanings: it could be a type of right described other than the traditional 
copyright/author’s right, such as database protection, or it could be used to explain the nature of a 
copyright/author’s right.46 Since an author’s right contains aspects of both moral rights and economic 
rights, one could not easily categorize it as a personality right or as a property right, but rather as a sui 
generis right, e.g. German law, which adopts the monist approach, considers economic and moral 
rights to be different aspects of one general right and, as a result, they cannot be dealt with separately. 
Therefore, it is neither a property right nor a moral right, but a sui generis right. In contrast, French 
law adopts a dualist approach and regards moral rights and economic rights as two different entities 
with different sources. As to the practice in Anglo-American legal traditions, there was no recognition 
of moral rights. However, in order to perform the responsibilities assumed under the international 
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copyright treaties, the common law countries had to incorporate moral rights into the scope of 




1.2.4 Monopoly right theory 
The concept of monopoly can be categorized as “market monopoly” referring to a situation where one 
person is the sole owner/seller of certain goods in the market and has no competition. It can also be 
categorized as “legal monopoly” indicating an exclusive right granted by law.48 The monopoly right 
theory is mainly used in common law countries. According to it, copyright is a grant by a state that 
gives exclusive rights to right owners. This theory confirms the sovereignty of a state and may be 
considered as a continuation of the printing/publishing privileges.
49
 Nevertheless, it also explains why 
certain limitations are imposed on copyright, e.g. a limited time for protection, in contrast to rights to 




1.2.5 Influence of theories on making choice-of-law 
Among the above, the property theory is widely accepted. Considering the similarities it shares with 
standard property rights, one may consider a choice-of-law rule for cross-border copyright disputes 
that is similar to the one applied to standard property: lex rei sitae. The property aspects of copyright, 
such as existence of the right and scope of protection would support a lex rei sitae approach. However, 
the intangible and ubiquitous nature of copyright and related rights, as well as its monopoly right 
nature, place the lex rei sitae approach in question. As for standard property, it is relatively easy to 
identify a place where the property is located and designate the law of that place to a dispute arising 
from that property; whereas copyright, a subject that came to exist in one place and is simultaneously 
exploited in several other places would be difficult to be “located” in one place. In addition, the moral 
rights aspect of copyright would raise a question as to whether and if so, how moral elements can be 
linked to a connecting factor of the place of its location, or to a connecting factor of a person due to its 
personality elements.  
 
Furthermore, if a separate choice-of-law rule is to be applied to a moral rights issue, the possible 
application of two different choice-of-law rules one for moral rights and one for economic rights may 
seem to contradict the monist concept of copyright, as pointed out by van Eechoud.
51
 And if copyright 
is an exclusive right, one may be concerned to what extent party autonomy may be accepted in 
copyright disputes in that the exercise of party autonomy may contradict the sovereignty of the state 
where the copyright has been granted. Still further, since it is evident that the economic character of 
copyright has gained and will continue to gain more importance than moral rights, one may then 
wonder whether more flexibility, which is aimed at increasing judicial efficiency in international 
copyright protection, should in this regard be introduced to choice-of-law,
52
 in particular considering it 
as a source of inspiration for the PRC legislature and judiciary.  
 
The above questions and concerns will be further compared and analysed in light of more 
considerations described in chapters 2 through 5 infra.  
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1.3 Legal basis of copyright and related rights 
Arguments to justify the grant of copyright or author’s right have been classified according to different 
categories. Grosheide listed seven types of arguments which, according to him, overlap each other.
53
 
Sterling compressed them into five: natural justice, creative incentive, general public interest, social 
contract and moral, some of which he classified into sub-arguments.
54
 Stewart advanced four major 
arguments: natural justice, economic, culture and social.
55
 Finally, van Eechoud divided the 
justifications into two main categories: a justice argument and a utility argument, under the influence 
of social arguments and cultural policy and freedom of expression.
56
 Since worldwide there are two 
main differing legal traditions for protecting literary and artistic works - copyright and author’s right - 
it is reasonable to begin with the justice and utility arguments.  
 
The legal justifications on which the two traditions are premised differ from each other sharply. 
Copyright based on a utilitarian premise is generally adopted in common law countries where granting 
copyright is considered to stimulate production of the widest possible variety of creative works at the 
lowest price, and to be an incentive to authors to produce more work. The contrary is the philosophical 
premise of the author’s right in the justice argument: that an author deserves to gain the fruit from 
his/her work as a matter of right and justice, an argument that is mainly used in civil law traditions.  
 
The two legal justifications are different: the utilitarian argument focuses on the utility of copyright for 
society, while the justice argument focuses on the author who as a matter of justice must be protected 
in his work. In other words, the differences between these two arguments boil down to the core issue 
about whose interests should be protected: the public interest or individual interest. The differing 
rationales of copyright and author’s rights reflect a parting of the ways between “utility” and 
“efficiency” for the public and “justice” and “fairness” for individual authors. However, as Goldstein 
rightfully pointed out, “the traditions of copyright and author’s right are far more alike than they are 
unlike.”57 Many contemporary copyright laws do not strictly follow only one of these justifications any 
more. This has to do mainly with the wide-spread accessions to the Berne Convention, which bridges 
the two justifications by laying down minimum protection standards, and which, in turn, leads to 
substantially similar rules for all Union states.
58
 Nevertheless, with the expansion of so-called 
international copyright, a shift away from the personality theory/justice theory towards the utilitarian 




1.3.1 Justice argument 
According to the 18
th
 century natural law reasoning, an intellectual creation naturally belongs to its 
author. And the fruits derived from a creation “naturally” belong to their creator. It was deducible 
from this argument that there should be property-right protection of intellectual creations when a bond 
between the author and the work was established. It calls for copyright protection as a matter of 
natural justice. Whether or not a work would have any utility for society would not affect entitlement 
to property right protection for the creation.
60
 This reasoning influenced the adoption of the authors’ 
right tradition in France during the years of the French Revolution. In contrast, a justification based on 
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While the debate about natural law faded, a related theory - the personality theory - gained importance 
during the formation of the author’s right tradition. Under this doctrine, protection of both an author’s 
personal and economic interests in the created work was justified by the personality right. This is 
reflected in the laws of author’s right countries that aim, not only at securing the author’s economic 
interests, but also at protecting the author’s works against uses that are prejudicial to spiritual interests, 
and, in particular, moral rights.
62
 All laws in accord with this tradition put the rights of the author, a 
human being who created the work, at the centre of attention, and they are mainly concerned with the 
author’s relation to the work.63 This focus is reflected in author’s right statutes, such as Article L111-1 
of the French Code of Intellectual Property which in part reads that the “[a]uthor of a work of the 
mind enjoys an exclusive right… of intangible property in this work, on the basis of the mere fact of its 
creation.” Also, Article 11 of the German Copyright Act 1965 reads in part “the author’s right 
protects the author in his intellectual and personal relations to the work and in the exploitation of the 
work”.  
 
1.3.2 Utilitarian argument 
This argument, including its incentive and economic efficiency constituents, is based on the general 
view that copyright law should serve the public interest. Thus, some scholars look at copyright as part 
of an incentive system for the purpose of motivating production of an optimal quantity of works of 
authorship, which as a result promotes public welfare, while, the economic efficiency argument 
derived from it has also been invoked to justify the granting of copyrights. 
 
1.3.2.1 Incentive portion of the utilitarian argument 
The incentive argument has a long history in copyright literature. It is premised on beliefs that 
granting copyright protection will motivate an author to create or disseminate the work, leading to 
intellectual enrichment of the public.
64
 This justification is more commonly used in the Anglo-
American common law countries. 
 
In the early 18
th
 century, the Statute of Anne recited the essential rationale for British copyright law. 
As the title of the statute indicated, it was “[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the 
copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein 
mentioned”. Accordingly, under this statute, copyright was considered as an incentive to authors to 
create, so that the public may have access to and be enriched by their works.
65
 The statutory protection 
granted was considered as an “encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books”. 
 
Somewhat resembling the Statute of Anne’s statement of purpose about encouraging learning, the 
United States Constitution declares that 
“[c]ongress shall have power… to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
discoveries.”66  
The underlying policy of this provision is to promote the public welfare through private market 
incentives, i.e. the production of works is encouraged by giving the author a limited economic 
monopoly in the form of copyright, and the worth of the work is then determined by the market.
67
 More 
than a century later, the US House of Representatives Committee Report on the comprehensive 
copyright revision proposed in 1909 supported departure from the justice argument by stating that 
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copyright “is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writing… but upon the ground 
that the welfare of the public will be served.”68 According to the constitutional provision, the US 
Congress has the power to grant rights to copyright owners, provided that the measure of rights granted 
is apportioned to serve the overall objective of promoting the progress of “Science and useful Arts”. By 
adopting a positive law approach, under which rights are granted solely as a matter of statute, the 
legislature will determine the content and the scope of such rights as it sees fit, in accordance with the 




Clearly, the focus of the utilitarian approach is to find a balance between the 
“aspects of the common good that are best served by recognizing intellectual property rights 
and those that are best served by preserving the public domain and disseminating 
information.”70  
By the same token, in determining whether protection should be extended to new subjects or rights, 
the utilitarian argument also plays a role because the legislature should be aided by empirical proof 
that authors would create more works by granting/extending copyright. As observed by van Eechoud, 




On the global level, the EU has become an important player in the process of international 
harmonization of copyright protection. In order to adapt copyright to new technology and new 
markets, European countries have, over the last centuries, been very active in expanding what is 
covered by copyright and copyright protection, which in turn also influenced their international law 
making. 
 
EU legislation in the field of copyright is mainly based on utilitarian justifications. From the 1990’s, 
the European Community started a process of harmonizing copyright and related rights laws within the 
EC. Since the adoption of the first EC copyright and related rights Directive - the Software Directive 
in 1991,
72
 the EU published seven copyright and related rights Directives.
73
 The adoption of these 
Directives shows a trend to reach for both horizontal and vertical harmonization among the EU 
Member States in the fields of copyright and related rights laws. As to the horizontal harmonization, 
one may see that the EU legislature kept on expanding the subject matter of copyright laws, such as: 
for the protection of software, databases, and broadcasting. The vertical harmonization leads to higher 
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levels of protection for the already existing copyright-protected subjects. This higher level of 
protection was reached by means of introducing more types of uses of a work under exclusive rights, 
such as introducing rental rights and resale rights, and prolonging the term of protection.  
 
The justifications that EU legislating institutions have advanced in their Directives on copyright can be 
found in the Recitals of each Directive. In general, the EU applies the utilitarian incentive argument 
that a high level of copyright protection ensures (continued) protection of intellectual creations.
74
 
Examples can be seen, e.g. in Recital 2 of the Software Directive
75
 and Recital 10 of the Term 
Directive.
76
 Apart from that, the Information Society Directive also recites the incentive justification 
for copyright and related rights protection. It states that copyright and related rights  
“protect and stimulate the development and marketing of new products and services and the 
creation and exploitation of their creative content.”77  
Another recital of the same Directive also states that copyright and related rights protection helps  
“to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of authors, 
performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public at large. Intellectual 
property has therefore been recognized as an integral part of property.”78  
Recital 10 of the Directive also argues:  
“If authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to receive 
an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in order to be able to 
finance this work. The investment required to produce products such as phonograms, films or 
multimedia products, and services such as "on-demand" services, is considerable. Adequate 
legal protection of intellectual property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the 
availability of such a reward and provide the opportunity for satisfactory returns on this 
investment.”79 
 
This approach may seem surprising because the justice argument, which has solid roots in European 
author’s right law countries, did not play an important role in the process of legislating EU copyright 
directives. The historical background of establishing a European Economic Community may, 
however, explain why the EU has mainly advanced the utilitarian justification in this field.
80
 
Nevertheless, the EU legislative institutions’ preference for adopting the utilitarian model is also 
evident in international instruments pertaining to copyright and related rights.  
 
The utilitarian justification has been adopted in the latest international copyright and related rights 
treaties. Unlike the earlier Berne Convention, which focused on the rights of authors, the new WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT), WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and WIPO Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performance (WAPT) clearly show preference for the utilitarian justification. It 
was prevalent at the WIPO Conference in Geneva in 1996.
81
 The preamble to the WCT states that the 
Contracting Parties emphasize “the outstanding significance of copyright protection as an incentive 
for literary and artistic creation.”82 Furthermore, these three treaties apply similar wording in their 
preambles, which are framed to recognize 
                                                          
74
 Mireille van Eechoud 2003 (supra n 15) 149-50. 
75
 “The development of computer programs requires the investment of considerable human, technical and 
financial resources while computer programs can be copied at a fraction of the cost needed to development them 
independently.” 
76
 It explains that “the need to harmonize copyright and neighbouring rights at a high level of protection, since 
these rights are fundamental to intellectual creation and stresses that their protection ensures the maintenance 
and development of creativity in the interest of authors, cultural industries, consumers and society as a whole”. 
77
 Recital 2 of the Directive. 
78
 Recital 9 of the Directive. 
79
 Recital 10 of the Directive. 
80
 Mireille van Eechoud 2003 (supra n 15) 151. 
81
 Simon Fitzpatrick (supra n 25) 219. 
82
 Preamble 4 of the WCT. 
Rationales of Copyright and Related Rights 
 17 
“the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors (performers and producers of 
phonograms) and the larger public interest, particularly education, research, and access to 
information”.83  





The World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs Agreement) has brought copyright within the sphere of 
trade regulation. It explicitly states that intellectual property is a property right. Since the TRIPs 
Agreement is a legal instrument drafted by the WTO, it lays down only rules dealing with economic 
rights. That inextricably links copyright and related rights to economics. Along with the continuing 
growth of the knowledge-based economy, it has been argued that the trade-influenced utilitarian model 
of copyright will certainly gain prevalence worldwide, and a new concept of copyright may even 
evolve, i.e. copyright as trade for national interests.
85
 As has been predicted,  
“the shadow of international trade led to an inevitable re-examination of not only conventional 
legal norms and familiar commercial practices, but also of the theoretical and doctrinal 
underpinnings of copyright as well.”86 
 
1.3.2.2 Economic efficiency part of the utility argument 
Derived from the incentive aspect of the utilitarian argument, the efficiency argument is commonly 
used by Anglo-American commentators to justify copyright protection. For example, in 1954 even the 
U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the economic justification that  
“[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in science and 
the useful arts”.87 
 
The starting point of the economic efficiency argument is the distinguishing character of copyright 
being a “public good”. Public good is defined as providing indivisible benefits for large numbers of 
persons at the same time. The typical examples of public goods are traditional governmental services, 
such as national defence and public safety.
88
 Public good is earmarked by its characteristics of non-
excludability and non-rivalous consumption. 
 
An economic good is non-rivalous (without rival, or non-competitive) if it is capable of being 
consumed so that the use of the good by one consumer does not diminish or affect the consumption by 
others. For example, music is a non-competitive good in that any number of people may listen to the 
same music at the same time, without ever using it up or depriving others’ of listening to it; more 
specifically, one more listeners to the music would involve no additional cost, even though this action 
leads to additional consumption. Non-excludability means that once a good is made available, it will 
benefit everyone, even those who choose not to pay for the use of the good but get a free ride as to it. 
This characteristic leads to the “free-rider” problem. As noted by Baumol and Blinder,  
“since the supply of a public good is not depleted by an additional user, the marginal cost of 
serving an additional user is zero. With zero marginal cost, the basic principle of optimal 
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resource allocation calls for provision of public goods and services to anyone who wants them 
at no charge.”89  
As a result, this characteristic makes it impossible for the private sector to provide public goods.  
 
Since they have non-rivalous and non-excludable characteristics, intellectual creations are public 
goods and suffer from the free-rider problem. Creating intellectual works involves fixed costs, such as 
time, effort, and money. Once created and made available to the public, the works can be easily used 
and copied. The first purchaser of the work could make copies and sell them at the marginal cost of 
copying and distributing the work. As everyone would like to free ride rather than to pay for the work, 
if the creators cannot prevent others from exploiting their works without having incurred the cost of 
creation, i.e. if everyone free rides, then surely intellectual creations would never be provided in the 
first place, at least not at the socially optimal level, simply because the creator will receive no 
revenue.
90
 The free-rider problem would also discourage other creators from investing in intellectual 
creations, in particular in the digital environment. The free-rider problem will be exacerbated as the 
marginal cost of reproduction approaches zero, and the tendency towards market failure increases 
correspondingly. 
 
Copyright is a device for addressing the following problem. Government grants market power –
copyright- to creators, and the rights granted provide incentives for creators to create because with the 
rights granted, creators are provided with assurance that they can recoup their costs if their intellectual 
creations prove to be of value to the public. 
 
Granting a property right creates positive incentives for the production of intellectual works because it 
enables a price to be charged for the work. It can also generate negative incentives: it can stifle 
dissemination of the ideas contained in the copyrighted work since it will increase cost for consumers 
and then reduce the dissemination and availability of such work. In the case where consumers may be 
the producers of further work, granting copyright may reduce the number of intellectual creations and 
the speed of the dissemination of works. Thus, copyright law is also the mechanism that is generally 
used to attempt to reach a “socially optimal volume”.91 As noted by Landes and Posner,  
“copyright protection – the right of the copyright’s owner to prevent others from making copies 
- trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to 
create the work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is 
the central problem in copyright law”.92 
 
Some scholars object to the grant of property right on intellectual creations by arguing that standard 
property rights protect rivalous goods, e.g. a car that can only be used by one person at a time, while 
intellectual creations are, in contrast, non-rivalous goods.
93
 In economic terms, it can be explained 
that rights attaching to standard property are an accompaniment of scarcity, while rights attaching to 
intellectual creations artificially create scarcity that would not otherwise exist, and can therefore 
restrict access to information goods. 
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Input from economics to justify the expansion of copyright protection or in amending copyright law 
can be mainly seen in the USA.
94
 Moreover, economic analysis has been relied on, as well, by the 
European Union in designing copyright protection rules, such as in the Software Directive, the Rental 
Directive and the Database Directive. In the Rental Directive, Recital 5 states that  
“(t)he creative and artistic work of authors and performers necessitates an adequate income as 
a basis for further creative and artistic work, and the investments required particularly for the 
production of phonograms and films are especially high and risky. The possibility of securing 
that income and recouping that investment can be effectively guaranteed only through adequate 
legal protection of the rightholders concerned.”  
In the Database Directive, the European Commission asserted a market failure rationale to justify the 
issuance of a Directive that requires Member States to adopt sui generis protection for controlling the 
extraction and reuse of data in databases. It is argued that without such a law, there would be too few 




The justifications described above give a picture of the foundations and objectives of a national 
copyright law system. The French author’s right law is notable for its natural law approach, where 
author’s right is an absolute, unrestricted, and essentially individualistic natural right. 96  On the 
contrary, the utilitarian argument adopted mainly in Anglo-American countries aims at promoting 
social good and serving the public interest by establishing incentives for creation and dissemination 
of intellectual works. 
 
1.3.2.2.1 PRC’s perspective 
The PRC’s Copyright Law (CRL) models a civil law tradition although it was enacted under pressure 
from other foreign countries, especially the USA.
97
 As shown in the legislative history of the PRC 
CRL and its current structure, it is clear that PRC copyright law is mainly characterized as following 




In the PRC, a debate about which system the PRC should adopt had long been discussed during the 
legislative process in the 1980’s. It was then decided that the term zhu zuo quan, which literally means 
the “right in a work creation” and is similar to the European notion of “authors’ right”, should be used 
in the law of protecting a person’s intellectual creation, and should therefore be used as the title of that 
law. Article 51 (now Article 56) of the CRL states, however, that in the Chinese version of PRC laws 
and international treaties, “authors’ right” has the same meaning as “copyright”.99 When the PRC law 
needs to be translated to foreign languages, the term “copyright law” should be used in the English 
version, and “author’s right law” should be used in the French, German and Spanish versions.  
 
Additionally, modeled largely on the continental civil law tradition, the PRC’s CRL recognizes four 
moral rights:  
- the right of disclosure (or publication)
100
: the right to decide whether or not to make a work public;  
- right of attribution
101: the right to claim authorship and to sign one’s name on a work;  
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- right of revision (or alternation)
102
: the right to revise a work or authorize another to revise the 
work;  
- right of integrity
103
: the right to prevent the work from being distorted or mutilated.  
Still further, the PRC’s CRL emphasizes the natural relationship between the author and the author’s 
intellectual creation. This can also be seen from the perspective of copyright ownership: as a general 
rule, copyright shall belong to the author as the actual creator of the work.
104
 However, it does provide 
for deviations from the European continental author-friendly approach in works created under certain 
relationships. For the work created under the supervision of and representing the will of a legal person 
or other organization that bears responsibility for the work and such work represents its will, that legal 
person or other organization is deemed the author.
105
 Under this circumstance, that legal person or 
other organization will enjoy economic rights as well as moral rights. But if a work is created in the 
fulfillment of assigned tasks, i.e. referring to the obligations that the employee is required to perform 
in the course of employment, copyright shall belong to the employed author, but the employer – legal 
person or other organization shall enjoy a priority right to exploit the work within the scope of its 
business for two years from the date of the completion of the work.
106
 The exception to this author-
friendly rule appears in cases where the work consists of engineering drawings or product designs, 
maps, software or other works created mainly by using the employer’s material and technical facilities 
in the course of employment, and within the employers’ responsibility.107 In this context, the employee 
author will only enjoy the right of authorship, and the employer will enjoy the other rights. Another 
author-friendly rule can be found when there is a commissioned work. According to Article 17 of the 
PRC’s CRL, copyright of a commissioned work shall, in the absence of a contractual agreement on the 
issue of ownership of the work, belong to the commissioned author. 
 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the PRC’s CRL is mainly characterized as following the 





1.3.3 Short summing up  
Within the sphere of the development of international treaties, it can be seen that the importance that 
the natural rights approach had gradually diminished as the utilitarian approach became dominant. 
Furthermore, harmonization efforts taken by the international treaties bridge the gaps between the 
continental European author’s right approach and the Anglo-American copyright approach. However, 
the differences between these two still remain. 
 
Granting exclusive rights to intellectual creators can be justified on the grounds discussed in the 
preceding sub-sections. Also, what a copyright regime needs to balance are the right of a rights owner 
to authorize or prohibit the reproduction and/or dissemination of the covered work on the one hand 
and the availability of this work to the public, on the other. Thus, each national copyright law contains 
a number of limitations and exceptions that are designed to enhance accessibility to intellectual works. 
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1.4 Limitations on and exceptions from copyright 
Exceptions and limitations as to copyright differ from country to country. This has to do with general 
attitudes to copyright, philosophical background, historical traditions, and even to some extent due to 
constitutional and administrative structure. 
 
The legal construction of exceptions and limitations is as old as copyright itself.
109
 They existed in 
copyright acts and bilateral treaties of the 19
th
 century, as well as in the Berne Convention. For 
example, the former Article 7 of the Berne Convention allowed the reproduction of newspapers or 
similar articles for the purpose of reporting current events with a view of guaranteeing the freedom of 
press.
110
 In the current version, several limitations and exceptions are scattered throughout the 
Convention. Article 10 deals with the rights of quotation and uses for teaching purposes; Article10bis 
with press usages; Article 11bis with the conditions for the exercise of broadcasting and other rights; 
Article 13(2) with the reservations on the exercise of mechanical reproduction rights; and Article 
30(2)(b) and the Appendix with developing countries. 
 
A general rule, describing to what extent the Berne Union states could institute permitted limitations 
and exceptions, can be found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. It provides the Union states 
with the possibility to permit reproduction of works without the author’s authorization, provided that 
the exemption from the reproduction right is limited to certain special cases, does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work, and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author, the so-called “three-step test”.111 Soon this test became an essential part of various treaties,112 
European directives,
113




Copyright policies as to limitations and exceptions are becoming increasingly important in the modern 
communications era. Firstly, different national laws in this aspect may raise a concern that an act 
which is permissible under one country’s law will be regarded as an infringing act under another 
country’s law. This would further give rise to a controversy regarding the choice-of-law issue once the 
act or copyrighted work involves foreign elements. Under this circumstance, an issue could arise as to 
which law’s limitation would govern the use of the work.  
 
Moreover, to strike a balance between the interests of right owners and the interests of the public in 
having the access to copyrighted works is becoming more difficult nowadays. With the advent of 
digital and networking communication, on-line dissemination of copyrighted works has been 
increasing dramatically. Some impacts of digital technology on copyright, e.g. copyrighted works can 
be digitalized, and can be copied easily, economically, quickly and without losing quality, can cause 
nightmares for rights owners as they easily lose control over their copyrighted works. Thus, rights 
owners call for strengthening copyright protection, either by broadening the scope of the reproduction 
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right or introducing a new right of making available to the public.
115
 Rights owners use technical 
protection measures to protect against piracy, unauthorized taking and using the digitalized 
information, and therefore gain the control of the work. Because the strengthened protection hinders 
public access to works, limitations on these rights in the digital context are therefore required. As 
provided in the WCT, the existing limitations under the Berne Convention may be extended to the 
digital environment. Additionally, new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital 




Limitations and exceptions as to copyright can be divided into two types: the inherent limitations and 
the external limitations on copyright.
117
 The former are the actual or potential restrictions arising from 
the provisions of the law itself which serve to balance the interests of the rights owner and the public. 
They include the term of protection, the originality requirement, the idea/expression dichotomy, the 
exhaustion of right, etc. Copyright, in particular the economic rights, is not perpetual. It normally lasts 
for seventy year pma in the western counties,
118
 and fifty years pma under the PRC’s CRL. After the 
expiration of the term, the works will fall within the public domain and serve the public interests. 
Under these circumstances, the public can then freely use or communicate with the works. The 
originality requirement and the idea/expression dichotomy limit the scope of the protected subjects, 
because doing otherwise would hinder scientific progress and unduly restrict the free flow of 
information.
119
 According to the doctrine of exhaustion of rights (first use doctrine),
120
 the rights 
owner will lose (exhaust) certain rights after the first use of the work with his permission. Without the 
exhaustion doctrine, the original rights holder would perpetually exercise control over the sale, transfer 
or use of a good or service embodying in intellectual property and therefore control economic life.  
 
The external limitations of copyright are the result of “the application of legal or other principles 
which are separate from copyright law, or indeed from the law of intellectual property as a whole”,121 
which encompass certain acts that are not considered as infringing acts due to the application of legal 
or other principles. These limitations take the forms of exemptions, statutory or compulsory licenses, 
and mandatory collective administration of rights.
122
 By conforming to these forms, copyrighted work 
can be used freely with or without remuneration. 
 
The two legal traditions for protecting literary and artistic works - copyright law and author’s right 
law are premised on different legal justifications. These differences can also be seen in the way the 
rights and limitations are expressed in legislation. Generally, the rights of a copyright owner can be 
defined in either broad or narrow terms, and such definitions will have a direct impact on the 
limitations. For example, in author’s right law countries, the rights of copyright owners are mostly 
phrased in broad, open terms that allow the exclusive rights to encompass a wide scope of acts or uses, 
and combine with a system of narrowly defined exemptions, whereas in copyright law countries, the 
rights are laid down in great detail and are limited with a relatively flexible system of exemptions: e.g. 
the fair use or fair dealing defence applied in the US and UK copyright laws respectively, leaving 
courts with sufficient room for interpretation. At the EU level, a technique similar to the civil law 
tradition was introduced. Article 5 of the Information Society Directive provides an exhaustive list of 
limitations,
123
 i.e. no Member States may adopt any limitation other than those laid down in the list. 
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Since only one exemption from this list is obligatory on Member States, the diversity in this respect 




1.4.1 Justifying limitations and exceptions to copyright 
The imbalance of the interests between rights owners and the public as a whole may cause some 
conflicts. In order to avoid the conflicts and calibrate this imbalance, limitations and exceptions to 
copyright should be adopted. Even though the purpose of limiting copyright is to serve the “public 
interest”, how to define the “public interest” in this respect is rather difficult.125 Guibault distinguishes 
four types of roles for limitations and exceptions to copyright:  
- the fundamental rights: freedom of expression and right to privacy,  
- competition law and industrial practice,  
- promoting culture and knowledge, as well as  




1.4.1.1 Fundamental rights 
The fundamental right defence, in particular the freedom of expression, the right to information, and 




1.4.1.1.1 Freedom of expression and right to information 
Such exceptions serve strong and overriding public interests based on constitutional rights. Freedom of 
expression has been enshrined as a fundamental right in a wide variety of international and regional 
treaties,
128
 to name a few: the Universal Declaration of Human rights,
129
 the European Convention on 
Human Rights
130
 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
131
 which became 
legally binding along with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. This 
freedom is codified in European national constitutions: e.g. Article 7 of Dutch Constitution Law 
(Grondwet). In the PRC, Article 35 of the Constitution states that the citizens of the PRC enjoy 
freedom of speech and freedom of press. This justification forms also the premise for the only instance 
of a mandatory limitation in an international copyright treaty: the right of quotations in Article 10(1) 
of the Berne Convention. Furthermore, using protected works for the purpose of caricature, parody, 
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pastiches or criticism are exempted from copyright, and such works can then be used without 




Freedom of information is to promote the free flow of information. Thus, the use of copyrighted works 
bearing an informational character, such as news reporting, political speeches or reporting of 
administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings, should be allowed without the authorization of 




1.4.1.1.2 Right to privacy 
A conflict between exclusive copyright and the fundamental right of privacy has been growing 
gradually. The focus is the limitations on private use. Previously, copying of works by hand for private 
use did not seriously affect the interests of right owners, and as a result an exception for private use 
was accepted.
134
 However, with the advent of copying equipment, such as: photocopying machines 
and scanners, a large amount of copying could be done at home, where monitoring the reproduction of 
copyrighted works becomes difficult for rights owners. A private copy levy system was then 
developed with a view to providing some compensation to the right owners. This system is carried out 
by means of imposing a levy on the sale of copying equipment, or on blank recording media (audio 
and video tapes, discs etc.), and the sums collected are distributed to the rights owners concerned.  
 
The digital reproduction processes and the Internet pose challenges to the levy system. As individual 
access to copyrighted material can be easily accessed on line and the worldwide distribution of the 
copied material can be facilitated via the Internet, private copying in the digital environment inevitably 
leads to questions about the effectiveness of the levy system. On the other hand, technology 
development provides rights owners with technological protection measures so as to control the use 
and distribution of their works. Surely, the right of privacy together with other fundamental rights, 
namely freedom of expression and right to information will draw more attention in regulating 
limitations on copyright.  
 
1.4.1.2 Promotion of culture and knowledge 
This justification is quite similar to the fundamental rights one, where the right of information should 
be upheld to promote the flow of information. This justification is of particular importance for 
institutions like public libraries, public archives, and research and education institutes.   
 
In the education and scientific research sector, providing limitations to copyright would contribute to 
intellectual development of students and researchers, and the society as a whole in the end. These 
limitations take the forms of either using without payment,
135
 or using against an equitable 
remuneration
136




Public libraries and archives make copies of information, whether for internal purposes or for 
providing services to the public. Granting limitations and exceptions to copyright for them will 
encourage the dissemination of knowledge and information in society. Due to the rapid development 
of technology, notably in the online environment, libraries are interested in mass digitalization projects 
to preserve and/or disseminate information online. Therefore, some countries adopt complex systems 
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 Yet other countries provide only a general exemption in the situation where 
reproducing a work by non-profit libraries or archives is for their own collections and for the purpose 




In order to encourage the creation, circulation and dissemination of knowledge within the Internal 
Market, the European Commission produced a Green Paper on Copyright in Knowledge Economy
140
 
which focuses on how research, science and educational materials are disseminated to the public and 
whether knowledge is circulating freely in the Internal Market, particularly in the digital environment. 
After public consultation, the Commission published a Communication
141
 which stated (reiterated) the 
importance of balancing different interests, including those of libraries, archives, teaching and research 
sectors, and announced a series of preparatory actions contributing to the future strategy on intellectual 
property.  
 
1.4.1.3 Overcoming market failure 
This justification can be explained in the situation where the dealing between the rights owners and the 
users is so small that the transaction costs of formulating an agreement outweigh the value of any 
license that might be negotiated between them. A typical example can be seen in the levy system 
discussed above. Since finding and enforcing copyright among individual users is extremely difficult 
and inefficient, rights owners can be made better off with an effective right without having to exercise 
an individual right lacking a real scope. This economic consideration is also the premise for other 
limitations on copyright: reprographic copies being made for internal use within business or 




1.4.1.4 Competition law and industrial practice 
This reason is used to prevent abuses of economic monopolies and to facilitate trade for certain users 
of copyrighted works. The competition law justification is reflected in Article 8(2) of the TRIPs 
Agreement, which allows contracting states to adopt measures to prevent the abuse of IP rights by 
rights holders. Article 40(2) of the same treaty further complements Article 8(2) in that it allows 
contracting states to specify “in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in 
particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on 
competition in the relevant market”. Reading these two provisions together, it can be deduced that the 





The competition law exemption is often used for the exclusion of ideas and facts from copyright 
protection.
144
 Apart from that, it is also used in the right of users of computer software to reverse-
engineer or decompile software to promote interoperability and foster competition.
145
 Article 6 of the 
Software Directive has adopted such a rule for the system of the European copyright regime. 
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1.5 Influence of technology on copyright protection 
Copyright has always been in an evolving scenario.
146
 As stated by Justice Stevens of the US Supreme 
Court, “[f]rom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology.”147 Since the invention of the printing process, copyright law, along with the development 
of technology, has been developed by experiencing four waves of technological development. Each 
development, such as: the invention of photocopying, telefax, and the utilization of cable and satellite, 
required considerable investment. By applying these new technologies, copyrighted works can be 
produced and disseminated efficiently, in the meantime they can also be copied or infringed quickly 
and cheaply. Moreover, these new technologies enable the works to cross borders more easily. For 
copyright holders, such changes make them feel that the traditional copyright systems are not strong 
enough to retain or regain control over the dissemination of their works. They then call for the 
amendment or expansion of copyright protection. Hence, copyright law itself has to be adapted to the 
new technology and to the new commercial realities that it brings to bear.  
 
It is also of note that the value of copyrighted work becomes increasingly important in economic 
terms. This increase is the result of information and communications technologies, which have formed 
fundamental bases in a wide variety of industrial sectors. The creation of the information society has 
placed copyright in the centre of economic development because it is copyright that motivates 
provision of information that is essential to economic development. 
 
The development of information and communication technology, in particular the Internet, has 
impacted copyright mainly in two aspects: the creation of new subject matters of copyright and the 
rapid dissemination of the works. These are due to the fact that digital technology enables intellectual 
creators to use the Internet with confidence to create and distribute their works within the digital 
environment.  
 
1.5.1 Creation of new subject matter 
Copyright was born into a world of print and scripted live theater in the 18
th
 century. The protected 
subject matters were limited only to books, plays, etc. Along with technological development and 
international harmonization of copyright, the scope of copyright protected works has been expanded 
greatly. The international treaties have witnessed this expansion. The Berne Convention specifies the 
scope of copyrighted works as “literary and artistic works”;148 the TRIPs Agreement, on top of the 
Berne Convention, adds the protection of computer programs and compilations of data. In addition, 





Moreover, technological developments have facilitated the availability of information in electronic 
form, i.e. copyrighted materials can be digitalized. As a result, they can be used in many different 
media, and stored in different forms. For example, music can be produced in digital form by using 
high tech equipment, and it can be easily, cheaply and speedily recorded, saved and reproduced in 
extensive amounts in digital storage devices, such as “memory sticks” or MP3 or MP4 players. 
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1.5.2 Rapid dissemination of work 
Technological development has also made changes in the speed of distribution of copyrighted works. 
Originally, copyrighted works were contained in books and play scripts, which, due to the limitation of 
technology, could normally be distributed in restricted forms, e.g. print or theatre, etc. With the 
utilization of cable and satellite, the means of transmission are no longer limited to conventional 
hardcopy reproduction. Even later, broadcasting is not confined to traditional cable or wireless 
broadcasting, because the Internet makes the transmission more efficient: a work put on the Internet 
can be quickly accessed by everyone who has access to the Internet in virtually every place in the 
world. Thus, by using digital technologies, a copyrighted work can be rapidly distributed and can 
easily reach global audiences. There is little doubt that the digital dissemination of copyrighted work 
will also affect the enforcement of copyright on the work, since “[m]ulti-state distribution of 
intellectual property and multi-state infringements are corollaries of the worldwide web”.150 Hence, 
once on-line copyright infringement claims become common, the difficulties in defining the places of 
infringement and the infringers will be magnified.  
 
Reaching global audiences raises another concern about copyright: the inconsistencies among national 
copyright laws. In practice, so-called “international copyright” has no existence, and what exists is 
only a bundle of national copyright protection regimes,
151
 each of them reflecting a country’s own 
perception of exclusive rights of the creator and the importance of public access to the works created. 
The differences in national copyright laws may have practical influences on the activities of an 
intellectual creation: e.g. a creator that is an author of a work according to one country’s law may not 
be an author of the same work under another law. Differences in limitations on copyright may also 
mean that an activity that is non-infringing under one country’s law may be infringing under another. 
Therefore, it raises concerns about choice-of-law when cross-border communications are involved.  
 
1.6 Copyright and choice-of-law 
1.6.1 The multiplication of choice-of-law problems in cross-border copyright and related rights 
protection 
As Grosheide pointed out, historically there was no link between copyright law and private 
international law (PIL), since both fields of law “depend entirely on the assumption that legally 
relevant phenomena can be located territorially” and they should be applied to regulate actions or 
behaviours within a territory.
152
 Conventional PIL analysis looks to geography for connecting factors 
to determine the applicable law, while copyright law traditionally is also territorial in nature, which is 
to be understood as invoking the national law that will apply to acts of copyright infringement in a 




However, both fields of law have strong international dimensions, e.g. the domicile of the parties, the 
place of infringement, etc. For copyright, literary and artistic works are independent of a physical link 
with any territory and can therefore be easily transmitted across borders and simultaneously exploited 
in a great number of countries, whether legally or illegally. Moreover, the fact that the copyrighted 
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works continue to have a legal link with the creator even after the work has been transferred amplifies 




Along with the enhanced mobility of authors and copyrighted works, concern is raised as to the law 
applicable to a situation where a copyright claim involves several legal systems, e.g. Harry Potter, a 
work that was published simultaneously in many countries.   
 
In the age when copyright law had recently been born, courts could easily pinpoint the territories in 
which works, namely books or dramatic scripts, were originated and disseminated. Even in the 20
th
 
century, courts could still tie the applicable law to points fixed in geographical locations, because in 
that time the published works or broadcasts were most often from known centres to surrounding 
audiences. Nowadays, the global economy and advanced information technology, notably the Internet, 
challenges the choice-of-law determination. The Internet is not territorially based. Physical territory 
does not exist on the Internet; works put on the Internet cannot be stopped at any border; and they can 
be made simultaneously accessible everywhere in the world. Additionally, in the global economy, the 
collaboration to create a work by diverse authors located around the world also has become usual in 
business practice.
155
 Under these circumstances, it is no longer possible to localize works or authors at 
any single point upon which the applicable law can be determined. 
 
Due to the lack of a uniform legal source in international copyright and related rights protection, 
national courts are, inevitably, forced to use their own choice-of-law rules to designate the law 
applicable to a copyright claim involved with several legal systems. As will be seen in the following 
section, more complex situations can be brought before national courts in cases where the Internet and 




1.6.2 Main characteristics of copyright 
Copyright and related rights are property rights under which a creator enjoys an exclusive use of the 
created work, bounded by limitations. Despite that, the immaterial character of copyright and related 
rights and the other characteristics that distinguish them from standard property rights need to be 
scrutinized because their special characteristics exert influence on the respective choice-of-law rules in 
cross-border copyright and related rights cases. 
 
1.6.2.1 Intangibility 
The feature of copyright and related rights that is first and foremost encountered is intangibility. The 
law of standard property protects property rights in tangible, material things, such as a car or piece of 
land, while the law of copyright concerns expressions of human thinking and feeling and other 
expressions or information, all of which are intangible although always expressed through a tangible 
medium. 
 
1.6.2.2 Its ubiquity 
Due to copyright’s intangibility, copyrighted work, e.g. information, can be in existence at different 
places at the same time. An expression can be first read in many copies of the same book at the same 
time, and be seen in a drawing, and be experienced by viewing a motion picture of it. At the same 
time, the non-rivalous character of an intellectual creation provides it with a tendency to be spread 
around since it cannot be circumscribed with physical boundaries. In comparison, standard property 
must normally have a definite location in space. 
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1.6.2.3 No erosion by use 
Information is a public good. Its intangible characteristics of non-opposability and non-excludability 
mean that others cannot be excluded from making use of it, and that it can be readily copied without 
any direct taking from its initial owner, with the result that others can still continue to use it. The use 
of a copyrighted work by one person will not affect its use by others. By contrast, exercise of a 
standard property right in something tangible will oppose a single act of possession, i.e. once someone 
possesses a car, it cannot be used by others at the same time, and once the car has been destroyed, the 
property right in it will be extinguished, while, in the case of copyright, erosion of the medium will not 
affect the copyright on what it is used to express, e.g., if the book gets burned that physical thing will 
come to an end, but the copyright on what the book expresses will remain. 
 
1.6.2.4 Territoriality 
Territoriality is a universally accepted concept in copyright law. This concept is however not explicitly 




At the outset, territoriality means that powers of the legislature to legislate are normally limited to the 
territory of the state concerned. In the context of copyright law, this principle means that copyright law 
is limited to the national territory of the legislator, which amounts to a limitation on the effect of rights 
created. Furthermore, since copyright is an exclusive right to use or exploit material within the borders 
of the country concerned, an infringement of those rights involves improperly using or exploiting such 
materials only in that country. A national copyright law cannot extend to any territory outside that 
country. In other words, it does not have an extra-territorial effect.
158
 Imposing the restrictions of a 
national copyright law outside the national territory where they have been legislated, or applying one 
country’s copyright law to an alleged copyright infringement occurring in another country would in 
effect contravene the territoriality principle. 
 
Thus, the application of such a principle responds to two interests. One is the interest of state 
sovereignty. To impose a country’s copyright law on alleged activities that occurred in another 
country might be considered by the latter country as a violation of its sovereignty, in particular where 
under the latter country’s copyright law such activities are not considered to be infringements.159 The 
second interest is in securing reasonable investment expectations. By knowing the extent of protection 
and enforcement of copyright and related rights in certain countries, those who want to exploit 




The concept of territoriality in copyright has long existed. It started to exist in the medieval systems of 
privileges, when kings, princes, dukes, city councils and church officials in Europe granted privileges 
to individual publishers.
161
 Under this system, the privileges had to be limited to the territory governed 
by the relevant sovereign. Foreign rulers would theoretically have no obligation to recognize or 
honour the privileges granted by others.
162
 The territorial concept remained with the arrival of 
copyright legislation that arose later on, even though copyright legislation had the purpose of 
protecting the interest of authors by rewarding their effort or investment. A multilateral treaty - the 
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Berne Convention that was concluded by the end of 19
th
 century adopted the “national treatment” 
principle by providing that a Berne Union state must offer the same protection to the nationals of other 
states as it offers to its own nationals, and set up the “minimum protection” standard requiring Union 
states to establish certain minimum standards specified in the Convention into their own substantive 
laws. Reading the principles of national treatment and minimum protection together, it is submitted 
that each Union state meeting the minimum protection standard required by the Convention, was able 
to develop and enforce its own laws, and to have its own particular copyright legislation. In other 
words, it is submitted that the Convention confirmed the territoriality principle. 
 
The territorial character of copyright was also confirmed in rule-generating studies and proposals of 
academically-linked institutions. The ALI Principles adopted by the American Law Institute 
confirmed that “[i]t has simply been assumed that each State’s rules apply to anything transpiring 
within its borders, and no further.”163 The Max Planck Institute Principles for Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Property
164
 (CLIP Principles) recite in the Preamble that “intellectual property rights are 
private rights, limited in its exercise and enforcement to specific territories, and that each sovereign 
State is free, subject to international obligations, to regulate whether and under which conditions 
intangible goods shall enjoy legal protection.” 
 
Clearly, the IP community still favors territoriality. This principle envisages that a copyright or related 
rights owner will have to manage a bundle of independent national rights, as many as there are 
territories where protection can be found.
165
 Each national copyright law of concern regulates the 
existence and content of the right and the conditions for protection, provided that the claimant is 




The Internet has seriously complicated the situation for copyrighted works. As mentioned earlier, a 
work that is put on the Internet can become simultaneously accessible throughout the world. This 
renders the principle of territoriality much more problematic because the laws of every country in 
which the work may be received come into play, and these laws may differ in substance. The absence 
of international copyright law sparks consideration of choice-of-law rules once a copyrighted work 
becomes available across national borders.  
 
The above characteristics distinguish standard property rights in tangible things from intellectual 
property in intangibles: the exclusive rights that vest in intellectual creations rely on a grant from a 
legislature, whilst the exclusiveness involved in owning tangible properties derives from their physical 
nature. Thus, “property rights in tangibles must be protected to avoid conflicts and even social unrest 
whereas the protection of intellectual property rights is rather a matter of maximizing social 
welfare.”167 
 
When a choice-of-law issue arises, any international copyright protection would have to confront a 
question about which choice-of-law rule should apply. Even though copyright is considered as a sort 
of property right, its intangible nature, the non-formality requirement and the fact that the right is 
created by operation of law -automatically so to speak- makes any application of the standard property 
approach using lex rei sitae to copyright and related rights subject to serious question, since these 
characteristics cannot place copyright at a given location.
168
 Furthermore, a debate about whether the 
territoriality principle, the dominant principle in copyright protection, should be considered as a 
choice-of-law rule also arises. Section 1.6.3.4, next, deals with these issues.  
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1.6.3 Choice-of-law rules in cross-border copyright claims 
Three considerations make copyright choice-of-law rules special: 1) the public character of copyright, 
2) the regulation of copyright protection through supra-national norms, and 3) the territorial scope of 
such protection. The next three subsections expand on them.  
 
1.6.3.1 Public character of copyright 
Copyright is a right to exclude others from copying a work granted or protected by a state, and the 
holder of it normally engages in economic activities such as reproduction and exploitation of the work 
within that state. Although the vesting of a copyright does not require a registration procedure, 
copyright does have a public character. Respect for national interests and public interests, both in 
terms of economic and cultural development, makes copyright especially important. When a choice-
of-law problem is involved, several concerns can be raised. First, it can make the application of 
foreign law unusually problematic, as it may seem to impinge on the sovereignty of the state where the 
rights are in question. In addition, this public character of copyright can often mean that where 
enforcement of local rights is involved, application of the lex fori is mandated.
169
 Second, due to the 
public character of copyright, it is commonly accepted that party autonomy is out of bounds because 
individual parties should not be permitted to contract out state sovereignty. However, considering the 
facts that copyright law enforcement is also a private law matter and that copyright deals with 
relationships between private parties, one may wonder whether a certain extent of party autonomy 
should be allowed in cross-border copyright infringement claims, at least in the litigation phase of 
calculating damages. 
 
1.6.3.2 International copyright treaties 
As indicated above, there is no such thing called international copyright law. The most widely used 
multi-lateral copyright treaty, namely the Berne Convention, aims for greater uniformity of the 
protection levels on the basis of substantive national law by, as stated above, setting minimal standards 
for protection in those situations involving the laws of more than one country. The Berne Convention 
also establishes the “national treatment” principle according to which, as also stated above, each 
country promises to grant the same protection to nationals of the other country as it grants to its own 
nationals.  
 
However, whether and to what extent the substantive principles encompassed by the Berne 
Convention and other multi-lateral treaties provide or imply any particular choice-of-law rules has 
always been a much debated issue among academics and national courts.
170
 It has also been debated 
whether the national treatment principle actually functions as a choice-of-law rule in cross-border 
copyright disputes. This debate separates scholars into two groups: one maintains that the national 
treatment clause is only a non-discrimination clause, i.e. a mechanism for ensuring equal treatment of 
foreigners in relation to protection of their copyrighted works in countries other than the country of 
origin, while the other group contends that this clause is also a choice-of-law rule requiring application 
of the law of the country in or for which protection is claimed.
171
 Furthermore, Article 5(2) of the 
Berne Convention is considered by some as amounting to a lex loci protectionis rule, but others object 




Additionally, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention provides for the non-formality requirement, i.e. 
coming into existence of copyright does not rely on any governmental registration procedures. From 
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the perspective of choice-of-law, this non-formality requirement distinguishes copyright from other 
types of IP rights, such as patent, trade mark. Thus, specific choice-of-law rules for copyright are 
needed. 
 
1.6.3.4 Territoriality: could it be a choice-of-law rule? 
The concept of territoriality is many-headed.
173
 Apart from what described in the preceding section 
1.6.2.4, this concept leads to the issue whether the territoriality principle functions as a choice-of-law 
rule. Among the scholars who answer it affirmatively, some interpret the principle strictly, referring it 
to the lex fori, and in such a way that they do not recognize a copyright acquired from abroad, or an 
infringement from abroad. Others connect the principle with the law of the country for which 
protection is sought, i.e. the lex loci protectionis. 
 
However, that connection is questionable. First, the territoriality principle is not specific to copyright 
or other industrial property rights. In fact, it is applied in other fields of law as well.
174
 Since applying 
territoriality in other fields of law hardly ever leads to a point of view that the principle is a choice-of-
law rule, neither should it be so in the context of copyright law. Similarly, as rightly stated by these 
scholars, the territoriality principle exists also in choice-of-law rules. National legislatures develop 
national choice-of-law rules either by means of drafting their own rules or by entering into 
international or regional treaties in this respect, and the effects of the national choice-of-law rules are 
also confined to that state.
175
 Furthermore, whether to apply a choice-of-law rule is also determined by 
the national (territorial) law of the forum. Holding on to the territorial character of the choice-of-law 
rule here would mean that the choice-of-law rule would be eliminated entirely and the lex fori would 
be applied exclusively. Under such a circumstance, nothing in the forum’s law could justify the 
inclusion of foreign laws.
176
 That would certainly be against the spirit of the Berne Convention. 
Additionally, the argument that “each country legislate its own copyright law that applies only within 
its borders” cannot justify the territoriality principle as a choice-of-law rule, since the existence of 
choice-of-law rules depends on the existence of states having different private laws.
177
 That copyright 
is territorial does not distinguish copyright laws, bearing a private law character, from other laws that 
are subject to choice-of-law rules.
178
 Therefore, it is submitted that the territoriality principle, in the 
context of copyright, should be interpreted as admitting the independence of copyright, i.e. that 
copyright exists separately in each country to the extent that each country recognizes it, representing 
the culture and social policies of that country. In fact, if copyright laws were the same in all countries, 
there would be no need for a rule of territoriality.
179
 As Fentiman pointed out, “the territoriality of 
national intellectual property protection is not a peculiarity of some legal systems, but an inherent and 
universal feature of such protection.”180 
 
Copyright is an intangible right not connected with any material thing that has its source in legislation. 
Therefore, the spatial scope of that right is logically limited to the territory of the legislating state. 
181
 
Additionally, observations that the territoriality principle equates with lex loci protectionis are 
similarly questionable. Territoriality means that each sovereign state may apply its own laws to claims 
that the copyright be enforced in its territory. It also means that in such a case no effect would be given 
to foreign law; the lex loci protectionis rule may, however, designate the application of foreign law in 
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a situation where, e.g. foreign copyright claims are brought before the court where the alleged 
defendant is domiciled. Under such circumstances, the territoriality principle differs from the lex loci 
protectionis.
182
 They cannot be equated with each other. Nevertheless, the lex loci protectionis is 
compatible with the concept of territoriality to the extent that this concept allows for certain extra-






This chapter describes the idea, nature and characteristics of copyright by looking into the legal 
justifications for it. It also describes limitations to the scope of copyright protection and exceptions 
from it. By studying these justifications, it demonstrates that, in relation to pertinent choice-of-law 
rules, the importance of knowing the rationales for copyright and related rights is because these 
rationales constitute the basic assumptions for the copyright and related rights policy that a particular 
legal order has adopted. This chapter also examines the impact on copyright protection of new 
technologies, namely the Internet. It discusses the challenges brought to international copyright 
protection by using new technologies, not only in terms of the expanded categories of copyright 
subject matter and the rapid reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works, but also in view of 
the ease of committing copyright infringement worldwide. The latter presents even greater challenges 
for choice-of-law issues in that there will be greater numbers of countries involved in copyright 
claims. This chapter further highlights the unique characteristics of copyright that distinguish it from 
other kinds of property rights, say from rights to tangibles. On that basis, this chapter argues that, from 
the perspective of choice-of-law rules, IP rights should be dealt with specifically. Furthermore, by 
pinpointing the territorial character of copyright, this chapter argues that the territoriality principle 
should not be too readily equated with the lex loci protectionis rule because the strict interpretation of 
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CHAPTER 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TREATIES  
 
Copyright protection has gone for a long way: starting from the 18
th
 century for the only protection to 
domestic works, till the earlier part of the 19
th
 century, under which bilateral treaties were concluded 
with regard to the protection of copyright, due to the increased negative economic impact of piracy 
abroad, and finally in the second half of the 19
th
 century, efforts were made to improve international 
copyright and related rights protection. They led to a series of multi-lateral treaty instruments on 
copyright and related right protection: for copyright, the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright 
Convention (hereinafter UCC) and the WIPO Copyright Treaty (hereinafter WCT); and for related 
rights, the Rome Convention 1961, the Geneva Phonograms Convention 1971 and the WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (hereinafter WPPT). More recently, the most important treaty 
covering the major types of intellectual property is the TRIPs Agreement. 
 
As copyright and related rights have been the subjects of a number of international treaties, one may 
enquire whether these treaties contain or entail any rules specifying which country’s copyright laws 
will apply. If the answer is affirmative, states that adhered to these treaties will be obliged to honor 
those choice-of-law rules in cross-border copyright disputes that fall within the scope of these treaties; 
if there are no choice-of-law rules contained in these treaties, references to national choice-of-law 
rules then have to be made. 
 
Having these questions in mind and to understand the influence of international copyright and related 
rights protection on the choice-of-law issue, this chapter will briefly describe the development of 
international copyright protection in the first section. An analysis of the international copyright and 
related rights treaties, including the Berne Convention, the UCC, the Rome Convention 1961, the 
TRIPs Agreement, the WCT, the WPPT and the envisaged WAPT, will be carried out in the second 
section. Since the purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the relationship between international 
copyright and related rights treaties and the choice-of-law rules, there is no need to deal with all 
copyright and related rights treaties. As the most important copyright treaty, the Berne Convention, 
which serves as a model for other copyright treaties, will be given more attention so as to illustrate the 
law created by international treaties. In addition, a search as to whether substantive principles 
embodied in the international copyright treaties ordain or imply any particular choice-of-law rules will 
be conducted. Notably, the role of the principle of national treatment, a rule preventing discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, will be looked at, since it is a topic having been much debated among 
national courts and academics.  
 
2.1 Development of International copyright protection 
2.1.1 Some historical facts about international copyright protection
184
 
The spread of printing presses in 15
th
 century Europe enabled rapid multiple copying. In order to 
protect printers’ and bookbinders’ interests, state authorities granted legal protection in a form of 
“privileges” or exclusive rights to print and sell copies of a book for a limited time within their 
respective territories.
185
 In succeeding centuries, a series of modern statutes were adopted. Under them 
a general right of authors was recognized,
186
 and that became a subject of private law. Among these 
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statutes, two legal traditions were discernable: the copyright laws in Anglo-Saxon law countries and 
the author’s right laws in Continental European law countries. 
 
An attempt to achieve international copyright protection was mainly facilitated by the motivation to 
prevent the gradual increase of international “piracy” during those days. By the beginning of the 19th 
century, it was realized that works produced in one country could be profitably exploited in another: 
for example, a book or a play script could be appreciated also by the citizens of other countries or even 
be translated into other languages. Moreover, continuous improvements in printing technology made 
such works more vulnerable to piracy.
187
 As a result, unauthorized reproduction and use of foreign 
works became “established features” of the then European cultural and social life.188 This practice 
even continued for a considerable period of time after most countries adopted national copyright 
laws.
189
 In fact, considerable differences existed among national copyright laws.
190
 In particular, there 
were the extremely different results from applying various national provisions, and that failed to 
provide sufficient copyright protection for foreign works.  
 
Nevertheless, there was a gradual move towards elimination of international “piracy” and, in 
consequence, the recognition of the rights of foreign authors in most European countries. The so-
called copyright-exporting countries, like France and Great Britain, which occupied pre-eminent 
positions in the areas of literature and the arts, wanted to have their copyrights protected outside their 
territories.  
 
France had tried in a decree of 1852
191
 to unilaterally extend the protection under French law to all 
works published abroad, without requiring reciprocal protection of French works in those countries. 
As explained, the philosophical rationale for this national altruism was that “author’s rights, being 
natural rights of property, should not be restricted by artificial restraints such as nationality or 
geographical boundaries”. 192  This national altruism was however only followed by Belgium in 
1886,
193
 and no other countries recognized that kind of unilateral grant of protection to the works of 
foreign authors. The lack of reciprocity by other states made both Belgium and France terminate their 




Gradually, every country that had some kinds of cultural products was taking steps to have its cultural 
products protected in foreign countries. Mutual recognition of each other’s copyright then became the 
necessary approach. The copyright-exporting countries started to exercise pressure on countries that 
were exploiting their publications, and gradually a series of bilateral treaties were concluded. More 





2.1.2 Protection of foreign works by national laws 
As described above, France and Belgium adopted a kind of national altruism to unilaterally grant 
protection to foreign works of foreign authors within their respective countries. Even then, the extent 
of protection in these countries differed. As explained by Ricketson and Ginsburg, the 1852 French 
Decree only allowed a foreign author to enjoy in France the rights granted to him under the laws of his 
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 Thus, foreigners’ rights were not assimilated to those of French nationals, and a 
foreigner could not enjoy the rights further accorded under the French law in addition to his own. The 
Belgian Law of 1886 provided, however, complete assimilation of foreign authors, with the exception 
of the duration of protection. According to the Belgian Law, the term of protection accorded to foreign 
authors’ works in Belgium could not exceed that granted to the foreign authors by their own countries; 
furthermore, if a foreign work ceased to be protected in the author’s country of origin, the protection 




Unlike France and Belgium, other countries adopted more restrictive approaches in granting copyright 
protection to foreign works. Some countries required a criterion based on the nationality of the author, 
such as the German Copyright Act which protected all works of German nationals, wherever 
published.
198
 Foreign authors whose works were published in Germany were also protected but only if 
the works were published by a German publisher.
199





 and Hungarian law
202
 adopted an approach based on domicile, rather than 
nationality, as a criterion of protection. Some countries adopted only the nationality criterion, which 
meant works of foreigners would not be protected, even if they were published locally.
203
 Other 
countries applied the criterion of the place of publication. According to it, all works published within 
the territory of a country would be protected under that country’s law, irrespective of the nationality of 









 and others.  
 
2.1.3 Bilateral treaties 
Along with the enhanced movement of cultural works and people, as well as the need to combat 
“piracy”, most countries were ready to grant protection to foreign works, but on condition that their 
own works also receive protection in the country of the origin of the foreign works. Reciprocal 
protection formed the basis of bilateral copyright treaties.  
 
The first bilateral copyright treaty was concluded between German states during the first part of the 
19
th







 century bilateral treaties rested, however, on different types of 
reciprocity. Some treaties required material reciprocity, according to which country A would accord 
protection to works originating in country B only if the latter gave comparable protection to works 
from country A. Other treaties required formal reciprocity, i.e. national treatment, meaning that 
                                                          
196




 Art. 61 of the German Law of 11 June 1870; Art. 20 of the Law of 9 Jan 1876. (referred into Ricketson and 
Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26.) 
199
 Ibid; Paul Goldstein 2001 (supra n 57) 16. 
200
 Art. 451 of the Norwegian Law of 8 June 1876; Art. 15 of the Law of 12 May 1877. (artistic property) 
(referred into Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26.) 
201
 Art. 10 of the Swiss Law of 1883. (referred into Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
202
 Art. 79 of the Hungarian Law of 1884. (referred into Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
203
 In Greece, Art. 433 of the Greek Penal Code 1833; in Portugal, Art. 576 of the Portuguese Civil Code 1867; 
in Spain, Art. 50 of the Spanish Law of 1879; in Sweden, Art. 19 of the Swedish Law of 10 May 1877; Art. 8 of 
the Law of 8 May 1867; in Finland, Art. 32 of the Finnish Law of 1880; in U.S., ss 4952 and 4971 of the US 
Copyright Act of 1870. (referred into Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
204
 S 1 of the UK Literary Copyright Act 1842; see also Routledge v Low (1868) LR 3 HL 100. (referred into 
Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
205
 Art. 36 of the Austrian Law of 1846. (referred into See Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
206
 Art. 27 of the Dutch Law of 1881. (referred into See Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
207
 Art. 42 of the Italian Law of 1882. (referred into see Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) para 1.26) 
208
 France concluded the most bilateral treaties on copyright (13).  
209
 For details, see Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) paras 1.29 – 1.42. 
International Copyright and Related Rights Treaties 
 37 
country A could accord protection to works originating in country B on condition that the latter would 
give works from country A the same protection as it accorded to works of its own nationals. Unlike 
material reciprocity, formal reciprocity did not necessarily require a comparable degree of protection 
by each state, but only required the assimilation of the works of another state to those of its own 
authors.
210
 As will be seen in the following section, formal reciprocity (national treatment) is one of 
the fundamental principles in the Berne Convention. Its application of formal reciprocity differs, 
however, from the one in the bilateral treaties in that the Convention lays down the minimum standard 
of protection that every Union state must follow. 
 
Despite their contribution to the establishment of international copyright regime, bilateral treaties 
proved unsatisfactory.
211
 First, there were great variations in terms of the contents of the treaties. The 
provisions concerning covered persons and protected works, the duration of protection, restrictions on 
reproduction rights, etc. were framed in different ways, and as a result it was troublesome for 
authors/publishers to figure out whether and/or to what extent a work could be protected in a country 
or countries other than their own.
212
 Second, in practice, some treaty countries failed to abide by their 
treaty obligations.
213
 Furthermore, most of the bilateral treaties were not just for copyright. They were, 
rather, trade treaties containing a copyright clause. These types of treaties led to several drawbacks in 
terms of copyright protection in foreign countries. One drawback was the uncertain duration of 
treaties. Since trade treaties were dependent on the political and economic situations of a state, these 
treaties could be denounced or renegotiated on short notice. Once that occurred, authors would face a 
sudden loss of their rights in foreign countries.
214
 Another drawback was the “most favoured nation” 
clause often used in trade treaties. Under such a clause, a state needs to extend benefits accorded to 
one state to all other states. In the copyright context, in a situation where country A and country B 
agreed to grant each other the benefit of the “most favored nation”, once country A subsequently 
concluded an agreement with country C offering a higher level protection to the authors of country C 
than those provided in the agreement between country A and B, then the “most favored nation” clause 
would enable the authors of country B to claim in country A the more favorable treatment accorded to 
the authors of country C. Consequently, the operation of bilateral treaties would not be certain because 
the level of copyright protection could shift whenever a treaty partner entered into bilateral relations 




By the end of the 19
th
 century, around 100 bilateral treaties had been concluded. They formed an 




2.2 International copyright and related rights treaties 
2.2.1 The Berne Convention 
2.2.1.1 Origins of the Berne Convention
217
 
Due to the different fundamental characteristics of copyright in different countries, national copyright 
laws differed extensively, not only in terms of the categories of works protected, but also of their 
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scope and the duration of protection. Neither were bilateral treaties an effective means of guaranteeing 
protection on the international level. With the increased growth in trade and the continuous flow of 
printed material among countries, it was realized that copyright protection could be much more 
effectively established if common rules were applied.  
 
An attempt to establish a universal copyright law could be found in a relatively early period. In a 
series of international congresses, in particular the 1858 Brussels congress, the issue of the nature of 
copyright was intensely debated. That led to the highly controversial issue concerning the duration of 
protection. Nevertheless, a general consensus on the need for international copyright protection was 
reached, which was reflected in the following Resolution, to just name the core of the Resolution: 
authors of literary and artistic property should enjoy the exclusive right to authorize publication, 
reproduction and distribution of their works, so should the composers for dramatic and musical works 
and artists for their drawings, paintings and other works; the duration of protection in all laws should 
be the life of the author plus 50 years after the death of the surviving spouse; authors should have the 
exclusive right to authorize translations of their work, provided they make their first use of this right 
within three years after publication of the original; as to foreign authors and owners of copyright in 
works published abroad, the principle of national treatment and simplification of formalities were 
adopted.
 218
 The subsequent congresses, such as the 1861 one in Antwerp, and others, supported the 
1858 Brussels Resolution. 
 
A further step was taken by authors, artists and publishers, who assembled together at the 1878 
international literary congress in Paris, where the ALAI, the Association Littéraire International 
eventually renamed being Association Littéraire et Artistique International was founded under Victor 
Hugo’s leadership. It is noteworthy that at the 1882 Congress in Rome, a proposal was put forward by 
Dr. Schmidt of the German Publishers’ Guild, who suggested forming an international copyright union 
for drafting a universal law on literary works. That paved a road to an international copyright 
convention. 
 
Following-up on the proposal adopted at the 1882 Rome Congress, the Conference, that was 
conducted over three days in September 1883 in Berne, Switzerland, produced a draft convention 
consisting ten articles. The draft convention dealt with the general principle of national treatment in 
Article 1, which was based on the place of publication or performance; a definition of “literary and 
artistic works” in Article 2; protection for manuscripts and unpublished works in Article 3; according 
the same rights to successors in title as those given to authors in Article 4; translation rights in Articles 
5 and 6; that foreigners should have the same legal remedies against infringement as nationals do in 
Article 7; retroactivity of the draft convention in Article 8, namely that the Convention would apply to 
all works which had not yet fallen into the public domain in their countries of origin at the moment of 
the Convention’s entry into force; that Union states have the right to enter separate agreements 
between themselves as long as these agreement would not contravene the Convention in Article 9; and 
establishing an international office for the deposit of national copyright laws in Article 10.  
 
After several conferences that occurred over the next three years, delegates produced a final draft of a 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The Convention was signed on 9 
September 1886 by ten countries - Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, 
Liberia,
219
 Switzerland, and Tunisia - and it came into effect on 5 December 1887. 
 
2.2.1.2 Basis of the Berne Convention 
From its inception in 1886, the Berne Convention has, in accord with its Article 17, been revised on 
several occasions: in 1896 (Paris), 1908 (Berlin), 1928 (Rome), 1948 (Brussels), 1967 (Stockholm), 
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with the last revision in 1971 (Paris).
220
 These revisions attempted to clarify and expand the 
substantive minimum rights “so as to increase their scope in favour of industrialized producer 
countries.”221 Since the Berne Convention can be amended only by unanimous agreement of Union 
states, with the increasing membership of the Berne Union including both developing countries and 
developed countries, a unanimous agreement on revising the Convention became almost impossible. 
The reform of copyright did not, however, stop, and it was carried on in the legislative processes 
leading to the TRIPs Agreement in the field of trade law and the formulation of a new WCT: Article 
9(1) of the TRIPs Agreement incorporates most of the Berne provisions, and Article 1(4) of the WCT 
requires compliance with the Berne Convention. 
 
The membership of the Berne Convention has expanded over time. Currently, the Union has reaches 
165 member states.
222
 Due to its connection with the TRIPs Agreement, which requires the WTO 
member states to comply with its substantive provisions (except those covering moral rights) and the 
Appendix to the 1971 Paris Act of the Convention, the Berne Convention not only regulates copyright 
relations between its Union states, but also provides international standards of protection for all 
Members of the WTO, whether or not they are the Berne Convention Union states. As such, it 
provides the basic standard of copyright protection throughout most of the world. 
 
In addition to its influence on the development of national copyright laws, the Convention has had 
profound influence on the formation of the international copyright treaties that were established 
afterwards. These treaties include the UCC, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performing 
Artists, the WCT and the WPPT.  
 
The history of the Berne Convention demonstrates that the Convention is the one that was begun with 
the establishment of basic principles. The pivotal principle of the Convention is national treatment. 
Accordingly, there is an extensive series of provisions obligating Union states to provide national 
treatment to authors protected under the Convention. Also, the Convention contains certain minimum 
rights that all Union states must grant to such authors. Establishing minimum rights was to do with the 
considerations that the sole principle of national treatment may lead to the situation where an 
inadequate level of protection accorded by a Union state to its own rights holders could be extended to 
foreign authors; in order to avoid such an undesirable result of national treatment, a minimum level of 





In dealing with new modes of exploitation and technological development, the Convention 
incrementally extended the scope of rights and protected subjects in its revisions. For the purpose of 
this work, there is no need for a detailed study of the Berne Convention. The important matters i.e. no 
requirement of formality, entitlement to protection, term of protection, expanded categories for 
copyright protection, and the ownership issue receive extra attention in the following subsections, 
since these topics have relevance to the topic of this study insofar as they help to identify the law 
applicable to international copyright protection.  
 
For the sake of clarity, in the work at hand, all references will be made to the Convention text adopted 
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2.2.1.2.1 Non-formality 
The 1886 version of the Convention adopted the common practice under the then national law of 
recognizing national use of formalities such as registration and deposit for the enjoyment of the 
prescribed rights “to the accomplishment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by law in the 
country of origin of the work”.224 A notable change was, however, made in the 1908 Berlin Act, which 
abolished the formality requirement as a condition for the acquisition, exercise, or enjoyment of 
copyright.
225
 Under this circumstance, Convention protection became fully independent from the 
conditions and formalities in the countries of origin of a work, except for national provisions 
governing the duration of the protection. The 1971 Paris Act reiterated this by stating that “enjoyment 
and the exercise” of copyright “shall not be subject to any formality”.226  Dispensation from any 
requirement of a formality now leads to the automatic existence/creation of copyright. The non-
formality provision was actually one of the reasons why the United States initially declined to join the 
Union, since under the then US Copyright Act 1909, notice, deposit, registration and a domestic 
manufacture clause were required for copyright protection. With adherence to the Berne Convention 
on 1 March 1989, the USA also dispensed with formality as a requirement in its national copyright 
law. 
 
The non-formality feature distinguishes copyright from other forms of intellectual properties, 
specifically patent and trade marks, which do require registration and government issuance as a 
condition for legal protection. As far as a choice-of-law rule is concerned, the non-formality/non-
registration rule leads to the situation in which copyright law protection will not be linked or attached 
to a specific territory of registration in dealing with issues of the existence and initial ownership of the 
right. 
 
2.2.1.2.2 Entitlement to protection 
The Berne Convention requires the Union states to give copyright protection to works that are eligible 
for such protection. It is then important to know which authors and which works will be eligible for 
protection under the Berne Convention’s provisions. To receive such protection, an author or a work 
has to be within one of the requirements established in the Convention. The eligibility of authors for 
protection under the Convention is generally dealt with in Article 3, and Article 4 specifically deals 
with cinematographic works, works of architecture and artistic works incorporated in a building. On 
the whole, the Convention offers three connecting factors: 1) nationality, 2) first publication of the 
work in a Union state and 3) habitual residence. It is, nevertheless, to be noted that these factors are for 
determining the scope of the Convention in regard to works and authors. They are “in no respect 
connecting principles as regards the applicability of the law of that country.”227  
 
1) Nationality: as mentioned in Article 3, copyright protection is granted to all works of the author 
who is a national of one of the Union states, whether or not the works have been published in non-
Union state or are unpublished. The nationality rule has been revised at the 1967 Stockholm Revision 
Conference. 
 
2) Habitual residence: authors who have their habitual residence in a Union state are also eligible for 
protection under Article 3(2) of the Convention if they do not possess the nationality of one of the 
Union states. This factor was proposed, but rejected, for the 1886 Act, and was finally inserted by the 
1967 Revision. The reason for introducing this criterion had to do with the consideration that authors 
from non-Union states living in a Union state established a close link to the Union and, as a result, 
they are entitled to the protection. Such an introduction was, however, opposed because it would 
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discourage non-Union states from adhering to the Union.
228
 The discussion as to whether the term of 
“domicile” should be introduced was conducted during the 1967 Revision Conference. However given 
the diverse interpretation of this term, “domicile” was not accepted at the end and instead, the term of 
“habitual residence” is adopted with a view that it embodies a factual criterion rather a legal one.229 
  
As for the timing when nationality or habitual residence should be established in a Union state, the 
Berne Convention does not provide any guidance and leaves it for the national laws of Union states to 
determine. As to the effects of changes in these factors, e.g., does a work lose Convention protection if 
its author abandons his nationality or moves his habitual residence out of a Union state? Alternatively, 
for example, if the author changes his habitual residence or nationality from a non-Union state to a 
Union state, is Convention protection gained from the moment of change? Such questions remain to be 
determined by national courts in accord with the national laws that such courts will apply. For answers 
to these questions, some scholars have distinguished between published and unpublished works. For 
the former, if the changes of the nationality or habitual residence are to a non-Union state, an author 
should not lose Convention protection if at that time he has already established his eligibility for 
Convention protection. Conversely, in the situation where the author changes its habitual residence or 
nationality from a non-Union state to a Union state after his work is first published outside the Union, 
then the author should not gain Convention protection for it.
230
 For unpublished works, the date that 
should be determinative becomes controversial: should it be the date on which the work was created, 
or the date on which it, without being published, “became available” to members of the public, or the 




3) First publication of the work in a Union state: this forms another of the connecting factors in 
Article 3 of the Convention. Additionally, simultaneous publication in a non-Union state and 
publication in a Union state within 30 days of that first publication will be deemed simultaneous so 
that the non-Union state publication will be assimilated to the first publication in a Union state.
232
 This 
connecting factor operates independently, without requiring the existence of another connecting factor, 
such as nationality. As to the concept of “publication”, the Convention defines it in Article 3(3) by 
describing published works as 
“works published with the consent of their authors, whatever may be the means of manufacture 
of the copies, provided that the availability of such copies has been such as to satisfy the 
reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the nature of the work.”  
However, the same provision excludes the following from the definition of publication:  
“[t]he performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, cinematographic or musical work, the 
public recitation of a literary work, the communication by wire or the broadcasting of literary 
or artistic works, the exhibition of a work of art and the construction of a work of 
architecture”.233 
 
As for cinematographic works, works of architecture or artistic works incorporated in a building or 
another structure, Article 4 of the Convention provides other connecting factors. Thus, Article 4 
provides for protection: in the case of cinematographic works, if the maker of the work has his 
headquarters or habitual residence in one of the Union states; in the case of works of architecture, if 
the place where the work was erected in a Union state; in the case where artistic works are 
incorporated in a building or other structure, if the place where the building or other structure is 
located is in a Union state. 
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Each of the above connecting factors establishes a link between a work and a Union state. In fact, the 
Union state that the connecting factor designates will be the country of origin of that work. As will be 
analysed below, the country of origin is an important principle of the Convention, which determines 
whether a work can benefit from minimum Convention protection in other Union states. 
 
2.2.1.2.3 Protected works  
According to the Berne Convention, only works protected under the Convention can be subject to 
national treatment and minimum protection. Thus, Union states are not obliged to grant national 
treatment to a work that is not protected under the Berne Convention. In a similar vein, such a work 
would not be entitled to the Convention’s minimum protection in a Union state. 
 
The listing of the works entitled to protection is given in Articles 2 and 2bis. According to Article 
2(1), the Convention protects expressions of “literary and artistic works”, which shall “include every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression enumerates a list of protected subject matters”. The provision follows up with a 
comprehensive list of examples, which had, since the 1886 Berne Act, been expanded during the 
successive revisions: photographs were added in the 1896 Paris Addition Act;
234
 choreographic and 
architectural works in the 1908 Berlin Act; lectures and other oral works in the 1928 Rome Act; works 
of applied art and industrial design in the 1948 Brussels Act,
235
 and folklore in the 1967 Stockholm 
Act. This list includes the principal categories of works that have been recognized in most national 
copyright laws, and ensures copyright protection under the Convention. It is of note that the works 
enumerated in Article 2(1) are not defined in the Convention, and as a result of that the definitions and 
scope of these works are subject to national laws.  
 
The Convention also contains provisions under which translations, adaptations, arrangements of music 
and other alterations of a literary and artistic work,
236
 collections such as encyclopedias, etc. that 
constitute intellectual creations
237
 are protected without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. 
News of the day and miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information are 
excluded from protection.
238
 Protection for official texts of a legislative, administrative or official legal 





Works of applied art: giving special attention to works of applied art is due to the fact that this 
category of work is used for industrial purposes; for instance, a piece of furniture has designs, shape, 
and other artistic elements, but these elements are part of the furniture - the industrial product itself. 
This utilitarian character of works of applied art could make one wonder whether such works should 
be considered as artistic works when artistic elements can be identified in the works, and whether the 





Before the entry into force of the Berne Convention, different approaches had been taken to regulate 
the extent of the protection of artistic works in the industrial sphere, e.g. in France, a model for dealing 
with this issue was gradually developed during the course of the 19
th
 century, even though the course 
of that development was uneven. It was generally agreed that the makers of such works were entitled 
to copyright protection under the law of 1793, i.e. an artist did not lose the protection which he 
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enjoyed in relation to his “pure” intellectual work for the mere reason that said work was turned into 
an industrial product. The absolute cumulative protection based on the principle of the "unity of art" 
was then developed, and according to it there is no problem in excluding one or another type of legal 
protection.
241
 In other national laws, such as German and Italian laws, attempts were made to fix a 
boundary between works of “pure” art and those of art applied in industry, according to which works 
that are more industry-oriented could be excluded from copyright protection. In Great Britain (later the 
UK), a more rigid rule was applied, and accordingly after its 1911 Copyright Act, copyright protection 
was denied altogether in the case of an artistic work that was “industrially applied”.242 
 
The question how to deal with works of applied art was not discussed as part of the early revisions of 
the Berne Convention. Later in the 1908 Berlin Act, national treatment without any requirement of 
reciprocity was adopted,
243
 which was, however, considered unsatisfactory. During the revision 
process of the Brussels Act, a regime for the protection of applied arts was established, and this regime 
is continuously in use in the current version of the Convention. First, works of applied art were 
inserted into the list of the matters enumerated in Article 2(1) of the Convention. As a result, Union 
states are obliged to protect works of applied art. As further provided in the Brussels Act, it is left to 
Union states to determine the extent to which such works would be protected under their copyright 
laws or their laws on industrial designs and models. However, they must provide reciprocity: where 
one Union state only protects a particular work of applied art as a design or model, the author of that 
work would only be entitled in other Union states to the protection that the laws of those Union states 
accord to designs and models.
244
 The Paris Act further completed the rule by adding that the works 
which only enjoy industrial design protection in their countries of origin but not so in other Union 
states for the reason that those other states do not accord the same industrial design protection, shall be 




The effect of this Article is that Union states are not required to protect works of applied art under 
national copyright laws; rather they may protect them under the laws on industrial designs. In fact, 
such legislative effort has been reflected in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property. According to it, the Paris Union states are obliged to protect industrial designs.
246
 Since the 
memberships in both the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention largely overlap, most Berne 
Union states have enacted laws on industrial designs. Thus, Article 2(7) of the Berne Convention 
stipulates that as long as the law of the country where protection is claimed accords industrial designs 
protection to works of applied art, regardless how the law of the country of origin operates in this 
regard, such works will enjoy industrial design protection in the former country. If, however, the law 
of the country where protection is claimed does not provide industrial design protection to works of 
applied art, then the law of that country shall grant copyright protection for such works treating them 
as artistic works.  
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2.2.1.2.4 Duration of protection 
Prior to 1886, there were substantial differences in national laws in respect of the lengths of temporal 




 adopted the term of protection of the 
author’s life plus fifty years; life plus thirty years in Germany249 and Switzerland250; life plus eighty 
years in Spain,
251
 and so on. Due to these differences, it was proposed to have a uniform term among 
Union states. The 1886 Act, however, prescribed only the minimum term of ten years for translation 
right.
252
 For the rest of rights, the Convention did not grant national treatment, instead it subjected the 





The 1896 Paris Act did not address the issue of duration, but the perceived need to adopt a uniform 
time period of protection continued. The 1908 Berlin Act established a non-mandatory minimum term 
of protection of life, plus 50 years after the author’s death, together with comparable terms for 
photographic and other works.
254
 Due to the non-mandatory nature of the provision, Union states could 
still determine the protection according to their own laws and limit the term of protection for foreign 
works to those in their countries of origin. The 1928 Rome Act further added the minimum term of 
protection for joint works as 50 years from the death of the last surviving author.
255
 Finally, the 1948 
Brussels Act stipulated a mandatory minimum term of protection of life plus fifty years. 
 
The Paris Act kept the minimum term of protection at the life of the author plus fifty years after his 
death. It also prescribed alternative minimum terms for cinematographic works, anonymous and 
pseudonymous works and photographic works, e.g. for photographs and works of applied arts, Union 
states may maintain a protection of a minimum of 25 years from their completion;
256
 for 
cinematographic works, Union states may choose protection for 50 years from completion or from the 
time the work was first made available to the public.
257
 A comparison of terms is preserved in Article 
7(8),  
“the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed; 
however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the 
term fixed in the country of origin of the work”.  
Clearly, this provision is not subject to national treatment. As will be seen in a later section, this 
provision concerns a limitation on the duration of protection under the law of the country where 
protection is claimed, because it does not apply at all when the term of protection under that country’s 





Authorship plays an important role in the application of the Berne Convention. The Convention 
requires, among other things, that the author to be a national or resident of a Union state. Still further, 
the concept of authorship attaches to application of two main principles laid down by the Convention: 
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minimum protection and national treatment. The Convention does not set forth a definition of 
“author”. It has, however, been commented that the Convention does make an implied reference to an 
individual creator in the part of its preamble maintaining its purpose is the protection of “the rights of 
authors in their literary and artistic works”, and in some other provisions, such as Article 6bis and 
Article 7.
 259
  Nevertheless, the Convention lays down rebuttable presumptions for defining authorship: 
in the absence of the proof to the contrary, the person whose name appears on the work “in the usual 
manner” is the author of the work.260 Furthermore, it lays down a rule for determining copyright 




From the outset, the Berne Convention did not define who or what an author is. This may have 
something to do with the general consensus on this issue among the states represented at the early 
conferences: the creator of a work is to be the author of a work, and that author is to be the first owner 
of the copyright in the work.
262
 In the subsequent revisions, the concept of author had still not been 
defined. That was the result of the divergence of national laws in this regard, in particular the two 
distinct rationales underpinning the author’s right law tradition and the copyright law tradition.263 As 
to the former, only an individual who is the human creator of the original works can be qualified as an 
author, though in certain cases legal persons may be vested with the rights of an author,
264
 and for the 
latter, a legal person, such as a corporation can be an author, too.
265
 With ownership also not defined, 
the Berne Convention refers to national law to determine who qualifies as an author and thus the initial 
owner of copyright in a literary or artistic work. Nevertheless, an attempt at defining ownership can be 
seen in the area of cinematographic works.  
 
Cinematographic works: the ownership issue concerning cinematographic works has long posed 
problems for the protection of copyright in an international context. This issue is special in the sense 
that making a cinematographic work requires many participants’ creative contributions. Since whether 
these contributors should be entitled to be treated as the co-authors of a film and, as a result, entitled to 
exploit the right were regulated differently in common law and civil law systems,
266
 a risk that those 
treated as authors would be different in different countries will become real and affect the position of 
the film producers who make investments in cinematographic works and their financial motive to 
produce films. Hence, with a goal of enhancing and facilitating dissemination of cinematographic 
works across borders, an initiative to harmonize laws dealing with ownership issues in connection 
with cinematographic works had moved forward in the revision processes of the Berne Convention. 
 
Common law countries recognize that it is only producers who can be granted copyright in 
cinematographic works.
267
 An exception can, however, be seen in the present UK law. As a result of 
the entry into force of, and requirement to implement the EC Directives, the UK amended its law to 
add the principal director as an author. In the case where the principal director is the producer’s 
employee, the producer will be the sole initial owner of the copyright on the film concerned. The 
United States follows a similar approach: the producer of a cinematographic work owns the economic 
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exploitation rights in the work. Such a result is achieved by the application of the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine.
268
 As provided in Title 17 section 201(b), in the case of a work made for hire, the employer 
or other person for whom the work was prepared is deemed to be the author and, unless the parties 
have expressly agreed otherwise in writing, owns all of the rights encompassed by the copyright. In 
practice, the producer will establish the film as a work-made-for-hire and therefore own the copyright 
on the film. 
 
Civil law systems also demonstrate complexity in this respect.
269
 They take three main approaches: 
ownership by creative contributors, a legal assignment, and a presumption of assignment. For the first, 
the creative contributors, such as directors and camera operators are the owners of the right in the 
cinematographic work unless and until they have made an agreement transferring their rights.
270
 The 
legal assignment approach uses the device of a legal assignment of these rights which are deemed or 
implied to have been made by the co-authors. Under this approach, the producer is the initial owner of 
the exploitation rights, and the contract with the creative contributors cannot declare such contributors 
to be the initial owners.
271
 The presumption of assignment approach proceeds on the basis of an 
assumption that the economic rights in the film have been transferred to the producer of the film, 




Copyright protection of cinematographic works was first introduced in the 1908 Berlin Act, which, 
however, did not provide for who should be treated as the authors of such works. The situation 
remained the same in the subsequent revisions and is retained in the current version of the Convention, 
even though there were attempts to harmonize this subject on a worldwide level. Thus, the question 
who may be the author(s) of a cinematographic work is still subject to national legislation. 
 
As explained in the preceding paragraphs, the approaches to determine ownership in cinematographic 
works are so different in national laws that reaching a consensus on adopting one uniform system is 
virtually impossible. It is beyond any doubt that these approaches led to difficulty for international 
protection of cinematographic works. For example, creative contributors, such as directors of a film, 
are treated as initial owners in one country, but will not be treated so in another. This problem was 
dealt with during the revision process of the Stockholm Act, under which an attempt was made to  
“establish a system which would, as far as possible, provide clarity as to the person entitled to 
exercise the film exploitation rights in countries where the law provides that it is the creative 
contributors who are the initial owners of the authors’ rights in the cinematographic work”.273  
 
Article 14bis of the Berne Convention was then added in the Stockholm Act. It forms a rather 
“intricate reaffirmation of the national treatment principle, coupled with a substantive clause and a 
conflict rule”.274 Article 14bis (1) reiterates that a cinematographic work shall be protected as an 
original work. Since Union states could not agree on who was to be the author of a cinematographic 
work,
275
 Article 14bis(2)(a) provides that the ownership of copyright in such works shall be a matter 
for the legislation in a country where protection is claimed. As such, Union states are free to maintain 
the systems they prefer. Articles 14bis2 (b)(c)(d) and 14bis3 provide a solution to the authorship issue 
in cinematographic works. First, these provisions do not apply to the countries where the initial owner 
of cinematographic works is the producer, but only to the countries where the initial owners are 
persons who have brought contribution to the making of the work. Furthermore, in the countries 
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involved, these provisions do not apply to works that pre-exist the film, such as “scenarios, dialogues 
and musical works created for the film, or to the principal director thereof, unless the national 
legislation provides otherwise”. 276  In these countries, the contributors cannot object to normal 
exploitation, including reproduction, distribution of copies, screening in public, broadcast, etc, with 
regard to the film to which they have agreed to contribute, unless there is an agreement to the 
contrary.
277
 The form of such an agreement, i.e. whether a written one or one with the same legal 
effect is required, should be subject to the law of the country where the producer has his seat or 
habitual residence. This choice-of-law rule has the effect that all such agreements are governed by just 
one, single national law. Nevertheless, this choice-of-law rule can be set aside by the Union state 




Clearly, the Convention now recognizes the “film copyright” system embodied in the legislation of the 
common law countries.
279
 An effective harmonization of ownership in cinematographic works has, 
however, not been achieved by Article 14bis. First, in this regard, maintaining national treatment in 
ownership in cinematographic works keeps the national law systems intact. Furthermore, Article 14bis 
concerns only the limited number of Union states in which the initial owners of the film are 
contributors to its making, since a majority of the countries’ laws recognize the producer as an initial 
owner either by law or by contract, so that this article has only limited scope of application, and 




The Berne Convention does not directly deal with the issue of initial ownership. Thus, this issue 
remains subject to national legislation. Even for cinematographic works, the Convention has only 
limited effect. When concerned with the cross-border exploitation of cultural works, a more difficult 




2.2.1.2.6 Rights of protection 
From its very beginning, the Berne Convention sought to establish rights that are granted by the 
Convention. In responding to the challenges posted by contemporary needs, such as technological 
development, the list of exclusive rights has been gradually expanded during the processes of revising 
the Convention.  
 
The 1886 Berne Act expressly guaranteed two rights that were generally protected under the then 
national laws: the rights in relation to the making and public performance of translations of works.
282
 
The right of reproduction, which was also regularly protected under national law, was not included in 
the 1886 Act. The reasons for this omission may have been that the right was assured through national 
treatment
283
 so that it “was so much taken for granted that it was not even mentioned”,284 or it may 
have been because the scope and content of the reproduction right were so different under various 




The 1908 Act added protection for cinematographic productions as derivative works.
286
 The same Act 
also added a qualified right to make recordings of musical works
287
 and established a principle that a 
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work’s protection in any country of the Union is independent of its protection in its country of 
origin.
288
 The exclusive right in relation to broadcasting and public communication of works,
289
 and 
moral rights of attribution and integrity
290
 were introduced in the 1928 Rome Act.
 
The 1948 Brussels 
Act further strengthened several minimum Convention rights, including moral rights, the right of 
adaptation, and the right of translation. It expanded the broadcasting right to include television,
291
 and 
clarified rights in cinematographic works,
292
 and recognized the droit de suite (the resale right). The 
exclusive reproduction right as a minimum right with permitted exceptions was finally established in 
the 1967 Stockholm Act. It was the 1971 Paris Act that included for the first time the reproduction 




Moral rights: rights accorded to authors are generally classified into “moral rights” and “economic 
rights”. The former relates to protection of the author’s personality and the integrity of his work. In 
contrast, economic rights by themselves are not to protect the reputation of the author and/or the 
integrity of the work; rather, they aim at giving the rights owner control over commercial exploitation 
and use of the work, such as the rights of reproduction and distribution. 
 
Moral rights were first recognized in France and Germany long before their inclusion in 1928 in the 
Berne Convention, as a minimum standard.
294
 There were, however, no moral right protections in the 
common law countries. The differences between the civil law and common law countries in this regard 
originated from the tradition, indicated in Chapter 1, that in civil law countries an author’s right is 
considered to be a right stemming from personality, so that moral rights can only vest in, and initially 
be granted to individual human beings. Thus, only certain civil law countries supported the proposal 
for incorporating moral rights into the Convention at the 1928 Rome Revision Conference, and the 
provision that was finally adopted resulted from a compromise that took into account the concerns of 





Article 6bis(1) of the Convention recognizes two moral rights: the right to claim authorship of the 
work one has created (the paternity right), and the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work that would be prejudicial to the 
author’s honor or reputation (the integrity right). Article 6bis(1) expressly provides these rights are 
independent from the author’s economic rights, and are reserved to the author even after a transfer of 
the author’s economic rights. As to any question whether moral rights could be assigned or 
transferred, the Convention, as a part of a compromise in favor of common law countries, leaves it to 
the national laws of the Union states.
296
 Such a compromise can also be seen in Article 6bis(2) of the 
Convention, providing, after the author’s death, these rights shall be maintained at least until the 
expiration of the corresponding economic rights and further providing that they shall be exercisable by 
the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. In 
the same provision, the Convention left an option for those countries whose legislation at the moment 
of their ratification of, or accession to the Convention did not provide for the protection of all the 
rights set out in Article 6bis(1) after the death of the author. These countries could choose to provide 
that some of these rights may cease to be maintained after the death of the author. Article 6bis(3) then 
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provides that the legislation of the country where protection is claimed is to govern the means of 
redress for safeguarding the rights granted in that article.  
 
The reluctance of common law countries to recognize moral rights is, as will be seen in the coming 
sections, reflected in Article 9(1) of the TRIPs Agreement, which, while imposing on member states 
the obligation to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, makes an express 
exclusion of the moral rights provision. Notwithstanding the TRIPs provision, moral rights protection 
gained recognition in the WIPO Treaties: the WCT obliges member states to, unlike the TRIPs 
Agreement, comply with substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, including moral rights and, 
as a result, all WCT member states are under a treaty obligation to recognize an author’s rights of 
paternity and integrity; the WPPT also provides in its Article 5 for performers’ rights of attribution and 
integrity in live and recorded aural performances.  
 
2.2.1.3 The basic principles 
The Berne Convention requires a Union state to provide copyright protection to those “foreign” (i.e. 
non-domestic) works that are related to another Union state in the manner specified in the Convention. 
Animated by the desire “to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of 
authors in their literary and artistic works”, 297  the Convention establishes two main principles: 
minimum right (jus conventionis) and national treatment. Minimum rights that are accorded in the 
Convention itself are granted to authors who are entitled to protection under the Convention 
irrespective of the national law of the country where protection is claimed.
298
 National treatment 
means that works originating in one of the Union states must be granted the same protection in each of 
the other Union states as the latter grant to the works of their own nationals.  
 
These two principles are interrelated. Since merely granting national treatment to foreign authors 
could occur in a situation where a lower level of protection is accorded by a Union state to its own 
authors, which would be the level of protection that would be extended to foreign authors, as well. 
Consequently, foreign authors would be under-protected in that Union state. In order to avoid such an 
undesirable result, the Convention’s drafters inserted minimum levels of protection for foreigners and 
foreign works. As a result, foreign authors who are entitled to protection under the Convention shall 
enjoy in all Union states other than the country of origin of their works, not only those rights which the 
law of the countries concerned grant or may grant in the future to their nationals, but also the rights 
specially set forth in the Convention. 
 
Article 5(2) of the Convention embodies two additional principles that are important: the principle of 
automatic protection and the principle of independent protection. According to the terms of the former, 
Union states may not require that the existence of protection be conditioned on compliance with any 
formality.
299
 Under the principle of independent protection, Convention protection is independent of 
the terms of protection provided by the country of origin of the work.
300
 Article 5(3) states that 
protection in the country of origin is governed by that country’s domestic law. It follows that the 
Convention deals only with copyright protection that has an international feature. In accord with this, 
the principles of national treatment and minimum rights do not apply in the country of origin, but only 
in Union states other than that country. There is one exception to this, where the author is not a 
national of the country of origin of a work as to which he enjoys Convention protection. Thus, it is 
important to first identify the country of origin, because that determines which works, as well as what 
persons, are entitled to Convention protection. 
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2.2.1.3.1 Country of origin 
Country of origin is a fundamental concept used in the Berne Convention to distinguish domestic 
works from foreign ones and thereby determine whether a work can benefit from the Berne minimum 
standards of protection in other Union states. However, this concept has limited effect, because it does 
not prescribe the level of protection for a work protected under the Convention, except for what is 
provided as to duration of certain protections in Article 7(8),
301
 dealing with the protections for applied 
art
302
 and the droit de suite (artists’ resale right). While the Convention does not oblige the country of 
origin to afford minimum Convention rights to its own nationals, which is a matter for its national 
legislation as already noted above,
303
 it does, however, require a Union state to grant minimum 
Convention rights to authors whose countries of origin are other Union states. Under such a 
circumstance, it might occur that a Union state discriminates for its own authors against foreign 
authors,
304
 even though this may hardly ever happen because most Union states would not be willing 
to do that. Thus, in terms of the practical level of protection that a work receives, the country of origin 




Article 5(4) of the Convention sets forth a general rule for the process of identifying the country of 
origin, which in general is the Union state of first publication. The reasons for choosing the country of 
first publication as the country of origin were probably three-fold. First, this criterion was commonly 
used in national copyright laws and bilateral treaties. Second, this criterion respects the distinct legal 
relation created between an author and his/her published work.
306
 Third, this criterion would make it 
easier for users to discern where and whether a work is protected and would thereby facilitate 
exploitation of the work, since a published work will most probably be labeled with information about 




Article 5(4) also deals with such particulars as the authors’ nationality or habitual residence in 
situations of non-published works and where the first or simultaneous publication has not taken place 
in a Union state. According to these particulars: if a work is initially published in a Union state, that 
state is the country of origin; if the work is simultaneously published
308
 in several Union states, the 
state granting the shortest term of protection is the country of origin;
309
 if the work is simultaneously 
published in a Union state and a non-Union state, the Union state is the country of origin;
310
 in the 
situation where a work is not published, or is firstly published in a non-Union state without 
simultaneous publication in a Union state, if the author is a national or habitual resident
311
 of a Union 
state, that state is the country of origin.
312
 Article 5(4) deals with other particulars. For 
cinematographic works, the country of origin is the Union state where the maker of the work has his 
headquarters or habitual residence.
313
 In such a case, the place where the maker of the work is 
incorporated or registered is not relevant; as for works of architecture, it is the Union state where the 
work is erected; in the case where other artistic works are incorporated in a building or other structure, 
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Determining the country of origin under the rules in Article 5(4) may encounter problems. First, it may 
be difficult to find the country of origin in the circumstance of simultaneous publication on a 
worldwide scale. Nowadays, worldwide simultaneous publication is a rather common phenomenon in 
the information society. For example, Harry Potter 6, also 7, was published at the same time 
worldwide; in the IT software sector, the copies of a new program are commonly published 
simultaneously in several countries; similarly, a work can be published simultaneously online once the 
work is put on the Internet, provided that electronic publication is considered as publication under the 
meaning of Article 5 of the Convention.
315
 In such circumstances, difficulty in identifying a country of 
origin may arise if the Union states involved grant the same shortest term of protection. Looking to 
Article 5(4) for any specific solution could be of no avail. However, some scholars suggest that the 
country of origin should be decided by the date of the actual first publication, provided that such a date 
can be ascertained;
316





Potential problems may also arise when the nationality or habitual residence of an author is used to 
determine the country of origin as provided in Article 5(4)(c).
318
 First, a difficulty may arise when 
authors change nationality, or more often than not, habitual residence. Furthermore, difficulty may be 
encountered in cases where co-authors have different nationalities or habitual residences, or where the 
authors have several nationalities. It is suggested that if the countries concerned are only one Union 
state and one non-Union state, then the Union state should be the country of origin; when several 
Union states are involved, the country of origin should be the Union state granting shortest term of 
protection;
319
 when several Union states grant the same term of protection, then the solutions 
suggested by the scholar cited in the preceding paragraph should be considered. 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Minimum standards of protection 
The Convention establishes its minimum standards in respect of the persons qualified for protection 
under the Convention, the protected subjects, the right to be protected, the duration of protection, as 
well as limitations and exceptions subjecting to the three-step test. As to persons qualified for 
protection, authors and their successors in title mentioned in Article 2(6) and presumptive authors in 
Article 15 are the persons entitled to the protection. Protected subjects include the works laid down in 
Articles 2 and 2bis. Fundamental substantive rights to protection include moral rights of the authors in 
Article 6bis, and other rights: the translation right in Article 8, the reproduction right in Article 9, the 
public performance right in Article 11, the broadcasting right in Article 11bis, the public recitation 
right in Article 11ter, the right of adaptation in Article 12, the recording right in Article 13, the film 
right in Article 14 and the droit de suite in Article 14ter.
320
 There are also mandatory provisions 
concerning the absence of formalities in Article 5(2), the duration of protection in Article 7, and the 




The minimum standards of protection are more in favor of the interests of authors and their successors 
in title. They concern any work protected under the Convention in all Union states other than the 
country of origin of the work,
322
 irrespective whether the law of the country where protection is 
claimed provides the same level of protection.
323
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While the Convention deals only with the treatment of foreign works in a country other than their 
country of origin, it neither imposes an obligation on Union states about the way they treat their own 
nationals, nor introduces minimum rights for domestic works. In any event, since its minimum 
standards of protection cannot hinder Union states from providing higher levels of protection, Union 





Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention stipulates that protected authors are entitled to the rights 
accorded by the Convention. In cases where the application of national treatment leads to a lesser 
degree of protection than that required as a minimum under the Convention, rights holders may invoke 
the Convention’s minimum standards of protection before national courts of Union states. In fact, 
however, although the Convention does not oblige Union states to introduce the Berne minimum 
rights for domestic works, most countries have actually done so because they usually prefer not to 
discriminate against domestic works in favor of foreign works.
325
 Thus, despite its restriction to 
international situations, its principle of minimum rights has indirectly caused harmonization, to a 







National treatment had been the general method of providing for reciprocal protection in bilateral 
treaties in the 19
th
 century. It usually required that a state would accord protection to works originating 
in another state on the condition that the latter would give works from the former the same protection 
as it gave to works of its own nationals. This was, however, formulated differently in different treaties 
in terms of the scope and conditions of its application, for example some treaties would require the 
work in question to be protected in the country of origin.
328
   
 
During the process of drafting the Berne Act, a matter as to whether the principle of national treatment 
should be included was not as intensively debated as other matters, although in the 1884 Diplomatic 
Conference the German delegation did raise this matter and made further proposals for the unification 
of copyright law. The French, Swedish and Swiss delegates did not approve of such a proposal in view 
of the divergences that existed among national copyright laws and held that attempting to unify 
substantive copyright laws was not realistic. Then in the same Conference, they reached a compromise 
by adopting an approach of maintaining different national laws as the basis for international 
protection, combined with the principles of national treatment and minimum rights.  
 
The principle of national treatment was not completely adopted in the 1886 Berne Act, mainly due to 
the questions of compliance with formalities and duration of protection, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs.
 329
 Nevertheless, the final version of the Convention follows the basic requirement of 
national treatment, which read as follows:  
“[a]uthors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, 
in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective 
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laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted 
by this Convention”.330 
As to the works subjected to national treatment, the above-quoted provision requires the grant of 
national treatment to authors “in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention.” 
This is presumably in reference to the general scope of works which Article 2(1) describes as “every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression”, including, but not limited to, the list of examples enumerated in Article 2(1), as quoted in 
Chapter 1, section 1.1 supra. 
 
The principle of national treatment as augmented by minimum rights and the rule of retroactivity,
331
 is 
subject to any reservations a Union state may have made under the Paris Act or under some earlier 
Act, if it has preserved them under the Paris Act.
332
 Also, as explained in the preceding paragraphs, 
some exceptions to the principle of national treatment have been stipulated.  
 
Exceptions and limitations to the principle of national treatment 
It has been submitted that the reason for introducing exceptions to material reciprocity had mainly to 
do with the fact that national laws of Union states were so different that applying national treatment 
would lead to unreasonable imbalances of protection: a country with stronger protection would, 
according to the principle of national treatment, have to provide its stronger protection for foreign 




In order to correct such imbalances, the Berne Convention stipulates several exceptions to national 
treatment. Article 2(7) deals with the works of applied art, designs and models: works protected in the 
country of origin solely as designs and models are entitled in other countries of the Union only to such 
protection as is granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such special protection is 
granted in that country, such works must be protected as artistic works;
334
 Article 6(1) deals with 
restricted protection for nationals of non-Union states that do not grant adequate protection: where a 
non-Union state does not adequately protect the works of authors of a Union state, that state may 
restrict the protection of works of nationals of the non-Union state, unless the author concerned 
habitually resides in a Union state. If the country of first publication avails itself of this right, other 
Union states need not grant greater protection to the work than that granted in the country of first 
publication;
335
 Article 7(8) deals with the duration of protection, and authorizes the “comparison of 
terms” test: the temporal period of protection is governed by legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise provides, the period 
shall not exceed the one fixed in the country of origin of that work;
336
 Article 14ter(2) deals with the 
droit de suite, which requires reciprocity for the recognition of the right: the droit de suite may be 
claimed in a Union state only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and 
to the extent permitted by the country where this protection is claimed. 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the structure of Berne Convention is rather complex. Some 
provisions are the combination of harmonization, national treatment and reciprocity, such as the term 
of protection in Article 7 and the protection of works of applied arts and industrial designs in Article 
2(7). Other provisions are mandatory, such as: the exclusive right to authorize translation in Article 8 
and the freedom of citation in Article 10(1).  
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This complexity is further shown by the inter-relation of national treatment and minimum standards. 
As discussed in the sections 2.1.3.2 and 2.1.3.3 of this chapter, mere application of national treatment 
could lead to an imbalance of protection for a work in the country of origin and other Union states, and 
the Convention’s minimum rights correct this imbalance to a great extent by obliging Union states to 
accord minimum rights to foreign authors. Eventually, these minimum rights, indirectly, reach a 
certain degree of harmonization of copyright law of the Union states. However, given the diversity 
existing among national copyright laws, it is factually impossible to achieve total harmonization of 
copyright law worldwide. The legislative processes of the Berne Convention and its complex structure 




2.2.1.4 Does the Berne Convention contain choice-of-law rules? 
Whether and to what extent the Berne Convention may contain choice-of-law rules or may address 
solutions to the choice-of-law problem has been much debated among scholars and national courts.
338
 
Some scholars have submitted that the Berne Convention does contain such rules, or that it addresses 
such solutions.
339
 Their reasons for that are mainly two-fold. One dwells on the fact that the 
Convention stipulates only certain rights. Rights that are not regulated in the Convention are left for 
determination by national laws. In view of that, it has been maintained that the Convention needs 
choice-of-law rules to designate which national law shall apply to those rights not dealt with in the 
Convention. A second reason is based on the consideration that national treatment does not obviate 





This choice-of-law rule discussion is related to several aspects of the Berne Convention: those dealing 
with the application of the law of the country of origin, the principle of national treatment, and the 
laws of the country where protection is claimed. On that basis, some scholars argue that the law of the 
country of origin (the lex originis) constitutes a general choice-of-law in international copyright 
protection matters, or that the principle of national treatment entails a choice-of-law rule, or that 
Article 5(2) of the Convention is a choice-of-law rule referring to the application of the law of country 
where protection is claimed.  
 
2.2.1.4.1 The lex originis 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs on the Berne Convention, the notion of country of origin is 
rather important for it because it establishes the reference points for the application of the basic 
principles of the Convention, namely national treatment and minimum standards. Additionally, this 
concept often appears in legal writings as a choice-of-law rule concerning copyright protection in the 
international arena, particularly the issues of the existence, content and initial ownership of right. 
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The law of the country of origin – lex originis - is often stated to emanate from the “principle of 
universality”, directly linking copyright with one particular country. This theory had been presented 
by Bartin. According to him, for artistic and literary works, published and unpublished works should 
be treated differently: for published works, the existence and scope of the copyright should conform to 
the law of the country in which the first publication took place, and for unpublished works, to the law 
of the country to which the author belongs.
 341
   
 
Some academics have observed that the Berne Convention makes partial reference to the lex originis 
in relation to the matters of duration of protection and the recognition of a droit de suite.
342
 Still others 
contend that Articles 5(1) and 5(3) of the Berne Convention lead to a choice-of-law rule designating 
the lex originis, even though that would clearly be a unilateral choice-of-law rule only determining 
when domestic law applies to foreigners. They contend that it “must be interpreted bilaterally”, 
leading to a conclusion that the law applicable is the law of the country where the work was 
produced.
343
 Accordingly, they view the lex originis as a general rule that applies in all situations 
where the Berne Convention does not provide otherwise, e.g. the lex originis does not govern the 
matters of extent of protection and means of redress, as Article 5(2) expressly mentions but in 




On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the Berne Convention does not contain a lex 
originis rule.
345
 First, defining the country of origin is only for establishing certain conditions or 
limitations on the application of the national laws of the countries where the protection is claimed 
under the Convention, and consequently it is not a choice-of-law rule. The definition of the country of 
origin had been rather important in the 1886 Berne Act, because under it an author could claim rights 
under the Convention only upon the fulfillment of the conditions and formalities described by the law 
of the country of origin, i.e. as to the author’s capacity to enjoy rights in any other countries, the rights 
first had to be established in the country of the origin of his work. This situation was, however, 
changed by the 1908 Berlin Act. Under it the enjoyment and exercise of the rights granted by the 
Convention “are independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work”.346 In 
other words, the protection of a work under the lex originis, regardless of the definition of the country 
of origin, does not extend outside that country.   
 
Moreover, since the application of the lex originis is based either on nationality or the place of 
publication, such application would afford foreigners degrees of copyright protection higher or lower 
than those accorded to nationals and consequently would contradict the spirit of the Convention, 
which is aimed at avoiding discrimination against foreign authors.
347
 In fact, as will be analysed in the 
following paragraphs, the principle of national treatment includes a negative feature excluding 




What is more, the lex originis approach was recognized only in the Montevideo Convention on 
Literary and Artistic Property.
349
 According to that Convention, authors of a work and their successors 
enjoy in the signatory states the rights granted to authors by the law of state in which first publication 
or production of the work took place, i.e. the law of the country of origin.
350
 The less successful record 
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of the Montevideo Convention in being accepted also causes doubt about the lex originis approach. 
Because certain works can originate in more than one country, applying the lex originis leads to a 
situation where different rights will attach to the same works. One can imagine the inefficiency that 
would result from one right originating in a country granting a higher level of protection and the other 
in a country with a lower level of protection.
351
 This potential for inefficiency clearly demonstrates 





In addition, it is submitted that the lex originis rule
353
 should not be accepted as a general choice-of-
law rule in cross-border copyright claims, or as a choice-of-law rule in any dispute regarding to issues 
of the content, existence and initial ownership of copyright. First, the concept of the lex originis is not 
clear. Does it refer to the law of nationality, or habitual residence of the creator, or the place of 
publication? Defining the lex originis becomes more complicated when there is co-operative creating 
or in regard to work for an employer. If the lex originis refers to the place of publication, one may still 
wonder: what about unpublished works? Hence, predictability cannot be served by it. 
 
Although one might argue that adopting the lex originis would be in the interest of both the rights 
owners and the authorized copyright users in that for authors it would guarantee predictability and 
continuity of their copyright when their works cross borders
354
 and for authorized right users it would 
ensure that the work will receive the same treatment in all states,
355
 which could in turn facilitate 
international exploitation of copyright and international trade.
356
 It is still questionable whether 
adopting one single law- the lex originis - would really be an advantage, because doing so would lead 
to a situation where different copyright law systems would govern different works in the same country 
depending on their respective countries of origin.
357
 Consequently, it would be cumbersome in 
practice, since users, lawyers and courts would continuously have to become acquainted with a very 




Applying the lex originis to international copyright protection also attracts criticism on the following 
additional grounds. As has been pointed out above, copyright granted by a particular legal order 
reflects that country’s economic and cultural policies and balances public and private interests at stake 
in that country. Thus, considering the bundle of independent copyrights created in different countries, 
one may question why copyright created in one country, reflecting the values of that country and its 
rules on the existence, content and initial ownership of the right, should be extended to cover literary 




In conclusion, the Berne Convention does not contain a choice-of-law rule that designates the lex 
originis, and, in fact, the lex originis should not be adopted for making a general choice-of-law in the 
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2.2.1.4.2 Does national treatment entail a choice-of-law rule? 
National treatment is the bedrock principle of the Berne Convention that guarantees that rights owners 
protected in one Union state can claim in other Union states the same protection that the latter grant to 
their own nationals. Whether this principle should also be viewed as a choice-of-law rule has been 
much debated. The opinions in this regard are quite divided. Some commentators observe that this 
principle is simply a non-discrimination rule, requiring foreign and national authors to be treated in the 
same way under national law
360
 and restricting Union states from enacting laws that treat national 
authors more favorably than foreigners.
361
 In their view, the aim of this rule is to remove the 
differences between domestic authors and foreign authors, and consequently this principle cannot be 




It is believed that national treatment will only be applied once the applicable national law has been 
determined through the use of national choice-of-law rules.
363
 This view point was also upheld by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Itar-Tass case stating that “(…) the Convention’s 
principle of national treatment simply assures that if the law of the country of infringement applies to 
the scope of substantive copyrights protection, that law will be applied uniformly to foreign and 
domestic authors”. 364 Hence the principle concerns applying the same substantive laws to foreigners 




Others, however, contend that the principle of national treatment should be applied in advance, i.e. 
taking effect before dealing with the problem of choice-of-law, or it should be applied by the 
competent court before investigating the applicable law.
366
 This opinion is based on the argument that  
“the problem of the applicable law to intellectual property only arises if the subject, - normally 
a foreigner-, has the right to be the titleholder of the intellectual property. If the subject does 
not enjoy this right, the problem of the law which is applicable to the intellectual property 
would not arise and there would be no problem of ‘conflict of Laws’ in the case.”367 
According to this, the principle of national treatment should be interpreted in the sense that in applying 
the choice-of-law rule an obligation not to discriminate first applies. 
  
In contrast, most academics agree on a choice-of-law interpretation of the national treatment 
principle,
368
 even though their opinions differ as to which choice-of-law rule that principle refers to. 
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Some distinguished scholars believe that it should be interpreted as the application of the law of the 
country of origin,
369
 while others observe that that principle refers to the law of the forum country.
370
 
Stewart points out that the principle of national treatment indicates application of the law of protecting 
countries. As to the concept of “the law of protecting countries”, his interpretation is that it should be 
accepted as “broadly speaking the lex fori”.371 He further argues two reasons for that interpretation. 
First, adopting the lex fori would improve the quality of judgments and guarantee more certainty, since 
each court prefers to apply their own law, which they know best. Second, applying the lex fori would 
enable gradually attaining uniform higher levels of protection, since the countries providing lower 
level copyright protection will encounter the situation in which their nationals would get higher 
protection in other Union states, and the pressure of providing a higher level protection to their own 





Still other scholars maintain that national treatment points to the application of the law of the 
protecting country, i.e. the lex loci protectionis.
373
 As has been argued, the Convention “specifically 
refer(s) to the law of the country of protection as regards the application of the principle of national 
treatment.”374 Since this principle is understood as taking a territorial approach, it leads to the opinion 
that the law of a protecting country applies to all issues of cross-border copyright disputes, even “the 
question of who is the first owner of copyright is also decided in accordance with the law of the 
country where protection is claimed”.375  
 
It should, nevertheless, be repeated here that national treatment is merely a non-discrimination rule 
ensuring equal treatment to foreigners in relation to the rights on their works in countries other than 





First, the historical development of national treatment in international copyright protection 
demonstrates that national treatment has facilitated the extraterritorial recognition of foreign authors’ 
capacity of enjoying and exercising their rights in the countries other than the one where the rights 
have been granted. It has been argued that, from the perspective of this historical development, the 
principle of national treatment provides a solution to the so-called “legal vacuum” problem, which 
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could occur if a national law insists on dealing with national authors and foreign authors whose own 
law of the country of origin was territorially limited and as a result they would be left without 
protection by any law, and therefore the principle of national treatment must be a choice-of-law rule 
coupled with the rule of non-discrimination.
377
 Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that a rule for 
ensuring equality of treatment says nothing about the applicable law. In reality, national treatment is a 
rule for foreigners, aiming at protecting foreigners from any discrimination due to their capacity as 
foreigners, and it ensures that foreigners will enjoy copyright in the country where they claim such 
protection within the ambit of the Convention.  
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by the distinguished scholar A. Lucas, such a rule confirming the status of 
foreigners should be distinguished from a rule on choice-of-law,  
“‘an ancient temptation to lump together the status of foreigners and the choice-of-law’ has 
weighed heavily, and still does so, on the interpretation to be given to what is known as the 
principle of national treatment contained in Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention and adopted 
in many other international instruments.”378 
 
In addition, the opinion that national treatment does not function as a choice-of-law rule is shared by 
the WIPO, the international organization that administers the Berne Convention. It confirms that  
“neither does the national treatment principle reflect a private international law approach, as it 
does not purport to designate the law of any particular country that is to govern an intellectual 
property issue involving a foreigner, but merely states that foreigners should not be treated 
differently than nationals with respect to intellectual property issues”.379  
 
Some case law has upheld this opinion, as well. In Tod’s case, the ECJ held that “[a]s is apparent 
from article 5.1 of the Berne Convention, the purpose of that convention is not to determine the 
applicable law”.380 Judge Newman also concluded in the Itar-Tass case that the principle of national 




Insisting that national treatment includes a choice-of-law function may be irreconcilable with the 
purpose and the spirit of the Berne Convention. As stated in the preceding paragraphs, historically, the 
drafting of the Berne Convention was aimed at providing protection to a work with a foreign origin or 
a foreign author, and there was no choice-of-law issue in the picture. Insisting on doing so may lead to 
the reliance on “nationality” as a proper connecting factor and may consequently lead to different 
degrees of protection being granted to national and foreign rights owners, which would be contrary to 




If one were to persist in holding that the principle of national treatment has something to do with a 
choice-of-law issue, then the only relevance of that issue would be its negative way of operation, more 
precisely, by denying the possibility of applying “nationality” as a connecting factor and denying the 
lex originis approach.
383
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In fact, the same discussion on the principle of national treatment may also be encountered in regard to 
Article 3(1) of the TRIPs Agreement,
384
 Article 2 of the Rome Convention 1961
385
 and Article II of the 
UCC.
386
 As will be analysed later, national treatment is simply a rule requiring non-discrimination, 
confining its effect to domestic contexts, and does not imply a choice-of-law rule.  
 
2.2.1.4.3 Does Article 5(2) have a choice-of-law rule function? 
The question as to whether Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is a choice-of-law rule has also been 
debated among scholars. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention reads as following: 
“(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such 
enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country 
of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of 
protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be 
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.” 
 
Some scholars contend that this provision is a choice-of-law rule because its wording clearly states 
“…shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.” However, 
their opinions differ on how to interpret “the laws of the country where protection is claimed”. Some 
commentators interpret it as referring to the lex loci protectionis (the law of the country for which 
protection is sought), others as the lex fori (the law of the country before whose court the case is 
brought),
387
 yet others as the lex loci delicti (the law of the country where the alleged violation of the 
right has committed). 
 
As to the lex fori, it is argued that when Article 5(2) refers to the laws of the country where protection 
is claimed in regard to “the means of redress afforded to the author”, since the means of redress 
arguable refer solely to rules of procedure in relation to the means available for the copyright owner to 
bring a claim in the forum country, it is generally governed by the lex fori and, as a result, one may 
adhere to a view that the laws of the country where protection is claimed refers to the lex fori.
388
 It is 
also argued that, because the place of the forum is often the place where the alleged violation of the 
right was committed, the lex fori of that place shall then apply to the disputes. What is more, the literal 
reading of “the laws of the country where protection is claimed”389  leads to an inference that it 
designates the lex fori. Somehow, this also has to do with the belief that the drafters of Article 5(2) 
may have assumed that the place of forum and the place of infringement would in practice coincide. 
This might have been a reasonable factual assumption at the time the provision was drafted.
390
 As a 
result, confusion arises as to whether “the laws of the country where protection is claimed” designates 
the lex fori. 
 
These arguments should not, however, be upheld. As to the first argument, “the extent of protection”, 
just like “the means of redress”, is also stated to be subject to the laws of the country where protection 
is claimed. So merely relying on “the means of redress” for designating the lex fori is not sufficient, let 
alone the fact that “the means of redress” are sometimes not exclusively judicial. As to the second, 
although the coincidence of the two places would often occur in practice, the place of forum may have 
no relation with the alleged copyright claim. In other words, authors may bring a claim before a court 
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other than the place of alleged infringement, e.g. the country where the alleged defendant has assets.
391
 
Under this circumstance, application of the lex fori cannot be justified. Moreover, there are 
circumstances under which the applicable law is necessary to be defined in a legal relationship but 
outside of a court proceeding, such as in the context of contractual negotiation.
392
 Furthermore, 
applying the lex fori may also be contrary to the general objectives of the Berne Convention which 
ensure that “authors be protected in as uniform a manner as possible”,393 because applying the lex fori 
may result in a disjunction  
“between the law applied to the claim and the law that governs in the place where the 
infringement occurred; that in turn may mean that the author does not receive the same level of 
protection as do authors in the country of infringement.”394 
 
Additionally, applying the lex fori in cross-border copyright disputes may frustrate the parties’ 
reasonable expectations. In practice, a plaintiff could bring a copyright dispute before a court where 
the alleged infringer is domiciled, if this place had nothing to do with the copyright at stake, the 
parties’ interest would be jeopardised if the lex fori denies such copyright protection or rejects the 
existence of the right.
395
 Furthermore, the application of the lex fori in this case would be incompatible 
with the rationale of copyright, which is to reflect the economic and cultural policy of the country that 
granted such rights.  
 
Still further, applying the lex fori would encourage forum shopping. Since the same individual right 
will be governed by different laws depending on the place of the submission of the dispute, the 





Other experts and courts contend that the expression of “the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed” that is set forth in Article 5(2) designates the lex loci delicti.397 Such an interpretation should 
not be supported because the fact that the place where the work is used and the place where the work 
is allegedly infringed are often identical cannot just because of that fact justify designation of the lex 
loci delicti. Additionally, since the Berne Convention is aimed at establishing a “comprehensive legal 
system of lawful uses of works”, concern should be given to the exploitation or use of the copyrighted 
work, rather than infringement only.
398
 Furthermore, since wording similar to “the laws of the country 
where protection is claimed” is used in other provisions of the Convention, such as Articles 
14bis(2)(a) and (2)(c), which deal with ownership and the limitation of certain rights of certain 
contributors to cinematographic works, and since the lex loci delicti is only for infringement claims 
and cannot be applied to determine issues such as initial ownership, an interpretation of “the laws of 
the country where protection is claimed” as referring to the lex loci delicti would not be appropriate. 
 
The predominant opinion on the interpretation of the term “the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed” is that it refers to the lex loci protectionis.399 It is argued that the wording of Article 5(2) 
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shows the drafters’ preference for choosing the law of the country of protection as the applicable law 
rule and rejecting the lex originis.
400
 To further support this opinion, some scholars maintain that the 
imprecision of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which causes the confusion about lex fori or lex 
loci protectionis, occurred because the drafters of the Convention during the drafting process could not 
imagine that a copyright claim could be brought to a court of country different from the country where 
the alleged violation had been committed.
 401
 Moreover, adopting this interpretation guarantees legal 
certainty, because the law applicable will be the same irrespective of the place of the court hearing the 
claim.
402
 What is more, this interpretation promotes judicial security in that the law applicable will be 
that of the country where the author’s right is effective, 403 which is similar to the opinion that Article 5 
refers to the law of the country where the work is used.
404
 Hence, it has been suggested that the 
expression “the laws of the country where protection is claimed” should be interpreted to mean the law 




As a number of commentators have rightly observed, it is again repeated that Article 5(2) is not a 
choice-of-law rule.
406
 First, given the public law nature of copyright in history and the drafting process 
of Article 5(2), it is unlikely that the drafters of the Convention intended to introduce a choice-of-law 
rule for copyright disputes.
407
 Second, Article 5(2) stipulates that the matters of “means of redress” 
and “extent of protection” be governed by “the laws of the country where protection is claimed”. As 
the preceding paragraphs indicate, any interpretation of the language in question as designating a 
choice-of-law rule would be a cause for controversy. The Berne Convention does not provide a clear 
definition or definite interpretation of “means of redress”. It would follow that such a matter should 
then be subjected to classification under national law to determine whether it is part of substantive law 
or part of procedural law. If it is classified as substantive law, the lex causae should apply, and if 
classified as procedural law, then the lex fori should apply.
408
 Among scholars, opinions in this regard 
also vary. Some observe that the “means of redress” should be in reference to the lex fori,409 others 
maintain that this refers to the lex causae, as provided by certain rules of national private international 
law.
410
 Still others submit that the “means of redress” in Article 5(2) is not exclusively judicial, which 
is the same as what is enumerated in the Part III of the TRIPs Agreement. As a result it does not need 
to be made subject to the lex fori.
411
 Thus, if for the sake of argument, the lex fori governs the “means 
of redress”, how about “the extent of protection”, a matter generally governed by the lex loci 
protectionis? It would be incredible for a Convention to have one of its expressions interpreted in two 
different ways, i.e. that “the laws of the country where protection is claimed” would mean both the lex 
fori and the lex loci protectionis at the same time.  
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Even if someone insists that Article 5(2) by referring to “the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed” is a choice-of-law rule, the opinions regarding the scope of Article 5(2) would again have to 
deal with the question whether this provision actually performs a choice-of-law function. Some 
experts interpret that the choice-of-law rule referred in Article 5(2) applies only to the matters of 
“extent of protection” and “means of redress”.412 Hence, the law applicable to the matters other than 
these two will have to be determined by courts according to their national choice-of-law rules. 
Consequently, it could be the lex loci protectionis, or the lex loci delicti, the lex fori or the lex originis 
that will be applied, e.g. French courts apply the lex originis to determine the initial ownership and 
existence of copyright;
413
 Austrian laws provide the application of the lex loci delicti to the creation 
and termination of IP rights;
414
 and German courts accord a wider scope of the application of the lex 
loci protectionis in cross-border copyright disputes.
415
 Under this circumstance, different laws could 
be applied to different matters of copyright claims. Then, one might deliberate on two further issues: 
why would the drafters of the Berne Convention deal with only two aspects of copyright claims when 
they had the choice-of-law consideration in mind,
416
 and would the results of applying such an 
interpretation be consistent in terms of adjudicating cross-border copyright disputes and providing 
certainty and predictability for both rights owners and users? 
 
Some scholars maintain that a choice-of-law rule embedded in Article 5(2) has a wider application of 
“the laws of the country where protection is claimed” that extends to all matters of copyright claims.417 
If Article 5(2) is to be so interpreted, the references in favor of the legislation of “the country where 
protection is claimed” in Articles 6bis(2), 6bis(3), 10bis(1), 14bis(2)(a) would then make no sense, 
because the wider interpretation of Article 5(2) should have covered the matters laid down in these 
provisions.  
 
Moreover, the imprecise wording of the connecting factor, i.e. “where protection is claimed” used in 
Article 5(2) raises a concern about whether it should be considered as a choice-of-law rule. The 
wording “the laws of the country where protection is claimed” is ambiguous in that it may be 
interpreted, as discussed above, as the lex fori, the lex loci delicti, or the lex loci protectionis. From the 
very disagreement about what choice-of-law rules the Berne drafters purported to introduce, it may be 
inferred that Article 5(2) cannot be construed as a choice-of-law rule. 
 
Based on the above arguments, it is submitted that Article 5(2) is not a choice-of-law rule. As to what 
has been observed, this provision is no more than “another illustration of the efforts to abolish 
discrimination against foreign authors.”418  
 
2.2.1.4.4 Short summary 
To conclude, the Berne Convention consists of a body of substantive rules, not choice-of-law rules, 
except where it deals with contracts concerning contributions to cinematographic works (Article 
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14bis(2)(c)). According to that the question whether a contract for cinematographic adaptation of a 
work has to be made in writing, shall be a matter for the legislation of the country of the Union where 
the maker of the cinematographic work has his headquarters or habitual residence. This provision 
further stipulates that if a written form is required under the law of the country where the protection is 
claimed, that applies even where the country of the maker of the work does not require such a form.
419
 
Thus, the exception combines the lex originis and lex protectionis rules. 
 
As discussed earlier, the Berne Convention is the most important copyright convention, not only 
because of its great practice importance, but also because of its influence on the formation of 
international treaties that were established afterwards. Since above sections have reviewed the 
structure and the principles of the Berne Convention for their choice-of-law relevance, it is necessary 
to briefly also study those treaties. 
 
2.2.2 The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) 
The Berne Convention had a European origin, and its influence spread to other continents. Until the 
1948 Brussels Revision of that Convention, important states like the United States, the Soviet Union 
and other countries in Asia and Africa had, however, not adhered to the Berne Convention. The 
primary reason had to do with the consideration that the Berne minimum standards were incompatible 
with their domestic laws.
420
 For example, as for the United States, the Berne minimum standards of 
moral rights, the non-formality requirement and the minimum duration of 50 years pma differed from 
the then copyright law – US Copyright Act 1909. According to the latter, moral rights were not 
recognized, certain formalities were required for the protection of copyright and copyright protection 




The UCC was intended to bring these countries into the international copyright sphere. The initiative 
of establishing an international treaty bridging Berne Union states and non-Union states could be 
traced back to the 1928 Rome revision of the Berne Convention, when a discussion was undertaken to 
include the United States as a party.
422
 Under the auspices of UNESCO, a separate copyright 
convention – the Universal Copyright Convention - was adopted in 1952 and revised in 1971.423  
 
2.2.2.1 Basis and structure 
Like the Berne Convention, the UCC provides for national treatment and minimum rights.  The 
general standard of protection is, however, lower than that established in the Berne Convention. The 
UCC requires contracting states to provide “adequate and effective” protection as a minimum right 





 As to the first three, contracting states may adopt exceptions that “do not conflict with 
the spirit and provisions of this Convention”.426 Unlike the Berne Convention, the UCC lays down a 
maximum of formalities which may be required to secure protection with the symbol © accompanied 
by the name of the copyright owner and the year of first publication,
427
 and it does not include moral 
rights. As for the duration of protection, Article IV of the UCC prescribes a minimum term of twenty-
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five years pma, or if the protecting country does not compute the copyright term on the basis of the 
author’s life, twenty-five years from publication or registration of the work. 428  Unlike the Berne 
Convention, the UCC contains no provisions on determination of authorship. 
 
2.2.2.1.1 National treatment 
Article II
429
 of the UCC briefly lays down the principle of national treatment, stating that the works 
protected by that Convention enjoy in each contracting state the “same protection as that… State 
accords to works of its nationals.” It prescribes a concrete obligation to assimilate foreign authors with 
national authors. Under the UCC, every contracting state has to grant the works of those who are 
nationals of another contracting state or who have first published in a contracting state the same 
protection that such other contracting state accords to works of its own nationals that are published for 
the first time in its own territory. Unpublished works by nationals of other contracting states shall also 
enjoy the same protection as corresponding domestic works. The sole exception to the principle of 
national treatment in the UCC is a provision regarding the term of protection in Article IV (4) (a). 
According to it, no contracting state is obliged to grant a longer period of protection than that fixed for 
corresponding works in the country of origin.  
 
One scholar observes that the UCC contains a “more disguised” choice-of-law rule, which is due to 
the fact that the UCC does not operate on the basis of the concept of “country of origin”.430 He further 
explains that the national treatment principle enhanced in the UCC requires the contracting states to 
accord the same protection to foreign works eligible for protection as they accord to works of their 
own nationals, and as a result, a kind of lex loci protectionis applies to works protected by the UCC.
431
 
Nevertheless, it is concluded herein that the wording of Article II only requires the contracting states 
to treat qualifying works no less favorably than they treat the works of their own nationals, and as has 
been argued with respect to the above comparable sections on the Berne Convention, the principle of 
national treatment has nothing to do with designating the law that is applicable to international 
copyright protection. 
 
2.2.2.2 Relation to the Berne Convention 
Since the UCC offers a lower level of copyright protection than the Berne Convention, a Berne Union 
state could withdraw from the Berne Union and join the UCC. To discourage this from happening, the 
drafters of the UCC introduced the so-called “Berne Safeguard Clause” in Article XVII. Under this 
clause, when a country has withdrawn from the Berne Convention, works that have that country as 
their country of origin shall not be protected by the UCC in the Berne Union states.
432
 In addition, the 
UCC states that it will not apply to the “relationship among countries of the Berne Union in so far as 
it relates to the protection of works having as their country of origin, within the meaning of the Berne 
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Convention, a country of the Berne Union”433 and that it will not “in any way affect” the provisions of 
the Berne Convention or membership of the Berne Union.
434
 Nowadays, the above provisions are of 
limited practical importance because of the full incorporation clause of the TRIPs Agreement, which 




As a whole, the UCC has been successful in terms of membership. The two important states, the 
United States and the Soviet Union joined the UCC in 1955 and 1973 respectively, while both 
countries were not yet Union states of the Berne Convention. Although the UCC has a large 
membership -100 contracting states,
436
 its importance in the international copyright regime is 
diminishing. Since the UCC aims at bringing more countries together on a “lowest common 
denominator” basis, it cannot catch up with the trend towards increasing the level of copyright 
protection, especially, with the accession of the USA to the Berne Convention in 1989 and the 
subsequent advent of the TRIPs Agreement, to which almost all countries are conforming and which, 




2.2.3 The Rome Convention 1961
438
  
The appearance of the technology of electronic recording, then radio and later on television in the 
early 20
th
 century created a need for protection of works derived from these technologies, such as 
protection against unauthorized reproductions of sound recordings, performances and broadcasts. The 
producers/creators of such works, who made investments of skill, expertise and finance, initially called 
for protection within the ambit of the Berne Convention. 
 
The issue of international protection for such rights was first raised in the 1908 Berlin Revision when 
the British government proposed international protection for phonograph record producers. However, 
that proposal was not considered because the subject might more properly be protected as industrial 
property rather than copyright.
439
 In subsequent Berne Convention revision processes, the subjects of 
protecting performing artists and recorded performances had been raised in the 1928 Rome Revision 
and the 1948 Brussels Revision. In the latter Revision, the Conference passed resolutions calling for 
Union states to study the issues on the protection of broadcasters, performers and sound recording 
producers.  
 
Since then, a need to adopt a separate, self-standing international instrument to protect performers, 
sound recording producers and broadcasters had become accepted. The reasons for a separate 
convention may have had to with the unique inter-related nature of the three subjects. All sound 
recordings that are commercially exploited involve performances and they function as important 
constituents of broadcasting. Thus, the best and most convenient way of achieving protection for such 
presentations and establishing balanced protection among them was to formulate a separate legal 
instrument specifically dealing with the rights of performers, sound recording producers and 
broadcasters.
440
 There had been difficulties making the Berne Convention encompass those three 
rights within its scope. As described in the preceding section, the Berne Convention accords protection 
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mainly to individual creators of a work, while the typical owners of the three related rights,
441
 
particularly sound recording producers and broadcasters are always companies or corporations. That 





The preparatory work for a separate convention was carried out by three intergovernmental 
organizations: BIRPI (the predecessor to WIPO), UNESCO and the International Labour Office (ILO) 
and by three international non-governmental organizations: FIM (the International Federation of 
Musicians) later joined by FIA (the International Federation of Actors); IFPI (the International 
Federation of Producers of Phonograms) and EBU (the European Broadcasting Union).
 443
 A final text 
of the convention was signed on 26 October 1961 in Rome and came into force on 18 May 1964.  
 
2.2.3.1 Basis and structure  
The Rome Convention 1961 establishes the principle of national treatment, accompanied by minimum 
rights accorded to the beneficiaries of the Convention: performers, phonogram producers and 
broadcasting organizations. The basis of protection under the Convention is, however, not the same for 
each of them. Phonogram producers are granted an exclusive reproduction right (Article10).
444
 
Similarly, broadcasting organizations are accorded an exclusive right of reproduction, rebroadcasting 
and the fixation of their broadcast (Article 13).
445
 However, performers are not granted an exclusive 
right, but the “possibility of preventing” certain acts (Article 7), such as preventing unauthorized 
fixation of performances.
446
 Performers may (like phonogram producers) have a right to receive a 
single equitable remuneration for the secondary use of the phonograms as provided in Article 12.
447
 
The Convention permits contracting states to provide exceptions for e.g. private use, the purposes of 
teaching, etc. (Article 15)
448
 and to make reservations from the Convention in the circumstances 
described in Articles 5(3), 6(2), 16, and 17. A minimum period of protection of 20 years is provided 
(Article 14).
449
 Furthermore, the Rome Convention 1961 does not require a formality as a condition 
for the Convention protection, but permits a contracting state to do so subject to a maximum of 
formality (Article 11). According to it, a contracting state requiring a compliance with a formality 
should consider any formality to be fulfilled by the symbol ℗ accompanied by the year date of the first 
publication, and the rights owners and producers’ names or trade marks applied on the published 
phonograms or their containers.
450
 It is of note that the Rome Convention 1961 does not contain any 
provision as regards moral rights, infringement, remedies, penalties or enforcement. 
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As a rule, the Rome Convention 1961, like the Berne Convention, applies only for the protection of 
the enumerated kinds of beneficiaries in international situations, i.e. the situations where foreign rights 
owners are involved.
 451
 Thus, protection of these beneficiaries in their own countries is left to their 
domestic laws. In fact, similar to what happened in the case of the Berne Convention, the minimum 
rights described above have also been regularly applied by the contracting states in domestic situations 




2.2.3.1.1 National treatment 
Modeled on the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention 1961 provides national treatment to foreign 
works. Article 2 defines national treatment as the treatment accorded “by the domestic law of the 
Contracting State in which protection is claimed”. This conception of national treatment is further 
specified in respect of each of the three groups of beneficiaries.
453
 Adopting such an approach had to 
do with the potential that the criteria for national treatment could vary in the respective national 
legislations.
454
 Unlike the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention 1961 does not provide for a 
concept of the country of origin, and, as a result, it provides for a more simple method for the 




The application of national treatment to performers means that performers protected under the 
Convention can claim in a contracting state the same treatment as provided under its domestic law for 
national performers in respect of performances taking place, first fixed or broadcast in that state. For 
example, Contracting state A grants its own national performers the right to authorize recording of any 
of their performance taking place in its territory, then state A must accord the same treatment to the 
performers who are entitled to claim national treatment under the Rome Convention 1961, subject to 
certain limitations provided in the Convention. Similar provisions are also provided to the other two 
groups of beneficiaries. In short, it is the treatment that “a State grants under its domestic law to 
domestic performances, phonograms, and broadcasts”.456 
 
The Rome Convention 1961 includes a few exceptions to national treatment. These are in the cases 
concerning the remuneration right for performers and phonograms producers for secondary uses,
457
 
and the communication right of broadcasting organizations.
458
 Under these circumstances, 
“contracting States may make reservations in order to limit the protection granted, while the other 
contracting States may limit their protection towards the one making the reservation accordingly”.459  
 
The principle of national treatment, together with minimum rights and the limited reciprocity rules, is 
to avoid injustice caused by large divergences in levels of protection among contracting states.
460
 It 
should be submitted that national treatment here is only concerned with treatment under the domestic 
laws of a protecting country, and as analysed above in relation to the almost identical wording in 
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2.2.4 The TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPs Agreement is a legal instrument on intellectual property protection for international trade. 
That is administered by the WTO. Prior to TRIPs, copyright and related rights were, at the 
international level, regulated by the treaties administer by the WIPO or jointly by UNESCO and the 
ILO. From the late 1970s, the developed countries expressed increasing concerns that the Berne 
Convention fails to provide adequate protection for their copyrights, especially in the area of 
audiovisual entertainment, such as the music and film industries. This concern was also added to by 
the emerging technological changes, in particular the Internet, which has dramatically enhanced the 
distribution of copyrighted works on a vastly wider scale.  
 
Dissatisfaction with the Berne Convention has mainly been caused by two drawbacks inherent in it. 
First, that Convention does not provide adequate mechanisms for enforcing rights before national 
judicial or administrative bodies. Second, that Convention does not provide effective mechanisms for 
settling disputes between Union states.
462
 Although the Berne Convention contains a theoretical right 
of access to the International Court of Justice “concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention”,463 that provision had never been invoked and its effectiveness was substantially reduced 
due to the fact that it allows Union states to declare they were not bound by the jurisdiction of the 
court.
464
 Furthermore, experience with the most recent attempt to revise the Berne Convention in 1971 
has showed that it will be difficult to reach a consensus on a further revision of the Convention. As 
required by Article 27(3) of the Convention, unanimity of all Union states is needed for a further 
revision. Given the conflicts of interest between developed and developing countries, and even those 
between the industrialized countries, reaching such unanimity is bound to be rather difficult.
465
 Taking 
a trade-based approach to intellectual property protection, other than through the WIPO treaties was 
then conceived. Within the framework of the GATT, negotiations and discussions about intellectual 
property protection were initiated.
466
 In 1994, the member states to the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
concluded the TRIPs Agreement, which aims at contributing 
 “to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.”467  
 
Several main features of TRIPs deserve to be highlighted here. TRIPs covers all intellectual property 
rights that come within its scope, including copyright and related rights. It requires Members to adhere 
to national treatment and the most-favored nation principle. Based on the Paris and Berne conventions, 
it incorporates substantive rules enshrined in those treaties. Furthermore, it increases the level of 
protection in all fields of intellectual property: e.g. in the fields of copyright, including the subjects of 
computer programs, compilations of data, and some aspects of related rights. More strikingly, it fills in 
gaps that were left by the Paris and Berne Conventions, i.e. it introduces substantial procedural 
requirements so as to achieve effective enforcement of IP rights within national administrative and 
judicial systems, e.g. to order a party to desist from an infringement, to order the infringer to pay the 
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rights holder damages, and so on. Moreover, it establishes an effective dispute settlement mechanism 




2.2.4.1 Relation with the Berne Convention 
The relationship between the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement is established in Article 
9(1) of the TRIPs Agreement.
469
 It requires that Members shall comply with specified articles of the 
Berne Convention and its Appendix. The technique of full incorporation of the substantive provisions 
of another convention is rather new in international treaty law.
470
 Because of the full incorporation, 
rights and obligations already long established in the Berne Convention will assist in the interpretation 
of the TRIPs Agreement. Full incorporation also means that even the members that are not parties to 
the Berne Convention are obliged to abide by its substantive provisions. In that way it keeps these 
states from engaging in lengthy negotiations on the specifics of the Berne standards.
471
  Furthermore, it 
assures that disputes involving the Berne Convention between WTO members can also be resolved 
under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, even in a situation where the TRIPs member is not an 
adherent to the Berne Convention.
472
 What is more, the obligation of full compliance actually resulted 
in an increase to the membership of the Berne Union states from 47 to 165. 
 
Moral rights (Article 6bis of the Berne Convention) are expressly excluded from TRIPs. Such 
exclusion may have something to do with the nature of the Agreement, which is trade and economics 
related, whereas moral rights are not “trade related”.473 Notably, this exclusion does not derogate from 
the rights and obligations that the contracting states to the Berne Convention have under its Article 
6bis. In fact, such rights and obligations remain in force, but cannot be made applicable to the WTO 
members that have not adhered to the Berne Convention, and such states therefore cannot, in any 




For copyright protection, the TRIPs Agreement extends coverage further than the Berne 
Convention.
475
 The TRIPs Agreement supplements the provisions laid down in the Convention, 
particularly by introducing rules for the protection of computer programs and compilations of data 
(Article 10), and the recognition of rental rights, at least for computer programs, except where the 
program itself is not the essential object of the rental (Article 11). Besides, TRIPs stresses the often-
described “idea/expression dichotomy” in its Article 9(2) so that its copyright protection can apply to 
an expression, but not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.  
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2.2.4.2 Basic principles of the TRIPs Agreement 
2.2.4.2.1 Most-favored Nation Principle (MFN)
476
 
Article 4 of TRIPs stipulates an obligation of most-favored nation treatment,
477
 which requires all 
members to extend advantages, favors, privileges or immunity accorded to one member state 
immediately and unconditionally to all other member states. Incorporating the MFN principle into 
TRIPs ensures that all member states would obtain an equivalent level of protection when more 
extensive protection was granted to some foreigners.
478
 Therefore, nationals of other member states 
will be treated in the same way. It is notable that the MFN, a feature of tariff treaties, was not 
traditionally incorporated in the WIPO Conventions.  
 
The MFN is not limited to TRIPs obligations, but extends to all protection for intellectual property 
rights, except for the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.
479
 
Several other exceptions to the MFN treatment are also provided: privileges that consist of judicial 
assistance or law enforcement of a general nature, not particularly confined to IP protection;
480
 
privileges contained in the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention 1961 providing for 
reciprocity which exclude not only national treatment, but also MFN;
481
 privileges existing prior to the 
entry into force of the TRIPs Agreement to the extent that agreements with respect to them are notified 
to the TRIPs Council and, do not amount to “an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” against 




2.2.4.2.2 National treatment principle 
Although the national treatment principle has been applied in the Berne Convention and the Rome 
Convention 1961, Article 3
483
 of the TRIPs Agreement reiterates it,
484
 requiring that each WTO 
member state should treat nationals of the other member states as least as well as the former treats its 
own nationals in relation to the protection of intellectual property. Being a part of “General Provisions 
and Basic Principles”, national treatment applies to all aspects of IP rights laid down in Article 1(2), 
and includes copyright and related rights. Of course, national treatment is the key principle of the 
Berne Convention. With the full incorporation of the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention 
into TRIPs, the principle of national treatment in the Berne Convention is also incorporated, along 
with the exceptions to that principle that the Berne Convention provides. Additionally, the exceptions 
from it in the Rome Convention 1961 also have to be respected.  
 
                                                          
476
 The application and effect of the MFN, see Silke von Lewinski (supra n 60) paras 10.40-10.49. 
477
 Art. 4 of TRIPs reads, “(w)ith regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.” 
478
 For interpretation of the MFN principle, see UNCTAD-ICTSD (supra n 466) 77-82; Carlos M. Correa (supra 
n 469) 65-72. 
479
 Art. 4(c).  
480
 Art. 4(a). 
481
 Art. 4(b). 
482
 Art. 4(d). 
483
 “1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions 
already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome 
Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. In respect of performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this obligation only applies in respect of the rights 
provided under this Agreement. Any Member availing itself of the possibilities provided in Article 6 of the Berne 
Convention (1971) or paragraph 1(b) of Article 16 of the Rome Convention shall make a notification as foreseen 
in those provisions to the Council for TRIPS.” 
484
 As to the need for restating national treatment in the TRIPs Agreement, see J. Reinbothe and A. Howard, 
‘The State of Play in the Negotiations on TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay Round)’ (1991) 5 EIPR 157, 159. 
Choice-of-law in Cross-border Copyright and Related Rights Disputes 
 72 
National treatment is further extended to performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations whose rights are provided for under TRIPs. With regard to the subjects and rights that 
are not covered by the above-mentioned Conventions but are dealt with in the Agreement, such as 
database and exclusive rental rights, Article 3 of TRIPs ensures application of the national treatment 
principle.
485
 Thus, any other rights provided under international agreements, such as the Rome 
Convention 1961 and the post-TRIPs treaties like the WPPT, do not have to be extended to nationals 




National treatment enhanced by TRIPs involves the protection of intellectual property. The concept of 
“protection” is broadly defined in footnote 3 to Article 3 of TRIPs, which includes, with the intent to 
prevent discrimination based on nationality, not only the availability and scope of IP rights, and their 
maintenance and enforcement, but also their acquisition and use.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some scholars consider the principle of national treatment as 
encompassing a choice-of-law rule that designates the law of the protecting country to govern the 
scope of protection for a foreign work.
 487
 Accordingly, any alternative interpretation favoring the 





It is, nevertheless, submitted by this writer again that national treatment enhanced in TRIPs is, as 
argued above with respect to Article 5 of the Berne Convention, a mere non-discrimination rule, 
ensuring application of the same protection of intellectual property both to foreigners and nationals. 
As observed by Pertegás, the mere relevance of Article 3 of TRIPs to a choice-of-law rule would be its 
negative exclusion, i.e. nationality in this context cannot be used as a connecting factor, as “this may 
lead to a different degree of protection granted to national and foreign right owners”.489 As to claims 
arising from cross-border copyright or related rights, a specific reference to a national choice-of-law 
rule is therefore necessary.  
 
All in all, the TRIPs Agreement has been very significant for improving and expanding copyright 
protection on an international plane. It not only increased the membership of the Berne Convention 
Union: the fact that 157 countries (as at 24 August 2012) are bound to the TRIPs Agreement increased 
the membership in the Berne Convention due to the requirement of full incorporation of the Berne 
Convention, but also increased the level of protection that countries must accord to intellectual 
achievements and extends the enforcement mechanism of the WTO to intellectual property 
obligations. According to some scholars, the TRIPs Agreement clearly “reflects the overall expansion 
of copyright law into the field of the industrial activities of the information age”.490  
 
2.2.5 The WIPO Treaties 1996 
As discussed above, a further revision of the Berne Convention was considered no longer feasible. 
Meanwhile, along with globalization and development of new technology for communication, notably 
the Internet, international copyright protection needed to again adapt in order to react to challenges 
brought on by the new phenomena. In the field of related rights, it was the same. Similar to the Berne 
Convention, a further revision of the Rome Convention 1961 was also seen as difficult to achieve, 
which may also have been due to the facts that three separate international organizations: the WIPO, 
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UNESCO and the ILO were involved and three different subject areas had to be dealt with: 
performances, phonograms and broadcasts. 
  
Finally, at the WIPO diplomatic conference held in 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty were adopted.
491
 The adoption of these two treaties was a 
milestone for international protection of copyright and related rights, since they not only improved 
traditional copyright and related rights protection, but also contained distinct features for solving 
problems arising from the Internet. Due to their relevance to the Internet, these treaties have been 
labeled as “Internet treaties”.492  
 
2.2.5.1 WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The WCT is closely related to the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. Some provisions of 
the WCT clarify the contents of the former treaties, whereas others clearly provide new and 
supplementary protection. As to its relation with the Berne Convention, the WCT is a “special 
agreement” within the meaning of Article 20 of the Convention, and as a result, any restriction of the 
principles of the Berne Convention is not permitted, and nothing in the WCT is to derogate from 
existing obligations of contracting states under the Berne Convention.
493
 Furthermore, Article 1(4) of 
the WCT requires contracting states to comply with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention,
494
 however, it does not require contracting states to adhere to the Berne Convention, as is 
required by TRIPs.
495
 Such compliance with the Berne Convention means that the principles of 
national treatment, minimum rights and no formality requirement were effectively incorporated from 
the Berne Convention into the WCT without any modification. Furthermore, Article 3 of the WCT 
reiterates the clarification that contracting states are obliged to apply Articles 2 through 6 of the Berne 
Convention mutatis mutandis “in respect of the protection provided for in this Treaty”. Consequently, 
by reference to the Berne Convention, protected subjects, criteria of eligibility and national treatment 
are applicable under the WCT. The Berne exceptions to national treatment are also applicable in the 




As to its objects of protection, the WCT extends further than the Berne Convention.
497
 The WCT 
introduces new categories of protectable subject areas: computer programs are given the status of 
literary works,
498
 and compilations of data (databases) must be protected if, by reason of selection or 
arrangement of their contents, they constitute intellectual creations.
499
 In addition, the WCT again 
clarifies that copyright protection “extends to expressions and not to 184ideas, procedures, methods of 
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operation or mathematical concepts as such.”500 It is of note that the newly-introduced protectable 
subjects and clarifications about copyright protection are not new for international copyright treaties 
because such subjects had already been introduced by the TRIPs Agreement. 
 
The WCT introduced several improvements to minimum rights:
501
 a distribution right,
502
 which goes 
beyond what is in Articles 14(1)(i) and 14bis(1)(2) of the Berne Convention; an exclusive right to 
authorize commercial rental for computer programs, cinematographic works and works recorded in 
phonograms;
503
 and an exclusive right to authorize any communication to the public of works by wire 
or wireless means, including public release of the works in a manner that the members of the public 
may access works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
504
 In addition, the WCT 




In a situation where contracting states national laws provide for limitations and exceptions to WCT 
granted rights, Article 10(1) of the WCT requires those states to abide by the three-step test set forth in 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention relating to limitations on the reproduction right.
506
 The test is 
given a wider scope in Article 10(2), where it states that when applying the Berne Convention, the 
parties shall confine any limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to such special 
cases as are defined in Article 10(1). The Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 states it is to be 
understood that the provisions of that article permit contracting states to carry forward and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws 
which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, it should also be 
understood that these provisions permit contracting states to devise new exceptions and limitations 
that are appropriate to the digital network environment. As a precaution, the Agreed Statement 
provides that Article 10(2) shall neither reduce nor extend the scope of applicability of the limitations 
and exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention. 
 
Furthermore, for more effective enforcement of rights in the digital environment, the WCT introduces 
new obligations and requires contracting states to protect against circumvention of effective 
technological measures of copyrighted works
507
 and against interference with electronic rights 
management information.
508
 Such obligations are a novelty since they were mostly unknown in 
national and international law up to that time. In addition, the WCT requires effective enforcement 
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procedures in national laws, including “expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies 
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements”.509 
 
2.2.5.2 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
The WPPT was aimed at solving problems arising from new technologies, particularly the Internet in 
relation to the protection of performances and phonograms. The WPPT does not follow the general 
principles as they are prescribed in earlier international related rights treaties, namely the Rome 
Convention 1961 and the TRIPs Agreement. Instead, it provides for a clearer and larger scope of 
protection than what is in those treaties.
510
 The WPPT announces a principle of “no formality”,511 
which is a step beyond those in the earlier treaties. Accordingly, formalities, such as registration or use 
of the notice consisting of the symbol ℗ cannot be required as conditions of protection under the 
WPPT. 
 
The WPPT also modifies the principle of national treatment in its Article 4, which is defined in a way 
clearer than earlier treaties, and expressly restricts the scope of national treatment to the “exclusive” 
rights specifically granted in the WPPT and the right to equitable remuneration for secondary uses 
contained therein.
512
 Accordingly, as to the rights that are not specifically provided in the WPPT, 
contracting states are not required to grant national treatment, even if such rights are provided under 
their national laws.
513
 The sole exception to national treatment is related to the remuneration right for 
secondary uses under Article 15 of the WPPT: where a contracting state makes a reservation permitted 
under Article 15(3) of the WPPT, the other contracting states may apply material reciprocity instead of 
national treatment.
514
 The Rome criteria of eligibility for protection are, however, applied by analogy 
in Article 3(2) of the WPPT.
 515
 Accordingly, the minimum rights and national treatment laid down in 
Article 3(1) and Article 4(1) respectively should be accorded to those that fulfill the Rome criteria.  
 
The WPPT provides for minimum rights to both performers and phonogram producers, but not for 
broadcasting organizations. Nor does the WPPT resolve the protection of audiovisual performances. In 
comparison with those provided in the Rome Convention 1961 and the TRIPs Agreement, the 
minimum rights required in the WPPT are more specific and wider in scope. Notably, along the lines 
of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, the WPPT adopts an approach to require that performers 
receive rights of paternity and integrity in their live aural performances or performances fixed in 
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In addition, the WPPT grants performers economic minimum rights in their unfixed performances. As 
to such rights, which have never been accorded in international treaties, the WPPT requires performers 
to receive exclusive economic rights for the fixation of their unfixed performances and the 
broadcasting and communication to the public of their unfixed reproduction.
517
 Furthermore, the 
WPPT grants performers an exclusive right of reproduction for their performances fixed in 
phonograms, directly or indirectly,
518
, a distribution right for their performances fixed in phonograms 
broadcast or distributed to the public,
519
 a commercial rental right as to performances fixed in 
phonograms,
520
 and a right of making available, which corresponds to the one provided in the WCT.
521
 







 and making available.
525
 In addition, it provides common rights to equitable 




The WPPT adds, for the first time in international related rights treaties, the three-step test for related 
rights to calibrate the limitations that contracting states may impose on exclusive rights.
527
 As to the 
duration of protection, the WPPT requires a longer term of protection than the Rome Convention 
1961. The minimum twenty years protection required in the Rome Convention is extended, in the 
WPPT, for a performance fixed in phonogram to fifty years from the year of fixation;
528
 as for 
phonogram producers, protection lasts for fifty years from the phonogram’s publication, or else, fifty 
years from the year of fixation.
529
 Although the TRIPs also provides for fifty years protection, the term 
of protection for phonogram producers is potentially longer in the WPPT, because the term of 
protection in the TRIPS calculates from the fixation or the taking place of the performance, rather than 
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from the publication as what the WPPT requires.
530
 Like the WCT, the WPPT requires contracting 
states to provide protection for technological measures
531




When compared with the other international copyright and related rights treaties, the WIPO Treaties 
have considerably increased the minimum level of protection, both in the traditional areas and in the 
new areas responding to the latest technological development, in particular the Internet. In addition to 
that, the WIPO Treaties extend or clarify the rights that are equally important for the traditional 
environment of exploitation of copyright and related rights, such as the right of distribution or rental 
rights. Along with the increase of the membership of these Treaties: 89 countries have become parties 
to the WCT
533
 and also 89 to the WPPT,
534
 these Treaties will contribute to a higher level of protection 
on a wider scale.  
 
2.2.5.3 WIPO Audiovisual Performances Treaty (WAPT) 
As summarized above, the Rome Convention 1961 clearly recognizes international protection of 
audiovisual performances by granting rights to prevent unconsented to audiovisual broadcasting, 
communication to the public and fixation of live performances, and also recognizes rights to prevent 
reproduction of performances which are incorporated in a visual or audiovisual fixation (Articles 7.1 
and 19). However, the TRIPs Agreement and the WPPT have not appeared to emphasize this, in 
particular, the WPPT has updated the rights of phonogram producers and of performers in respect of 
the use of their sound recordings but has not extended the protection of performers to their 
performances fixed in audiovisual fixation, such as television, film and video. Instead, a Resolution 
was adopted at the conclusion of the Conference in 1996 which called for the WPPT to be 
complemented by a protocol to the WPPT on the protection of audiovisual performers. Thus, a 
substantial gap was left in the protection of audiovisual performances. 
 
At the Diplomatic Conference held by the WIPO on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances in 
Geneva in 2000, a Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of an Instrument on the Protection of 
Audiovisual Performances (Basic Proposal) was presented.
535
 The provisions and the structure of the 
Basic Proposal largely reflected the WPPT. The major difference between the Proposal and the WPPT 
was, in addition to their scopes of the application, that the Basic Proposal would extend performers’ 
rights to include protection for audiovisual performances, and address the issue concerning transfer of 
the economic rights granted to performers. A treaty could not be finalized by the end of the Diplomatic 
Conference due to the much-debated fundamental issues in relation to a transfer of rights from the 
performer to the film producer and the ownership of the rights concerned. Again, that’s the battle 
between the opposing entrenched positions by certain countries concerning ownership of rights: the 
copyright system and the author’s right system. Having the divergences in mind, the treaty drafters 
provided four alternatives (E to H) ranging from one extreme of having a rebuttable presumption of 
transfer of the performers’ economic rights to the producers to the other extreme of having no 
provision on transfer at all. It is noteworthy that the drafters also suggested a solution in between, i.e. 
providing for a choice-of-law solution that would apply the law of the country most closely connected 
with the particular audiovisual fixation. In such a way, contracting states would not be required to 
amend their domestic laws (Alternative G). Nevertheless, due to the differences in concepts put 
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forward by the countries, an agreement on a proposed substantive rule could not be reached, neither 




Concession on the transfer of economic rights was made in the later meetings. Member states at the 
Standing Committee on copyright and related rights agreed to make the rule on this issue sufficiently 
flexible to adapt to different national laws.
537
 The WIPO reconvened the Diplomatic Conference in 
June 2012 in Beijing, the PRC. After a high level negotiation with the aim of concluding an 
international treaty protecting the rights of performers in their audiovisual performances, a treaty was 
finalized, 122 countries signed the final Act, and 48 countries have signed the treaty itself. The treaty 




The treaty provides for national treatment (Article 4), economic rights covering performers for their 
unfixed performances (Article 6), rights of reproduction (Article 7), rights of distribution (Article 8), 
rental rights (Article 9), rights of making available of fixed performances (Article 10), rights of 
broadcasting and communication to the public (Article 11), protection against circumvention of 
technological protection measures (Article 15), and so on. For the first time audiovisual performers 
would also be accorded moral rights protection against the distribution or modification of their 
performances that would be prejudicial to their reputations (Article 5).  
 
As to the difficult issue concerning transfer of economic rights, the treaty establishes some balance 
between performers’ and producers’ rights.539 However, since the question of transfer of rights from 
the performer to the producer is strongly related to the specific copyright culture of the signatory 
parties and the national industry standards, one may wonder whether the treaty would gain full-hearted 
support from a country that is wedded to either of the opposing concepts. Additionally, all the 
discussions and negotiations on the issues of transfer of economic rights and the ownership concerned 
during the legislative process of the treaty prove the difficulty in copyright and related rights 
protection in the international arena. Related to the topic of this dissertation, such difficulty is also 
encountered in the context of choice-of-law rules.  
 
Once the WAPT is ratified, both performers and producers will gain benefits. Although the Rome 
Convention 1961 provides certain protections for performers, it cannot respond to the challenges 
brought by new means of distribution of audiovisual works, in particular via the Internet. Furthermore, 
as stated above, the WPPT does not extend protection to performers in respect of their performances 
fixed in audiovisual fixations. The gap that was left will be filled by the WAPT. In this respect, 
performers not only receive a wide scope of economic rights, but are also entitled to moral rights for 
the first time. As for producers, they will gain international recognition of the importance of the 
transfer of economic rights. Nevertheless, only time will tell if the WAPT, an international legal 
instrument aimed at promoting international protection of performers, will be effective for these 
purposes. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly describes the historical development of copyright protection, demonstrating stages 
of such protection under the privileges system, private statutory law, bilateral treaties and multi-lateral 
treaties. Along with this process, the Berne Convention became regarded as the most important 
international copyright treaty. Accordingly, this chapter describes the basis and structure of the 
copyright protection set forth in that Convention, and further discusses that Convention’s general 
principles: automatic copyright protection (non-formality requirement), minimum standards of 
protection, and national treatment of foreign works. A survey of the UCC, the Rome Convention 1961, 
the TRIPs Agreement, the WCT, the WPPT and the WAPT demonstrates that in the field of 
substantive copyright and related rights laws, the contemporary trend is towards harmonization. As 
analysed, the international harmonization of copyright law in fact sets up bundles of copyrights. As a 
result, the territoriality principle remains important for copyright and related rights. The chapter then 
argues that applying international substantive copyright rules as substitutes for choice-of-law rules in 
cross-border copyright and related rights claims should not be supported.  
 
As to the heavily debated issue whether the treaty required national treatment principle is a choice-of-
law rule, the chapter argues that this principle is merely an anti-discrimination rule only requiring 
national laws to treat foreign and national authors in the same way. It therefore has no impact on the 
choice-of-law issue. Similarly, this chapter also submits that certain provisions laid down in 
international copyright and related rights treaties such as Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention stating 
the application of the laws of the country where protection is claimed do not directly or expressly refer 
to choice-of-law rules, with the limited exception of Article 14bis(2)(c) of the Berne Convention. 
 
In summary, from this general study of international copyright and related rights treaties, it can be 
concluded that, insofar as international copyright and related rights protection is concerned, these 
international treaties have largely harmonized substantive protection within their adhering states. As to 
the choice-of-law discussion often raised in reference to these treaties, this writer reiterates that these 
treaties do not contain or imply a rule designating the law applicable to cross-border copyright and 
related rights disputes. Thus, when a choice-of-law issue is raised in the course of such disputes, 
reference should be made to the rules codified or used for that purpose in regional or national 
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CHAPTER 3 EUROPEAN APPROACH  
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the international copyright and related rights treaties do not contain 
solutions to the problem of identifying the law applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights 
disputes – or they only provide for them in a very limited way. So, continuing the enquiry would 
normally call for recourse to domestic choice-of-law rules of concerned individual countries; however, 
since European Union (EU) law prevails in most European countries, such rules are mostly the same 
or similar in them. EU law is a body of treaties and treaty-authorized European-wide legislation 
enacted by EU institutions, aimed at unifying or harmonizing certain law in the Member States.
540
 This 
legislation occurs not only with respect to substantive law, but also with respective to private 
international law (PIL) and is primarily aimed at proper functioning of the European internal market – 
i.e. the European “common market”. As part of EU “Europeanization” of PIL, domestic PIL rules of 
the Member States were gradually displaced by the common European rules. 
 
In order to learn how the body of European supra-national law deals with choice-of-law problems in 
cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, light must be shined on a series of EU directives 
that have the purpose of harmonizing certain aspects of copyright within the EU, and then on the EU’s 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II).
541
 Accompanying all 
that, given the limited scope of Rome II, which deals, inter alia, with non-contractual obligations 
arising from IP rights infringement, the chapter will also carry out a comparative analysis of the laws 
of some major European states with regard to the law applicable when matters fall outside the scope of 
Rome II. This chapter’s analysis of the European approach in this respect will provide inspiration for, 
and be helpful in assessing and commenting on, this aspect of PRC law addressed later in this book. 
 
To summarize in advance, at its outset, this chapter describes the “Europeanization” process of PIL 
rules and looks into how PIL rules have been unified under the aegis of EU laws. It then examines the 
European copyright directives so as to explore whether, in the process of harmonizing European 
copyright and related rights, any choice-of-law rule for cross-border copyright and related rights 
disputes appears in these directives. The third section looks into the background and general structure 
of the Rome II Regulation. Special attention is given to its provisions dealing with infringement of IP 
rights, including copyright and related rights. The effect of these rules will be discussed. Based on the 
observation that the issues of existence, content and termination of copyright, as well as the initial 
ownership of copyright, are not dealt with in Rome II, section 4 is a comparative analysis of the laws 
of certain European states in these respects. Inspiration that EU laws and European states’ national law 
and practice may provide for the PRC legislature or judiciary is analysed in section 5. The chapter then 
concludes in section 6.  
 
3.1 European Union Laws 
 
The roots of what is now the European Union were planted in the 1950s.
542
 They started with the 
European Coal and Steel Community, which entered into force in 1952 and ended on the expiry of its 
50-year term.
543
 A Treaty to similarly control atomic energy (EURATOM) was signed in 1957, and 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed in Rome on 25 May 
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 Since then, the international organization called a Community developed both in its scope and 
function. The EEC Treaty was subsequently revised several times: in 1986, the Single European Act 
was signed with the aim of eliminating remaining barriers to the single internal market; effective 1 
November 1993, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) renamed the EEC to EC, enlarged the scope 
and activities of the Community and established fixed arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation 
parallel to the EC to be called the European Union; effective 1
 
May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
retained the overall three-pillar structure of the EC Treaty, even though it moved functions among the 
three pillars; in 2003, the Treaty of Nice was signed so as to improve the efficiency of the EU’s 
institutions in an enlarged Community;
545
 and the latest revision – the Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 
13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009 which bases the European Union on 
two Treaties of equal legal standing:
546
 the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
547
 which amended the EC Treaty and renamed the EC to 
the EU.  
 
For the development of the “Europeanized” PIL rules, it can be noted from the following that it has 
been a rather recent process.
548
 The turning point for its development was the entry into force in 1999 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which made a fundamental change in this field of law. Nevertheless, the 
treaties adopted before and after the Amsterdam Treaty have certain relevance in the development of 
the European PIL rules.  
 
3.1.1 Article 220 of the EEC Treaty
549
 
Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, PIL matters were dealt with by means of inter-governmental 
cooperation, i.e. no competence was transferred to the European institutions. Under the EEC Treaty, 
Article 220 empowered the Member States “so far as is necessary” to enter into negotiation with each 
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals, inter alia, the simplification of 
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals 
and of arbitration awards. Even though, normally speaking, a state can decide itself whether it wants to 
enter into a negotiation in order to make an agreement with the other state, the purpose of introducing 
this article is to oblige Member States to start negotiations about certain matters and in certain 
situation that are not covered by the Treaty insofar as four freedoms in the Treaty (right of 




Although this provision encouraged Member States to cooperate regarding the recognition of 
judgments, it has been extensively interpreted to go beyond that.
551
 It became the legal basis for 
several international conventions: the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
552
and the parallel Lugano Convention 
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3.1.2 Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty 
While the Treaty of Maastricht renamed the EEC to European Community (EC), revised and expanded 
the working and scope of its legislative process, and established the fixed intergovernmental 
arrangement newly called European Union, it did not make great changes with respect to PIL: it 
merely maintained Article 220 and in the mean time introduced some new provisions. The Treaty of 
Maastricht did revise the organizational arrangement into three pillars: the Community Pillar, the 
Second Pillar of common foreign and security policy, and the Third Pillar of justice and home affairs. 
As to the Third Pillar, Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht contained provisions on cooperation in the 
field of Justice and Home Affairs, in particular, Article K.1(6) of the Treaty classified judicial 
cooperation in civil matters as one of the areas of common interest to the Member States of the 
European Union. While PIL was referred to as “judicial cooperation in civil matters”, it remained an 




3.1.3 The Amsterdam Treaty 
The Treaty of Amsterdam made a fundamental change in the development of the entire PIL of the 
European Community.
555
 It granted legislative competence for EC institutions to enact PIL measures. 
It also integrated the Third Pillar on cooperation between Member States in the field of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters into the EC’s First Pillar with the result that the Community could enact 
relevant legislation and the Member States no longer needed to negotiate and ratify treaties on those 
subjects. As the legal basis for that, Article 65 EC Treaty (now Article 81 of TFEU) empowers the 
enactment of measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters that have cross-border 
implications, insofar as “necessary for the property functioning of the internal market”. On the basis 
of this provision, all three of PIL’s major issues, namely jurisdiction, choice-of-law and recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments began to be and will continue to be dealt with within the scope 
of EU law. 
 
The European Commission has extensively interpreted Article 65 of the EC Treaty (now Article 81 of 
TFEU) and relied on this competence norm to enact regulations in the areas of jurisdiction, recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments, judicial cooperation between Member States and choice-of-law 
rules: for example the Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels II bis Regulation
556
, the Insolvency 
Regulation,
557
 the Service Regulation,
558
 the Evidence Regulation,
559
 the Rome I Regulation
560
 and the 
Rome II Regulation. The last one will be intensively studied as one of the topics of this dissertation. 
                                                          
553
 The drafters of the Convention considered adopting a double convention, i.e. having unified jurisdiction rules 
helpful for facilitating recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Thalia Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of 
the EU and Their Impact on Third States (OUP, Oxford 2007) 12-4. 
554
 For details, see R. Bieber and J. Monar (eds), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union: the 
development of the Third Pillar (European Interuniversity Press, Brussels 1995). 
555
 For details, see Jürgen Basedow 2000 (supra n 548); Paul Beaumont, ‘Interplay of private international law 
and the European Community’ in Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz and Paul Skidmore (eds), The Future of 
Remedies in Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 137-90; Andrew Dickinson, ‘European Private International 
Law: embracing new horizons or mourning the past’ (2005) JPIL 197-236. 
556
 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27th November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, OJ L338. 
557
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L160. 
558
 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of 
documents), OJ L324. 
559
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member 
States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L174. 
European Approach 
 83 
3.1.4 The Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty 
The changes made by the Treaty of Nice in terms of PIL were restricted to legislative points, namely 
except for family law matters, the previous voting requirement by unanimity in the Council was 
changed to qualified majority voting.
561
   
  
When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the three pillars structure ended and, as a result, the First 
and Third Pillars of the pre-Lisbon organizational structure have in effect been merged to be governed 
by the TFEU. The Treaty of Lisbon also brought a number of changes in the field of PIL.
562
 Article 81 
of the TFEU enlarged the legislative competences of the Union to adopt decisions so that they no 
longer depend upon the internal market criteria, which have now been replaced by the phrase 
“particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. While retaining the 
special legislative procedure for family law matters, the TFEU introduced a special Passerelle Clause, 
through which the Union’s legislators may make some aspects of family law having cross-border 
implications subject to its ordinary legislative procedure, with the consensus of national 
Parliaments.
563
 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon expanded the matters that the EU addresses,
564
 even 
though some of those matters such as development of alternative dispute resolution and support for 
judicial training had already been dealt with under Article 65 of the former EC Treaty (now Article 81 
of the TFEU). Additionally, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, every national court, 
except in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, which opted out of that treaty provision, may 




As discussed, Rome II should be understood in the context of the Europeanization of PIL. It is one of a 
series of regulations in the field of PIL that have been established following the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
pursuant to the competence provided in Title IV of the former EC Treaty (ex-Articles 61-68). 
According to ex-Article 65 (now Article 81 of the TFEU), measures in the field of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters having cross-border implications, insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market, cover, among others, those promoting compatibility of conflict-of-law rules.  
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3.2 European Protection of Copyright and Related Rights 
3.2.1 Harmonization of copyright and related rights features 
From the 1990’s, the EC started a harmonization process as to copyright and related rights laws within 
the Community. The initiative taken by the EC Commission was due to two urgent needs: copyright 
and related rights laws were affected by technological developments in producing and disseminating 
protected materials, and the increasing importance of copyright and related rights as an economic 
factor in the internal market. This process led to harmonization of national laws on particular aspects 




Due to the divergence of national laws, the harmonization process was taken up by means of 
Directives. It was believed that harmonization of this subject matter would be more appropriate for 
attaining the goal than unification, because a Directive, unlike a Regulation,
567
 leaves Member States 
with a certain amount of leeway as to the exact rules to be adopted.
568
 Thus, Member State laws 
enacted on the basis of a Directive will not have exactly the same rules among the Member States. 
Insofar as copyright and related rights are concerned, there are only certain aspects that have been 
harmonized, and even among those aspects, the Directives do not deal with all the copyright subjects.  
 
Already in 1986, the Council of Ministers had issued a Directive on the legal protection of 
semiconductor topography, which subsequently extended protection to persons from certain non-EEC 
countries, as well as nationals of Member States.
569
 Afterward, the Commission published a Green 
Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology dealing with certain issues pertaining to 
copyright that required immediate action,
570
 including matters of piracy, home copying of sound and 
audiovisual material, distribution and rental rights covering certain material, as well as protection of 
computer programs and databases. Subsequently, on 5 December 1990, the Commission undertook an 
extensive Working Programme in the field of copyright and related rights.
571
 
   
Following the Green Paper and the Working Programme, the EC took steps to adopt directives on the 
matters discussed in those two documents. Following adoption of the first European Copyright 
Directive – the Software Directive in 1991, the EC has adopted seven directives in the fields of 
copyright and related rights including: the Rental Directive in 1992,
 
the Broadcasting Directive and the 
Term Directive in 1993, the Database Directive in 1996, as well as the Information Society Directive 




                                                          
566
 J.A.L. Sterling (supra n 18) para 26.05; for the detailed harmonisation process, see H. Cohen Jehoram, 
‘Harmonizing Intellectual Property Law within the European Community’ (1992) 23 IIC 622; Mireille van 
Eechoud and others, Harmonizing European Copyright Law: The Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2009) 1-29. 
567
 Art. 288 TFEU (ex Art. 249 EC Treaty) provides “[…] A regulation shall have general application. It shall 
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.” 
568 
Art. 288 TFEU (ex Art. 249 EC Treaty) provides “[…]A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods. […]”. Whilst a Regulation takes effect on the 20th day after it is published in the EU 
Official Register (unless it provides for another time), a Directive does not because time is needed for Member 
State authorities to choose the form and method for implementing the objectives in the Directive. So, a Directive 
will specify a period of time for Member State authorities to act - usually about two years. In the meanwhile, 
since EU law supersedes Member State national law, existing Member State domestic law must not be construed 
in a way that conflicts with the objective that the Directive requires. Once a Directive has been fully 
implemented by all the Member States, its EU law objectives are said to be “harmonised”.  
569
 Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor 
products [1987] OJ L24/36. 
570
 COM (88) 172 final. 
571
 Working Program of the Commission in the field of copyright and neighboring rights, COM (90) 584 (final).  
572
 List of the citation of these Directives and their sequel directives, supra, 9, 72, 73. 
European Approach 
 85 
It must be noted, nevertheless, that these directives aim at harmonizing certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights laws within the EC, rather than focusing on PIL issues. Even the most 
comprehensive European copyright directive - the Information Society Directive - was enacted to 
implement a number of new international obligations as to copyright arising from EU signing of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
573
 It lays down only substantive 
rules harmonizing some aspects of copyright and related rights among Member States and does not 
provide any choice-of-law rules. 
 
Arguably, certain provisions laid down in these copyright directives may have an effect on identifying 
the applicable law, in particular Article 1(2) (b) of the Broadcasting Directive, and the Enforcement 
Directive.
574
 Article 1(2) (b) of the Broadcasting Directive provides  
“the act of communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in the Member State where, 
under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the program-carrying 
signals are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and 
down towards the earth.”  
An exception to this rule is provided for a situation where the act of communication occurs in a third 
state that does not provide the level of protection as that stated under Chapter II of the Directive. 
Under the latter circumstance, the act of communication to the public shall be deemed to have 
occurred in the Member State where an uplink station is situated or in the Member State where a 
broadcasting organization has its principal establishment if there is no use of an uplink station situated 
in a Member State.
575
 Strictly speaking, Article 1(2) (b) is not a private international law rule. It is a 
substantive rule.
576
 Some scholars may nevertheless contend that this provision has a determinative 
effect on the choice-of-law issue
577
 because the definition provided in the provision indicates that a 
rights holder may invoke his exclusive right only in one state, i.e. where the program-carrying signals 
are introduced. In other words, the rights holder can only make a claim under the law of the state of 
uplink.
578
 Thus, to a certain extent, Article 1(2) (b) may be considered to be a choice-of-law rule, 




In addition to the harmonization achieved within the EC as to certain substantive aspects of copyright 
and related rights, the Community adopted an Enforcement Directive aimed at addressing the 
difficulties arising from the disparities among the legal systems of Member States with regard to the 
means of enforcing IP rights.
580
 The Directive requires Member States to apply effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate remedies and penalties against those engaged in counterfeiting and piracy.
581
 The 
measures required include evidence
582
, evidence protection measures,
583







 etc. It is of note that the purpose of the Directive is to 
                                                          
573
 Council Decision of 16 March 2000 on the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (2000/278/EC) OJ L89, 6–7; Recital 15 
of the Information Society Directive. 
574
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC of April 29 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights [2004] OJ L195/16. (Enforcement Directive) For details, see Michel M Walter and Dominik 
Goebel, ‘Commentary on Enforcement Directive’ in Michel M Walter and Silke von Lewinski (eds) (supra n 9) 
1193-364. 
575
 Art. 1(2)(d) of the Broadcasting Directive. 
576
 Josef Drexl 2005 (supra n 368) 158; Fawcett and Torremans 2011 (supra n 13) 13.61. 
577
 Fawcett and Torremans 2011 (supra n 13) 13.61; Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) paras 20.22-20.24; 
Eckart Gottschalk, ‘The Law Applicable to Intellectual Property Rights: Is the Lex Loci Protectionis a Pertinent 
Choice-of-Law Approach?’ in E. Gottschalk, R. Michaels, G. Rühl and J. von Hein (eds), Conflict of Laws in a 
Globalized World (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 215. 
578
 Fawcett and Torremans 2011 (supra n 13) 13.61. 
579
 Ricketson and Ginsburg (supra n 110) paras 20.22-20.24. 
580
 Recital 8 of the Enforcement Directive. 
581
 Art. 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive. 
582
 Art. 6 of the Enforcement Directive. 
583
 Art. 7 of the Enforcement Directive. 
584
 Art. 9 of the Enforcement Directive. 
Choice-of-law in Cross-border Copyright and Related Rights Disputes 
 86 
regulate enforcement of IP rights, rather than the rights themselves. Although the Directive regulates 
the procedural aspect of laws, it has no direct impact on choice-of-law rules in IP disputes, as 
explicitly stated in recital 11 of the Directive: 
“(t)his Directive does not aim to establish harmonised rules for judicial cooperation, 
jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters, or 
deal with applicable law.”  
 
3.2.2 The principle of anti-discrimination 
Article 18 TFEU (ex-Article 12 EC Treaty) prohibits any discrimination on the ground of nationality. 
Thus, a Member State cannot maintain a law which gives nationals of other Member State different 
treatment from its own, provided that it falls within the scope of the Treaty. In 1993, the anti-
discrimination principle was applied by the ECJ in the joined cases Phil Collins
587
 and Cliff Richard
588
. 
In those judgments, the ECJ held that ex-Article 12 EC Treaty applies to copyright and related rights, 
particularly because of their effects on trade in goods and services in the Community.
589
 In the course 
of its judgments, it ruled that the facts that there are differences in national laws relating to the 
protection of copyright and related rights, and that not all Member States acceded to the Rome 
Convention 1961 do not justify an infringement of the anti-discrimination principle enshrined in ex-




The ECJ reiterated the principle in a 2005 copyright case, Tod’s.591 That case concerned an action 
brought by an Italian company and its French affiliate against a French company that allegedly 
infringed the former’s registered designs of shoes bearing Tod’s trademark in France. The defendant 
claimed that under Article 2(7)
592
 of the Berne Convention, Tod’s was not entitled to claim author’s 
right protection in France for designs that do not qualify for such protection in Italy.
593
 The question 
referred to the ECJ was whether  
"[…] Article 12 EC, which lays down the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, mean that the right of an author to claim in a Member State the copyright protection 
afforded by the law of that State may not be subject to a distinction based on the country of 
origin of the work".  
The ECJ, referring to Phil Collins, affirmatively answered the protection may not be subjected to such 
a distinction. It is of note that the Tod’s decision does not mean that the French court has to give the 
Italian claimants in France the benefit of legal rights available to the Italian claimants in Italy. Instead, 
it only means that the French court should not withhold from the Italian claimants in France the 
enjoyment of rights that French claimants in France have. 
 
The anti-discrimination principle enshrined in Article 18 TFEU provides only a duty of Member States: 
they cannot refuse to grant a national of another Member State the protection under copyright or 
related rights which the former state grants to its own nationals. This principle constitutes, in fact, 
another form of the national treatment principle within the EU and supersedes any restrictions by 
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 As analysed in the preceding chapter, since the purpose of the principle of 
national treatment is not to function as a rule to identify the law applicable to copyright or related 
rights claims, neither for such claims should the related principle of anti-discrimination on nationality 





Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the process of harmonizing copyright and related rights 
within the EU has not directly dealt with rules on choice-of-law. In order to identify such rules, as 
applied in copyright and related rights claims, one should refer to the EC Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) because it aims at unifying choice-of-law rules 
regarding certain kinds of tort claims, which may include copyright and related rights infringement. 
 
3.3 Rome II Regulation 
The Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations was adopted on 11 July 
2007. As its name indicates, this Regulation provides choice-of-law rules for non-contractual 
obligations to be uniformly applicable in Member States with respect to each other, as well as to all 
non-EU countries. According to the recitals of the Regulation, the proper functioning of the internal 
market created a need to establish the same choice-of-law rules in order to improve the predictability 
of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the applicable law and free movement of judgments.
596
 As 
a result, courts in each Member State (except Denmark) will apply identical choice-of-law rules to 
disputes involving non-contractual obligations irrespective of the substantive law they designate. This 
Regulation is relevant to another EU legal instrument that provides unified choice-of-law rules for 
contractual obligations, the Rome I Regulation, which except for three opting-out states replaced the 
Rome Convention 1980.
597
 With Rome I and Rome II, together, Union legislators unified choice-of-
law rules for all but a very few states within the Union. As a result, greater predictability is available 
as to the outcome of litigation before Member States courts. As commented by an American conflicts 
scholar, 
“Rome II is a dramatic step in the federalization or ‘Europeanization’ of private international 






The origins of the Rome II Regulation date all the way back to negotiations that took place in the 
1970s for a European Convention on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. 
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A preliminary draft EEC convention containing both aspects had been prepared by 1972.
600
 A number 
of disagreements and the accession of new Member States to the EEC, however, eventually prevented 
the finalization and adoption of the preliminary draft convention.
601
 In 1978 the then Member States 
decided to limit the scope of the convention to the contractual obligations. As a result, the Rome 
Convention 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations was opened for signature on 19 June 
1980. Further negotiation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations was, however, not 
continued. Then in October 1998, the Council adopted a joint Action Plan of the Commission and the 
Council with regard to how to best implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. It was named the Vienna Action Plan.
602
 Since then, the project to draw 
up a legal instrument on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations was again on the agenda. At 
the same time, a proposal for a convention on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations was 
finalized by the European Group for Private International Law (GEDIP).
603
 This proposal helped to 
form the basis of the Rome II Regulation, since a number of points have been referred to in the current 
Regulation. 
 
Instead of publishing a green paper, in 2002 the Commission launched on the Internet a wide-ranging 
consultation on the subject of a preliminary draft proposal for a Council Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations.
604
 The Commission received in response around 80 
contributions from both industry and academics, who heavily criticized the preliminary draft 
proposal.
605
 The industry commentators believed that there is no need for such a legal instrument and 
questioned the competence of the Commission to deal with this subject. Based on follow-up 
consultations and a public hearing, the Commission in July 2003 presented a proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.
606
 In 
this proposal, special rules for non-contractual obligations arising from infringement claims of IP 
rights were introduced;
607
 but with respect to such claims, parties would not be allowed to choose the 
law to apply.
608
 In response to the Commission 2003 Proposal, the European Parliament (hereinafter 
EP) published its First Reading with some recommendations.
609
 The standing point of the First 
Reading was that it advocated greater flexibility in the general rue for torts/delict and less reliance on 
special rules for particular torts.
610
  It is of note that the Parliament First Reading suggested 
eliminating the non-inclusion of party autonomy for intellectual property claims.
611
 In light of the 
amendments proposed by the Parliament First Reading, the Commission adopted a modified proposal 
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 From its contents, it is clear that the Commission upheld its own approach in 
general.
613
  Subsequently, the Council’s Common Position supported the Commission 2006 
Proposal.
614
 For example, it rejected party autonomy as to the non-contractual obligations arising from 
IP rights infringement claims. Responding to that Common Position, the EP published its Second 
Reading,
615
 in which the EP again put forward those issues that had been raised in the Parliament First 
Reading but had not been reflected in the Council’s Common Position. Since all amendments put 
forward in the Parliament Second Reading could not be accepted by the Council, a conciliation 
process was formally opened on 15 May 2007. During this process, common agreement regarding the 
text of the Regulation was achieved. The disagreement on the substantive provisions was resolved in 
the Council’s favour. The EP nevertheless succeeded in adding a review clause to the Regulation that 





It is also noteworthy that, unlike other EC PIL instruments, such as the Rome Convention 1980, Rome 
II was not accompanied by any explanatory report, which could have been helpful in the interpretation 
of terms and provisions. As a result, the recitals in its Preamble, which provide general principles of 
the Regulation, should be given close attention when the interpretation of the rules and provisions 
contained therein are at stake. Furthermore, the legislative history of this Regulation and the 
documents provided by different EU institutions will also shed some light in terms of the 
interpretation of the Regulation. 
 
3.3.2 The structure of the Rome II Regulation 
The Rome II Regulation consists of seven chapters. Chapter I state the scope of the Regulation and the 
definition of terms it uses. Chapter II provides a choice-of-law scheme for torts and delicts, consisting 
of a general rule in Article 4, and specific rules in the fields of product liability (Article 5), unfair 
competition and acts restricting free competition (Article 6), environmental damage (Article 7), 
infringement of IP rights (Article 8) and industrial action (Article 9). Article 4 is a residual rule to be 
applied only when the specific rules, which have limited application, do not apply. Chapter III 
provides choice-of-law rules for obligations arising out of unjust enrichment (Article 10), negotiorum 
gestio (Article 11) and culpa in contrahendo (Article 12), which are the concepts having no equivalent 
in the substantive laws of some Member States. It is of note that general torts/delicts in Article 4 and 
the matters laid down in Chapter III are mutually exclusive categories, i.e. if an obligation arises from 
a tort/delict, it cannot at the same time arise from e.g. negotiorum gestio.
617 
Chapter IV deals with 
freedom of choice. General provisions, in particular those dealing with the scope of the applicable law, 
overriding mandatory rules, prohibition of renvoi, ordre public, as well as the transitional and final 
provisions, are in Chapters V, VI and VII. 
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3.3.3 Scope of the Rome II Regulation 
For the substantive scope of Rome II, its Article 1 states that it shall “apply, in situations involving a 
conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.” Matters that 
specifically fall outside the scope of Rome II include revenue, customs, administrative law matters, the 
liability of the state for acts and omissions in the exercise of state authority (acta iure imperii), and 
those laid down in Article 1(2) of the Regulation dealing with non-contractual obligations arising out 
of family relationships, matrimonial property regimes, wills and succession, bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and other negotiable instruments, directors’ liability, auditors’ liability, the relations 
between the settlors, trustees and beneficiaries of a voluntary trust, and nuclear damage, as well as 
violations of privacy and rights relating to personality. The restriction to civil and commercial matters 
put forward in this provision has no impact in relation to copyright and related rights infringement 
disputes because the latter arise in civil and commercial circumstances.  
 
3.3.3.1 “Non-contractual obligations” 
Although the Rome II Regulation determines the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, it 
contains no definition of the concept of “non-contractual obligation”. Nonetheless, the Community 
legislators did state that the concept should have an “autonomous” definition,618 i.e. reference shall not 
be made to the law of one of the states concerned, but rather to the “objectives and the scheme” of the 
Regulation and to the “principles that stem from the corpus of the national legal systems”.619 This is 
because among Member States the concept of “non-contractual obligation” varies from one Member 
State to another, in particular the demarcation line between contractual obligations and obligations 
based on tort or delict varies.
620
 An “autonomous” definition of “non-contractual obligation” avoids a 
risk that one obligation is considered contractual under one state’s law but not so in accordance with 
the law of another and, as a result, ensure that this concept is given full effect and applied uniformly in 
all the Member States.  
 
“Non-contractual obligations” in the Rome II Regulation come under two main categories, those that 
arise out of a tort or delict and those that are not considered so under certain countries’ substantive 
laws, such as unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo. Further, Rome II 
contains no explanation of this concept. It is widely accepted that the concept of “non-contractual 
obligations” is intended to complement the concept of “contractual obligations” in both the Rome 
Convention 1980 and the Rome I Regulation.
621
 Such an interpretation is supported not only by the 
terminology applied in those instruments, - “contractual obligations” v. “non-contractual obligations” -
, but also by Recital 7 of Rome II, which states that  
“the substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) and the instruments 
dealing with the law applicable to contractual obligations.”  
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Therefore, there should be no overlap between Rome I and Rome II Regulations when distinguishing 
contractual and non-contractual obligations.
622
 In reference to the above-quoted Recital 7, Article 5(3) 
of Brussels I (No 44/2001) deals with “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict”, which 
correspond with the term “matters relating to a contract” as used in Article 5(1) of the same 
Regulation. That may give an indication as to the meaning of the concept of “non-contractual 
obligations”. 
 
It is of particular note that such a general explanation may cause ambiguity or similar difficulty in the 
context of copyright and related rights claims. 
 
In defining non-contractual obligations in copyright and related rights disputes difficulty may arise 
from the interface between the contract law aspect, particularly licensing contract,
623
 and tort law, 
which is what infringement claims are. For example, if parties to a licensing contract agreed that a 
licensee, who has his habitual residence in the Netherlands, would only distribute a copyrighted work 
in the Netherlands, but the licensee then also distributes the work to China, shall the licensor who 
habitually resides in Germany bring the dispute as a contract or non-contract claim or both? The 
possibility of concurrent liability makes the demarcation of contractual and non-contractual 
obligations more difficult since not all countries recognize the concurrent claims. As a result, the 
treatment of the obligations, even based on the same factual situation, could in theory differ from one 
country’s law to another’s.624 When the issue of applicable law is involved, a question may arise as to 
whether all claims should be governed by the lex contractus, and if not, how the applicable law issue 
should be dealt with in the context of concurrent contract and non-contract claims. Although the Rome 
Convention 1980 and its successor the Rome I Regulation do not contain any specific provision on IP 
rights, there is no doubt that contractual obligations arising from copyright transaction shall fall within 
the scope of those instruments.
625
 Accordingly, both instruments may be applicable to licensing 
contracts and to assignment contracts, as well.
626
 However, non-contractual obligations arising from 
copyright infringement claims are dealt with in the Rome II Regulation.  
 
Among the laws of the Member States, the demarcation lines between contractual and non-contractual 
obligations are not identical.
627
 Insofar as IP rights are concerned, only the Belgian PIL Code remedies 
the classification issue between contractual and non-contractual obligations. Under it, transferability 
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and the manner of transfer of IP rights are subject to the lex protectionis.
628
 While other PIL codes, 
such as the Austrian PIL provide for the application of the lex loci protectionis to a wide scope of IP 
rights, including existence and termination, but in the context of IP rights transfer, the nature of 
transfer as such is still debatable: is it a matter that is contractual in nature, or a non-contractual 
one?
629
 Thus, the existence of different demarcation lines could lead to different ways of 
characterizing a claim, and on that basis, different choice-of-law rules would be applied in the courts 
of different Member States.  
 
The importance of clarifying the demarcation lines between contractual and non-contractual 
obligations in copyright disputes is also due to a certain rigidity of the choice-of-law rules provided in 
the Rome II Regulation. The commonly applied exceptions, such as: party autonomy and the escape 
clause where there is “a manifestly closer connection” are not to be found in connection with 
copyright infringement claims.
630
 In contrast, the Rome I Regulation does provide such exception 
rules. The fact that characterizing a claim as contractual or non-contractual leads to the application of 
Rome I or Rome II will, in turn, result in the application of different national laws. Thus, in reference 
to the example given two paragraphs above, if the claimant were to allege the case as a contract claim 
in order to maintain that a choice-of-law clause in the contract states that all disputes that arise or are 
related to it should be governed by Dutch law, the latter may be the law applicable to the dispute, 
provided that application of Dutch law does not affect the forum’s public policy and overriding 
mandatory rules. Even if the parties were not to have agreed on the applicable law, in such a case the 
court would choose, as the law governing the contract, the law of the country in which the party 
required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence,
631
 or the law 
of the country with which the contract is from all the circumstance of the case manifestly more closely 
connected,
632
 or the law of the country with which the contracted performance is most closely 
connected, if the law applicable cannot be determined according to the choice-of-law rules of the law 
of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his 
habitual residence. Consequently, the law governing the contract claim could be either Dutch law or 
PRC law or German law. In contrast, if the claimant were to allege the cause of action as a pure IP 
infringement claim, Rome II will apply to the dispute, and in that context, the rule of the lex loci 
protectionis laid down in Article 8(1) of Rome II will designate the application of PRC law.  
 
To some extent, a claimant can in practice choose how to allege claims.
633
 In academic or judicial 
theory, the determination should not depend merely on how the claimant labels the claim as either 
contractual or non-contract.
634
 Nevertheless, for interpreting “non-contractual obligations” the 
Community instruments of the Brussels Regime and the Rome Regime provide some guidance and 
should be looked at in the next two subsections. 
 
3.3.3.1.1 Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation 
It is of note that the Brussels Regime does not use the terminology of “contractual obligations” and 
“non-contractual obligations”. Instead, they use “matters relating to contract” in Article 5(1) and 
“matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” in Article 5(3). Except for that difference in 
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terminology, Rome II, unlike the Brussels Regime, does not treat unjust enrichment, negotiorum 
gestio and culpa in contrahendo as tort or delict claims and, as a result, provides them with special 
choice-of-law rules. Therefore, it is submitted that the terminology used in the Brussels Regime 
regarding “matters relating to contract” and “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” should not 
be directly applied in the Rome II Regulation insofar as the characterization of non-contractual 
obligations is concerned,
635
 but the key elements of the ECJ interpretation in this regard should be 
taken well into consideration.
636
 Thus, the ruling rendered by the ECJ in this regard as to the Brussels 
Regime can shine some light on the Rome II Regulation. 
 
The ECJ has ruled that the phrase “matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict” in the Brussels 
Convention should be autonomously interpreted in the light of the Convention’s objectives and 
general scheme
637
 to cover all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are 
not related to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention.
638
 Thus, the concepts of 
“matters relating to a contract” and “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” should be mutually 
exclusive. The ECJ left this to national laws and did not give a clearer characterization.
639
 Scholars 




When tentatively applying the ECJ interpretation of the concept of “matters relating to tort, delict and 
quasi-delict” in Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention to the concept of the non-contractual 
obligation in Rome II, it can be clearly seen that some important rulings would be transplanted to 
Rome II, such as giving an interpretation that is autonomous (i.e. EU law, rather than national laws) to 
the concept of “non-contractual obligation”,641 applying them to non-contractual obligations that are 
likely to arise,
642
 and covering non-contractual obligations arising out of strict liability, as well.
643
 
Therefore, it can be maintained that, in the absence of further explanation about this, the ECJ rulings 
on the concept of “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” have not provided clear enough 
references to the concept of “non-contractual obligation”. Nevertheless, the negative definition given 
by the ECJ which requires “not related to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1)” can lead to 
further analysis of the definition of “matters relating to contracts” in that Article 5(1). That may 
provide an opposing picture as to the concept of “matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict” and 
may, in turn, shine some light on the concept of “non-contractual obligations” required by Rome II. 
 
The ECJ observed that, based on the system and objectives of the Convention, the definition of 
“matters relating to a contract” in Article 5(1) should be given an independent concept.644 The Court 
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further observed that the concept is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no 
obligation freely assumed by one party towards another.
645
 In order for Article 5(1) to apply, the 
existence of a contract is not an essential element.
646
 Instead establishing a legal obligation which is 
freely assumed by one party towards another and which is also the basis for the claimant’s action is a 





Furthermore, Advocate General Jacobs’s opinion on Engler v Janus Versand has identified certain 
generally recurring features regarding the concept of “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict”, 
and that is important for clarification of “non-contractual obligations”. He wrote 
“first, one usual element in a tortuous, delictual or quasi-delictual act is that it is in breach of a 
legal rule… Second, a claim in tort, delict or quasi-delict generally, perhaps always, requires at 
least an allegation of harm or damage suffered - reflected in the expression ‘harmful event’ in 
Article 5(3) of the Convention… Third, it is commonly the case that any amount awarded by a 
court to a claimant in tort, delict or quasi-delict takes account, primarily, of the nature and 
degree of harm suffered and perhaps, secondarily, of the seriousness of the (unlawful) act giving 
rise to the claim. There is generally a central element of compensation, though the final award 
may in some cases be increased to a dissuasive, or reduced to a symbolic, level”.648 
 
The above ECJ observations may be applied to distinguish “contractual” in Rome I from “non-
contractual” in Rome II. Accordingly, one may consider an obligation as contractual when the contract 
fulfils two conditions: first, following the ECJ’s factual analysis, an intentional and voluntary act by 
one party to another should be required, maybe some reciprocal voluntary acts; second, the contract 
concerned must be the basis for the claimant to initiate his action. Therefore, it can be further 
concluded that if an obligation-based claim does not fulfil the above two conditions, the claim will not 
be considered as contractual and it will consequently fall within the scope of Rome II as a “non-
contractual obligation”.649  
 
3.3.3.1.2 Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation    
The Rome Convention 1980 and its successor Rome I (except the Convention, not the Regulation, still 
applies in the UK and Denmark) deal with choice-of-law rules for contractual obligations.
650
 As to the 
concept of contractual obligations, there is however no clear guidance that can be found in either 
instrument. As stated in Recital 7 of that Regulation, its substantive scope and provisions should be 
consistent with those of the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and judgments. The conditions for 
constituting a contractual obligation were defined by the ECJ in the course of interpreting “matters 
relating to a contract” under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Regime, in particular in Engler v Janus 
Versand, supra, which may provide some support in defining the concept of “contractual obligation” 
for purposes of the Rome I Regulation. The two phrases, “matters relating to a contract” and 
“contractual obligation”, should, however, not be interpreted identically because they serve different 
purposes. The former serves only the purpose of establishing special jurisdiction, whereas the latter is 
the basic term of the Rome I Regulation.
651
 Additionally, the practical consequence of a matter falling 
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either within the scope of Rome I or Rome II differs from those of falling within Articles 5(1) or 5(3) 
of the Brussels Regime.
652
 However, as maintained by certain scholars, it is not possible to render the 




Since, just as with the Brussels Regime and the Rome II Regulation, the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations are also intended to complement one another,
654
 contractual obligation claim in relation to 
copyright and related rights should be within the scope of either Rome I or Rome II. The criteria for 
characterizing a copyright obligation claim as contractual or non-contractual could be influenced by 
the ruling handed down in Engler v Janus Versand, supra, i.e. an intentional and voluntary act by one 
party to another, e.g. a licensor to a licensee, and probably some reciprocal voluntary act, must be 
established, and the contract between the licensor and the licensee must be the basis for one of the 
parties’ action. Once a contractual obligation is established, the choice-of-law issue will be governed 
by the Rome I Regulation. If not, the Rome II Regulation will be applied to determine the law that is 
applicable.  
 
It is mentionable that the test in Engler v Janus Versand provides a rather straight-forward solution to 
copyright related obligation claims, in particular in some cases where characterizing contractual and 
non-contractual obligations would be difficult, for example, in a dispute involving a licensee who sold 
products to a state other than the one agreed on in the licensing contract, or a dispute involving a 
licensee who continues to sell the licensor’s products when the licensing contract has expired and 
when the contract does not contain a provision specifying whether the licensee would still be entitled 
to sell the product after termination of the contract. When applying the first prong of the Engler v 
Janus Versand test to the above examples, it can be seen that the act of the licensee selling the 
products in the state where the parties did not agreed on it or the act of the licensee selling the products 
after the termination of the contract can be considered as unilateral acts of the licensees because the 
consents of the licensor for selling the products in other states or selling the products after the 
termination of the contract were not given. When applying the second prong of the Engler v Janus 
Versand test to the above examples, it is clear that the existing contracts could not be the bases for the 
licensors to bring their claims, even though one may argue that the disputes have a relation to the 
contracts, or the disputes are subject to the interpretation of the contracts, or a choice-of-law clause of 
the contract provides that the chosen law governs all the claims arising out of the contract. It is of note 
that the mere existence of a contract is not crucial; instead, the Engler v Janus Versand test requires 
establishing that the contract is the basis for the licensors to bring their claims.  
 
Additionally, this point has been implicitly confirmed in Rome II in the context of IP rights 
infringement claims because the legislators of the Rome II Regulation were unwilling to introduce an 
escape clause for IP infringement claims, i.e. a clause under which a non-contractual obligation that 
has a close connection with a contractual or other pre-existing relationship may be governed by the 
law applicable to that relationship. While such a clause has been accepted as to several other kinds of 
matters provided for in Rome II,
 655
 it is not available for IP rights claims. This unwillingness may be 
interpreted as that the legislators intended to apply a stricter rule to IP rights infringement claims, i.e. 
even though an IP right infringement claim might have a close connection with a contractual or pre-
existing relationship, this claim may still fall within the scope of Rome II and may still be governed by 
the law that is designated according to the choice-of-law rules written in Article 8 of Rome II. It can 
be further concluded that, with regard to obligation claims arising from IP rights, if claims are directly 
based on the contract, they will be considered as contractual obligations, and for claims that, such as 
the examples given above, are only related to a contract, they should not be considered as contractual 
obligations, but as non-contractual obligations. 
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The Rome I and II Regulations, together, cover the whole field of obligation claims in relation to IP 
rights. It is of note that, in the absence of any statement that Rome I is subordinate to Rome II, or vice 
versa, these two Regulations should be considered to stand on equal footing, so as to completely 
complement each other. There is no doubt that infringement of IP rights has to be characterized as 
tortious and falls within the scope of Rome II. It is, however, inevitable that certain obligations at the 
boundaries between these two could become difficult to characterize. So, when doubts arise from the 
characterization of contractual or non-contractual obligations relating to IP rights for which the Engler 
v Janus Versand test cannot provide an answer, it is suggested that characterizing the claim as a non-
contractual obligation should be preferred. This is because, in this writer’s view, the Rome II 
Regulation contains stricter choice-of-law rules for IP rights for the purpose of protecting public 
interests, e.g. it excludes an escape clause and the possibility of party autonomy,
656
 whereas Rome I 
protects mainly private interests. If a preference for characterizing an IP rights obligation as 
contractual, which accordingly enables application of the escape clause or party autonomy, it will 
seem to conflict with the territorial character of IP rights where the protection of public or policy 
interests are at stake. Thus, when the two interests seem to conflict, a higher ranking should be given 
to the public interests over private interests. Having this in mind, when there is difficulty in 
characterizing copyright obligation claims as contractual or non-contractual for the purpose of finding 
the law applicable within the EC, a preference for characterizing the claim as one for a non-contractual 
obligation may be supported because this preference, leading to application of Rome II, will enhance 
the protection of public interests.  
 
3.3.4 Temporal scope 
Although the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation is laid down in Articles 31 and 32, those 
articles did not make a clear statement about its entry into force.
657
 According to the general rules on 
the entry into force of Community instruments, a regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day 
from the day of its publication in the Official Journal.
658
 Since the Regulation was published on 21 
July 2007, the date of its entry into force would normally have been 20 August 2007.
659
 So the 
Regulation was not clear about the date of its application. That gave rise to discussions among 
scholars.
 660
 A November 2011 CJEU decision clarified this by reading Articles 31 and 32 together 
with Article 297 of the TFEU, with the effect that the date of application of the Rome II Regulation 
was fixed at 11 January 2009, with the consequence that it applies only to events giving rise to damage 
occurring from that date.
661
 Such an interpretation ensures, according to the CJEU, “the predictability 
of the outcome of litigation, legal certainty as to the law applicable and the uniform application of that 
regulation in all the Member States”.662 
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3.3.5 Universal application 
Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation provides that “[A]ny law specified by this Regulation shall be 
applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.” This universal application of the Regulation 
means that the uniform choice-of-law rules can designate the law of a Member State or of any non-
Member State. The principle of universal application was not new. It had been used in the Rome 
Convention, the Conventions concluded by the Hague Conference,
663





The purpose of adding this principle to Rome II has to do with “the proper functioning of the internal 
market as avoiding distortions of competition between Community litigants”,665 and it “may avert the 
risk of distortions of competition between litigants”.666 However, a question has been raised as to the 
legality of the Regulation in relation to adoption of the universality principle.
667
 The legal basis of 




requires that the measures 
adopted be for the proper functioning of the internal market. As argued by some scholars, the effect of 
the provision for designation of the law of a non-EU state may have little or no connection with the 
internal market.
669
 That would then challenge the legality of at least part of Rome II.  
 
This argument cannot be supported. Since the Commission made it clear in its 2003 Proposal that 
equal treatment for Community litigants should be preserved in disputes regardless whether they are 
purely “intra-Community” or “extra-Community”. Furthermore, “the separation between ‘intra-
Community’ and ‘extra-Community’ disputes is by now artificial”.670 From a practical point of view, 
having two sets of choice-of-law rules in Member States’ national laws, under which Rome II would 
be applicable only to “intra-Community” disputes and another set of rules would be for “extra-
Community” disputes that are within the material scope of the Rome II Regulation, would increase the 
complexity of the application of the rules,
671





 As concluded by the Commission, the universal application of Rome II 
will meet “the concern for certainty in the law and the Union’s commitment in favour of transparent 
legislation”. 674  Thus, in the author’s view, the legality argument for disfavouring the “universal 
application” should not be supported, and the universal application of the rules set out in the 
Regulation should be welcomed because doing so in the Regulation will serve the interests of clarity 
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and legal certainty: the parties can predict the law applicable to their disputes without having to 
consider whether their dispute has a sufficient connection with the internal market. 
 
The result of the universal application is that the law of a non-EU, non-EEA state could be applicable, 
e.g. PRC law. Thus, as of 11 January 2009, PRC legal practice will be confronted with over 26 EU and 
EEA states that have this fundamentally uniform choice-of-law system. If a Member State court 
(except in Denmark) can establish jurisdiction, whether on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation or its 
own national PIL rules, for a cross-border tort case that is within the scope of Rome II, that court will 
apply Rome II, which may designate application of PRC law to the disputes. It is very difficult to 
judge whether the outcome of applying PRC law to e.g. copyright infringement disputes, would be 
welcomed, but the fact that applying PRC law in such a circumstance would also be the result in 
another 25 or more Member States’ courts will certainly guarantee certainty and foreseeability of the 
law applicable. Meanwhile, the universal application of the Rome II Regulation does not prevent 
courts in non-Member States from reaching different results regarding to the law applicable to the 
situations that have contacts with the EU.
675
 Therefore, in order to enhance legal certainty and 
foreseeability of the applicable law as well as the proper functioning of the internal market, it was 
required to adopt the universal principle part of the Rome II Regulation. 
 
3.3.6 Choice-of-law Rules for Torts/delicts 
Within the system of the Rome II Regulation, Article 4 deals with the general choice-of-law rules for 
torts/delicts. It contains a basic rule of the lex loci damni in paragraph 1, a common habitual residence 
rule in paragraph 2, which can set aside paragraph 1, and an escape clause in paragraph 3, which may 
replace the above two connecting factors. 
 
3.3.6.1 General rule 
Article 4(1) provides that in the situation where a non-contractual obligation arises out of a general 
tort, it is the place of direct damage that plays a primary role, and the law of that place will be the law 
applicable to the claim (the lex loci damni). According to Recital 16 of the Regulation, unified choice-
of-law rules should enhance foreseeability of court decisions and ensure a reasonable balance between 
the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage. A connection 
with the country where the direct damage occurred strikes a fair balance between these interests, and 
reflects the modern approach to civil liability. 
  
Under its Article 4(1), the rule of the lex loci damni applies irrespective of any subsequent 
consequences that might occur in a country or countries other than where the initial damage occurred. 
This is in accord with the ECJ judgment as to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regime in Marinari v 
Lloyd’s Bank case, under which the concept of the place where the harmful event occurred would not 
include the place where the victim suffered financial damage following upon the initial damage arising 




Applying the lex loci damni as a general rule also has drawbacks. The Commission claimed that the 
lex loci damni strikes a balance between the interests of the tortfeasor and the victim.
677
 However, this 
rule does not take much of the interests of the former into account, since a non-intentional tortfeasor 
will not be able to foresee the places of damage in some situations. Under such circumstances, an 
escape clause of Article 4(3) may provide some way out for such a tortfeasor. Furthermore, the 
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Regulation does not address cross-border torts e.g. multi-state torts.
678
 As a result, those situations will 
be subject to the general rule of the lex loci damni, but application of the lex loci damni will not be 
practical, since in situations where the damages occur in different states, the laws of the states 
concerned will have to be applied on a distributive basis, like the so-called Mosaikbetrachtung in 
German law, the mosaic rule.
679
 The effect of this would be that Rome II will have to designate the 
application of multiple laws. 
 
It is true that there is no single solution that will be wholly satisfactory for all torts.
680
 The solution 
adopted by the Commission has been deemed to be a compromise between the two extreme solutions 
of applying the law of the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurs and giving the 
victim the option.
681
 Opting for a rule of lex loci damni is justifiable on the grounds that it promotes 
legal certainty and gives priority to protection of the victim without, however, completely neglecting 
the interests of the tortfeasor. In addition, this principle is in line with the evolution of comparative 
law in Europe, not only in the field of choice-of-law, but also in substantive law where under modern 
civil liability trends the objective of compensation supersedes the aim of deterrence, and this principle 




 3.3.6.2 Exceptions to the general rule 
The Commission pointed out in its 2003 Proposal that the application of the lex loci damni “might well 
be inappropriate where the situation has only a tenuous connection with the country where the 
damage occurs” and as a result it would be necessity to provide exceptions to be applied in specified 
circumstances.
683
 Similarly, it had been common for most modern European PIL rules to have 
exceptions to the general rule of the lex loci delicti for certain circumstances.
684
 In that context, two 
exceptions were adopted in Rome II in its Articles 4(2) and (3). 
 
3.3.6.2.1 Common habitual residence exception 
The common habitual residence rule in Article 4(2) represents the first of the two factors enabling 
flexibility. It takes into account a situation in which personal contacts with a state may not be with the 
state where the injury occurs.
685
 Accordingly, the place of habitual residence of “both” parties 
becomes the rule, since designation of that location is a way party expectations can be protected.
686
 In 
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The concept of habitual residence of both parties should receive an autonomous interpretation.
688
 In 
that regard, Article 23 of the Regulation contains only a partial definition in that in only concerns 
business. As to habitual residence of companies and other bodies, whether or not having corporate 
form, the place of habitual residence will be the place of central administration or, alternatively, where 
the damage occurs in the operation of a branch, agency or establishment, the place of its location.
689
 
As to damage by the tort of a natural person in the course of a business activity, it shall be that 
person’s principal place of business.690  
 
As to habitual residences of other natural persons, the Regulation does not specify any designation. 
Since the latter concept is also used in the Rome Convention 1980, the Rome I Regulation and the 
Brussels II bis Regulation, it is assumed that the ECJ ruling in analogous situations may be referred to. 
In an ECJ ruling relating to the interpretation of the definition of a child’s habitual residence for the 
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in the context of the Brussels II bis Regulation, the ECJ ruled that 
the concept of “habitual residence” under Article 8(1)691 of the Brussels II bis Regulation must be 
established on the basis of all the circumstances specific to each individual case
692
 and should be 
interpreted as meaning that “it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by 
the child in a social and family environment”.693 The ECJ further listed some factors that should be 
taken into consideration when establishing the habitual residence of a child, such as the duration, 
regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the family’s 
move to that state, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic 
knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that state.
694
 By citing this ruling in 
reference to the Rome II Regulation, it is suggested that determining the habitual residence of a natural 
person should be based on the factual criteria listed by the ECJ, with the result that the place of a 
natural person’s habitual residence should reflect some degree of integration of that person in a social 
and family environment. 
 
3.3.6.2.2 Escape clause exception 
Article 4(3) contains an “escape clause” which “aims to bring a degree of flexibility, enabling the 
court to adapt the rigid rule to an individual case so as to apply the law that reflects the centre of 
gravity of the situation”.695 This clause should be applied as an exception and only in the situation 
where a manifestly closer connection with another country has been established.
696
 Article 4(3) 
embodies a test of close connection. It has been argued that the concept of “close connection” should 
be defined on the factual base of the case and to require consideration of the significance of the 
territorial connecting factors.
697
 To discern the meaning of “close connection”, Article 4(3) includes, 
as an example of a connecting factor, “a pre-existing relationship between parties”, which is an 
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“accessory attachment” approach in tort claims that is commonly applied in Member States.698 The 
Commission stated that, although applying the same law to the pre-existing relationship and tort claim 
would respect the parties’ legitimate expectation and meet the need of having sound administration of 
justice, the law applicable to the pre-existing relationship should not be applied automatically to tort 
claims, and it is the courts that are vested with discretion to decide “whether there is a significant 
connection between the non-contractual obligations and the law applicable to the pre-existing 
relationship.”699  
 
In the Regulation, pre-existing contractual relationship is stated only as an example. Once a court 
decides that a contract is manifestly more closely connected with the tort in question, the law 
applicable to that contract will apply to that tort claim, and the Rome I Regulation will come to play a 
role because Article 4(3) of Rome II will lead to the result that the choice-of-law rules of Rome I 
govern both the contractual and non-contractual obligations.   
 
In addition to pre-existing contractual relationship, the Commission mentioned in its 2003 Proposal 
that it allows “the court to take account of a contractual relationship that is still only contemplated, as 
in the case of the breakdown of negotiations or of annulment of a contract, or of a family 
relationship.”700 Unlike the situation of an existing contract where the law applicable is to be governed 
by Rome I, the law applicable to the pre-existing relationship other than contracts, such as property 
should be decided according to national PIL rules, and that may cause inconsistency in the application 




The second sentence of Article 4(3) uses the wording “in particular”, which indicates, to repeat, that a 
“pre-existing relationship” is only an example of the circumstances that amount to a “manifestly closer 
connection”. As to how Article 4(3) should operate in the situation where there is no pre-existing 
relationship between parties, the Regulation does not provide a specific answer. For the sake of clarity, 
consistency and an appropriate measure of flexibility, the EP suggested listing a set of factors that may 
be taken into account as manifestly connecting a non-contractual obligation with another country.
702
 
The Commission did not accept it, the reason being that an escape clause should be applied only “by 
way of exception” and the EP’s approach would “substantially alter the spirit of the instrument”.703 
Thus, it is suggested that courts should apply an objective test to ascertain “manifestly close” 
connecting factors and apply Article 4(3) only in exceptional circumstances.  
 
3.3.6.2.3 Party autonomy 
The principle of party autonomy has long been accepted for choice-of-law rules as to contracts.
704
 As 
for non-contractual obligations, it is generally recognized that the parties’ choice should be respected, 
subject to various restrictions.
705
 Article 14 of Rome II provides the possibility for parties to choose 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations that fall within the scope of the Regulation, with the 
exception of unfair competition and infringement of intellectual property rights. It demonstrates that 
“freedom of choice” is a sort of main theme in Rome II. However, it imposes certain limitations on the 
application of party autonomy. First, the choice of law agreement must be an express agreement, or be 
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demonstrated by the circumstances of the case with reasonable certainty.
706
 Second, the timing of such 
an agreement will be crucial. Such an agreement can be concluded either ex ante or ex post. An ex ante 
agreement will only be valid where two conditions are fulfilled: 1) all parties are pursuing a 
commercial activity and 2) the agreement was freely negotiated.
707
 These conditions aim at protecting 
weaker parties.
708
 Third, the choice must not prejudice the rights of third parties. Fourth, in a domestic 
case, a choice of foreign law cannot displace mandatory provisions of the law that would have been 
applied without that choice.
709
 Similarly, as provided in Article 14(3), in the intra-Community case, a 
choice of a non-Member State’s law cannot displace mandatory provisions of Community law. In 
addition, Article 16 also gives the priority over the parties’ choice of law to the forum’s overriding 
mandatory provisions. 
 
The adoption of party autonomy in Rome II should be welcomed because it can improve legal 
certainty and foreseeability of the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, in particular in multi-
state infringement claims. In addition, by respecting the parties’ choice this principle implicitly 
acknowledges that parties are entitled to dispose of their civil rights. Introducing the principle of party 
autonomy in Rome II also demonstrates that autonomy within limits is among the central general 
principles of contemporary European PIL rules in tort.
710
 It continues the trend of expanding this 
freedom in the field of choice-of-law.
711
 It can be concluded that Article 14 of Rome II improves the 
existing situation in the legal systems of many Member States, even though the exclusion of party 
autonomy from copyright and related rights infringement claims, a matter of concern in the current 




3.3.6.2.4 Public policy 
Article 26 of Rome II provides for the overriding effect of the forum’s public policy by stating,  
“the application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be 
refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) 
of the forum”.  
This wording is very similar to Article 16 of the Rome Convention 1980, which the Giuliano & 
Lagarde Report described as “a precise and restrictively worded reservation”.713  
 
Recital 32 of Rome II emphasizes that Article 26 should be construed narrowly. In part, it recites, 
“[c]onsideration of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, 
in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and overriding 
mandatory provisions.”  
However, the public policy exception will only be invoked in unusual situations. Since this exception 
is to guard against results of applying foreign law that will be repugnant to the forum in a particular 
case and not to nullify the content of foreign law designated by the Regulation,
714
 the fact that a 
foreign policy in regulating non-contractual liability differs from the one of the forum could not, by 
itself, justify the displacement of the foreign law in favour of the forum’s rule.715 To define public 
policy in the context of Rome II, reference may be made to the same concept interpreted by the ECJ in 
relation to recognition and enforcement of judgments under Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 
and Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention, even though the aim of Rome II is different, i.e. to 
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determine applicable law for non-contractual obligations in contrast to declining to enforce a judgment 
when the result of enforcing it would violate public policy. The ECJ pointed out that the concept of 
public policy and its limits are matters within its jurisdiction in interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention.
716
 However, the content of the public policy of a Member State is not for the ECJ to 
define, rather 
“it is none the less required to review the limits within which the courts of a Contracting Sate 
may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition to a judgment 
emanating from a court in another Contracting State”.717  
According to the ECJ, recourse to a public order clause can only be envisaged where recognition or 
enforcement of the judgment delivered in another contracting state would be at variance to an 
unacceptable degree with the legal order of the state in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it 
infringes a fundamental principle, and  
“the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognized 
as being fundamental within that legal order”.718  
 
It has nevertheless been argued that public policy used as a corrective measure to applying a foreign 
law would be stronger than public policy as a bar to recognition of a foreign judgment.
719
 In any event, 
it may be deduced that the concept of public policy is not subject to definition by the Regulation, but 
the limits of the concept are subject to judicial review. The public policy exception may be raised by a 
court of a Member State seized of a case only when the application of a provision of the law of a 
country designated by the Regulation would infringe a principle that is fundamental to the legal order 
of the Member State forum. 
 
If a court invokes the public policy exception and thereby refuses to apply a foreign law that violates 
the forum’s public policy, what should the court then do? The Regulation does not provide any 
answer. The Commission assumed in its 2003 Proposal Explanation Memorandum that the odious 
foreign law would be allowed to be replaced by the lex fori.
720
 Although such an application would 
serve practical convenience and certainty, its legal position is still doubtful since such an application 
would hardly be in line with the principle of applying the law having the closest connection with the 
dispute.
721
 Thus, others advocate that the court should dismiss the case under such circumstance, or 
leave this issue to the laws of the Member States.
722
 In any event, in the absence of an autonomous 
interpretation from the CJEU on this issue, the courts of the Member States should keep the approach 
they had adopted before the Regulation came into force. 
 
3.3.6.2.4.1 Moral rights 
In view of the topic of this dissertation, attention needs to be focused on the moral rights involved in a 
copyrighted work. Moral rights are those related to the protection of the personality of an author and 
the integrity of this work, and they are commonly recognized by countries that have an author’s right 
feature.
723
 Moral rights are granted only to the author, i.e. the identification of authorship determines 
who the beneficiary of the moral rights will be, as well as the extent of the moral rights protection.  
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Since the authorship issue is dealt with differently in copyright law countries and author’s right 
countries, moral rights beneficiaries and the extent of moral rights granted are, in practice, treated 
differently. Further, as discussed in the previous chapters, France and Germany belong to the author’s 
right countries, but in their ways of dealing with moral rights they still differ from each other. French 
law adopts a “dualist” approach, according to which the author enjoys two separate sets of rights: “an 
incorporeal property right” that “includes attributes of an intellectual and moral order, as well as 
attributes of an economic order”.724 In France, moral rights may be claimed by all authors.725 Under 
the German Copyright Law (hereinafter UrbG),
726
 as to the rights granted to the author, it adopted a 
“monist” approach. According to this approach, moral rights and economic rights of an author cannot 
be separated, rather they are intertwined and influence each other in the way of their application, their 
exercise, and in the way the rights are recognized.
727
 In Germany, an author’s personality right 




In contrast, the copyright law system recognizes limited moral rights protection. Under the UK’s 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), for general works, an author is the one who creates 
it,
729
 while for other categories of works, authorship is attributed differently: a sound recording 
producer is the author of sound recording works; a producer and a principle director of a film, a 
broadcaster of a broadcast, and a publisher of the typographical arrangement of a published edition are 
authors.
730
 As to a work made by an employee in the course of employment, the employer is the first 
owner of any copyright in the work, subject to agreement to the contrary.
731
 Moral rights will be 





The following example can demonstrate the different treatment of moral rights. Moral rights in 
computer programs: Article 2(3) of the EC Software Directive provides that  
“when a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his duties or following 
the instructions given by his employer, the employer exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all 
economic rights in the program so created, unless otherwise provided by contract”.  
There is, however, no guidance on moral rights, which will be left to national laws. In the UK CDPA, 
Sections 79(2) and 81(2) state that the computer program authors enjoy no moral rights in the 
computer programs that they created. German law is the opposite: the creators of computer programs 
retain all moral rights in the program. Article 69(b) of the UrbG states the employer may exercise 
economic rights, unless otherwise agreed. As to the way that moral rights are to be exercised, German 
law does not have a provision to dismiss or disrespect it, in fact, it is believed that the employer needs 
to arrange for it with the author of computer programs.
733
 According to French law, the creators of 
computer programs are vested with authorship, but they cannot prevent the adaptation of the program 
within the limit of the rights which they have ceded, nor can they exercise the right of revision or 
retraction.
734
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Given the different statuses of moral rights in national copyright/author’s right law systems and the 
different scopes of their application, one may raise a question whether moral rights should be 
considered, as discussed in the preceding section, as fundamental rights that can be invoked under a 
public policy exception before the court seized of the dispute. 
 
Under the UK’s approach, moral rights are seen as fundamental rights, since they are the minimum 
guarantees to protect the basic rights of an author.
736
 Accordingly, they form part of public policy and 
should be applied by UK courts in a situation where the standard of moral rights protection in the 
otherwise applicable law is lower than the one in the CDPA.
737
 However, as rightly pointed out by van 
Eechoud, when the standard of moral rights protection of a lex causae is higher, it should not itself be 




The famous John Huston judgment rendered by the French Court de Cassation in the late 1980s is an 
example of how the moral rights issue is considered under French law. The heirs of the film director 
John Huston challenged in front of a French court broadcasting colorized version of the black-and-
white film The Asphalt Jungle in France, which had been produced and first published in the USA in 
the 1940s.
739
 The film was made by the American director Huston in the USA in the course of 
performing his duty as an employee of an American film company. The central question of the case 
concerned the identification of the “author” of the film. On this basis the assertion of moral rights 
could be determined. Under French law, the creator of a work is the author. Moral rights granted to the 
author protect the author against abuse of the work. However, in accord with the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine of the US Copyright Act (federal law), the film producer is deemed to be the “author” of a 
cinematographic work. Additionally, the employment contract between the director and his employer 
was governed by law in the USA (state law), and it contained a provision stating that any (residual) 
rights that Huston may have had were assigned to the film producer. It is of note that at that time the 
US Copyright Act did not recognize moral rights.  
 
Which law should apply to decide the authorship of the film? This law would have relevance on the 
issue of moral rights accordingly. Assuming that the court were to apply American law, John Huston 
would not be the author of the film, nor would he enjoy moral rights protection. However, if French 
law applied in this respect, John Huston would be the author and enjoy moral rights protection, and as 
a result he and his heirs would have standing to challenge abuses of his work on the basis of the right 
of integrity.   
 
The French Court de Cassation nevertheless applied French law to the authorship issue, and held 
further that the author enjoys his/her moral rights by the mere fact of its creation and that the 
colorizing of the film infringed the integrity of the work and infringed the author’s moral rights. The 
application of author-protective rules is imperative.
740





The author of this book is also of the opinion that the moral rights issues should not be considered as 
public policy, but as mandatory rules. This opinion is based both on the concept of public policy 
provided in Article 26 of the Regulation and on the different ways that public policy and mandatory 
rules are applied.  
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Firstly, Article 26 requires that the application of the law chosen under Rome II must be “manifestly 
incompatible” with the law of the forum. As explained in the Giuliano & Lagarde Report, the term 
“manifestly” had its origins in all the Hague Conventions since 1956 and it requires that special 
grounds relied on by the court seized be justified.
742
 It is suggested that the contravention of a 
fundamental principle of the legal order of a forum state should be obvious.
743
 Moral rights are, 
however, personality rights linked to the person of the author of the work, and forms part of the 
personal law of the author. They should not be invoked as a public policy exception.  
 
Secondly, different techniques for applying public policy and for applying mandatory rules show that 
moral rights protection should be invoked as a mandatory rule, rather than as public policy. When a 
court is about to invoke a public policy exception, the court should not replace the applicable law, but 
continue to give effect to those provisions of the applicable law whose applications are not 
objectionable. Thus, the public policy exception, which serves as a kind of shield, should be 
considered at a later stage of the litigation.
744
 On the contrary, mandatory rules function as a kind of a 
sword. They are given positive, overriding effects and the court should apply them directly, regardless 
of the contents of the rules of law that are otherwise applicable.
745
 Considering the way French law 
protects moral rights i.e. granting to a creator of a work, once the integrity of the author is at issue, 
even though French law may not apply to works that are not first published in France,
746
 constitutes 
direct invocation of the forum state’s moral rights protection thereby demonstrating that moral rights 
protection should be considered as mandatory rules rather than public policy.  
 
3.3.6.2.5 Overriding mandatory rule 
Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation provides: 
“nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the provisions of the law of the forum 
in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the non-
contractual obligation”.  
This provision, however, does not furnish a definition of mandatory law of the forum. In this respect, 
the Commission 2003 Proposal has referred back to the ECJ judgment in Arblade,
747
 where the 
definition of mandatory rules was expressed as 
“national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection 
of the political, social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require 
compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that Member State and 
all legal relationships within that State.”748  
 
According to the Commission, overriding mandatory rules can be applied directly by the court without 
looking into the forum’s choice-of-law rule to determine which law is applicable and to evaluate 
“whether its content would be repugnant to the values of the forum”.749 Moreover, Article 9(1) of 
Rome I, under the inspiration of the Arblade case, mentioned above, provides a definition of 
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“overriding mandatory rule”. Considering the affiliation of Rome I and Rome II, where some 
provisions could be interpreted consistently with each other,
750
 it can be refutably presumed that the 
Rome II definition of “overriding mandatory rule” should be the same as the one provided in Arblade 
case.
751
 By applying such a presumption, Member States’ courts will apply a similar test when they are 
about to invoke Article 16 of the Regulation. Furthermore, it is to be noted that Article 16 of Rome II 
concerns only international mandatory rules of the lex fori, not their internal mandatory rules. 
 
As analysed in the preceding section, moral rights protection under certain national laws is considered 
as overriding mandatory rule. One may wonder whether moral rights protection can be described as 
crucial for safeguarding the forum state’s public interest, such as its political, social or economic 
order. In the author’s right system, the primary focus is on the protection of an author/creator. As in 
the arguments put forward in the John Huston decision (3.3.6.2.4.1 supra), moral rights form part of 
an author’s personal protection and are therefore mandatory in nature. Accordingly, moral rights 
protection should be considered as one of the preponderant public interests that it is the purpose of law 
to protect.  
 
When considering a common law copyright law system, e.g. UK law, in which moral rights protection 
is provided separately and with a limited scope of protection, one may wonder whether moral rights 
granted under such laws will also be mandatory in nature and should be applied irrespective the law 
otherwise applicable. As observed in Chapter 2 supra, common law copyright law systems stress the 
commercial exploitation of a work. Under copyright laws in such systems, moral rights are provided 
for separately and can be waived by an instrument in writing signed by the person waiving the right.
752
 
Also, as discussed, in common law copyright law countries, the continuous exploitation of the work 
and continuous input to new works are favoured. Thus, moral rights protection in such countries does 
not get as a high ranking as it does in author’s right countries. It is, nevertheless, submitted that the 
commercial exploitation of a work cannot deprive the creator’s personality right, since in the process 
of exploiting copyrighted works, the creator should have certain control over the commercial use of 
his/her name, likeness, or other unequivocal aspects of one's identity. Those are basic rights owned by 
the creator. In fact, even the UK’s CDPA does not allow waiver of the right of attribution. Similarly, 
the basis for the fact that moral rights can be waived under common law copyright must be a 
perception that moral rights are recognized under that law, in spite of the limited extent of its 
protection of such rights.
753
 Therefore, it is concluded that moral rights protections should be treated as 
mandatory rules.  
 
3.3.7 Infringement of copyright and related rights 
As to IP rights infringement, Article 8 of Rome II sets forth independent choice-of-law rules. The IP 
rights laid down in Article 8 include “copyright, related rights, the sui generis right for the protection 
of databases and industrial property rights.”754 Accordingly, the choice-of-law rules stipulated in 
Article 8 will be applicable to claims of copyright and related rights infringement. Article 8, 
Infringement of intellectual property rights, provides in haec verba that 
“1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an 
intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed. 
2. In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary 
Community intellectual property right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not 
governed by the relevant Community instrument, be the law of the country in which the act of 
infringement was committed. 
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3. The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an agreement pursuant to 
Article 14.” 
Article 8(2) refers to the unitary Community IP right. Since copyright and related rights, as analysed in 
the preceding sections, are not unified at the Community level,
755
 claims arising from them will have 
no relevance to any application of Article 8(2).
756
 Thus, considering the scope of this dissertation, no 
special attention will be given to the Article 8(2) provisions.   
 
Using the wording “shall” in Article 8(1) and without referring to Article 4 shows the mutual 
exclusion of Articles 4 and 8, i.e. insofar as claims of IP rights infringement are concerned, specific 
rules provided in Article 8 prevail over the general rules set forth in Article 4. As to such claims, 
including copyright and related rights, the European legislators chose for a “hard and fast” rule: the 
law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of IP rights shall be the 
law of the country for which protection is claimed, without the possibility of applying exceptions like 
the law of the common habitual residence of the parties or having an escape clause of the kind 
embedded in Article 4(2) and (3).  
 
As rules providing for a specific tort - infringement of IP rights - the rules in Article 8 exclude the 
application of the choice-of-law rules designated for other specific torts, quasi-torts and non-
contractual obligations that may involve IP rights, such as Article 6 on unfair competition and Articles 
10, 11 and 12 on unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo, respectively. 
Regarding the latter three, Rome II makes it clear that Article 8 shall prevail over the other three 
provisions and shall apply if other non-contractual obligations arise from infringement of IP rights.
757
 
The purpose of this is to provide clarification and to confirm the primary role of Article 8 insofar as 
non-contractual obligations related to IP rights are concerned.
758
 On the same subject, others contend 
that this provision aims at ensuring one single law to apply to one dispute concerning IP rights 





Adopting the lex loci protectionis rule in Article 8(1) as the governing law for the non-contractual 
obligations arising from infringement of IP rights had provoked a debate in Europe.
760
 The debate was 
about whether it was necessary to unify the choice-of-law rules in this regard, especially in the context 
of copyright and related rights infringement, where the “territorial principle” is held essential, or 
whether the application of the lex loci protectionis was justified as the application of a “universally 
acknowledged principle”, as stated in Recital 26 of the Regulation. 
 
3.3.7.1 History of Article 8 
To begin, in connection with the debates mentioned at the end of the previous subsection one should 
have a close look at the legislative history of Article 8 of Rome II, since it clarifies a basic question 
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whether infringement of IP rights should be treated as a specific tort. The preliminary draft presented 
in 2002 made no reference to any choice-of-law rules about IP rights infringement. The reason for that 
omission is unknown. It has been speculated that it was either due to the absence of a perception that 
there was a problem or the absence of a clear picture of an optimal solution.
761
 During the consultation 
process, this issue was intensively debated among the parties potentially having a stake in the 
outcome.
762
 Academics, in particular those from the Max-Planck Institute’s Hamburg Group,763 urged 
that a specific tort of infringement of IP rights should be introduced because the application of the 
general rule – lex loci damni - was not appropriate. They suggested that the internationally recognized 
rule - lex loci protectionis- should instead be adopted as a specific rule in the Regulation. Others, such 
as governments and industry interests, demanded a carve-out of IP rights issues from the Regulation so 
as to preserve the “principle of territoriality” in the current international conventions, namely the 




Eventually the Commission 2003 Proposal adopted a specific article on infringements of IP rights, 
which “enshrines the lex loci protectionis principle for infringements of intellectual property rights 
conferred under national legislation or international conventions”,765 and regards this provision as 
“compatible with the specific requirements in the field of intellectual property”.766 Thereafter, the 
other EC legislative institutions did not question whether or not infringements of IP rights should be 
treated as a specific tort.  
 
In fact, there was a necessity for the EC to introduce a specific choice-of-law rule for non-contractual 
obligations arising out of infringement of IP rights.
767
 Since, as analysed in the previous chapter, the 
international treaties do not provide explicit choice-of-law rules in such claims. Lacking any uniform 
international choice-of-law rules in this regard, the compatibility clause of Article 28 of Rome II, 
which deals with the relationship of Rome II with other existing international Conventions, would not 
imply receptivity to any choice-of-law rule. Additionally, the law applicable to infringement of IP 
rights has been controversial in Europe.
768
 Insofar as copyright and related rights infringement claims 
are concerned, a review of national laws and practices shows that the lex loci protectionis and the lex 
loci delicti rules have been applied in Member States.  
 
3.3.7.2 European states’ national laws 
3.3.7.2.1 The lex loci protectionis 
For copyright infringement claim, the lex loci protectionis rule is well recognized in most national 
laws. It is recognized either in national statutes or in case law. 
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Switzerland and Belgium provide the lex loci protectionis rule to infringement claims. For the former, 
although it is not an EU Member State, the Swiss PIL Act has been considered as an inspiration for 




As to IP right infringement claims, the Swiss PIL Act provides a general rule of lex loci protectionis 
and limited party autonomy as to the law applicable. Article 110(1) of the Swiss PIL Act provides a 
general rule that “intellectual property rights shall be governed by the law of the State in which 
protection of the intellectual property is sought.” For copyright infringement disputes, this provision 
refers to the law of the state in which the plaintiff claims to have his/her copyright protected. In multi-
state copyright infringement claims, the application of Article 110(1) will lead to distributive 
application of the law of each state involving with the alleged infringement to the claims occurred in 
that state. The second paragraph of that provision provides the parties a limited freedom to choose the 
law of the forum for an infringement dispute.  
“In the case of claims arising out of infringement of intellectual property rights, the parties may 
always agree, after the act causing damage has occurred, that the law of the forum shall be 
applicable”.770 
First, this article allows party autonomy only ex post, i.e. after the dispute has arisen. Second, the party 
may choose only one national law, the lex fori, i.e. the Swiss law. Third, the parties may only choose 
the applicable law (lex fori) for the claims arising from infringement. The issues of the existence of the 
right and the extent of protection and ownership will still be governed by the lex loci protectionis. 
Fourth, it is generally held that party autonomy is only possible with respect to the claims that are not 
intrinsically linked to the ‘hard core’ of the IP rights.771 Therefore, parties cannot make a choice as to 
matters concerning the enforcement of the right, in particular, the possibility of granting an injunction. 
Accordingly, the freedom of choosing the applicable law is restricted to patrimonial claims arising 
from copyright and related rights infringement, such as the possibility of obtaining pecuniary damages 




The Belgian PIL Act also contains a specific provision concerning the law applicable to IP rights 
disputes. As one of the most recent codifications on private international law, Article 93 of Belgian 
PIL provides a general rule of the lex loci protectionis for IP rights litigation.
773
 According to it, 
infringement of copyright and related rights disputes shall be governed by the law of the state for the 
territory of which the protection of copyright and related rights are sought. As far as infringement 
disputes are concerned, no exception to the lex loci protectionis is available. Hence, in the event of 
multi-state copyright and related rights infringement disputes, a distributive application of the law of 
each state concerned on a country-by-country basis will be inevitable.
774
 In a recent case involving 
copyright infringement on the Internet, the Court of Appeal of Brussels ruled that the lex loci 
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property right is governed by the law of the State with which the intellectual activity has the closest connections. 
If the activity takes place within a framework of contractual relations, that State is presumed to be the State of 
which the law applies to these contractual relations, until proof to the contrary is brought.” 
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 K. Roox, ‘Intellectuele Eigendom in het Nieuwe Wetboek I.P.R.’ 
<http://www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_616.pdf> accessed on 2 October 
2012; Marie-Christine Janssens, ‘Belgian’ in Toshiyuki Kono (ed) (supra n 15) 359. 
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protectionis should be interpreted as referring to the law of the country where the damage is sustained, 
and that Belgian law should apply because the alleged infringing materials could be accessed in and 
were deliberately directed to Belgium. The law of the US where these materials were uploaded to the 
Internet was not applied in this case.
775
 Also, this judgment refers to a decision to the same effect on 




In Italy, Article 54 of the Italian PIL Act states a choice-of-law rule for rights relating to intangible 
assets.
777
 According to this provision, such rights shall be governed by the law of the state in which 
they are used. It is generally agreed in Italian doctrine that IP rights are included in the scope of the 
rights relating to intangible assets and the law applicable to the infringement of IP rights is therefore 
governed by the law of the state in which they are used. That has been interpreted as referring to the 
lex loci protectionis.
778
 The lex loci protectionis addresses all issues and problems arising from cross-
border copyright and related rights disputes i.e., the existence and creation of right, the scope of right, 




The Austrian PIL Act contains a specific choice-of-law rule for IP rights. Article 34(1) of the Act 
provides that “the creation, scope and termination of intellectual property rights are determined by the 
law of the state where the act of exploitation or the act of infringement occurred”.780 From its wording, 
this rule applies only to the property aspects of IP rights. In fact, since claims arising from 
infringement of IP rights are closely related to these property aspects, this provision is considered to 




The question whether Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL Act should be interpreted as an application of 
the lex loci protectionis or as the lex loci delicti has led to discussion. The Austrian PIL Act adopts the 
approach of applying the lex loci delicti, something that was also affirmed in the official 
commentary.
782
 Some contend that the reason for adopting the lex loci delicti as a specific rule for IP 
rights was to distinguish these claims from general tort claims, because for the latter the exceptions, 
such as party autonomy, were provided for as to the lex loci delicti, but did not apply in cases 
involving IP rights disputes. The Austrian Supreme Court had, however, ruled that this choice-of-aw 
rule should be interpreted as referring to the law of the state for which protection is claimed.
783
 In the 
Adolf Loos-Werke II case,
784
 where an action for copyright infringement was filed against a publishing 
company concerning the distribution of a book in Germany, the Austrian Supreme Court held,  
“According to Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL, the creation, scope and termination of 
intellectual property rights is determined by the law of the state where the act of 
exploitation or the act of infringement occurred. Accordingly, the legislator has 
chosen the law of the protecting state as a connecting factor (…). The protecting state 
                                                          
775
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 Nerina Boschiero and Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘Italy’ in Toshiyuki Kono (ed) (supra n 15) 729.  
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 Id, 28.  
780
 “sind das Entstehen, der Inhalt und das Erlöschen von Immaterialgüterrechten nach dem Recht des Staates zu 
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 For discussion, see Thomas Petz 2010 (supra n 759) 231, fn 63. 
782
 Marta Pertegás Sender, ‘Patent Infringement, Choice of Laws, and the Forthcoming Rome II Regulation’ in 
Jürgen Basedow and others (eds) (supra n 15) 165. 
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 OGH, Hotel-Video, 17 June 1980, JBl. 1986, 655; GRUR Int. [1986] 728 (Austrian law applies because the 
plaintiff claims to have copyright protection in Austria); OGH, Sachverständigenprüfung, 18 September 1990, 
GRUR Int. 1991, 650 (a distributive application of Art. 34(1) Austrian PIL would have resulted in the 
application of the same substantive law). 
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 OGH 4 Ob 125/93, Adolf Loos-Werke II 13 July 1993, GRUR Int. 1994, 638; similar wording found in OGH 
4 Ob 238/03h, Journalistenbüro 16 December 2003,  
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_20031216_OGH0002_0040
OB00238_03H0000_000> accessed on 2 October 2012. 
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is not the state where the proceedings are pending. If the plaintiff claims that the 
defendant has infringed all or some of the rights that the former holds in several 
states, the alleged infringement shall be assessed in each state on the basis of the law of the 
state where the infringement took place (unless renvoi applies)”.785  
 
This ruling confirmed not only that the law of the protecting state should apply, but also that in multi-
state infringement disputes there should be distributive application of these laws on a country-by-
country basis. Again, in a more recent related rights judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the 
application of Austrian law not only because the allegedly infringing activities occurred in Austria, but 
also because the plaintiff based his claim on the Austrian related rights law.
 786
 Although such 
disagreement with regard to the interpretation of Article 34(1) exists, the practical consequences of 




Article 10(4) Cc of the Spanish Private International Law uses the “same connecting factors as article 
5.2 of the Berne Convention”, leading to the application of the lex loci protectionis.788  Such an 
application is however applied in a unilateral way, where the provision stating that IP rights shall be 
granted protection on the Spanish territory by the application of Spanish law could be bi-lateralized by 





No explicit choice-of-law rule for infringement of IP rights is provided in German law. German courts 
have ruled that general choice-of-law rules do not apply to intellectual property cases, for the reason 
that the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has confirmed that, in the area of IP rights, it 
applies the law of the country for which protection is sought (Schutzlandsprinzip).
790
 In a case 
involving copyright infringement by sub-licensing,
791
 the Bundesgerichtshof defined the 
Schutzlandsprinzip. The Court ruled that this principle is based on Article 5 (2) of the Berne 
Convention.
792
 That suggests pointing to the lex protectionis, i.e. the law of the country for which 
protection is sought.
793
 Accordingly, the lex protectionis applies to determine copyright infringement 
claims. In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that the lex protectionis is a special choice-of-law rule 
for IP rights, which differs from the lex fori
794
 and from the lex loci delicti.
795
 Also, the ordinary 
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787
 Thomas Petz 2012 (supra n 625). 
788
 Javier Carrascosa González (supra n 339) 113. 
789
 Ibid; Nerina Boschiero (supra n 338) 100. 
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 Bundesgerichtshof, Sender Felsberg 7 November 2007, 152 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 317 (F.R.G.).  More discussion about German practice in IP rights infringement disputes, 
see Axel Metzger, ‘Germany’ in Toshiyuki Kono (ed) (supra n 15). 
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 Bundesgerichtshof, ALF 17 June 1992, 118 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 
394 (F.R.G.), GRUR 697. 
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 Bundesgerichtshof, Spielbankaffaere 1997, 136 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 
[BGHZ] 380, 385: “Das Berufungsgericht hat die Klageansprueche rechtsfehlerhaft allein nach deutschem 
Recht beurteilt. [...] Die Klaegerin hat ihre Ansprueche nur darauf gestuetzt, dass die Beklagte ausschliessliche 
Fernsehauswertungsrechte and dem Spielfilm 'Spielbankaffaere', die ihr fuer das Gebiet von Luxemburg 
zustuenden, verletzt habe. Schutzland ist hier demgemaess Luxemburg. Die Klaegerin behauptet nicht, auch fuer 
das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Fernsehauswertungsrechte zu besitzen.” (The Court of Appeal has 
wrongly applied German law to determine this dispute. […] The plaintiff has only argued the disputes based on 
the claim that the defendant had infringed her exclusive TV exploitation rights in the film “spielbankaffaefe” that 
is granted to her (the plaintiff) only in Luxemburg. Luxemburg is therefore the country of protection. The 




choice-of-law rules, especially the lex loci delicti for tort claims do not apply to IP rights. Neither is 
there application to them of the exceptions that are accepted in tort claims, such as the common 
habitual residence rule and party autonomy. 
 
3.3.7.2.2 The lex loci commissi delicti 
In comparison with the lex loci protectionis, European states less commonly apply the lex loci delicti 
to IP infringement disputes.  
 
The Dutch Tort Conflicts of Law Statute (Wet conflictenrecht onrechtmachtige daad [WCOD]) did 
not provide any specific choice-of-law rule for IP rights infringement claims. However, the Dutch 
legislators did not explicitly leave this subject matter outside the scope of that legislation. Also, among 
the Dutch academics, there were different opinions about whether the WCOD should apply to IP rights 
infringement claims.
796
 The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) held in a copyright infringement case, 
Bigott v Doucal,
797
 that the questions whether the reproduction in that case was unauthorized and 
caused copyright infringement shall be determined by the law of the country where the reproduction 
was made. This would be the choice-of-law rule applied to general tort claims: the lex loci delicti. It 
has, therefore, been submitted that infringement of copyright and related rights fall within the scope of 
the choice-of-law rules for general tort claims. It follows that the rules set forth in the WCOD would 
apply to copyright infringement claims, as well. 
 
Article 3(1) of the WCOD lays down the general rule of lex loci delicti.
798
 That was based on the 
Dutch Supreme Court’s COVA799 ruling in 1993.800 Application of this rule means that Dutch law will 
apply to copyright infringement claims that occur or may occur in the Netherlands. However, Dutch 
case law has not been consistent in this regard. In the above-mentioned Bigott v Doucal judgment, the 
Hoge Raad confirmed that the existence of a copyrighted work and the copyright protection should, by 
referring to the Berne Convention, be governed by the lex loci protectionis.
801
 At the lower court level, 
when defining governing law for the issues of existence, extent of protection and infringement of 
right, some courts ruled that the issues should be governed by the lex loci protectionis by directly 
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verveelvoudiging is vervaardigd.”) (The question of whether reproduction is unauthorized and constitutes 
infringement of copyright should be determined in accordance with the law of the country where the 
reproduction is made) [Translated by NZ]. 
798
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 M.H. ten Wolde, Inleiding Internationaal en Inter-Europees Privaatrecht (4
th
 edn J. Kosters-reeks-voor 
grensoverschrijdend privaatrecht, Hephaestus, Groningen 2008) 217. 
801
 Bigott/Doucal (supra n 797). (“Dit vloeit voort uit het stelsel van de, (…), Berner Conventie, dat meebrengt 
dat de vragen of sprake is van een werk en of dit bescherming verdient, moeten worden beantwoorden aan de 
hand van het recht van het land voor welks grondgebieden bescherming wordt ingeroepen.”) (This arises out of 
the system of the Berne Convention, which states that the questions concerning whether a work deserves 
protection should be answered by referring to the law of the country for whose territory such protection is 
claimed) [Translated by NZ]. Also, according to the Netherlands Constitution’s hierarchy of laws, treaties 
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referring to Article 5 of the Berne Convention,
802
 while some other courts followed the rule of lex loci 
delicti.
803
 In some cases, courts even determined governing law without explaining their motivation.
804
 
As mentioned by van Eechoud, “as long as the use occurs within the border of the Netherlands, Dutch 
law shall apply to decide whether there is an infringement”. 805  Two reasons could explain the 
inconsistency. First, due to the economic importance of copyright, a lot of infringement cases were 
brought in interlocutory proceedings (kort geding), under which immediate remedies, e.g. injunctions, 
can be granted to protect parties’ interests. The fact that the issue of the law applicable is normally not 
disputed in such interlocutory proceedings may explain the lack of clarity or the inconsistencies as to 
the choice-of-law rules applied in copyright litigation in those proceedings.
806
 Another reason may lie 
in the subtlety of the difference between the lex protectionis and the lex loci delicti, since in practice 
the application of either rule will in the majority of cases lead to the same outcome,
807
 especially in 




Most Dutch legal scholars believe that the lex loci protectionis principle is the logical choice-of-law 
rule for IP rights infringement disputes, including those involving copyright and related rights.
809
 As 
pointed out by van Eechoud, using the terms lex protectionis and lex loci delicti interchangeably is not 
accurate.
810
 The differences between these two terms actually relate to the application method and the 
scope of their application. The lex loci protectionis is the law of the country (or countries) for which 
the claimant claims protection. Thus, the claimant can unilaterally determine the applicable law by 
stating his claim to the court of the country for which he claims protection.
811
 Under that circumstance, 
the court should firstly apply the law of the country invoked by the plaintiff, and then answer the 
question whether an infringing act was committed in this particular country according to such 
country’s domestic law. Under the lex loci delicti, if the competent court does not find an infringement 
in a certain country, the law of that country is not applicable.
812
 Additionally, the scopes of the 
application of these two choice-of-law rules are different: the lex loci protection is applied not only to 
the infringement aspect of an IP rights dispute, but also to the aspects of the existence, scope, duration, 
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termination and initial ownership of the right, 
813
 while the lex loci delicti is only applied to 
infringement disputes. Nevertheless, in multi-state copyright infringement claims, either applying the 
lex loci delicti or the lex loci protectionis will lead to distributive application of the laws of the states 
that concerned. 
 
It ought to also be mentioned that the WCOD has several exception rules that displace its general 
choice-of-law rule, e.g. Article 6 giving parties the freedom to choose applicable law, Article 3(3) 
applying the law of the common domicile, and Article 5 containing the escape clause.
814
 It has 
however been questioned whether these exception rules were suitable for copyright infringement 




French legislation does not provide any specific choice-of-law rule for infringement of IP rights 
claims, and as a result courts commonly apply the choice-of-law rules for general tort claims for such 
claims. In practice, referring to Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention causes some confusion. The 
greater weight of French doctrine considers that this provision is a choice-of-law rule leading to the 
application of the lex loci protectionis. The opinions on the scope of the lex loci protectionis, however, 
have differed. Some consider that Article 5(2) governs not only infringement and sanctions, but also 
the conditions and initial ownership of copyright. Whereas others consider that this provision deals 
only with infringement and its consequences and that those other aspects of copyright fall outside the 
scope of the Berne Convention.816  
 
Judicial practice (jurisprudence) in this regard has been inconsistent. In 1959, the Cour de Cassation 
held (in the “Rideau de fer”817 case) in favor of, “applying the law of the country of origin for the 
issues of existence, originality, and initial ownership of works, and the lex loci protectionis to the 
content of the rights and the scope of protection.”818 Thus, for infringement claims, the Court indicated 
in favor of the application of the lex loci protectionis as to the content of the right and scope of 
protection. Nevertheless, in a 2003 case where several defendants, including French and foreign 
defendants had been sued for counterfeiting software in various countries, the Cour de Cassation 
ruled, by interpreting Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, that the law applicable to copyright 
infringement is not the law of the country of origin or of the forum court, but rather the laws of the 
countries in whose territories the infringements occurred, which were to be applied on a distributive 
base.819 Apparently, the Court relied on Article 5 (2) of the Berne Convention to justify the application 
of the general choice-of-law rule for torts. In the same judgment, the Court further stated that “French 
law as the law of the ‘place of effect’ is not exclusively applicable to the entire litigation in the 
absence of proof of a closer connection to France”, 820 and that the law of the place where the victim 
has his habitual residence cannot be taken into account because a closer connection with the place 
cannot be established. It has been argued from this language that the Court intended to use “the closest 
connection” rule that had been adopted for general tort claims in this case about copyright 
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infringement of software.821 Despite all that, in 2007 in the Lamore case, the Cour de Cassation 
reaffirmed that the law of the territory where the alleged harm occurred, rather than the place where 
the damage is sustained, shall govern copyright infringement claims.822  
 
In a recent case, the SAIF (“Société des Auteurs des Arts Visuels”), a French royalty collection 
organization for visual artists, sued Google Inc. and Google France for infringement by displaying 
SAIF’s copyrighted small online (“thumbnail”) images on the Google website. The Paris Civil Court 
of First Instance referred to the Lamore judgment and held US law applicable, for the reasons that the 
alleged infringing act was generated by the Google search engine which was developed by Google 
Inc., at its headquarters in California, USA, and therefore this place is the locus where the decisions 
are made and where the search engine activity was implemented.823  The Paris Court of Appeal, 
however, reversed the application of US law. It construed Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention as 
applying the law of the place where the alleged harm has been sustained. Since the alleged infringing 
act has effect in France - users accessed the Google search engine via the websites of google.fr and 
images.google.fr -, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that French law, instead of US law, should apply in 
this dispute.824 
 
Clearly, French courts consider Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention as referring to a choice-of-law 
rule in cross-border copyright disputes, however, the French judicial interpretation of this rule has not 
been consistent. Although it is generally recognized that the lex loci delicti should apply in copyright 
infringement claims, French courts have not stated a clear indication as to the application of the law of 
the territory where the alleged harm occurred or the place where the damage is sustained. 
 
Article 45 of the Portuguese Civil Code provides that the lex loci delicti governs the remedies for non-
contractual liability claims, especially the calculation of damages. Thus, the lex loci delicti also 
determines the right to compensation arising from cross-border copyright infringement disputes. This 
rule, as will be seen in the following sections, distinguishes cross-border copyright protection claims, 
which will be governed by Article 48 of the Portuguese Civil Code leading to the application of the lex 
originis.825  
 
It is submitted that, although the laws and practices from the doctrinal point of view are different 
within Europe, the practical effect of such practices have been quite similar in that in most situations, 
national courts interpret their tort choice-of-law rules as referring to the law of the country of 
protection in copyright infringement claims.826 The key difference among these laws and practice 
concerns the acceptance of parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their disputes involving 
copyright infringement. Nevertheless, with the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation, courts of 
Member States (except Denmark) have to apply the lex loci protectionis to designate the law 
applicable to cross-border copyright infringement claims and in this regard exclude the possibility of 
party autonomy.827  
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 3.3.7.3 Special rules on copyright infringement 
Rome II adopts special rules for IP rights infringement claims by applying the law of the country for 
which protection is claimed. As stated in Recital 26 of Rome II, this rule aims at preserving “the 
universally acknowledged principle of the lex loci protectionis”. As was noted by the Commission, 
“This rule, also known as the 'territorial principle', enables each country to apply its 
own law to an infringement of an intellectual property right which is in force in its 
territoriality: […]; in copyright cases the courts apply the law of the country where the violation 
was committed.” 
 
Adopting the lex loci protectionis for such claims has also been favoured by several commentators. 
They maintained that this is justified both from a comparative point of view and from the perspective 
of policy considerations.
828
 The comparative point of view can cite the trend to apply the lex loci 
protectionis in copyright infringement claims within Europe, either by codification, such as by the 
Italian, Swiss and Belgian PIL Acts, or by court interpretation. The policy considerations are that the 
locus protectionis is easily ascertainable and will facilitate the task of determining the applicable law 




It is, however, questionable whether the single lex loci protectionis rule in Article 8(1) of Rome II is 
sufficient in all cases to identify the law applicable to copyright and related rights infringement claims, 
since the exclusiveness of Article 8 means that in non-run-of-the-mill cases neither the exceptions 
provided in Article 4, nor party autonomy will be allowed to be resorted to in determining the law 
applicable to copyright and related rights infringement claims. As argued by some scholars, without 
any possibility for flexibility, the general structure of special rules provided in Article 8 is “an 
excessively rigid and oversimplifying generalization”. 830  Additionally, the unclear scope of the 
application of the lex loci protectionis has also been pointed out.
831
   
 
To summarize, in terms of the application of Article 8 of the Rome II Regulation, two main concerns 
have been raised i.e. the scope of the application of the lex loci protectionis and the effectiveness of 
this rule, especially in the context of multi-state copyright infringement. The next two subsections 
address these concerns. 
 
3.3.7.3.1 The scope of the application of the lex loci protectionis 
Article 8(1) of Rome II clearly establishes that the lex loci protectionis rule applies to IP rights 
infringement cases, including copyright and related rights. As to related issues, such as existence, 
duration, scope and initial ownership of copyright, some commentators have argued that the lex loci 
protectionis rule provided in Article 8(1) should apply. Those arguments then lead to differences of 
opinion about the scope of the Rome II Regulation and its Article 8(1), i.e. do those provisions also 
deal with the issues that are intrinsically linked to copyright and related rights, e.g. existence, duration, 
scope and initial ownership?  
 
Article 15 of Rome II sets down, in general, the scope of the applicable law. This article provides that 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations under the Regulation shall govern in particular: 
“(a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held 
liable for acts performed by them; 
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of 
liability; 
(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed; 
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(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures which 
a court may take to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of 
compensation; 
(e) the question whether a right to claim damages or a remedy may be transferred, including by 
inheritance; 
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained personally; 
(g) liability for the acts of another person; 
(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription and 
limitation, including rules relating to the commencement, interruption and suspension of a 
period of prescription or limitation.” 
 
The Commission 2003 Proposal for this (then numbered Article 11) had similar language which one 
commentator derided as being “all but helpful in solving the problems arising in the copyright field in 
particular”.832 He further suggested that the ECJ is the body that should define a clear scope of the lex 
loci protectionis rule in interpreting Article 8 and Article 11 (now 15).
833
 As to the same Commission 
proposal, another commentator suggested confining the scope of the lex loci protectionis rule solely to 
infringements, since it “has no direct bearing upon matters like existence and validity, let alone initial 
ownership, of the right.” 834  A similar view was expressed by yet another commentator, who 
maintained that  
“[n]either (Art. 8(1) and Art. 8(2)) provision applies, in any event, to questions concerning the 
creation, registration, validity or transfer of IPRs. Not only are such matters logically prior to 
any question as to whether there has been an infringement, they are also matters of status, 
which fall outside the material scope of the Regulation.”835 
 
Some scholars contend to the contrary that Article 8 covers the issues of content and extent of right, 
but does not go so far as those concerning existence and initial ownership of right, the reason being 
that the contents of IP rights that concern the basis and extent of liability are so closely connected to 
infringement of such rights that the one and same law should apply.
836
 Yet another commentator 
subsumed under this contention the argument that by interpreting Article 8 and Article 15 together, as 
integral parts of one provision (in pari materia), the creation or termination of IP rights can be related 
to Article 15(a), the extension of the right can be related to Article 15(b), the adjustment of claims can 
be related to Article 15(c) and the limitation of actions can be related to Article 15(h).
 
Because these 
matters are included in Article 15 of the Regulation,
837
 it is argued there would be no need for a special 




Still some other scholars put forth a wider interpretation of the scope of Article 8(1) from reading 
Articles 13, 15 and Recital 26 of the Regulation together,
839
 even though it is understood that Article 
15 was drafted in light of the classic tort/delict model affecting corporeal property rather than special 
tort-like rights peculiar to IP.
840
 However, they still advocate the opinion that nearly all relevant 
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aspects of an IP infringement claim are governed by the Regulation, including transferability and 
initial ownership of the right.
841
 As to the reasons for Rome II covering the issue of initial ownership, 
they argue for the conjoined effect and structure of Recital 26, and Articles 8, 13 and 15, although the 
plain wording of those provisions functions to demonstrate the scope of the lex loci protectionis rule. 
They assert that the issue of initial ownership is not a preliminary question justifying a different 
connecting factor. Instead, they argue, “it is part of the main issue of infringement, intertwined with its 
other aspects so that it should be governed by the same law”.842  
 
This writer submits that the material scope of the Rome II Regulation does not include such property 
aspects of IP rights infringement as the issues of existence, scope and duration of copyright and related 
rights, nor the initial ownership of these rights. The Regulation identifies the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations arising from an infringement, and that is limited by the scope of the 
Regulation. Thus, the property aspects involved in these issues should not be characterized as matters 
arising from an infringement. Although the issues of existence, scope, duration and initial ownership 
of copyright may be raised as incidental or preliminary issues in infringement claims, they are the 
issues that can be raised separately prior to litigating the issue of infringement.  
 
Furthermore, Article 15, which is placed under “common rules”, applies not only to infringement of IP 
rights, but also to claims arising from infringement of other property rights. As Petz rightly pointed 
out, if one assumes that the existence, or initial ownership of IP rights fall within the scope of Article 
15, so should the existence and ownership issues of other property rights. Such a result will, however, 
not be optimal in that it will compromise international jurisprudential harmony. Taking a vehicle 
accident as an example, the law applicable to such a claim would be, according to the general rule of 
Article 4 of Rome II, the lex loci damni. If, as advocated by some, Article 15 were to cover ownership 
issues, this law would also determine the ownership of the car, which would not only contradict the 
traditional choice-of-law rules that are commonly adopted in Europe - the lex rei sitae -, but also 
produce the contradictory result that the owner of the car could be different for the lex loci damni and 
the lex rei sitae.
843
 Thus, it is submitted, Article 15 of Rome II does not embrace intrinsic aspects of IP 
rights. 
 
Still further, as will be seen in the following sections, the choice-of-law rules for intrinsic aspects of 
copyright differ among Member States, in particular regarding initial ownership of copyright. Some 
Member States apply the lex loci protectionis and others apply the lex originis.
844
 If Article 15 of 
Rome II also covers intrinsic aspects of copyright, the adoption of Rome II means that in these 
aspects, those states that apply choice-of-law rules other than the lex loci protectionis will have to 
make “a sudden change” in their applicable law.845 As observed by some scholars, in the absence of 
any clear reference made by the European legislators, it cannot be assumed that making such changes 




The CJEU may, upon reference from national courts, define a clear scope of the lex loci protectionis 
rule by interpreting Article 8 and Article 15 together. Without clarification from the CJEU or the EU 
legislators, the issues of the existence, scope, duration, termination and initial ownership of copyright 
and related rights should be regarded as falling outside the scope of the Regulation, and be determined 
according to national choice-of-law rules.  
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3.3.7.3.2 The effectiveness of the Rome II rules in copyright and related rights infringement 
Article 8(1), when mandating application of the lex loci protectionis for IP infringement disputes, does 
not allow for flexibility similar to what has been included in connection with other sorts of Rome II 
non-contractual obligations. In this context, issues as to infringement of copyright and related rights 
will be governed by the law of the country where those rights are protected. In the traditional 
approach, the national law for which copyright protection is claimed would be applied to determine 
copyright infringement disputes. Foreign law could be applied in the situation where the competent 
court is not located in a state for which copyright protection is claimed. Due to the absence of a 
formality requirement such as registration, copyright and related rights are, upon their creation, 
actually a bundle of rights that exist in all Berne Union states. Applying the lex loci protectionis in 
copyright and related rights infringement claims means, if the same work has been allegedly infringed 
in many countries, the law of each such country will have to be applied to deal with the infringement 
that occurred within its territory. Under such circumstances, one may wonder whether the adoption of 
the single lex loci protectionis rule, without having any flexibility, e.g. allowing party autonomy or an 
escape clause, would provide a satisfactory result in dealing with copyright and related rights 
infringement claims, in particular in multi-state infringement cases.  
 
3.3.7.3.2.1 Multi-state copyright and related rights infringement 
The situation where a person acts in one country or several countries and the damage occurs in another 
country or countries can be described as “multi-local torts”. The identification of the law applicable to 
“multi-local torts” is probably the most difficult part of attempting to unify choice-of-law rules in tort.  
 
The multi-state copyright infringement problem had even been mentioned more than 100 years ago 
during the drafting process of the Berne Convention, because copyright is ubiquitous, meaning it can 
be infringed everywhere.
847
 Traditionally, cross-border conflicts occurred when books or other 
copyrighted objects were copied or distributed abroad, or transmitted by broadcasting or satellite to 
other countries. With the proliferation of high technology, the Internet in particular, cross-border 
copyright conflicts occur more often and more easily by simply uploading copyrighted materials to the 
Internet and simultaneously infringing through servers in a number of national territories. An example 
can be seen in the case where the former physician of the late French President Mitterrand published a 
memoir titled “Le Grand Secret”. The owner of an Internet cafe in France purchased a copy of the 
book, scanned it, and put the scanned-copy on the Internet, from which it was downloadable through 




Article 8(1) of Rome II does not contain any appreciability filter or spill-over protection, or any 
restriction on the level of choice-of-law.
849
 The Rome II article having such provisions is Article 
6(3)(b), which provides for a limited choice of one law in multi-state unfair competition cases by 
having two filters to prevent abusive forum shopping. In contrast, in a multi-state copyright 
infringement case, Article 8(1) of the Regulation does not try to limit the plaintiff’s claim to one 
country’s or a small number of countries’ laws. 
 
It should be admitted that the lex loci protectionis principle in the Regulation may still play a positive 
role in defining the law applicable to cross-border copyright infringement in the traditional form, 
where the cross border communication can still be confined to certain place(s). Whereas in the 
situation of ubiquitous infringement, where infringement happens virtually in every country, the 
application of the lex loci protectionis would mean that a multitude of laws have to be applied to the 
claims. A distributive application of the laws of the different countries for which protection is claimed 
on a country-by-country basis means that a court will apply the various legislative provisions on 
copyrights to examine whether the alleged work falls within the protection conferred by the respective 
law of each state for which protection is claimed. It is of note that neither Article 8 itself, nor other 
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parts of the Regulation specifically address the issue of the distributive application of different 




Many scholars contend that the distributive application of different laws rules is a disadvantage in IP 
rights infringement cases, including those involving copyright and related rights.
851
 In practical 
application, it will be unduly burdensome, if even possible, to determine, verify and apply all the 
national laws that are involved.
852
 Even if one assumes to locate the infringement only within the 
single European market, the application of the lex loci protectionis will still lead to the application of 
all 27 Member States’ national copyright laws. In addition, the distributive application means that the 
court will have to deal with foreign law. Litigation on the basis of foreign law is often complicated and 
time-consuming.
853
 The cost and effort involved will be extremely high, something that will not meet 
the expectation of litigants, whether they are plaintiff or defendant.
854
 Also, the end result may be hard 
to predict. A self-contradictory result may also occur. In some situations, a court may have to make a 
finding of infringement according to one national law and a finding of non-infringement according to 
another. For example, a design is under copyright protection in the Netherlands, provided that it meets 
certain requirements in accord with Dutch Copyright Law, while the same design will not be under 
copyright protection in Italian law, but under the protection of Italian industrial design and model 
rights. Under the circumstances, it might happen that the same work will be considered infringed in 
the Netherlands under Dutch law, but not so in Italy under Italian law, e.g. the term of protection for 
industrial design and model may have expired.  
 
To avoid the distributive application of national laws caused by the lex loci protectionis, the approach 
of applying one single law or a small number of laws in multi-state copyright infringements has been 
advocated, especially for infringements committed through the Internet. The following are the 
approaches that have been proposed.  
 
Applying the lex originis
855
  
The universal rule of the lex originis is not new among the European legislatures and is being applied 
in some fields, such as Article 1(2) (b) of the EC Broadcasting Directive. This rule is, however, not 
without drawbacks. As far as copyright is concerned, the application of the law of the country of 
origin means that the protection of copyright would depend on the level of protection of that 
country.
856
 In addition, it is very difficult to define what is the country of origin, let alone when the 
infringement is through the Internet. Should it be the country where the work had been first published? 
If so, difficulty could arise when there is an unpublished work. Furthermore, use of the Internet will 
make the geographical place of the first publication more problematic, but less important for this 
approach.
857
 Alternatively, should it be the country where the server that hosts the allegedly infringing 
materials is located, or the country where the website holder/operator that put the allegedly infringing 
materials on the Internet has a habitual residence or place of business? The main disadvantages of the 
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latter approaches are that the alleged infringer could manipulate the law that would be applicable by 
changing or setting up such places to best advantage. 
 
Applying the closest connection rule 
It has also been suggested for multi-state copyright infringement claims to apply the law of the state 
having the closest connection to the infringement in its entirety.
858
 Some academic institutions, as will 
be discussed more intensively in Chapter 4, namely, the European CLIP Group and the American Law 
Institute projects on intellectual property principles, suggest adopting such a rule and listing the factors 
which should be taken into account when determining the closest connection. This approach can only 
be partly supported. Although high technology has accelerated the global reach of copyright 
infringement, the underlying territoriality principle should still be respected. Additionally, defining the 
law of the state having the closet connection will be subject to the discretion of a judge in individual 
cases. The end result may not be foreseeable for the parties.  
 
Applying the law of the state that is directly and substantially affected 
The approach taken by Article 6(3)(b)
859
 of Rome II has been advocated, i.e. applying the law of a 
state where a market is directly and substantially affected. According to Bariatti, this approach may 
provide the most clear-cut rule for multi-state infringement, because the application of this approach 
does not depend on either the interpretation of the concept of “significant impact”, nor the will of the 
parties. Rather it might be influenced by their respective contractual power or be aimed at 




Applying the de minimis rule 
 
The CLIP Principles suggested a de minimis rule for multi-state copyright infringement claims.
861
 
According to that, a court needs only to focus on the alleged infringement claims that have either 
caused a substantial effect or when the alleged infringer has substantially acted within the state or 
states for which protection is sought.
862
 Conversely, an infringement that is de minimis will not be 
taken into consideration. As will be discussed in section 4.2.2.4 infra, applying the de minimis rule for 
such cases will raise some doubts. 
 
Based on the above, it is submitted that, given the territorial nature of copyright and related rights, the 
lex loci protectionis rule should remain as a general rule for such disputes,
863
 and the closest 
connection rule should be carefully added only as a displacement rule to the lex loci protectionis.
864
 As 
proposed in the following subsections, allowing limited party autonomy will certainly provide 
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flexibility to the lex loci protectionis rule and counter-balance some disadvantages caused by the 




3.3.7.3.2.2 Flexibility not available for copyright and related rights infringement claims 
Article 8 of Rome II does not provide any flexibility for IP infringement claims. Flexibility has, 
however, been introduced for the choices of law concerning non-contractual obligations arising from 
torts/delict, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo. In such claims, flexibility 
is generally constructed in such a way that a general choice-of-law rule is accompanied by exception 
rules. A common habitual residence rule is provided for general tort/delict claim, for the specific tort 
of product liability and for industrial action cases. Moreover, an open-ended escape clause that allows 
a departure from a general rule is also provided for general tort claims.
866
 Furthermore, freedom of 
choice is allowed for several non-contractual obligations in terms of designating applicable law.
867
 As 
stated by the Regulation, applying these rules aims at reaching a balance between ensuring legal 




3.3.7.3.2.2.1 No common habitual residence exception allowed for Article 8 
Article 8(1) does not provide a rule excepting from the general rule of lex loci protectionis cases where 
all the parties have a common habitual residence, i.e. in one country. Scholars commonly agree that 
such an exception should not be introduced for IP rights infringement cases,
869
 because accepting this 
exception for such claims might lead to an unwanted result that would contradict the very rationale of 
the territoriality principle of IP rights.
870
 Assume, for example, that a resident of the PRC owns a 
copyright on certain Dutch architecture that is located in the Netherlands and that another resident of 
the PRC infringed it, then application of the common habitual residence rule would mean that PRC 
law would apply to the infringement. In such a case, Dutch Copyright Law, the law of the place for 
which protection is claimed, would be undermined. The possibility of such a result could explain why 
the legislator rejected such an exception for Article 8. It has been suggested that a common habitual 
residence exception should be available in order to assess the consequences of the infringement.
871
 
According to this opinion, such a rule could help simplify disputes that involve on-line copyright 
infringement or complicated multi-state infringements, and as a result the issue of the consequences of 
an infringement would not need to be dealt with by different laws. As the purposes of the common 
habitual residence rule in Article 4(2) are to reflect the legitimate expectations of the parties,
872
 and to 
reach a balance between ensuring legal certainty and providing justice in individual cases,
873
 one may 
wonder whether such a rule would meet the expectations of the parties to a copyright infringement 
dispute. Considering the economic importance of copyright, a simple reference to the law of the 
country of common habitual residence may not be to the advantage of the rights owner in terms of 
granting an injunction or computation of damages, because it may jeopardize the protection granted by 
the law of the country of protection. Therefore, it is submitted that the common habitual residence rule 
should not be applied to copyright infringement claims.  
 
3.3.7.3.2.2.2 No escape clause allowed for Article 8 
Rome II also excludes a pre-existing relationship escape clause from its IP rights infringement 
provision. That includes elimination from copyright and related rights of any such clause. The reason 
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for the exclusion is unknown. Some academics contend that an escape clause should have been 




The absence of such an escape clause may lead to fragmentation of applicable law when there is a 
contractual claim and a claim of copyright infringement that relates to the performance of that 
contract. In practice, copyrighted work is normally exploited by means of licensing or assignment 
contracts, for example under a licensing contract the licensee is licensed to carry out acts that would 
otherwise constitute infringement. However, if the licensee carries out acts outside the scope of the 
licensing contract, e.g. distributing the work outside the agreed geographical area, his acts would not 
only constitute a breach of the contract, but also an infringement of copyright. Under those 
circumstances, there might be two different laws applying to the same facts because the law applicable 
to contract and the law applicable to the non-contractual claim would not be the same.
 875
 If, however, 
the EU were to adopt in Rome II an escape clause exception for IP right infringement claims, the 
problem of fragmenting applicable laws could be avoided, since only one law, the law applicable to 
the pre-existing relationship - the law of the licensing contract - will apply to the claims. In addition, 
an escape clause exception may save the court from the effort of differentiating the contractual and 
non-contractual claims. Consequently, complexity, inconsistency and legal uncertainty could be 
avoided. An escape clause may also be useful for multi-state infringement claims. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, the application of the lex loci protectionis rule in multi-state copyright disputes will 
lead to a distributive application of the laws of every country that concerns them. Applying an escape 
clause to identify a place of “manifestly closer connection” would prevent this distributive application 
of the laws. Hence, it is submitted that Rome II should provide an escape clause exception for IP right 
infringement claims, including those involving copyright and related rights. 
 
3.3.7.3.2.2.3 No party autonomy allowed 
Article 8(3) explicitly excludes the parties' autonomy to select the law applicable to IP infringement 
claims. Although the EP, during the drafting process of Rome II, had suggested the addition of party 
autonomy to such claims, the Commission did not accept that, and then the explicit exclusion of party 
autonomy remained in the final version of the Regulation.  
 
In the Regulation itself the reason for such exclusion was not clear. The Commission 2003 Proposal 
simply stated that “[f]reedom of will is not accepted… for intellectual property, where it would not be 
appropriate”.876  The reason why party autonomy is not appropriate for IP rights claims was not 
explained. The Hamburg Group Comments may, however, have shined some light on this point. It 
stressed the “territorial scope” of IP rights, and argued that “the parties’ choice should be without 
effect where public interests are or may be involved”.877 Some other scholars also embraced this.878 
Since IP rights have a substantial public law character and are granted according to individual national 
laws, the states’ sovereign decisions on IP rights protection on their territories should be respected.879 
Aside from that, the consideration that the domestic public interest of each country differs 
considerably may also be a reason for such exclusion.
880
 In the extreme case, the parties should not be 
allowed to choose the law of a country in which the right is not protected by the law of that country or 
the right does not exist under the law of that country. To do otherwise would only frustrate a state’s 
sovereign policy on IP rights.
881
 The explanation as put forward by Kreuzer is even more compelling. 
He wrote that  
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“the exclusion of an agreement on the law applicable to infringements of intellectual 
property rights is due to the fact that in these cases the rights are existing only on a 
territorial basis so that the parties possibly could select a legal system under which no 
intellectual property right may exist”.882 
 
Considering the territorial nature of IP rights and respecting the sovereignty of a state that grants the 
rights, it must be admitted that some grounds for not allowing party autonomy are reasonable. An 
argument of merely protecting the public interests, which was mentioned by the Hamburg Group, is, 
however, not sufficiently convincing, since if excluding party autonomy in the context of IP rights is 
for the purpose of protecting the public interests, one may ask why parties are given a right to choose 
the law applicable to other kinds of torts where public interests are largely involved, as well, such as 
prohibited environmental pollution.
883
 In addition, one may also wonder why public interests cannot 
be protected with a restricted party autonomy,
884
 such as the parties may only choose the law 
applicable to certain aspects of IP rights after the manner of tort cases, especially where the application 
of public policy and an overriding mandatory rule of the forum may counter-balance any undesirable 




In Article 8(3), a total ban on party autonomy in IP rights infringement claims became law. It is 
commonly recognized that some “core” aspects of IP rights should not be left to the law chosen by the 
parties, such as the issues of the existence of the right, the extent of protection and the determination 





Nevertheless, there are reasons why party autonomy, at least with restrictions, should be allowed in 
connection with IP rights infringement claims. 
 
First, allowing the parties to choose the law applicable to IP rights infringement claim is not unknown 
among European states. As described in the preceding section, the Swiss PIL Act allows parties to 
choose the forum law (Swiss law) ex post only in an infringement claim.
887
 The Dutch WCOD also 
provided an opportunity for parties to choose the law applicable to their IP rights infringement 




Second, the adoption of party autonomy will not only promote legal certainty and foreseeability as to 
the law that will be applicable, especially in multi-state infringement claims,
889
 but it will also enhance 
judicial economy. As discussed in the previous subsections, the application of the lex loci protectionis 
rule in multi-state infringement cases will lead to a distributive application of the laws of every 
country that concerns them. If the parties are given the opportunity to choose the law applicable to 
certain aspect(s) of the disputes, it will most likely provide the legal certainty and foreseeability for the 
parties to forecast the result of the dispute. Additionally, a total ban on a freedom of choice would 
force parties and judges to become acquainted with the laws of each and every country for which the 
protection is claimed. Thus, in terms of costs and effort involved, such a practice would not be 
satisfactory especially considering the universal application of Rome II. Having to know the laws of 
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Third, out of respect for state sovereignty and the territorial character of copyright, the “core” subject 
matters of copyright cannot be subjected to party autonomy. However, limited party autonomy should 
be accepted for certain subject matters, at least for the consequences of infringement, e.g. the Swiss 
PIL limits the ex post choice to patrimonial claims that arise from IP rights infringement claims.
891
 
Most academic commentators advocate this limited party autonomy approach just to the extent of 
assessing the legal consequence of infringement and the computation of money damages.
892
 As for the 
timing of party autonomy, it is submitted that a pre-tort agreement should not be permitted, since in 
common practice unbalanced bargaining power, such as: publishing house or music company as the 
rights owners on one side and a single writer or licensee on the other, may lead to one-sided choice-of-
law agreements. In such cases, the spirit of the freedom to make a choice may be jeopardized.
893
 A 
post-tort agreement as to the law applicable should be accepted, since it would be unlikely that a post-
tort agreement with boundaries could lead to a situation where state sovereignty or public interests can 
be seriously endangered. 
 
Last but not least, although it can be argued that party autonomy might possibly undermine state 
sovereignty or public interests, such an undesirable factor can nevertheless be checked and balanced 
by the possible application of overriding mandatory rules and public policy of the forum.
894
 In extreme 




It should therefore be concluded that the core matters of copyright and related rights, such as 
existence, extent of protection, assessment of infringement and unlawfulness should not be left to the 
choice of the parties as to governing law. As to the legal consequences of infringement, such as 
assessing monetary damages, the parties should at least be given an opportunity to make an ex post 
agreement on choosing the applicable law, as long as such a choice-of-law would not be permitted to 
affect the interests of third parties.
896
 Even in cases where the result of the chosen law turns out to be 
undesirable, it could still be balanced by the application of an overriding mandatory rule and/or public 
policy of the forum.  
 
To conclude this section, adopting a single rule of the lex loci protectionis in copyright and related 
rights infringement claims without a provision permitting the indicated flexibility is not in conformity 
with the spirit of the Regulation to reach a balance between legal certainty and the demands of justice 
in individual cases. Article 8(1) of Rome II without party autonomy will prove to be unnecessarily 
rigid, and its effectiveness will inevitably be subject to question in copyright and related rights 
infringement cases. 
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3.4 European national law and judicial practice 
As described above, the Rome II Regulation unifies choice-of-law rules for non-contractual 
obligations arising from infringement of IP rights among all EU Member States except Denmark. 
However, the issues of existence, scope, duration and initial ownership of copyright and related rights 
that fall outside the scope of Rome II must still be dealt with by relevant national choice-of-law rules.  
 
3.4.1 Existence, scope, duration and termination of the right 
In identifying the law applicable to the issues of the existence, scope and duration of copyright and 
related rights, the national laws of European countries have taken different approaches: either lex loci 
protectionis or lex originis. 
 
3.4.1.1 The lex loci protectionis 
The lex loci protectionis rule is well recognized in most national laws for determining the existence, 
scope and duration claims of copyright and related rights. This is based on the underlying rationale 
that “the intrinsic aspects of the right” will be governed by the law of the country for which protection 
is sought, including the creation, scope, termination, validity, authorship and ownership of the right.
897 
Some countries approach application of the lex loci protectionis to IP rights as a whole, thus defining 
it to cover not only infringement disputes, but also the existence, scope and duration of the rights, such 
as: Article 93 of the Belgian PIL, Article 110(1) of the Swiss PIL. As a result, in copyright and related 
rights disputes involving issues of existence, scope and duration, such provisions refer to the law of 
the country for which the plaintiff claims to have his/her copyright protected. The Swiss PIL does not 
provide any freedom for the parties to choose the law applicable to the issues of existence, scope and 
duration of copyright, as it does for infringement disputes.  
 
Similarly, Article 54 of the Italian PIL sets down a special rule for rights related to intangible assets. It 
provides that rights related to intangible assets shall be governed by the law of the country in which 
they are exploited. This has been construed as designating the law of the protecting country (lex loci 
protectionis) with the result that the lex loci protectionis determines the existence, creation, scope, 




Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL expressly provides that “the creation, scope and termination of 
intellectual property rights are determined by the law of the state where the act of exploitation or the 
act of infringement occurred”.899 As discussed in 3.3.7.2.1 supra, the wording of Article 34(1) has 
been construed as applying the law of the country for which protection is claimed.
900  
Since Rome II 
does not deal with the property aspects of IP rights, issues relating to the existence, creation, duration 
and termination of IP rights will remain to be covered by Article 34(1), and accordingly be governed 




In Germany, the Schutzlandsprinzip is the key principle for IP rights disputes. Courts and most 
scholars are of opinion that under it these questions should be determined by the law of the country for 
which protection is sought because the existence and other matters that are intrinsically related to the 
right are core areas of the territoriality principle.
902
 In addition, Ulmer’s proposal suggested that “the 
creation, scope and termination of copyright are to be governed by the law of the protection country”, 
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which follows from the principle of territoriality.
903 
It is, nevertheless, of note that some scholars 
advocated in favour of the application of the lex originis in answer to the question whether or not an 




As partly dealt with in the preceding section, in the situation where no statutory rule on the law 
applicable to the existence, scope of copyright is provided in the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad 
confirmed in Bigott v Doucal that the existence of a copyrighted work and the copyright protection 
should, by reference to the Berne Convention, be governed by the lex loci protectionis.
905
 To repeat, 
on lower court levels, when defining governing law for the issues of existence and extent of 
protection, the Dutch judicial rulings have not been consistent: some courts ruled that such issues 
should be governed by the lex loci protectionis,
906





It is again emphasized that in multi-state claims, the application of the lex loci protectionis will 
inevitably lead to a distributive application of different national laws on a country-by- country basis. 
 
3.4.1.2 The lex originis 
A few countries apply the lex originis to determine the existence, scope, duration and termination of 
copyright. Generally, the lex originis is defined as the law of the place of first publication of a 
copyrighted work, or the law governing the author’s personal status when the work was not published. 
Both connecting factors appear to manifest a universal recognition of the author’s copyright with the 
same law. 
 
Greek law is officially stated as: “copyright in published works shall be governed by the law of the 
state in which the work has been lawfully made accessible to the public for the first time”, and that law 
governs “the definition of the owner of the right, its subject matter, its content, its term and the 
restrictions relating to it”.908 So, as to all copyright issues, Greece applies the law of the country where 
the work was made accessible to the public for the first time. 
 
Article 48(1) of the Portuguese Civil Code similarly provides that 
“[w]ithout prejudice to what is laid down in special legislation, the rights of authors are 
regulated by the law of the place of first publication and, in the absence of publication, by the 
author’s personal law.”909  
However, this Code language is subject to special legislation that includes the Portuguese Code of 
Copyright and Related Rights, as well as the Berne Convention. As a result, the scope of any 
application of the lex originis rule expressed in the Portuguese Civil Code is very limited. Since it is 
argued that the Berne Convention provides a choice-of-law rule referring to the law of the country 
where protection is claimed, even PIL rules in the Portuguese Civil Code refer to the lex originis as the 
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As discussed in section 3.3.7.2.2 supra, French legislation does not provide a specific choice-of-law 
rule for cross-border copyright disputes. Among the French doctrines, opinions are divided whether 
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention designates the law applicable to other aspects of copyright.
911
 
Judgments of French courts do reflect that the issues of existence and originality of works will be 
governed by the lex originis, and, as indicated in the 1959 “Rideau de fer” judgment, the Cour de 
Cassation had clearly ruled to apply “the law of the country of origin for the issues of existence, 
originality, and initial ownership of works, (…)”.912  
 
Article 60 of the Romanian Law on the Settlement of the Private International Law Relations also 
refers to a comprehensive lex originis by providing that  
“The birth, contents and extinction of the copyright over a work of intellectual creation are 
subject to the law of the State where it was, for the first time, brought to the knowledge of the 
public by publication, representation, exhibition, broadcast or by any other property means.  
The works of intellectual creation not divulgated are subject to the national law of the 
author.”913  
 
3.4.2 Initial ownership 
As indicated in the preceding subsection, Rome II does not deal with the issue of initial ownership. As 
a result, such an issue will have to be determined according to the choice-of-law provisions of each 
Member State. Due to the absence of an EU harmonization provision, domestic legal regimes differ to 
some extent in this regard. Nevertheless, two approaches have mainly been used to determine the 
initial ownership of copyright and related rights among European states: the lex loci protectionis, and 
the lex originis. 
 
 3.4.2.1 The lex loci protectionis 
In some European countries, PIL statutes contain specific choice-of-law provisions dealing with IP 
issues, including initial ownership of copyright. Examples can be seen in Article 54 of the Italian PIL, 
which stipulates a special rule on rights related to intangible assets and provides for application of the 
law of the state in which such rights are exploited to govern them. This choice-of-law rule has been 
interpreted as designating the law of the protecting country (lex loci protectionis). As discussed in the 
preceding section, the lex loci protectionis can determine all issues arising from cross-border copyright 
and related rights claims, including initial ownership of copyright.
914
 Similarly, the lex loci 
protectionis rule provided in Article 110 of the Swiss PIL also governs the issue of initial ownership 
of copyright.  
 
Article 93(2) of the Belgian PIL prescribes a special choice-of-law rule regarding the issue of original 
ownership. It has no effect on copyright and related rights because it is explicitly restricted to 
industrial property. As a result, a general rule provided in Article 93(1) - the law of the country for 
which protection is sought governs issues related to initial ownership of copyright and related rights.
915
 
During the legislative process to arrive at the Belgian PIL, the question whether or not to adopt the lex 
loci protectionis for such matters had been under discussion
 916
 because Belgian courts, before the 
adoption of the PIL Act, had applied the lex originis approach: either the law of the nationality of a 
foreign author or the law of the place of first publication in determining the initial ownership of 
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 The lex loci protectionis as a choice-of-law rule had hardly been considered,
918
 the reason 
having been that the initial ownership of copyright falls outside the scope of Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention. The final adoption of Article 93 ended the discussion in this regard and endorsed Belgian 
courts’ application of the lex loci protectionis to determine the initial ownership of copyright and 
related rights.  
 
Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL provides for the application of the law of the state where the act of 
exploitation or the act of infringement occurred to matters of creation, scope and termination of IP 
rights which are on a list of issues that are, however, considered as non-exclusive, meaning the rule 
will also apply to other property aspects of IP rights, particularly initial ownership.
919  
Since the issue 
of initial ownership of copyright and related rights falls outside the scope of Rome II, national choice-
of-law rules, here again Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL shall remain applicable. Accordingly, the 
Austrian provision referring to the application of the lex loci protectionis governs the issue of initial 




In those European countries which have not enacted statutory provisions as to the law applicable to 
initial ownership of copyright, like Germany, the case law and legal doctrines affirm the application of 
the lex loci protectionis. The German Bundersgerichtshof has mainly been of the opinion that the 
initial ownership of non-registered IP rights is governed by the law of the country for which protection 
is sought.
921
 That ruling has also been followed by lower German courts.
922 
 In addition, the majority 
of German scholars advocate that the law of the state for which protection is sought should determine 
this issue.
923
 Still some commentators advocate the lex originis arguing that, no matter what law 
protects the copyright of its original owner, its initial title absolutely connects with the state of origin 




3.4.2.2 The lex originis 
Applying the law of the country of origin is often argued as an alternative to the lex loci protectionis 
for determining the initial ownership of copyright.
925
 According to this rule, the law of the country 
where copyright was published or the law of the place where the creator of the work has his residence 
has to apply.  
 
In the Netherlands, there is no clear choice-of-law rule for the initial ownership issue. This might due 
to the fact that cross-border copyright cases are often litigated in kort geding proceedings, under which 
the choice-of-law issue is hardly ever raised.
926
 In a recent case Michaud/Graham Packaging,
927
 the 
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Appeal Court of ‘s-Hertogenbosch adopted the lex originis rule to decide the issue of initial ownership 
and held that France was the place of origin due to the fact that the designer was a French residence. In 
Dutch doctrine, there is, however, a division of opinion on this issue. According to some, the lex loci 
protectionis should govern the initial ownership issue,
928
 while others are of the opinion that the lex 
originis should apply for the sake of legal certainty because under that circumstance only one national 




On several occasions, French courts have applied the lex originis to copyright ownership. As discussed 
above, the French Cour de Cassation ruled in the 1959 “Rideau de fer” case that initial ownership of 
copyright, together with other issues would be governed by the law of the country of origin. In another 
case, involving infringement of moral rights, the Cour de Casstion also applied the lex originis to 
determine the initial ownership of a film.
930
 That ruling has been closely followed by French lower 
courts. They consider the nature of the work along with initial ownership of copyright as general law 




In Portugal, as analysed in the preceding section, Article 48(1) of the Portuguese Civil Code provides 
that author’s rights are governed by the law of the place of first publication; if the work is not 
published, they are governed by the personal law of the author, which is the law of the nationality of 
that person. In a recent decision, the Portuguese Supreme Court affirmed application of the lex originis 
to the issue of initial ownership of copyright.
932
 This solution is also expressly provided for copyright 
ownership of softwares and databases.
933
 However, for a cinematographic work, it is stated that, 
according to Article 14bis(2)(a) of the Berne Convention, its initial ownership should be governed by 
the law of the country where protection is claimed.
934
     
 
Still further, as analysed in the preceding section, Article 67(1) and (3) of the Greek Copyright Act 
and Article 60 of the Romanian Private International Law Act both adopt the lex originis approach for 
initial ownership claims. 
 
3.4.3 Summary 
A comparison of European national choice-of-law rules and judicial practices demonstrates that the lex 
loci protectionis is the rule in pre-dominant use among European states for the issues of existence, 
content, duration and termination of copyright and related rights, even though the interpretations of the 
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lex loci protectionis differ among some countries, i.e. some countries interpret it as referring to the law 
of the place where infringement occurs while others interpret it as the place where copyright protection 
is claimed. Nevertheless, a few countries apply the lex originis to the existence, content, duration and 
termination of copyright and related rights. The lex originis rule, as an alternative to the lex loci 
protectionis, is also used by some countries to determine the initial ownership of copyright. 
 
3.5 Inspiration for PRC law 
What can the above facts and legal observations about choice-of-law in copyright and related rights 
cases in the EU and its Member States help in for assessing the development of laws pertaining to 
designation of laws applicable to such cases in the PRC and in inspiring and furthering future 
development of such PRC laws? 
 
First, the matter of identifying the law applicable to IP rights disputes should be dealt with 
specifically. This is due to the economic importance and the special character owned by these rights. 
The different types of IP rights, e.g. copyright and related rights are, however, not addressed 
individually in the Rome II Regulation. This is understandable because the scope of Rome II is limited 
to non-contractual obligations arising from IP rights infringement. In other words, it deals with the 
matters of infringement and remedies, which is indifferent in terms of finding the choice-of-law 
applicable to all the various types of IP rights disputes.  
 
Second, Rome II preserves the traditional principle of territoriality and adopts the lex loci protectionis 
rule to IP rights infringement disputes in its Article 8(1). Since Rome II does not provide any leeway 
for the lex loci protectionis rule, i.e. neither party autonomy nor an escape clause, the effectiveness of 
such a rule in practice could be questioned. The rigidity of Articles 8(1) and 8(3) has been criticized, 
and it is suggested that a limited degree of party autonomy should at least be accepted. Effectiveness 
concerns about this provision have also been raised in multi-state infringement disputes, since 
nowadays copyrighted work can so easily cross borders by means of high technology, in particular the 
Internet. Solutions in this regard are also advocated by scholars and academic institutions.  
 
Third, the scope of Rome II needs to be more certain. It is not certain from the Regulation whether or 
not the lex loci protectionis rule laid down in Article 8(1) should also govern the issues related to the 
right itself, such as existence, content, duration, termination and initial ownership of the right. The 
opinions of scholars about that are quite diverse. For the sake of clarity and legal certainty, the scope 
of the application of the lex loci protectionis should be clarified.  
 
Fourth, national choice-of-law rules for the matters related to copyright itself can be divided in mainly 
two groups: one applying the lex loci protectionis, the other applying the lex originis, to the matters of 
existence, content, duration of the right as well as the initial ownership. Examples of the former are 
e.g. Germany and Austria; as for the countries that adopted the latter approach examples are France, 
Greece etc. Thus, there is no consensus among European states on the law applicable to these aspects 
of copyright claims. This reflects policy considerations of each state.  
 
The above may inspire the PRC legislature and judiciary in the sense that when there is a chance for 
further legislating or hearing cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, attention should be 
given whether the territoriality principle should be maintained, and to what extent and in which aspect 
a deviation from this principle should be allowed. Furthermore, the scope of choice-of-law rules 
should be clarified, e.g. clarifying the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis rule. Especially 
for the matter of initial ownership of copyright and related rights, the opposite approaches applied by 
European states should remind the PRC legislature of clarifying its approach in accord with the PRC’s 
economic and cultural policy considerations. Moreover, copyright and related rights have not been 
specifically dealt with either in EU laws or in European states laws,  one may ask whether this 
approach should be kept in PRC law, or the PRC should introduce specific choice-of-law rules for 





This chapter briefly describes the history of the European Union with its focus towards the 
development of private international law in the EU. It then addresses the EU harmonization processes 
as to copyright and related rights and argues that the EU copyright directives do not directly deal with 
choice-of-law rules for copyright and related rights claims, and neither does Article 18 of the TFEU 
(the treaty anti-discrimination principle). The chapter continues by describing the “Europeanization” 
of PIL rules in the aspect of non-contractual obligations – in the Rome II Regulation. Rome II sets 
down a specific choice-of-law rule – a lex loci protectionis rule for non-contractual obligations arising 
from IP rights infringement claims, excepting Community IP rights. This rule has been criticised for 
lack of flexibility. Therefore, its effectiveness in copyright and related rights disputes has been subject 
to question. Furthermore, its absence of clarity as to the scope of application of this lex loci 
protectionis rule has also led to discussion. As argued in this chapter, Rome II deals only with non-
contractual obligations arising from IP rights infringement disputes with the result that the issues of 
initial ownership as well as the existence, contents, duration and termination of copyright fall outside 
its scope. Because of that, the chapter then surveys certain European national laws and judicial 
practices in the aspect of determining the choice-of-law for those issues. As demonstrated, there is no 
consensus among them on the choice-of-law rules for those issues. As for the interest of PRC 
legislators and judiciary, the observations made in this chapter should remind them to have a clear 
scope of application of the prescribed choice-of-law rules, to introduce flexibility to the general rule of 
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CHAPTER 4 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
As mentioned in the previous two chapters, international treaty organizations concerned themselves 
more with harmonizing substantive national laws and developing measures that facilitate the 
international protection of intellectual property than with private international law issues in the field of 
IP rights. As to the latter issues, three academic groups: the American Law Institute, the European 
Max Planck Group on CLIP and the Japanese Waseda University have taken initiatives for drafting 
three separate academic contributions, namely the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles and the 
Japanese-Korean Principles. Although fundamental differences among these Principles with regard to 
certain issues, they all provide pragmatic approaches for determining the law applicable to cross-
border copyright and related rights disputes. However, one may wonder how such Principles, being in 
the nature of “soft law”, can inspire the PRC legislature or judiciary when such disputes are at stake.  
 
In this chapter, the choice-of-law rules that each of the Principles provide as to the issues of existence, 
scope and duration of copyright, and as to infringement and remedies, as well as initial ownership will 
be discussed. A comparison of the three sets of Principles and their inspiration for PRC legal practice 
will be given in section 4 and 5 of this chapter, respectively. A conclusion is provided at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
4.1 The ALI Principles 
For some time, the WIPO had been trying to deal with PIL issues in the field of intellectual property. 
It has addressed this issue within the traditional system of international IP law, mainly having to do 
with harmonization of national laws. As to copyright and related rights, in 1998 the WIPO organised a 
meeting of a Group of Consultants on the Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of 
Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted through Digital Networks and commissioned two 
professors, Jane C. Ginsburg and André Lucas, to carry out two studies on this subject.
935
 WIPO’s 
subsequent Diplomatic Conference convened in 2000. It was aimed at adopting an instrument on the 
Protection of Audiovisual Performances.
936
 However, as discussed in Chapter 2, such a treaty could 





Thereafter, the WIPO, in coordination with the Hague Conference on Private international Law, 
organised a WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property.
938
 A draft convention 
concerning jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in IP matters was submitted by Professors 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg.
939
 This draft dealt little with choice-of-law rules. At the 
forum conference, WIPO commissioned professors Jane C. Ginsburg and André Lucas to prepare a 
further study on the transfer of rights of performers to producers of audiovisual fixations. It would 
concern substantive law regarding performers’ rights, in particular the rules on transfer of their rights, 
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as well as PIL rules in this context.
940
 Given the diversity of national rules in this subject, it was 




When at the Hague Conference its project for drafting a Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
942
 including IP disputes, encountered insurmountable 
obstacles to bringing it into realization,
943
 the drafters of that draft Convention then decided to 
undertake a project in the field of IP on private international law issues. The project would include not 
only jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments, but also applicable law. Such a 




Since then, the ALI has become the first institutional venue for preparing a set of principles on cross-
border litigation of intellectual property.
945
 After intensive discussions among ALI panel members of 
the several preliminary drafts issued in February of 2003, 2004, 2005 and in March 2007, the ALI 
approved its Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Judgments in 
Transnational Disputes (the ALI Principles) on 14 May 2007 and published them in September 2008. 
 
The ALI Principles are in a non-binding instrument that provides a common terminology so as to help 
courts and practitioners frame PIL issues in IP disputes and to provide guidance if national legislators 
ever need to enact legislation in this field, and to inspire discussion of this subject among the 
intellectual property community.
946
 The ambitions of the drafters of the ALI Principles were to 
establish a set of principles to balance common law and civil law systems with respect to PIL as it 
applies to IP rights and, as a result, to ameliorate the diversity of this particular field with generally 
applicable rules in the hope to “facilitate the international trade and the cultural life while respecting 
the needs of the economy worldwide”. 947 The ALI Principles cover the most important fields of IP 
rights, and they include copyright and related rights.
948
 The Principles only apply to transnational civil 
disputes involving IP rights, i.e. the claims between parties located in any two countries, or several 
countries.
949
 The ALI Principles consist of four parts: 1) definitions and scope of the principles, 2) 
jurisdiction, 3) applicable law and 4) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in 
transnational cases. Given the limits of this dissertation, only certain of its provisions on applicable 
law will be studied in this chapter.  
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4.1.1 Existence, scope and duration of copyright 
The ALI Principles respect the territoriality principle, which is embodied also in the choice-of-law 
rules provided therein. The Principles make a fundamental distinction between rights arising out 
registration and other intellectual property rights.
950
 As to the former, the law applicable is the law of 
each state of registration.
951
 Whereas for the latter, the lex loci protectionis approach, i.e. the law of 
each state for which protection is sought, is proposed. Accordingly, with regard to copyright and 
related rights, which are non-registrable, the law for which protection is sought should apply.  
 
The Principles do not provide separate choice-of-law rules as to the issues of infringement of 
copyright and other issues that are closely related to the right. Instead, they include all these matters in 
one short section. According to that, the lex loci protectionis comprehensively determines the 
existence, validity, duration and attributes of copyright and related rights, as well as infringement of 
copyright and related rights and the remedies for their infringement.
952
 It adopts a market impact test 
only for non-contractual obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition, which the Principles 




It is nevertheless a matter of note that, as for non-registered IP rights, the final ALI Principles have 
been premised on an approach different from their Preliminary Draft No. 2.
954
 The latter would have 
distinguished economic rights and personal rights by making the law applicable to the existence, 
validity and scope and infringement, “the law of any country where the allegedly infringing act has or 
will significantly impact the market for the work or subject matter at issue.”955 As for personal rights, 
Preliminary Draft No. 2 would have provided the governing law is the law of the country where the 
damage occurred.
956
 This Draft also would have provided exceptions to the above basic rules for 
situations where: the case is more closely connected with a country other than the country of market 
impact, where the parties have a pre-existing relationship, when it would be unduly burdensome for 
the court to decide on the basis of several other countries’ laws, or when those laws cannot be 
ascertained.
957
 Under these circumstances, the law of the country with the closest connection to the 
dispute would have applied, with the help of the factors listed in the second draft provision.
958
 The law 




Such a market impact approach to non-registered rights was not appealing. Even one of the reporters 
of the Principles had raised doubts about that.
960
 Adopting this approach would mean that, if the 
harmful effects occurred or will occur in certain countries and they are insignificant, those countries’ 
laws will not apply. It should then be questioned why such an approach is applied only to non-
registered rights. In fact, a market impact test is, as submitted by some scholars, frequently raised in 
disputes concerning a registered right, trademark disputes in particular.
961
 In addition, it has also been 
pointed out that there would be a necessity to distinguish registered and non-registered rights in 
determining the existence and scope of IP rights. If the drafters of the Principles intended to apply the 
market impact rule only to non-registered rights, would it mean that this rule is excluded from 
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application to registered rights? Rather, in adjudicating existence and scope issues of both registered 




Basic rules were, however, changed in Preliminary Draft No. 3 and remained in the final Draft. For 
economic rights, a territorial approach was chosen: the law of each country in which an infringement 
occurs determines the existence of the right, its scope and infringement; for personal rights, the law 
applicable should be that of the country where the author is habitually resident at the time the harm 
occurred. Changing the choice-of-law rule for personal rights was based on the consideration that non-





4.1.2.1 General rule 
For copyright and related rights, the ALI Principles chose the country for which protection is sought as 
the connecting factor. As explained in the official Comments of the Principles, the term “country for 
which protection is sought” is clearer than the term “country where protection is sought”, since the 
latter might lead to the application of the lex fori or lex loci delicti. Furthermore, since the Principles 
do not allow the application of the forum’s law when the sole basis for applying the forum law is the 
judicial competence of a court in that country,
964
 the term “country where protection is sought” is 
deliberately avoided. Moreover, those Comments contend that the “country for which protection is 
sought” is compatible with a market-oriented approach.965 
 
However, the ALI Principles depart from the territoriality principle in three areas: 1) in cases where 
infringement is ubiquitous, 2) party autonomy as to certain relationship aspects, and 3) the initial 
ownership of copyright. In these circumstances, uniform solutions have been adopted. The reason for 
choosing a uniform approach had to do with the attitude that “it does not seem reasonable to have so 
many different national solutions to one and the same legal issue”.966 
 
4.1.2.2 Party autonomy 
It had been suggested that the parties should be given the possibility to choose the law applicable, ex 
post, for determining the remedies imposed.
967
 In § 302, it is provided that the parties may choose a 
single law at any time, including after a dispute arises, to determine all or part of their dispute. The 
Principles, nonetheless, restrict application of party autonomy in several matters for the sake of public 
interests. First, the Principles would allow no party autonomy for the matters of validity and 
maintenance of registered rights, the existence, scope and duration of rights as well as the formal 
requirements for recording assignments and licenses.
968
 Furthermore, party autonomy in standard 
agreements would be limited to the usual scrutiny for reasonableness.
969
 Last but not the least, such 




Party autonomy for infringement actions was actually later introduced in the Principles. This section 
would allow the parties to select the law applicable to an infringement action after the dispute arises. It 
is stated that introducing party autonomy in infringement actions can better serve efficiency 
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 as the parties can agree among themselves on the law that will determine the monetary 
consequences of their conduct, and the claim could therefore be resolved quickly at a court, in 
particular in the situation where ubiquitous infringement has occurred, the parties could choose one 
single law to simplify the legal proceedings. In addition, unlike the issues of validity or existence of 
IP, party autonomy in infringement actions will not contravene the sovereign interests of a country.
972
 
In fact, the sovereign interests of a state can be guaranteed by resort to public policy and mandatory 
rules set forth in §§322 and 323, respectively. 
 
4.1.2.3 Ubiquitous infringement 
The ALI Principles are the first set of international “soft law” rules that take into account the 
importance of the Internet. For PIL, the transnational nature of the Internet and the ubiquitous nature 
of IP rights raise concerns about ubiquitous infringement, since many countries will be affected in 
cases where an infringement is ubiquitous. In the context of choice-of-law, applying the traditional 
territoriality principle to ubiquitous infringement claims means that multiple national laws will apply 
to those claims, because territoriality leads to the application of the laws of each affected country to 




To deal with ubiquitous infringement, the drafters of the ALI Principles decided to depart from 
territoriality to the extent that one single law or a small number of laws will be applied to the 
infringements occurring in many countries. As stated in §321 of the Principles, the simplification 
methods apply in cases when “the alleged infringing activity is ubiquitous and the laws of multiple 
States are pleaded.”974 Under subsection (1), the court may apply the law(s) of one state or a small 
group of states that has or have close connections to the disputes, not only to the infringement issues, 
but also to the existence, validity, duration and attributes issues. As to the interpretation of “close 
connection to the disputes”, the Principles set forth several examples as “where the parties reside”, 
“where the parties’ relationship, if any, is centered”, “the extent of the activities and the investment of 
the parties” and “the principle markets toward which the parties directed their activities”. The 
Principles further explain the reason why the above factors should be considered. As stated, the 
objective of IP rights is to create incentives to innovate and create, the countries that are closest to that 
objective are those where the parties reside, made their investment decisions, and expected to exploit 
the work. Moreover, a relationship previously-entered into among the parties, such as in the context of 
copyright, co-authorship, co-production, or commissioned work should also be a point of attachment 
in ubiquitous infringement because the parties in such relationships should be able to predict the law 
applicable to the IP rights at the time they entered into the relationships.
975
 It is also of note that the 
ALI Principles extend its solution to the issues of the existence, validity, duration, and attributes of the 
rights. The solution which the ALI Principles proposes here was inspired by the cascade solution in 
German law and Swiss law, e.g. Articles 133, 136 and 139 of the Swiss PIL. But unlike its sources of 





In order to balance the interests of the parties involved in the disputes, the drafters would allow the 
parties to demonstrate that the laws of certain countries would produce a significantly different 
outcome than that under the law or laws of the state or states chosen. And if that is the case, the court 
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4.1.3 Initial ownership of copyright 
With respect to the initial ownership of IP rights, the ALI Principles divide rights into three groups: 
registered rights, unregistered trademark and trade-dress rights, as well as other rights that do not arise 
out of registration. The latter include copyright and related rights. The Principles stipulate a special 
rule for each group.  
 
As far as the initial ownership of copyright and related rights is concerned, the Principles depart from 
the territoriality principle by designating application of the law of the creator’s residence at the time 
the subject matter was created.
978
 If there are several creators of the same subject matter, they can 
agree upon the law of one of their residences;
979
 in the absence of such a choice, the Principles 
designate the law of the state in which the majority of the creators resided at the time of the creation of 
the subject matter;
980
 and if the governing law still cannot be identified, then the law of the state with 
the closest connection to the first exploitation of the work should be applicable.
981
 If there is an 
existing employment relationship, the law governing the author’s employment relationship shall 




Clearly, the ALI Principles adopts the universality approach as far as possible resulting in worldwide 
application of only one law to the issue of initial ownership of copyright and related rights. As pointed 
out by one of the ALI Reporters, this can reduce transaction costs by avoiding conflicting cross-border 
situations where rights vest in different entities with regard to one single copyright work. 





The ALI Principles designate the “creator’s residence” at the time of creation as the point of 
attachment for determining the initial title to copyright and related rights. Since copyright requires a 
creation from the mind of a creator, it seems appropriate to use the creator’s residence at the time of 
creation as the point of attachment. However, this concept has not always been clear. The Principles 
expressly do not designate the term “country of origin”, even though this term is well established in 
other contexts in intellectual property law, such as the term “country of origin” in Article 5(4) of the 
Berne Convention. As explained in a Comment to the Principles, although the “country of origin” may 
offer a unifying point of reference for determining worldwide rights ownership, this term does not 
offer legal certainty. First, there is no international consensus on the definition of the “country of 
origin”. Article 5(4) of the Berne Convention presents several alternative criteria for determining the 
country of origin of a work of authorship, and the term has not gained consensus in the context of 
designating the applicable law. In fact, it identifies too many possibilities and cannot provide 
certainty.
984
 Furthermore, the intangible nature of copyright makes it difficult to find the “origin” of 
the right, in particular in the context of multinational co-operative or co-production works. This 
distinguishes copyright from tangible goods or property. Accordingly, the choice-of-law rules that 




The Preliminary Draft No. 2 had set forth the law of the place of first availability to the public for 
determining the initial title to works.
986
 Some scholars have defended this universally applicable 
approach by arguing that it will meet the parties’ reasonable expectations, because the place of first 
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availability to the public is generally chosen by parties with care.
987
 The place the parties choose to 
make the work first available to the public is also the place where the interests of the creator and the 
public will meet, which would be in line with the goals of copyright law. It is, nevertheless, to be 
noted that a simultaneous publication worldwide is not uncommon nowadays, even in the analogous 
world, let alone publication on the Internet, if there is a so-called publication on the Internet. In such a 
case, the place of first availability to the public would be subject to challenge, because such a place 
will not be one place, but as many places as there could be. Accordingly, such an approach will not 
result in applying a single law to the issue of initial ownership of copyright. 
 
Adopting a universality approach for the initial ownership issue in cross-border copyright and related 
rights should not be supported. As described above, finding a single connecting factor in this respect 
would be arbitrary, particularly where co-authors have not chosen an applicable law, since under such 
circumstances, the majority of those creators’ residences at the time of creation would be used. 
Furthermore, the connecting factor of the “creator’s residence” will not always be clear in practice, 
and such an application would not guarantee “no divergence with regard to the status of author 
throughout the world” as hoped by the drafters. Last but not least, applying such a universal approach 
would not respect the territoriality principle of copyright and related rights. 
 
4.2 The CLIP Principles 
The European Max Planck Institution’s Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) was begun in 
2004 with the aim of establishing a set of principles for conflict of laws for intellectual property (CLIP 
Principles). The project was derived from an initiative originally conducted by the Max-Planck 
Institute in Munich, Germany, which had planned to devise rules on jurisdiction for cross-border IP 
disputes and to insert those rules in the Draft Hague Judgment Convention.
988
 Nowadays, the CLIP 
Principles embrace the entire fields of jurisdiction and applicable law, as well as recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in the field of intellectual property. The CLIP Principles is drafted 
with the intention to improve the existing legal regimes in the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
CLIP Principles, once published, may be useful as a source of inspiration for national and international 
legislators including those in the PRC, or may be used to interpret or supplement international and 





Prior to the conclusion of the project, the Institute had presented preliminary drafts of the Principles on 
8 April, 6 June 2009, 1 September 2010 and 25 March 2011, respectively. The final text published on 
1 December 2011 serves as the basis for the discussion in this dissertation, unless it is otherwise 
stated. 
 
It is of note that against its European background, the CLIP Principles was prepared from the 
perspective of potential coordination with existing EU instruments, e.g. the Rome I and Rome II 




4.2.1 Existence, scope and duration of copyright 
The CLIP Principles adopt the lex protectionis as the general principle that applies to the matters of 
the existence, validity, scope, limitation and duration of copyright, and all other matters that are 
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intrinsically related to the right.
991
 Such an approach reflects the intention of the drafters to maintain 
the territorial character of IP rights, which is the basic principle applied in this set of Principles, as 





4.2.2.1 General rule 
The CLIP Principles maintain the principle of territoriality as the basic principle for infringement and 
remedies claims. Its Article 3:601(1) provides that, as the basic principle, the law applicable to 
infringement is the law of each state for which protection is sought. That is very close to what Article 
8 of Rome II provides. The Principles define the scope of “infringement” as including both liability for 
violation and for remedies. As precisely as possible, the Principles further clarify the scope of 
remedies to include injunctions, damages, and other means of redress for injury, as well as claims 
based on unjust enrichment and negotiorum gestio to the extent they concern non-contractual 





The CLIP Principles provide several exceptions from the basic rule, with the explanation that “in 
certain exceptional situations a faithful and literal observation of that rule would hamper rather than 
assist a meaningful pursuit of justice.”994 
 
 4.2.2.2 Party autonomy 
The CLIP Principles allow for party autonomy as to the law applicable to remedies claimed in 
infringement cases. According to Article 3:606(1), the parties may agree on such a choice before or 
after the dispute has arisen. Considering its European background, the CLIP Principles make a 
dramatic departure from Rome II, which explicitly excludes the possibility of party autonomy in IP 
rights infringement claims. The CLIP working group stated that the practical consequences of 
adopting this more liberal approach will not in any case be very significant, because a situation where 
the parties, after the dispute has arisen, agree to submit their case to a law different from the law 
applicable in the absence of any agreement could hardly ever happen: there will not be a choice for 
both parties to win.
995
 Under such circumstances, it is barely even conceivable that the parties would 




Article 3:606 provides an additional apparent subsidiary rule. In the situation where the infringement 
is closely connected with a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a previous contract 
related to the copyright, the law governing the remedies for the infringement should be the law 
governing the pre-existing relationship, with the exceptions that  
“the parties have expressly excluded the application of the law governing the pre-existing 
relationship with regard to the remedies for infringement, or it is clear from the all the 
circumstances of the case that the claim is more closely connected with another state.”997 
The role of this provision raises some doubts, however. First, the relation of the two rules (paragraphs 
1 and 2) to each other is unclear. Article 3:606 is entitled “Freedom of choice for remedies”, under 
which paragraph 1 sets forth the party autonomy rule for remedy claims. In this respect, one may 
speculate what the function of paragraph 2 is, since it reads more like a subsidiary rule to remedy 
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claims in general rather than an exception to party autonomy overriding the parties’ choice. Further to 
this concern, one may also speculate, as paragraph 2 does not state anything about which law should 
be applicable if the parties have expressly excluded the application of the law governing the pre-
existing relationship with regard to the remedies for infringement, or it is clear from all the 
circumstances of the case that the claim is more closely connected with another state. Here, should 
paragraph 2 be characterized as a subsidiary rule leading to the application of the law of another state 
which is more closely connected with the claim or as an exception to party autonomy in the context of 
paragraph 1, the parties’ choice, if there is any, should be respected? Thus, it is submitted that the title 
of Article 3:606 should be clarified to be entitled “applicable law rules for remedies”. 
 
4.2.2.3 Ubiquitous infringement 
The CLIP Principles provide choice-of-law rules that depart from the lex loci protectionis rule for 
ubiquitous infringement. Article 3:603 of the CLIP Principles stipulates that in the situation where 
infringement is carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, if the infringement 
“arguably takes place in every State in which the signal can be received”, a court may apply one 
single law of the state having the closest connection with the infringement. In comparison with the 
first two preliminary drafts, the current version adopts the law of only one state, rather than of “the law 
or the laws of the state or the states”.   
 
Furthermore, Article 3:603 explicitly states that the scope of the application of the single law 
designated under this provision, governing the “existence, duration, limitations and scope to the extent 
that these questions arise as incidental question in infringement proceedings”. This provision differs 
fundamentally from the first two preliminary drafts, under which the provisions on ubiquitous 
infringement concerned only infringement issues; other issues such as existence, duration leave to the 
basic rule leading to a distributive application of laws of the protecting countries. The reason for such 
changes may have something to do with the introduction of Article 3:603(3) in Preliminary Draft No. 
3, which, as will be described in next paragraph, provides certain balance in the situation where the 
application of one single law would lead to essentially different results than those by the application of 
the laws of a state or states covered by the disputes.  
 
As Article 3:603 aims at concentrating ubiquitous infringement claims under one single law of a state 
that is closely connected to the infringement, the CLIP Principles list the factors that should be taken 
into account when determining the closest connection: the infringer’s habitual residence, the 
infringer’s principal place of business, the place where substantial activities in furthering of the 
infringement in its entirety have been carried out and the place where the harm caused by the 
infringement is substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety.
998
 Nevertheless, in order to 
maintain an appropriate balance between the parties, Article 3:603 of the CLIP Principles allows the 
parties according to its paragraph 3 to demonstrate and plead that the laws of a state or states covered 
by the dispute differ from the law applied by the court in aspects which are essential for the decision. 
In this case the court should apply the different laws pleaded unless this would lead to inconsistence 
results, e.g., if one jurisdiction would grant an injunction whereas the other jurisdiction would not 
grant the injunction. Under this circumstance, the court may apply one law and take into account the 




4.2.2.4 De minimis rule 
The de minimis rule, as set forth in Article 3:602 of the CLIP Principles, is another of the CLIP 
departures from the territoriality principle. Since the above-discussed ubiquitous infringement rule 
does not apply to all multi-state infringement cases, the de minimis rule is designed to provide 
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solutions in the form of a materiality rule.
1000
 According to this provision, in the situation where an 
alleged infringement has occurred in several states, the court may only focus on the alleged 
infringement claims under which the alleged infringer has acted to initiate, or further the infringement 
in the state or the states for which protection is sought or where the activities by which the right is 
claimed to be infringed have substantial effect within, or are directed to, the state or the states for 
which protection is sought.
1001
 Consequently, the court does not need to focus on an infringement 
which has not caused a substantial effect or where the infringer has not acted to initiate or further the 
infringement in the state or the states for which protection is sought, unless the court considers it 




Accepting such a de minimis rule has advantages in multi-state cases. It preserves the operation of the 
lex loci protectionis and the distributive application of national laws while alleviating the effect of the 
distributive application of the law of protecting countries on a country-by-country basis because it 




The wording of the provision, “[a] court applying the law or the laws determined by Article 3:601 
shall…”, shows that the de minimis rule is more of a substantive law rule making reference to market 
impact than an applicable law rule.
1004
 According to some scholars, this rule has been proved to be an 
essential factor in cross-border IP disputes, in particular concerning conflicting trademark cases on the 
Internet.
1005
 This rule was inspired by the similar rules set out in Article 2 of the Paris Union and the 
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other 
Industrial Property Rights and Signs, on the Internet,
 1006
 which stipulate that an infringement shall 
only be held to occur in a country if its use has commercial effect in that country.
1007
 The CLIP 
Principles, however, would expand the application of this rule to all types of IP rights, including 
copyright and related rights, and to all cases, regardless of the means of communication, i.e. whether 




Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the de minimis rule is not, strictly speaking, a choice-of-law 
rule. Rather it is a rule of interpretation that should be applied on the substantive level. One may still 
conjecture how to define a de minimis situation in connection with the infringement of certain rights 
where it would be inappropriate to ask for commercial relief, such as: a moral rights claim.
1009
 
Furthermore, inserting a de minimis rule into an internationally legal binding instrument would create 
problems leading to a situation where a court would have to look into the law of a country that it 
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4.2.3 Initial ownership 
In all preliminary drafts of the CLIP Principles, the choice-of-law rules insofar as they deal with the 
initial ownership issue were the same, that is, the law of the country for which protection is sought,
1011
 
notwithstanding that among the Working Group there had been intense discussions whether this 
territorial approach should be preferred. Some members of the Working Group contended that the lex 
originis rule has the advantages of applying only one law throughout the world to the initial ownership 
issue and of promoting efficiency, especially in the context of copyright and related rights.
1012
 The 
majority of the Group, however, was of the opinion that the territorial approach in this regard should 
be adopted because it is consistent with the policy considerations of copyright law, and in practice, 
“courts are not willing to accept the consequences of the lex originis and apply their national 
copyright law as part of the public policy of the forum”.1013 The lack of a consensus on a definition of 
the lex originis also raised doubts about application of this approach.  
 
The drafters of the CLIP Principles took into account of the fundamental distinct rationales between 
copyright and author’s right laws that reflect in the initial ownership of copyright in the aspect of 
whether an artificial person can be an author, e.g. in the context of works made in the course of an 
employment relationship, and chose different choice-of-law approaches for registered and non-
registered rights to determine the initial ownership of the work made in the course of employment or 
other contractual relationships. Unlike for registered IP rights, to govern the initial ownership of 
copyright and related rights the CLIP Principles would not accord that choice-of-law rule to 
employment or other contractual relationships. Instead, it would adhere to the lex loci protectionis 
rule, and in addition it would grant authority to the judge to give effect to a work-made-for-hire 
provision of the law of another country that has a close connection with the situation.
1014
 It is argued 
that in practice, in most author’s right law systems, creators who are employees grant a transfer or an 
exclusive license for all economic rights in the work to their employers either by a legal assignment or 
a presumption of assignment.
1015
 They do not differ significantly from a work-made-for-hire doctrine 
as far as the attribution of the economic rights is concerned.
1016
 As stated, this approach is partly 
inspired by Article 2 (3) of the EC Software Directive (all economic rights). According to it, the 
economic rights in a work shall be granted to the employer in the situations where the employee is 
performing his duty or is following instructions given by the employer. To do otherwise would seem 
to be odd, as both parties assumed that during the creation of the work, the employer will own the 
exclusive economic rights of the work actually created by the employee.
1017
 Thus, this provision may 
give some guidance for interpretation of the relationship of employer and employee.  
 
In this respect, the CLIP approach has been criticized as “insufficient and inconsistent”.1018 First, it 
does not provide a clear rule. Instead it leaves this to the discretion of the judge without any clear 
indication about how to exercise such discretion. Furthermore, the CLIP Principles strive for 
mandatory protection of the author, allowing derogation of the foreign rules of work-made-for-hire 
would contradict the fundamental rationale of the Principles. Moreover, the treatment of moral rights 
deserves attention. It has been argued that if the substantive law of the contractual relationship with a 
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work-made-for-hire rule can be given effect in the context of economic rights, why should moral 
rights be treated so strictly by applying the general law of the lex loci protectionis. Thus, it is proposed 




The CLIP Principles also deal with the issue of co-authorship.
1020
 They characterize two separate 
aspects involved in co-authorship: a proprietary aspect and other aspects, and propose two sets of rules 
for them. As to issues like who is entitled to the initial co-ownership, the Principles refer to the choice-
of-law rules as to the initial ownership issue set forth in Article 3:201, under which the lex loci 
protectionis is applied as a general rule.
1021
 For issues concerning the mere exercise of IP rights, such 
as waiver, consent and any other form of exploitation, division of revenues, and authority to enforce 
the IP rights and to bring suits, the Principles leave them to contractual arrangements.
1022
 Thus, the 
CLIP Principles characterize most issues arising out of the co-authorship relationship as contractual in 
nature and confer party autonomy on them. It is maintained that allowing party autonomy will 
facilitate the exercise of the right because the parties may choose the law that best fits to their 
expectations.
1023
 In the absence of an agreement, the Principles would apply the law having the closest 
connection.  
 
4.3 Japanese-Korean Principles 
Apart from the efforts undertaken by the ALI and the European Max Planck Group, on another side of 
the world – in east Asia, there has been drafting on still more sets of principles in relation to PIL and 
IP. Two groups of East Asian scholars engaged in such projects: The Japanese Transparency Working 
Group and the Private International Law Association of Korea and Japan presided over by Japan’s 
Waseda University. The latter produced a joint proposal drafted by the members of the Private 
International Law Association of Korea and Japan (Japanese-Korean Principles), while the former 
produced the Japanese Transparency Proposal on Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual Property (October 2009) (Transparency Proposal). 
 
The two sets principles serve different purposes and have different scopes of application. The 
Transparency Proposal is a product of the Transparency of Japanese Law Project whose purpose has 
been to facilitate commercial transactions between businesses in Japan and in other countries by 
providing information in English on Japanese legislation, case law and doctrines related to 
international business. The Project was divided into working groups for international: corporate law, 
sales law, financing law, civil procedure law, and IP law. In 2006, Japan’s parliament promulgated its 
Act on the General Rules of the Application of Law in order to reform Japan’s private international 
law.
1024
 However, this Act does not provide any specific choice-of-law rules for IP matters. Inspired 
by the ALI and CLIP Principles, the Transparency Working Group on IP undertook to draft a proposal 
for additional statutory provisions in this respect in the context of the 2006 Act. The draft 
Transparency Proposal aims at further improving existing Japanese private international law. 
 
Separately, the October 2010 Japanese-Korean Principles form one of the parts of the Waseda 
University Global COE (Centres of Excellence) Programme for research in science and related areas. 
Those Principles were aimed at creating a model law with minimum statutes that could provide 
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influence over legislation in East Asian counties.
1025 
During the process of drafting these Principles, 
the ALI, the CLIP Principles and current relevant legal systems in East Asian Countries were taken 
into consideration. Thus, the principles and rules that are accepted in common are affirmed in the 
Principles. As to issues that are not shared in common by East Asian countries, the Principles propose 
new rules. The provisions laid down in the Principles may serve as a set of guidelines for judicial 
interpretation in courts and may function as a supplemental source of laws for providing solutions to 
the issues that are not covered by national statutory rules.
1026 
Since the Japanese-Korean Principles 
target the East Asian countries, in a region where the PRC is an important country, this dissertation 
will additionally focus on the choice-of-law rules provided in these Principles. Where the rules of the 
Japanese-Korean Principles differ from those of the Transparency Proposal, those differences will also 
be discussed.  
 
The Japanese-Korean Principles consist of rules on international judicial jurisdiction, and applicable 
law, as well as enforcement of foreign judgments concerning IP rights.
1027 
The discussion undertaken 




4.3.1 Existence, scope and duration of copyright 
The Japanese-Korean Principles would adopt the lex protectionis as the general rule governing “all 
matters concerning an intellectual property right as such”.1029 The scope of the application of the lex 
protectionis is rather flexible: it would be up to national court to determine what matters fall within the 
scope of this provision. Nevertheless, it provides examples of certain matters such as: the existence, 
validity, content, revocation of the right and the like, with the exception of the matters specifically 
dealt with in the Principles, e.g. transferability of rights.  
 
The Principles define the lex protectionis as the law of the state for which protection is sought.
1030
 
Such an interpretation is due to the consideration that IP rights are exclusive rights granted by a state 
over intangible property, and the state of protection is therefore the general connecting factor for 
choice-of-law as to IP rights.
1031
 The same provision further provides a subsidiary rule for registered 
IP rights, according to which the lex protectionis should be interpreted as the law of the state of 
registration. Of course, since the existence of copyright and related rights does not depend on 
registration, the lex protectionis means the law of the state for which protection is sought. 
 
It is noteworthy that with the aim of facilitating the exploitation of IP rights, the Principles would 
provide a wider scope for the application of party autonomy by allowing the parties to choose a law 
governing IP rights matters, including the existence and scope of the rights.
1032
 Nevertheless, it is 
maintained here that such a liberal approach should not be supported, since these matters concern 
rights reflecting a state’s national cultural and economic policies, and therefore should not be subject 
to the choice of the parties. 
 
The Transparency Proposal would however turn to the different connecting factor of “the state which 
grants the right”. Accordingly, the law of the country that grants an IP right shall govern all issues 
pertaining to that right, including the existence and effects of the rights.
1033
  Adopting such a choice-
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of-law rule has to do with the consideration that such matters are reflections of the IP policies of a 
country that granted such right, and these policies should be respected.
1034
 The existence of the rights 
regulated in the Transparency Proposal is wide. It encompasses also the matters of creation, validity 
and duration of the rights.
1035  
Contrary to the Japanese-Korean Principles, the Transparency Proposal 
excludes the possibilities of having the parties agree on the applicable law in this regard because the 
matters of existence and scope of the rights reflect the cultural policies of a country that granted the 




4.3.2 Infringement  
4.3.2.1 General rule 
The Japanese-Korean Principles adhere to the territoriality principle and provide the same choice-of-





The Transparency Proposal, however, characterizes IP right infringement claims as claims in tort. 
Accordingly, it would apply the law of the place where the results of the unauthorized exploitation of 
the intellectual property occur or are to occur,
1038
 which corresponds to the choice-of-law rules for tort 
liability stipulated in the 2006 Act.
1039
 The scope of this rule encompasses not only the issues about 
whether there has been an infringement, but also to the issues of remedies such as injunctive relief and 
damages. The Transparency Proposal uses the term “results of the exploitation” in this provision. 
Since the term “results” refers to the economic loss in the market, the approach taken in the Proposal 
points to the law of the market of the country where the loss was sustained. Thus the Proposal 
seemingly introduces a market impact rule. As argued by the draftsmen, this term should not, 
however, be considered as the one derived from a substantive law leading to the application in advance 
of substantive rules. Instead, this term should be viewed from a PIL perspective, because the term 
“results” is also used with respect to tort liability when determining the applicable law, where that 
concept does not come from a substantive law, but from a PIL principle.
1040
 As to how to define the 
place where the results of the exploitation of IP occur or are to occur in reference to copyright 
infringement, it is suggested that this place should be the place of the market that the alleged infringer 
has targeted.
1041
 The advantage of applying this rule is that it retains the principle of the independence 
of copyright. A clear disadvantage of this approach will however occur in the context of the Internet, 
where there are so many targeted markets that it is cumbersome to apply each and every law of which 
a market has been affected, and difficult to determine which market has been specifically targeted.  
 
Clearly, in infringement claims, the Transparency Proposal retains the principle of the independence of 
the right, but it does not adopt a strict sense of the territoriality principle.  
 
4.3.2.2 Party autonomy 
Party autonomy provided in the Japanese-Korean Principles has a scope of application that is wider 
than what has been described in ALI and CLIP Principles. It is authorized not only for infringement 
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and remedies claims, but also for other matters that are intrinsically related to the right, including the 
existence and the scope of copyright.
1042
 Additionally, party autonomy enhanced in the Principles is 
rather liberal in that the parties may designate the law at any time, i.e. before or after the infringing act 
occurs, and may apply the law to the whole or part of their disputes. However, considering the 
divergence existing among national copyright laws, in particular in certain East Asian countries, where 
there is no clear and stable rule for the protection of IP rights, the Japanese-Korean Principles require 
that the choice made by the parties regarding the right itself should only be effective among the 
parties.
1043
 Although it was expected that in such a way, IP rights exploitation could be facilitated 
among the East Asian countries,
1044
 it is still doubtful whether such an approach is too far reaching, 
since allowing an ex ante or ex post choice as to the intrinsic aspects of the right does not respect the 
territoriality of copyright and related rights. Nevertheless, the parties’ agreement on the applicable law 




The Transparency Proposal allows the parties to change the applicable law, which is similar to rules 
concerning general tort liability.
1046
 The scope of changes by the parties is limited. First, such changes 
can only be made after the IP infringement occurs. Furthermore, the changes of the applicable law 
may not affect the rights of third parties.
1047
 Moreover, certain issues: such as the existence, primary 





4.3.2.3 Ubiquitous infringement 
The Japanese-Korean Principles set down specific rules for ubiquitous infringement in their Article 
306. According to this article, the law of the state that has the closest connection with that 
infringement in its entirety would apply to claims of ubiquitous infringement. For such infringements, 
Article 306 provides a limited specification that it is “an infringement that occurs or has occurred in 
unspecific and multiple states”.1049 For determining the closest connection, Article 306 lays down the 
factors that should be taken into account: the state which most closely connects to the parties - the 
infringer's habitual residence or the infringer's particular place of business in case of infringement 
activity occurring in its business operation; the state in which the owner of such right has principal 
interests; and the state in which the infringement activity mainly occurs, the state against which the 




In ubiquitous infringement cases where the issues of existence, validity, content, revocation, 
transferability, and effect of transfer on third parties of a copyright are raised as a preliminary or 





Applicability of Article 306(1) and (2) to ubiquitous infringement would, however, be curtailed when 
a party pleads and proves that there is another law that has a closer connection with the dispute than 
the one designated by these two provisions, more specifically when the law of another state, namely 
the one in which the alleged infringement has occurred, would lead to a “different solution” than that 
resulting from the applicable law under Article 306(1) and (2). In such a case, the law of that other 
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state would govern the liabilities and remedies arising from that infringement, unless that would lead 




Although the Transparency Proposal characterizes infringement of IP rights as a liability claim and 
would then apply to the IP infringement the law of state where the results occur or are to occur, it will 
also encounter difficulties in the context of ubiquitous infringement of copyright because it will be 
difficult to identify where the results of the exploitation are produced in such situations, and will be 
difficult to determine which market has been specifically targeted by such infringement. Additionally, 
that will lead to the distributive application of each and every law of each state whose markets are 
affected. To deal specifically with ubiquitous infringement, the Transparency Proposal proposes to 
specially apply the law of the “place” where the results of the exploitation of intellectual property are, 
or are to be, maximized.
1053
 As stressed by its draftsmen, the “maximized” result of exploitation that 
would be required by this provision would not compute the amount of  money damages from a 
substantive law perspective, rather it would be based on the frequency of exploitation such as the 
numbers of downloads in a specific jurisdiction.
1054
 Furthermore, the Transparency Proposal would 
restrict the timing of the “maximized result of exploitation” to the moment when the action is filed. In 
any event, if the result of the application of one single law is “extremely unreasonable” in relation with 
a specific country, the liability or remedy determined by that law shall not be applied in relation with 
that country.
1055
 In such a way, the disadvantage of applying one single law could be offset.  
 
4.3.3 Initial ownership 
The Japanese-Korean Principles would apply the lex loci protectionis as a general rule governing the 
initial ownership of IP rights.
1056
 However, for copyrighted works it lays down a special rule. 
According to this rule, the initial ownership of a copyrighted work would be governed by the law of 
the state in which the work is initially created. In the situation where the law of that state is not clear, 
the law of the creator's habitual residence at the time of the creation would be “assumed” as the 
governing law. If there were more than one creator, the applicable law would be deemed to be the law 
of a creator's habitual residence at the time of the creation as agreed by the creators. In the absence of 
such an agreement, the applicable law would be assumed to be the law of the state in which the 




Clearly, the drafters of the Japanese-Korean Principles try to designate one single law to govern the 
initial ownership of copyrighted works for the reason that the application of the same law to initial 
ownership of copyright in East Asia may promote the exploitation of copyrighted works and lessen the 
unauthorized use of those works. It is, nevertheless, to be noted that the solution this rule provides is 
not complete because it does not further designate which law shall apply if there is no majority of 
creators that habitually reside in a place at the time of the creation and if the creators have not reached 
any agreement in this regard.  
 
The Japanese-Korean Principles do provide a supplemental connecting factor to protect the right 
holder of intellectual property, primarily copyright, in the situation where the law designated in 
accordance with the above provisions would not extend to the title to the copyright. Under such a 
circumstance, the initial title to the copyright would be governed by the law of the state in which the 
work is “first exploited and protected”.1058    
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As to an initial ownership issue raised in the context of employee work or other pre-existing 





The Transparency Proposal proposes a rule applying the law of the country that grants the IP rights to 
govern the initial ownership of IP rights, including copyright and related rights. As described in the 
preceding sections, such a choice-of-law rule is also adopted for other issues that are intrinsically 
linked to that right, namely the existence, transferability and effects. So a single unitary legal 
relationship is established. Along the same lines as in the arguments relating to the issue of the 
existence of a copyright, one of the underlying reasons for this solution is due to the fact that initial 
ownership reflects a country’s policies on copyright, which differ from country to country and 
therefore deserve respect. Based on the same considerations, the initial ownership of copyright created 
by employees in an individual employment relationship should apply the same choice-of-law rule to 
the initial ownership of copyright i.e. the law of the country that grants the right, even though the 




4.4 Comparison of the three sets of Principles  
4.4.1 Similarities 
In general, the three sets of Principles share some similarities. They maintain territoriality as the basic 
principle, which embodies in the context of choice-of-law to cross-border copyright and related rights 
claims. Based on the concept of territorially restricted copyright, all the Principles designate the 
application of the law of the state for which protection is sought to govern the matters of existence, 
duration and scope of copyright and related rights. The same lex loci protectionis rule would apply 
also to infringement claims under the three sets of Principles. Nevertheless, these Principles also 
advocate moderate departures from the territoriality principle, such as recognizing the parties’ 
specified freedom of selecting a law in the case of infringement claims, and providing a solution to the 




4.4.2.1 Target group 
For the differences among these three sets of Principles, it should be firstly noted that they have 
different target groups in mind. The CLIP Principles was drafted with the intention of improving the 
existing legal regimes in the European Union, whereas the Japanese-Korean Principles aim at 
contributing to the regional integration of the East Asian Countries and the ALI Principles aim for 
increased coordination of American laws. 
 
4.4.2.2 Categorization 
Another difference between them that needs to be pointed out is that the CLIP and Japanese-Korean 
Principles categorize infringement and remedies issues and apply the lex loci protectionis to them, 
while the ALI does not make such a categorization. The practical consequence of this would be that 
the court adopting or referring to the ALI Principles would need to use its forum PIL rules. A very 
different result would occur in the situation where the forum law categorizes the remedies issue as 
pertaining to procedural law, because there the issue will be governed by the law applicable to the 
relevant civil procedure, rather than the lex loci protectionis. 
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4.4.2.3 Party autonomy 
Party autonomy is enhanced in every set of Principles. The scope of its application, however, differs. 
The CLIP Principles allow for freedom of choice only as to remedies claims, whereas the ALI 
Principles adopts a contrary approach by excluding certain issues from the scope of party autonomy, 
such as the existence, attributes, transferability and duration of the rights. Thus, it is more clearly 
structured and coherent. A wider scope of the application of party autonomy is accepted in the 
Japanese-Korean Principles in that the parties may choose a law governing not only their infringement 
and remedies claims, but also governing other matters that are intrinsically related to the right, 
including the existence and scope of copyright.  
 
Under the three sets of Principles, the parties can make a choice of the law applicable to infringement 
and remedies claims before or after the dispute has arisen. Such a choice is however not without 
limitation. The Japanese-Korean and ALI Principles require that the choice made by the parties should 
not be allowed to affect the vested rights of third parties. As to the Japanese-Korean Principles, the 
freedom to choose the law applicable to the aspects that are intrinsically related to the right is limited 
to matters solely between the parties. To impose such a requirement has to do with the wider scope of 
the application of party autonomy that is permitted. Since the parties are allowed to choose the law 
governing the matters intrinsically related to the right, e.g. the existence and scope of the rights, it is a 
necessity to limit the effect of their choice to any relationship between the parties. Nevertheless, the 
far-reaching approach of allowing a wider scope of application for party autonomy should not be 
supported because of the sovereign right of states to decide whether and how copyright and related 
rights should be protected in their own countries must not be a matter subject to private parties’ 
choice. 
 
4.4.2.4 Ubiquitous infringement 
All three sets of academic contributions set forth specific provisions for ubiquitous infringement, 
trying to identify one law or the laws of a small group of countries for infringement claims occurring 
in many countries. In general, the three sets of Principles adopt the approach of applying the law of a 
state or the laws of a small group of states having a close or the closest connection.  
 
There are however fundamental differences existing among them. The rules introduced in the CLIP 
Principles are rather limited and narrower in scope. First, as to the concept what constitutes ubiquitous 
infringement, the CLIP Principles set forth a definition of “ubiquitous media”. The CLIP rules will 
apply only in cases where use is made of ubiquitous media, such as the Internet or similar media that 
may develop in the future, and the infringement “takes arguably place in every state in which the 
signal can be received”. Similarly, the Japanese-Korean Principles defines ubiquitous infringement as 
“an infringement that occurs or occurred in unspecific and multiple states”. Such a definition is 
however lacking in the ALI Principles, since to trigger application of its provision only requires that 
the alleged infringing activity be ubiquitous and the laws of multiple states be pleaded. Thus, the 
Internet is only one of the media that need be used under the ALI Principles. As a result, some 
infringing acts that occur simultaneously in a number of countries through analogous media, such as 
magazines, will be dealt with as ubiquitous infringement under the ALI Principles, but not so under 
the CLIP Principles.  
 
Second, the CLIP Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles allow a stricter concentration of one 
single law of a state in ubiquitous infringements, whereas under the ALI Principles, the law(s) of one 
state or a small group of states may apply.  
 
Third, the ALI Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles both deal with the ubiquitous 
infringements in regard to all types of intellectual property; however, Article 3:603 of the CLIP 
Principles, by contrast, applies only to infringements of copyrights and well-known trademarks. The 
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reason for excluding patent claims is, as explained by the CLIP working group, that national patent 
laws are so different from each other, and the territoriality principle should still be maintained. As a 





Fourth, when defining the criteria according to which the closest connection should be identified, the 
three sets of Principles focus in different ways: the ALI Principles focus more on the places of rights 
holders, to the contrary, the CLIP Principles are clearly favorable to alleged infringers with the stated 
intention of balancing the positions of both parties because “it compensates the defendant for the 
plaintiff’s privilege to bring suit under one applicable law”, 1062  whereas the Japanese-Korean 
Principles take a more practical approach, aimed at adopting the connecting factors that “can be easily 
be discerned and grasped.”1063 Such differences may lead to the application of a different national law 
for the same case if a judge were to refer to different sets of Principles.  
 
Fifth, the ALI Principles would allow the application of one law or a small number of laws not only to 
liability for infringement and to remedies but also to the existence, duration and attributes of the rights. 
By contrast, the CLIP Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles accept only the concentration of 
one law to infringement and remedies, but for the issues of existence, content and duration of the 
rights, the rules on ubiquitous infringement would apply only when these issues are raised at a 
preliminary or incidental stage. This difference explains also why when adopting the “closest 
connection” principle, the ALI Principles require application of the law having a close connection to 
the dispute, whereas the Japanese-Korean and CLIP Principles require the closest connection to the 
infringement, because the former permits a wider scope of application encompassing matters other 
than infringement and remedies, to which the latter two are limited. In this respect, using the wording 
“close” connection in the ALI rather than “closest” as in the CLIP Principles seems to give judges who 
would refer to the ALI Principles more discretion to determine the law or laws applicable to the case.  
 
As to ubiquitous infringement, all three sets of Principles try to identify one single applicable law or a 
small number of laws by using different connecting factors. In order to maintain an appropriate 
balance between the parties, all these academic contributions provide possibilities for departing from 
the application of the law that is designated according to these contributions. Such a correction rule 
was first introduced by the ALI Principles, and has served as a blue print for the other sets of 
Principles. Nevertheless, it is to be mentioned that such a rule leaves more uncertainty as to the law 
applicable to ubiquitous infringement because it leaves the court with too much discretion to 
determine the law applicable to such infringements and its effect, and leaves both parties too much 
uncertainty as to the law applicable. Considering the fact that none of the Principles provides for a rule 
that will ensure legal certainty and foreseeability of the applicable law for such claims, introducing the 
above correction rule will only make the designation of the applicable law for ubiquitous infringement 
more complex. Therefore, it is submitted that such a correction rule should not be introduced. 
 
In addition, the CLIP Principles introduce a de minimis rule for multi-state infringement claims. This 
rule requires the court to focus only on the alleged infringement claims that the alleged infringer has 
acted to initiate, or further the infringement in the state or the states for which protection is sought or 
within which the activities by which the right is claimed to be infringed have substantial effect within, 
or are directed to, the state or the states for which protection is sought. As discussed, this rule is not a 
procedural choice-of-law rule designating the applicable law, in addition to that, how to define a de 
minimis situation in the context of an infringement of certain rights, such as: moral rights, would also 
be difficult in that it would be inappropriate to attach a commercial effects requirement to such rights. 
Thus, such a rule should not be introduced for copyright and related rights disputes.  
 




 Axel Metzger 2010 (supra n 768) 176; Annette Kur 2009 (supra n 988) 12. 
1063
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4.4.2.5 Initial ownership 
As to the initial ownership of copyright and related rights, two opposing approaches have been taken 
by these academic contributions. The ALI Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles adopt a 
universality approach leading to the application of one law governing the initial ownership of 
copyright. The laws chosen, however, are different. The ALI Principles apply the law of the creator’s 
residence at the time of the creation of the work, whereas the Japanese-Korean Principles apply the 
law of the state in which the work is initially created, and only when that law does not have clear 
application, will the law of the creator’s habitual residence at the time of the creation apply. In co-
authorship cases, both sets of Principles adopt the same rules according to which authors can agree 
upon the law of one of their habitual residences; in the absence of such an agreement, the law of the 
state in which the majority of the creators resided at the time of the work’s creation applies. The place 
of the first exploitation of the work will play a role when the governing law still cannot be identified 
(under the ALI Principles), or the designated applicable law does not extend to the title of copyright 
(under the Japanese-Korean Principles). As to the initial ownership of works created in the course of 
employment or other kinds of contractual relationship, both sets of Principles adopt a universal 
solution by referring to the choice-of-law rules governing the contract. Clearly, in determining the 
initial ownership of copyright and related rights both ALI and Japanese-Korean Principles try to 
expand the universality principle as far as possible. 
 
The CLIP Principles adopt other approach. It maintains a territoriality approach, and stipulates that the 
law of the country for which protection is sought would govern the initial ownership issue. For the 
works created during employment or other contractual relationships, it proposes an arguable approach 
of granting the judge authority to give effect to work-made-for-hire provisions of the law of another 
state that has a close connection with the situation. In co-authorship works, the CLIP Principles would 
distinguish the proprietary aspect from other aspects. As to the former, it refers to the choice-of-law 
rule for general initial ownership; the Principles leave the latter to contractual arrangements. In the 
absence of an agreement, the law with the closest connection should apply.  
 
4.4.2.6 Short summary 
From the above comparisons, it is can be noticed that none of the sets of Principles has chosen 
universality for a basic principle. Rather, they propose “a modern and pragmatic revaluation of the 
territoriality principle” 1064  with moderate flexibility in applying the territoriality principle, in 
particular in the field of choice-of-law rules for copyright and related rights. In this context, they 
provide special choice-of-law rules for ubiquitous infringement cases, and allow party autonomy for 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights, as well as rules to apply to the initial ownership issue.  
 
It is worth noting that all sets of Principles take into account the importance of the Internet and set 
forth rules with moderate departures from the basic principle of territoriality. That there are departures 
demonstrates that the principle of territoriality is still the most important one for copyright and related 
rights, even in the digital world where the Internet and other communication technology are used. So it 
is more important to cope with the traditional territoriality principle along with the challenges brought 
on by the Internet, rather than discard the principle. Thus, in the context of the law applicable to 
copyright and related rights disputes, territoriality is maintained as the basic principle, while allowing 
moderate deviation from it. Difficulties remain, however, as to aspects of that law and as to what 
extent deviations should be allowed because ensuring legal certainty and foreseeability of the 
applicable law should in any event be guaranteed.   
 
In general, the CLIP Principles are more strict about and they lean more towards the territoriality 
principle, since the CLIP’s approach to this principle strictly restricts deviations from it, e.g. it limits 
the scope of party autonomy to remedies only; adopts a narrow definition of “ubiquitous 
infringement”, and chooses the lex loci protectionis rule for initial ownership of copyright and related 
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rights; whereas the ALI Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles adopt the universality approach 
for the initial ownership issue. 
 
These academic groups have indeed exerted their best efforts to draft complete sets of Principles for 
complex PIL issues in IP rights. By providing these “soft law” proposals, the drafters hope to provide 
inspiration for legislators, judiciary and legal practitioners when issues of the kind discussed here are 
at stake.  
 
4.5 Inspiration for PRC law 
Then, what inspiration can PRC legislators and judiciary draw from these academic contributions? 
From the outset, it can be noted that every set of Principles remains with the basic principle of 
territoriality, i.e. where the lex loci protectionis rule applies to the issues that are intrinsically linked to 
the right, including the existence, scope and duration of copyright and related rights, as well as to 
infringement. In this respect, it needs to be noted that the territoriality principle should remain as the 
basic principle in PRC law and judicial practice, i.e. application of the law of the country for which the 
protection is claimed. However, the scope of the application of the lex loci protectionis needs to be 
clarified. 
 
Furthermore, in one way or another, all three sets of Principles pay special attention to unregistered IP 
rights, in particular copyright and related rights: e.g. the ALI Principles distinguish registered rights 
and unregistered rights from the beginning; the Japanese-Korean Principles provides different choice-
of-law rules for initial ownership of copyright and related rights: the lex originis rather than the lex 
loci protectionis that is used for other IP rights. It proves that copyright and related rights, not bearing 
a character that requires registration and coming into existence upon the creation of a work, should be 
given special attention when the choice-of-law issue is involved. 
 
Moreover, party autonomy is enhanced in these Principles. It is only as to the extent of their 
application and limitations that the sets of Principles differ from each other. At least, with respect to 
copyright and related rights infringement disputes, all sets of Principles would allow the parties to 
choose the law applicable, either ex post or ex ante. Thus, in view of providing legal certainty and 
foreseeability, party autonomy should be accepted for cross-border IP rights infringement disputes in 
PRC law and practice. The scope of its application should however be limited and should not include 
the issues pertaining to the rights. 
 
Additionally, all sets of Principles take ubiquitous infringement disputes into consideration and 
prescribe choice-of-law provisions for them. Along with the increased use of the Internet, choice-of-
law rules for ubiquitous (multi-state) copyright and related rights infringement disputes certainly need 
to be addressed in PRC law. The approaches taken in these Principles, applying the one state’s law 
that has the closest connection with the dispute or infringement, can be a source of inspiration. 
However, when defining the closest connection, these Principles have suggested different connecting 
factors. This is because every set of Principles has a different perspective. In this respect, the PRC 
legislature and judiciary should provide clear guidance in defining the closest connection for such 
disputes. In order to invoke such an application, a definition of ubiquitous (multi-state) infringement 
should be provided. It must, nevertheless, be noted that legal certainty and predictability should not be 
compromised under such circumstances.  
 
Last but not least, the choice-of-law rules on initial ownership of copyright and related rights should 
be clarified. The Principles have taken two opposite approaches: adopting either a universal rule or a 
territorial rule in that context. This issue has always been a matter of controversy in legal practice, in 
particular now that there has been increased cross-border exploitation of IP rights. Thus, with the aim 
of better protecting copyright and related rights and providing legal certainty as to the rights owner, 
PRC legislators should be providing a clear choice-of-law solution to determine the initial ownership 





In the absence of international treaty provisions on private international law rules for IP rights, three 
academic groups drafted and proposed separate sets of Principles with the aims of facilitating cross-
border exploitation of intellectual property and improving international protection of intellectual 
property. This chapter describes choice-of-law rules in each set of Principles as to the aspects of the 
existence, content, duration, termination and initial ownership of copyright and related rights, as well 
as the infringement of such rights. Based on these descriptions, a comparison is made. As for the topic 
of this dissertation, the inspiration that the PRC legislature and judiciary can draw from these 
academic contributions is also provided. As argued at the end of this chapter, the territoriality principle 
should remain as the basic one, and the lex loci protectionis rule should have a wider scope of 
application to cover the matters of the existence, content, scope, duration, termination and 
infringement of rights. Party autonomy should be extended for certain claims, however, its scope of 
application should be carefully defined. Furthermore, the contemporary issues concerning multi-state 
infringement disputes and certain related aspects of copyright and related rights are specifically dealt 
with in these sets of Principles. In this context, the PRC legislature and judiciary should think about 
introducing rules for such claims and give special attention to copyright and related rights disputes. 
For the issue of initial ownership of copyright and related rights, a clear position should be taken, 
leaning either towards universality or territoriality. On this basis, choice-of-law rules for works created 
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CHAPTER 5 PRC LAW  
 
China’s rich and extensive history spanned several thousands of years of civilization, but as to the 
development of legal system in the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter PRC), a much shorter 
history with western imprint may be reviewed. Since the adoption of economic reform in 1979, the 
doors of the PRC have been opened step-by-step. Along with this process, the PRC’s economy and the 
contacts with the rest of the world dramatically increased, and that accelerated the development of 
laws in the PRC, including private international law and copyright law. However, once these two 
subjects intermingled, or more precisely, once there was a need to determine the law applicable to 
cross-border copyright disputes, the legislation and judicial practices at PRC People’s Courts prior to 
the 2011 PIL Statute were showing only an incomplete, inconsistent and outdated picture of how they 
resolved this issue. The increasing need, generated by business drives as well as by commercial and 
other interests in the world, for active dealing with the PRC also called for modern and updated PIL 
rules. Against this background, the PRC legislature embarked on the legislative process that led to the 
Statute on the Law Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations in 2002, which was enacted eight 
years later on 1 April 2011. In that Statute, the legislature devoted one chapter to the often-raised 
issues of IP rights disputes, including copyright and related rights disputes. As the first clear set of 
choice-of-law rules for IP rights disputes under PRC law, it is a matter of necessity to examine 
whether these rules will provide reasonable and practical solutions for the topic of choice-of-law in 
foreign-related copyright and related rights disputes. 
 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the PRC legal system. It describes the legal organization of 
the PRC and its judiciary, and continues with a description of the development of PIL in the PRC. The 
sources of choice-of-law rules in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes will be listed in 
section 3, where the position of international treaties among PRC laws and its impact on domestic law 
will be analysed. Section 4 surveys judicial practice at People’s Courts by making an attempt to 
include as many cases as possible to help illustrate how People’s Courts dealt with applicable law 
issues in cross-border copyright disputes. Section 5 contains an analysis of judicial practice. Then a 
description of the newly-adopted choice-of-law rules for IP rights and their possible impacts on PRC 
judicial practice will be presented in section 6, followed by the conclusion to this chapter.  
 
5.1 Introduction to the PRC legal system 
According to Prof. John H. Merryman of Stanford University, there are three highly influential legal 
traditions in the contemporary world, which he classifies as civil law, common law and socialist 
law.
1065
 He describes a remarkable nature of the “socialist law tradition” consisting of its underlying 
attitude that all law is an instrument of economic and social policy.
1066
 According to him, the PRC is a 
country that belongs to the socialist law tradition. Chinese academic writings share this opinion.
1067
 
Nevertheless, it should not be denied that the PRC legal system also carries a civil law label because 
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the evolution of modern PRC law and its legal system was strongly influenced by Soviet laws, 




Prior to the establishment of the PRC, a largely Western-style legal code inspired by the civil law 
tradition, mainly German law and Japanese law, had been adopted in the Republic of China. In 1949 
when the PRC was established, the Chinese Communist Party abolished all then-existing laws and 
regulations, and left what was virtually a legal vacuum in China. Then in the 1950’s, a new legal 
system was started from the scratch. In addition to the strong influences of German law and Japanese 
law that were retained in the Chinese legal culture, the PRC began to establish its laws and legal 
system based on the model of the former Soviet Union, which was basically still in the French-style 
civil law tradition.
1069
 A further attempt at rebuilding the PRC’s legal system was, however, 
interrupted by a series of political movements in the 1960’s and 1970’s, which brought all law-making 
processes to a standstill. The year of 1978 is seen by Chinese scholars as a turning point in legal 
development in the PRC
 1070
 because with the adoption of the reform and open-door policy, the PRC 
started rebuilding its legal system under the doctrine of “Chinese reality with reference to foreign laws 
and legal systems”.1071 As a result, numerous laws and regulations were adopted. Many of them 
actually reflect the imprint of the experience and models of Western countries, such as individual acts 
on the protection of intellectual property. As of 1990s, legal reform has become a priority for the 
government. The PRC has established comprehensive branches of codified laws and has adopted 
thousands of laws in the form of statutes. More importantly, the PRC has also made great efforts to 
ensure that its law will conform to commonly-accepted international practice and standards.
1072
 One 
example can be seen in the process of joining the WTO. In order to keep in line with WTO 
requirements and WTO-related agreements, the PRC has made enormous efforts to draft new laws and 
revise existing laws, such as in the field of IP protection.
1073
 Meanwhile, the practice of absorbing 
international standards into PRC law still continues. For example, it is reflected in the legislative 
process that led to the newly-adopted Statute on the Law Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil 
Relations. 
 
The civil law tradition in PRC law is evident in its judicial system. Unlike the common law system, 
where court decisions are the major sources of law, the PRC has a statute based legal system, i.e. when 
People’s Courts adjudicate a dispute, they are primarily bound by statutes. Decisions rendered by 
higher levels of the People’s Courts are not official sources of law and, as a result, they could not 
become precedents binding on lower courts. In other words, decisions rendered by PRC courts are not 
binding on later cases having similar characteristics. Nevertheless the decisions delivered by the 
Supreme People’s Court (hereinafter SPC) and higher courts have strong influence on lower People’s 
Courts, because their decisions on factual situations are respected and used as guidelines when laws 
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In summary, the RPC’s current legal scheme is a “combination of traditional Chinese culture and the 
Soviet model, mixed with the characteristics of the civil law family, plus some US flavor”1075. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the PRC’s choice-of-law rules in cross-border copyright and 
related rights disputes, one should look into the legal organization of the PRC and the whole 
framework of its judiciary. 
 
5.1.1 Legal organization of the PRC 
At present, there are twenty-three provinces (including the Taiwan province), five autonomous regions 
(Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang), four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Chongqing) and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao). Except 
Hong Kong and Macao, all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions are within the 
jurisdiction of the PRC.
1076 
 
The PRC used to be a unitary socialist legal system with one single legal district. With the return to the 
PRC of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999, the PRC government adopted a policy of “one 
country, two systems”,1077  under which Hong Kong and Macao continue to exercise independent 
legislative, judicial and final adjudicative powers in their respective regions.
1078
 Since then, the PRC 
has become a country with multiple legal systems: Hong Kong with a British common law 
background, Macao with a Portuguese civil law background, and Taiwan with a legal tradition that has 
been heavily influenced by Japanese and European civil law traditions. A legal problem of inter-
regional conflicts issues therefore arose.
1079
   
 
From the perspective of private international law, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are independent 
legal entities having an equal status with the Mainland.
1080
 Accordingly, Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan constitute sorts of “foreign elements” to mainland China,1081 or to be more precise, inter-
regional elements: if a case involves elements arising from these three places, such as: one party or 
parties to the dispute is/are the residents of these three places, etc., that case should be classified as an 
inter-regional one. As to the conflicts of laws arising from inter-regional cases, some aspects, like 
jurisdiction, judicial assistance, recognition and enforcement of judgments as well as arbitration 
awards have been gradually coordinated. In this context, a legal form of “arrangement” is normally 
adopted with the aim of enhancing co-ordination and co-operation among these legal regions.
1082
 In the 




 In theory, Taiwan province is under the jurisdiction of the PRC, although Beijing has no “official” contact 
with Taipei. Upon the eventual reunification of Taiwan to China, Taiwan will become also a special 
administrative region enjoying autonomy. 
1077
 一国两制 This concept was first brought up in the late 1978 by Deng Xiaoping dealing with the peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan issue. It has been used and developed in the reversion process of Hong Kong and 
Macao to China. See Deng Xiaoping’s Talk with Yang Liyu, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping邓小平文选 [in 
Chinese] (People Press, 1993) 230.  
1078
 Art. 2 of Basic Laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 
promulgated on 4 April 1990 and entered into force on 1 July 1990; Art. 2 of Basic Laws of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated on 31 March 1993 and entered into force 
on 20 December 1999. 
1079
 Jing HUANG and Andrew Xuefeng QIAN (supra n 1067); Jing HUANG etc. (eds), Studies of Inter-regional 
Legal Issues in China中国的区际法律问题研究 [in Chinese] (Beijing, Law Press 2001).  
1080
 Jing HUANG and Andrew Xuefeng QIAN (supra n 1067) fn 3, 303; Shuangyuan Li, Fuyong Ou, Pengnian 
JIN and Mao ZHANG, General Private International Law of China中国国际私法通论  [in Chinese] (3rd edn, 
Law Press China, Beijing 2007) 151. 
1081
 The foreign element here means a non-mainland-China element or an element arising from the regions other 
than the Mainland. 
1082
 As to Hong Kong, there are three arrangements (in the form of judicial explanations) issued by the SPC in 
the aspect of judicial cooperation. These are: Arrangement for Mutual Service of Judicial Documents in Civil 
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mean time, some judicial interpretations
1083
 have been published to further regulate and improve 
judicial standards in dealing with inter-regional conflicts. Insofar as choice-of-law problems are 
concerned, the newly-adopted Statute and other regulations do not distinguish between inter-regional 
conflicts and those of an international character. As a result, the choice-of-law rules stipulated in the 
Statute and other regulations shall equally apply to inter-regional conflicts and international ones.   
 
Unlike many western countries’ constitutions, which stipulate a clear separation of powers among the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches, the Chinese Constitution provides for a functional division 
of powers into legislative, executive, judicial and procuratorial organs, which are exercised in line with 
the principle of “unity of deliberation and execution”. According to this principle, all state powers are 
vested in one system, the People’s Congress system,  
“which deliberates and makes decisions; these decisions are then executed by administrative, 
adjudicative and procuratorial organs which are created by, responsible and subordinate to, 
and supervised by the people’s congress”.1084 
 
5.1.1.1 Legislative organs 
The legislative power lies in hands of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Standing 
Committee of the NPC. The NPC has power to amend the Constitution by a two thirds majority 
vote.
1085
 The NPC can also formulate basic laws of the PRC, which are regulatory documents 
concerning criminal matters, civil matters and other matters that it formulates, such as: GPCL and 
Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPL), while the Standing Committee of the NPC formulates the 
laws other than these basic laws, such as: Copyright Law. In addition, the Standing Committee of the 
NPC has the power to partially supplement or amend the laws enacted by the NPC when the NPC is in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Commercial Proceedings between the Mainland and Hong Kong Courts signed in Shenzhen on 14 January 
1999; Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region signed in Shenzhen on 21 June 1999; Arrangement on Reciprocal 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties 
Concerned signed in Hong Kong on 14 July 2006. For details of these Arrangements, 
<http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/index.htm#mainland> accessed on 2 October 2012. 
As to Macao, there are also three arrangements in the aspect of judicial cooperation: Arrangement for Mutual 
Service of Judicial Documents and Taking Evidence in Civil and Commercial Proceedings between the 
Mainland and Macao SAR Courts signed in Macao SAR on 14 January 1999 (No. 39/2001 Announcement of 
Chief Executive of Macao SAR) <http://cn.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/record/1.aspx> accessed on 2 October 
2012; Arrangement Between the Mainland and the Macao Special Administrative Region on the Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments signed in Macau SAR on 28 February 2006 
(No. 12/2006 Announcement of Chief Executive of Macao SAR) 
<http://en.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/record/612.aspx> accessed on 2 October 2012; Arrangement 
Concerning Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and Macao Special 
Administrative Region signed in Beijing on 30 October 2007 (No. 22/2007 Announcement of Chief Executive of 
Macao SAR) <http://cn.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/record/737.aspx> accessed on 2 October 2012. 
1083
 As to Hong Kong and Macao, The Minutes of the Seminar of the National Court Hong Kong and Macao 
involved Commercial Trialing Working Group 全国法院涉港澳商事审判工组座谈会纪要, published by the 
SPC on 21 January 2008, 法发[2008] 8 号. As to Taiwan, Several Legal Questions About People’s Court 
Dealing with Taiwan Involved Civil Disputes关于人民法院处理涉台民事案件的几个法律问题, published by 
the SPC on 9 August 1988; Provisions on the Recognition of Certain Taiwan Region Courts’ Civil Rulings关于
人民法院认可台湾地区有关法院民事判决的规定, published by the SPC on 22 May 1988, 法释[1998]11号; 
Several Provisions on Serving the Taiwan Involved Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Proceedings 关
于涉台民事诉讼文书送达的若干规定, published by the SPC on 23 April 2008, 法释[2008] 4号。 
1084
 Jianfu CHEN (supra n 1071) 119. 
1085
 Arts. 62 and 64 of Chinese Constitution. (Chinese Constitution adopted at the 5
th
 Session of the Fifth NPC 4 
December 1982; 1999 Amendments adopted at the 2
nd
 Session of the Ninth NPC on 15 March 1999; 2004 
Amendments adopted at the 2
nd
 Session of the Tenth NPC on 14 March 2004.)  
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recess, provided that such amendments do not contravene the basic principles of the laws.
1086
 These 
regulatory documents formulated by the NPC and its Standing Committee constitute the narrow 
concept of “laws” in China. The People’s Congress and its standing committee at a lower level, such 
as in a province, autonomous region or municipality, can promulgate local regulations, which should 
not contravene the PRC Constitution, laws or administrative regulations that are formulated by the 
central government.  
 
 5.1.1.2 Executive organs 
The State Council is the highest organ of state administration and the executive body of the state and 
therefore the highest organ of state power. It is composed of the Premier, the Vice-Premiers, the State 
Councillors, the Ministers in charge of Ministries and Commissions, the Auditor-General and the 
Secretary-General.
1087
 The State Council is empowered to issue and execute administrative regulations 
in accordance with national laws. Government agencies, ministries and commissions which are under 
the State Council, are vested with the power to issue orders, measures, and directives in conformity 
with the State Council’s regulations. Local organs of state power and government bodies formulate 
laws and administrative measures. These laws and measures must not contravene the Constitution or 
laws, administrative regulations or local regulations of their respective provinces or autonomous 
regions, and shall be subject to the approval of the standing committees of the people’s congresses of 




5.1.1.3 Judicial organs 
The PRC Constitution establishes the People’s Courts and Procuratorates as the judicial organs of the 
state. In addition to the SPC and the People’s Courts established locally at various levels, the 
Constitution provides for other special courts: maritime, railway and military etc. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Hong Kong and Macao SARs enjoy autonomous status in the legal 
organization of the PRC. Accordingly, the Hong Kong SAR has been continuing its English common 
law and the Macao SAR has been keeping its Portuguese legal system, with their courts of final 
appeal. However, constitutional matters fall outside the judicial powers of SARs and are subject to the 
competence of the PRC central government. 
 
5.1.2 Judiciary 
Although the systematic establishment of courts only began in 1979, the development of People’s 
Courts has dramatically increased both in terms of the number of courts and the number of cases 
adjudicated.
1089
 PRC courts are organised into four tiers: basic courts, intermediary courts, high courts 
and the Supreme People’s Court, for the prefecture, city, province and national levels respectively.1090 
                                                          
1086
 Fusen ZHANG (eds), China- Outlines of the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (Law Press 
China, Beijing 2004) 4-5. 
1087
 Arts. 85 and 86 of Chinese Constitution.  
1088
 Fusen ZHANG (supra n 1086) 6-9. 
1089
 Jianfu CHEN (supra n 1071) 150.  
1090
 Arts. 18-21 of the Law of Civil Procedures of the People’s Republic of China中华人民共和国民事诉讼法 
(CPL). (the Trial version of the CPL adopted at the 22
nd
 Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth NPC on 
8 March 1982 and implemented on a trial basis as of 1 October 1982; the CPL 1991 adopted at the 4
th
 Session of 
the Seventh NPC on 9 April 1991, promulgated and entered into effect on 9 April 1991 and amended at the 30
th
 
Session of the Tenth NPC Standing Committee on 28 October 2007, entered into effect on 1 April 2008, and 
amended again at the 28
th
 Session of the Eleventh NPC Standing Committee on 31 August 2012, will enter into 
effect  on 1 January 2013.)  
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The territorial jurisdiction of each People’s Court exactly corresponds to the territorial area covered by 




According to the CPL, judicial proceedings occur in two instances, namely trial and appeal.
1092
 Where 
a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the court of first instance, he may file an appeal with the 
People’s Court at the next higher level, within fifteen days for domestic cases and thirty days for 
foreign-related cases, calculated from the day on which the written decision of the court is served. An 
appellate court can only review the relevant facts appealed and the lower court’s application of law. 
Once an appellate court delivers a decision, that decision becomes final, and no further appeal is 
allowed. A retrial is, however, allowed when the appellate decision was in error, upon request made 




Normally, the basic courts are the courts of first instance. Higher courts, i.e. intermediary courts, high 
courts and the SPC may however hear a case at first instance if the case has a potential significant 
impact in the areas of their respective jurisdictions.
1094
 Since most, if not all, foreign-related cases are 
considered as major cases having a significant impact, a dispute involving foreign elements generally 




Due to the special expertise required for adjudicating copyright and related rights disputes and the 
economic importance involved in those claims, the SPC states in the 2002 Copyright Interpretation
1096
 
that civil disputes concerning copyright shall be adjudicated at a level no lower than an intermediary 
People’s Court.1097 
 
As to the relation between the SPC and local People’s Courts, it is notable that the SPC has no control 
over any lower courts, except for work connections by means of supervision. In the PRC legal system, 
there is, in principle, no such legal doctrine as stare decisis for judicial practice, i.e. judgments 
rendered by the SPC have no direct binding force on lower courts. In practice, de facto “legal 
precedents” do, however, exist in the PRC judicial system. The SPC regularly selects and publishes a 
few controversial or important cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court and recommends 
these exemplary decisions to all lower courts by means of reference. Hence, lower People’s Courts do 
respect and follow these references, regardless whether they are the judgments delivered by the SPC 
                                                          
1091
 Arts.  2 and 18 of the People’s Republic of China People’s Court Organization Law中华人民共和国人民法
院组织法 (adopted at the 2nd Session of the Fifth NPC on 1 July 1979 and  amended at the 2nd Session of the 
Sixth NPC Standing Committee on 2 September 1983.) 
1092
 Art. 10 of the CPL. 
1093
 According to the CPL, a retrial may take place at the original court or the next higher court. A retrial request 
can be made by the president of the original court, the higher court having jurisdiction over the trial court, the 
Supreme People’s Court, or the parties to the litigation. A retrial request could also be filed upon protest by the 
people’s procuratorate. According to the CPL, the time limit for a retrial request is within two years after the 
judgment or decision takes effect. 
1094
 Arts. 19-21 of the CPL. 
1095
 Mo ZHANG, ‘International Civil Litigation in China’ (2002) XXV BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 59, 61. 
1096
 The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s court Concerning Several Issues on Application of Law in 
Hearing Correctly the Civil Copyright Cases最高人民法院关于审理著作权民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题
的解释, promulgated and effective as of 15 October 2002 by the SPC of the People’s Republic of China. (2002 
Copyright Interpretation) 
1097
 Art. 2 of the 2002 Copyright Interpretation.  第二条  著作权民事纠纷案件，由中级以上人民法院管辖。
各高级人民法院根据本辖区的实际情况，可以确定若干基层人民法院管辖第一审著作权民事纠纷案件。
(“Copyright civil disputes should be adjudicated at the jurisdiction level of not lower than the Intermediary 
People’s courts. Various High People’s Courts may according to the actual circumstances of their jurisdiction 
determine several basic-level People’s courts to hear the cases of copyright civil dispute of first instance.”) 
[Translated by NZ]. 
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itself or the instructions/opinions given by the SPC upon the request of a lower court, when the 




5.1.2.1 Roles of Supreme People’s Court 
The SPC performs a rather important function in the PRC legal system. In addition to hearing the 
cases that are within its jurisdiction in accordance with the CPL, the SPC is authorized to issue legal 
instruments, such as circulars and notices to lower courts. In addition, upon request of lower courts, 
the SPC renders judicial opinions on legal issues raised. 
 
More importantly, the SPC has a quasi law-making function.
1099
 Together with the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, the SPC has power to issue judicial interpretations on the application or interpretation 
of law and regulations. They are aimed at situations when a law is too general or has several meanings, 
and they provide “detailed analysis, clearer definitions or gap-filling rules for statutes either shortly 
after their promulgation or at any time the SPC or SPP feels that there is a need for 
interpretation”.1100 These interpretations are published and authoritative, and are of importance as 




In comparison with laws and regulations published by competent authorities, these SPC interpretations 
of laws and regulations are more voluminous, comprehensive and pervasive, and, as a result, they 
constitute a significant part of the hierarchy of PRC law. Such interpretation is a legislative 
construction of laws. Because of that it applies to all cases, whether they are current or future. Thus, it 
has a general law character. 
 
Judicial interpretations by the SPC are issued in almost all fields of law. Concerning civil and 
commercial matters, the SPC has issued many judicial interpretations, for example in the field of 
copyright, the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the 
Application of Laws in the Hearing of Cases Involving Computer Network Copyright Disputes 
(2000)
1102
 (hereinafter 2000 Online Copyright Interpretation), and the 2002 Copyright Interpretation 
and in 2006 two amendments to the 2000 Online Copyright Interpretation. These interpretations deal 
not only with substantive rules, but also with jurisdictional issues. They form parts of the sources of 
PRC copyright laws. 
 
5.2 Development of the China’s choice-of-law rules 
5.2.1 Rules before the establishment of the PRC 
Some Chinese scholars have traced the rules concerning the treatment of foreigners back to the Tang 
Dynasty, which was one of the most prosperous eras in Chinese history.
1103
 During the period 618-907 
CE, international trade was boosted by the Silk Road to the west and increased maritime shipping. For 
trade and business purposes, thousands of foreigners came and lived in numerous Chinese cities, 
especially, the then-capital city Chang An (nowadays Xi An), at that time the most populous city in 
                                                          
1098
 Jin HUANG (eds), Private International Law 国际私法 [in Chinese] (2nd edn, Law Press China, Beijing 
2004) 47. 
1099
 Chenguang WANG, ‘Lawmaking Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of Rapid 




 Hanqin XUE and Qian JIN, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’ (2009) 8 CJIL 
299, 305; Jin HUANG 2004 (supra n 1098) 47-8; Id, 12. 
1102
 最高人民法院关于审理涉及计算机网络著作权纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释 promulgated on 19 
December 2000, entered into force on 21 December 2000, amended on 20 November 2006 and 22 November 
2006, entered into force on 8 December 2006. 
1103
 Jin HUANG 2004 (supra n 1098) 119; Shuangyuan LI and others (supra n 1080) 82-3. 
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the world. During those days, the Tang Dynasty emperor Yong Hui issued and amended one of the 
most complete and systematic laws in Chinese legal history - “Yong Hui Code” (永徽律), also known 
as the “Tang Code” (唐律).1104 The Chapter on General Principles (名例章) laid down the rule for 
dealing with foreigner-involved disputes as “诸化外人同类自相犯者，各依本俗法；异类相犯者，
以法律论。” The literal understanding of this provision is that “for a case involving persons who 
belong to the same foreign sovereignty shall be governed by the law of that sovereignty; for a case 
involving persons who belong to different sovereignties, the Tang Code applies.”1105 A commonly 
accepted interpretation of this provision among Chinese scholars is that “if a dispute occurred within 
China among two parties sharing the same nationality, the parties’ national law shall apply; as to a 
dispute occurred within China among persons with different nationalities, the Tang Code shall 
apply.” 1106  If it were looked at from the perspective of European private international law, this 
provision would have the effect that the principle of personal law was to be applied to the first 
circumstance, and the principle of territorial law was to be applied to the latter situation. Hence, in that 
context, this provision could be viewed, to some extent, as a choice-of-law rule. 
 
Two issues need to be noted with regard to this provision. First, Chinese ancient laws including the 
Tang Code did not distinguish civil and criminal laws. Accordingly, such rules dealing with foreigners 
applied to both criminal and civil proceedings.
1107
 Second, the term “nationality” that is used by some 
Chinese scholars to interpret the provision laid down in the Tang Code deserves some deliberation 
about whether such a “nationality” concept did exist in the Tang Code, and whether such a 
“nationality” interpretation in this provision would be accurate. As seen in the legal history of 
continental Europe, its modern concept of nationality was only put into use with the promulgation of 
the Code Napoléon in 1804.
1108
 For the purpose of choice-of-law, the principle of nationality was 
advocated by Pasquale Mancini beginning in 1851, who argued for the principle of nationality on the 
ground that “laws are made more for an ascertained people than for an ascertained territory.”1109 
Therefore, the contemporary concept of nationality should be viewed with caution in approaching 




In any event, the rules provided in the Tang Code had not been further developed by the subsequent 
dynasties in Chinese legal history until 1918. In that year, the then Republic of China published the 
first statute on applicable law. It was based on Japanese
1111
 and German laws,
1112
 but was suspended 




5.2.2 Rules after the establishment of the PRC 
In the PRC’s legal system, private international law has a short history. As mentioned at the outset of 
this Chapter, when the PRC was established in 1949, the Communist Party abolished all then-existing 
legislation. During the period between 1949 and 1978, communication and contact between China and 
the outside world was so sparse that there was hardly any need for PIL rules. This was because PIL 
                                                          
1104
 永徽律 was drafted around in 650 under the Tang Dynasty- Yong Hui Emperor. The law was accordingly 
named Yong Hui Code. 
1105
 Literarily translated by NZ. 
1106
 Shuangyuan LI and others (supra n 1080) 82-3. “具有同一国籍的外国人在中国境内发生相互侵犯的案件
，适用当事人的本国法；不同国籍的外国人之间在中国发生相互侵犯的案件，按照唐朝的法律处理。” 
1107
 Id, 83. 
1108
 David McClean, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (5
th




 The legal historian considers the “category” to include not only foreign nations, but also minorities. For 
details, see Jinpan ZHANG, The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese La中国法律的传统与近代转型 
[in Chinese] (3
rd
 edn, Law Press China, Beijing 2009) 353. 
1111
 The 1898 Japanese Act on the Application of Laws, Horie. 
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 The 1896 Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EGBGB). 
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 Shuangyuan LI and others (supra n 1080) 83-4.  
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rules are not susceptible to development in a closed environment. In conjunction with the 1979 reform 





As far as choice-of-law rules are concerned, before the implementation of the 1986 GPCL, there were 
only sporadic provisions scattered about in piecemeal legislation, namely Several Approaches 
regarding to Marriage Registration of Chinese Citizens with Foreigners;
1115
 Article 12 of the Sino-
Foreign Joint Venture Law Implementing Regulations;
1116
 Article 36 of the Law of Succession;
1117
 and 
Article 5 of the Law on Foreign-related Economic Contract.
1118
 Enactment of the GPCL took a step 
further in the development of PRC’s choice-of-law rules. Its Chapter 8, titled Law Applicable to Civil 
Relations Involving Foreign Elements,
1119
 contains the first set of relatively systematic choice-of-law 
rules in Chinese legal history. It consists of nine articles dealing with the subjects of civil capacity, 
immovable property, contract, tort, marriage, maintenance and succession, as well as a public interest 
rule. In addition, in 1988, the SPC issued a provisional Opinions on Several Issues regarding to the 
Implementation of the General Principles of Civil Law of People’s Republic of China,1120  which 
further elaborates on the application of these articles. Since then, more choice-of-law rules have been 
provided in different statutes: Article 21 of the Adoption Law,
1121
 Articles 268-276 of the Maritime 
Law,
1122
 Articles 95-102 of the Negotiable Instrument Law
1123
, Articles 184-190 of the Civil Aviation 
Law,
1124
 Article 126 of the Contract Law,
1125
 Articles 2 and 3 of the Measures on the Registration of 
Adoption of Children by Foreigners in the PRC,
1126
 and Article 218 of the Company Law.
1127
 
Moreover, some choice-of-law provisions can be found in several SPC judicial interpretations: Article 
63 of the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Questions Relating to the 
Implementation of the Succession Law of the People’s Republic of China,1128 Article 5 of the Rules of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Questions Regarding the Application of Laws in the Trial of 




It can be seen from the foregoing that before the adoption of the current PIL Statute, choice-of-law 
rules consisted of general provisions along with specific ones for certain subjects. These rules were 
introduced to respond to specific needs or certain conflicts that were often raised in the course of 
practice. Against this background, several characteristics of these rules can be noted.  
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 中国公民同外国人办理婚姻登记的几项办法, published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1983. 
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 最高人民法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见（试行）, adopted at the 
Judicial Committee of the SPC on 26 January 1988. (1988 GPCL Opinions) 
1121
 收养法，adopted at the 23rd Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC on 29 December 1991, 
effective as of 1 April 1992, and amended on 4 November 1998.  
1122
 海商法, adopted at the 28th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC on 7 November 1992. 
1123
 票据法, adopted at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth NPC on 10 May 1995, revised 
at the 11
th
 Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC on 28 August 2004. 
1124
 民用航空法, adopted at the 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth NPC on 30 October 1995. 
1125
 合同法, adopted and promulgated at the 2nd Session of the Ninth NPC on 15 March 1999. 
1126
 外国人在中华人民共和国收养子女登记办法, issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on 25 May 1999. 
1127
 公司法, adopted at the 18th Session of the Tenth NPC on 27 October 2005 and effective as of 1 January 
2006. 
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 最高人民法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国继承法》若干问题的意见, issued on 9 November 1985. 
1129
 最高人民法院关于审理涉外民事或商事合同纠纷案件法律适用若干问题的规定 , issued on 11 June 




First, as shown above, they were scattered about in different laws and were unsystematic as a whole. 
They lacked certain general provisions that could be applied to all choice-of-law cases, such as 
characterization. Furthermore, some rules in different laws overlapped those in other laws, e.g. the rule 
on the application of international treaties is in Article 142 of the GPCL, while the same rule was also 
in Article 95 of the Negotiable Instrument Law and in Article 268 of the Maritime Law. 
 
Second, the choice-of-law rules were rigid and incomplete because they only dealt with claims 
involved in certain fields of law, such as marriage, contract, infringement, and as for others, e.g. IP 
rights and property rights, there were no choice-of-law rules available.  
 
Third, even in the field where certain choice-of-law rules were provided, the rules were still 
incomplete, unclear and non-specific. For example, Article 149 of the GPCL concerning succession 
dealt only with statutory intestate succession, without having anything about those cases involving a 
will, let alone those regarding the formal validity of a will. The same deficiency could be seen in 
marriage provisions, where only a marriage between a PRC citizen and a foreigner is dealt with, 
without a clear rule for those between two PRC citizens married in overseas locations or between 
foreigners married in the PRC. It could similarly be seen in property matters, where immoveable 
property is provided with a specific rule, but not one for movable property; and in divorce matters, 
where only divorce at court is equipped with a choice-of-law rule, but not one for divorce by consent, 
which is a sort of divorce procedure that needed to be submitted at a marriage administration 
department; and in civil capacity matters, only the civil conduct of a PRC national who resides 
overseas is provided with a choice-of-law rule, but there is nothing concerning the civil status of such 
a person or the civil capacity of a foreigner who resides in the PRC. 
 
Finally, certain choice-of-law rules are not scientific. As HUANG pointed out, Article 150 of the 
GPCL excludes not only the application of foreign laws, but also of international practice when such 
application violates the public interests of the PRC. Given the specific nature of international practice, 
which is a set of rules developed in the course of international commercial transactions, they do not 
involve public interests of a country and consequently they should not be excluded from application as 




5.2.3 The PRC Model Law 
The Chinese Society of Private International Law had been engaged in advocating a modern set of 
private international law rules since 1993. After seven years of efforts, in 2000 it published the final 
draft of the Model Law of Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China1131 (hereinafter 
Model Law). The Model Law contains not only choice-of-law rules, but also rules on jurisdiction and 
judicial assistance. It is purely academic and provides only a reference for legislative and judicial 
bodies or other government departments or legal science institutes or schools of law. This Model Law 
is regarded as representing the most comprehensive set of provisions on the PRC’s private 
international law, since it adopted the latest in theoretical research results, legislative trends and 
judicial practices throughout the world. Nevertheless, it is noted that this Model law is not a model for 
the Chinese legislature, because there had never been any legislative mandate for its preparation.  
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 Jin HUANG, ‘The Establishment and Improvement of China’s Statute on the Law Applicable to Foreign 
Related Civil Relations 中国涉外民事关系法律适用法的制定与完善’ [in Chinese] (2011) 29(3) Tribune of 
Political Science and Law 政法论坛 3, 8. 
1131
 中华人民共和国国际私法示范法. 
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5.2.4 Codification of the PRC PIL Statute 
Private international law has never existed as a separate branch of law in the PRC legal system. Even 
the newly-enacted Statute deals only with choice-of-law problems, because, according to the 
legislator, drafting a comprehensive PIL code, including jurisdiction as well as recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments would require amendments to many existing laws, such as the CPL, 





Codifying choice-of-law rules complemented the further development of PRC economic reform 
because the increasing contact with foreign countries requires having a set of complete, clear and 
concrete choice-of-law rules in the PRC legal system. The drafting process of the Statute on the Law 
Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations began in 2002 when Book Nine of the draft PRC 
(Chinese) Civil Code (CCC) was submitted for the first review.
1133
 At the time, it had been considered 
as being too complex to adopt an entire CCC, and a decision was made to adopt it one book at a time. 
Book Nine was scheduled to be processed after the Real Rights Law and the Tort Law would be 
adopted.
1134
 As planned, in 2010 the legislature reopened the legislative procedure for codification of 
the law applicable to foreign-related civil relations. After two legislative readings performed in August 
and October 2010, as well as after numerous discussions conducted with and among stakeholders,
1135
 
the Statute was, eight years after the publication of Book Nine, finally adopted on 28 October 2010.   
 
The Statute is significant for the development of the PRC’s PIL. From the formal point of view, it 
moves along a reform in the field of choice-of-law by ending the confusing jumble of fragmentary 
provisions scattered around in piecemeal laws with an organized codification of choice-of-law rules. 
As for its merits, the Statute has a wide scope extending to contemporary subjects like IP rights and 
incorporates major developments achieved in international and national codifications and reforms in 
the field of choice-of-law. It is noteworthy that the Statute still does not contain a complete set of 
choice-of-law rules: those currently prescribed in the Maritime Law, Negotiable Instrument Law and 
Civil Aviation Law remains in force. The reason for this appears to be more practical than conceptual: 
the choice-of-law rules for such foreign-related commercial relations are better dealt with in individual 
pieces of legislation, given the complexity and diversity of commercial laws.
1136
 The Statute consists 
of eight chapters and fifty-two articles, including General Provisions, individual chapters dealing with 
specific subject matters and Miscellaneous Provisions. Given the increased importance of IP rights in 
international trade and business, the Statute devotes one chapter to issues related to IP rights.  
 
                                                          
1132
 Weidong ZHU, ‘China’s Codification of the Conflict of Laws: Publication of a Draft Text’, (2007) JPIL 283, 
283-85. 
1133
 The draft CCC was presented for its first reading on 23 December 2002. It contains nine books. For its 
contents, the CCC consolidated the then-existing piecemeal legislation (contract law, marriage law, adoption law 
and succession law) and included draft legislation on real rights, tort and the law applicable to foreign-related 
civil relations. For the detailed legislative process of the Statute, see Jin HUANG 2011 (supra n 1130) 8-11. 
1134
 Weidong ZHU 2007 (supra n 1132) 285; Jin HUANG 2011 (supra n 1130) 9; The Report on Several 
Important Issues on the Draft Statute of the Application of Laws in Foreign-related Civil Relation, published on 
28 August 2010 after the second reading [in Chinese]. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1116/2010-
08/28/content_1593162.htm> accessed on 2 October 2012. (Report on Draft Statute 2010) 
1135
 Report on Draft Statute 2010. The Chinese Society of Private International Law has conducted several 
meetings in this regard and submitted several suggested papers at its Wuhan meeting, Hangzhou meeting, 
Beijing meeting and Sanya meeting in 2008, 2009, January 2010 and at the end of January 2010 respectively. 
(Wuhan Paper, Hangzhou Discussion Paper, Beijing Discussion Paper and Sanya Discussion Paper)  
1136
 Report on Draft Statute 2010 (supra n 1134) point 6. 
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5.3 Sources of Choice-of-Law Rules in Foreign-Related Copyright and Related rights and 
Current Legislation 
In the Chinese legal tradition, international treaties always form part of sources of PRC laws. 
Additionally, domestic legislation, such as the GPCL, and judicial interpretations should also be 
referred as another part of sources of laws. In this section, that legislation enacted prior to the Chinese 
PIL Statute which has relevance to foreign-involved copyright and related rights will be provided. 
Furthermore, although the PRC Constitution does not specify the position of international treaties 
among PRC laws, the impact of international treaties on Chinese domestic laws deserves some 
attention in this dissertation.  
 
5.3.1 Sources of Choice-of-Law Rules 
5.3.1.1 International treaties 
International treaties own a special position in the hierarchy of the PRC legal system. Based on the 





Insofar as copyright and related rights protection is concerned, the PRC became a member state of the 
UCC and the Berne Convention in 1992 and a party to the Phonograms Convention in 1993. Further in 
December 2001, it joined the WTO and the states that are complying with the obligations laid down in 
the TRIPs Agreement. Adherence to these international treaties shows the willingness of the PRC to 
undertake an international obligation to protect foreigners and foreign works. Although as discussed in 
Chapter 2, these treaties provide only substantive law protection, some Chinese scholars contend that 




5.3.1.2 Domestic legislation 
As described above, the PRC’s choice-of-law rules are scattered about in piecemeal legislative 
measures. It may be conjectured whether the PRC Copyright Law and other related legislation contain 
any choice-of-law provisions, or whether the choice-of-law rules stipulated in Chapter 8 of the GPCL 
and the 1988 GPCL Opinions have any relevance to foreign-related civil copyright claims. 
 
5.3.1.2.1 PRC Copyright Law (CRL), related legislation and judicial interpretations 
Similar to the development of PIL in the PRC, the history of the PRC copyright law reveals that its 
development is closely connected with the adoption of the Open Door policy and economic reform 
that began in 1979.
1139
 The first PRC CRL was promulgated in 1990, and further amended in 2001 and 
2010. In order to implement the CRL and provide copyright protection to computer software and 
integrated circuit layout designs, the State Council issued the Implementation Regulation on the 
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (Implementation Regulation on CRL), 1140  the 
Regulation on Protection of Computer Software (Regulation on Computer Software)
1141
 and the 
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 Infra section 5.3.2 International treaties in PRC laws. 
1138
 Wei SHI, ‘The Conflict and Application of Intellectual Property Right知识产权的法律冲突与法律适用探
微’ [in Chinese] (1999) (5) 21 Modern Law Science现代法学 74, 74; Shujie FENG, ‘Drafting the Conflict of 
Laws Rules in Intellectual Property Rights - a mixed application of lex protectionis and dépeçage论知识产权冲
突规则的拟定——保护国法主义与分割论的结合适用’ [in Chinese], (2005) (3) 148 Legal Science法学 101, 
102. 
1139
 Supra Chapter 1.  
1140
 中华人民共和国著作权法实施条例, adopted on 2 August 2002 and came into force on 15 September 2002.  
1141
 计算机软件保护条例 , adopted on 20 December 2001 and entered into effect on 1 January 2002. 
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The CRL establishes that PRC citizens, legal entities or other organizations enjoy copyright protection 
in accordance with the law, regardless whether or not their work has been published.
1143
 In a similar 
vein, computer software designed by PRC citizens, legal entities or other organizations, whether it is 
published or not will also enjoy copyright protection.
1144
 As to integrated circuit layout designs, PRC 





Copyright protection is also extended to foreign citizens under PRC laws. Works, including computer 
software, of a foreigner or stateless person first published in the territory of the PRC shall enjoy 
copyright protection.
1146
 The Implementation Regulation on CRL, following the general principle 
enshrined in the Berne Convention, clarifies that works that have been first published in a country 
outside the PRC and thereupon within thirty days are published in the PRC are deemed as published in 
the PRC at the same time.
1147
 Moreover, for integrated circuit layout designs created by a foreigner or 
stateless person, if the place where they are first put into commercial use is in the territory of the PRC, 




Still further, the CRL provides copyright protection for works of a foreigner or stateless person who is 
eligible to enjoy copyright under an agreement concluded between the country to which the foreigner 
belongs, or in which he has a habitual residence, and the PRC, or under an international treaty to 
which both countries are party,
1149
 or works of a foreigner or stateless person who belongs to a country 
which has not concluded an agreement with the PRC, or which is not a party to an international treaty 
with the PRC first published in a country which is a party to an international treaty with the PRC, or 
published both in such a member state and non-member state.
1150 
Similarly, software designed by a 
                                                          
1142
 集成电路布图设计保护条例及实施细则, adopted on 28 March 2001 and entered into force on 1 October 
2001. 
1143
 Art. 2(1). 
1144
 Art. 6(1) of the Regulation on Computer Software. 
1145
 Art. 3(1) of the Regulation on Integrated Circuit. 
1146
 Art. 2(3) of the Chinese CRL; Art. 6(2) of the Regulation on Integrated Circuit. 
1147
 Art. 8 of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. “Works of a foreigner or stateless person first published in 
the territory outside the People’s Republic of China and thereupon within thirty days published in the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China are deemed as the works published in the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China at the same time.” [translated by NZ] “外国人、无国籍人的作品在中国境外首先出版后，３０日内在
中国境内出版的，视为该作品同时在中国境内出版。” 
1148
 Art. 3(2) of the Regulation on Integrated Circuit. 
1149
 Art. 2(2) of the CRL. 
1150
 Art. 2(4) of the CRL. 
“Any work of a foreigner or stateless person which is eligible to enjoy copyright under an agreement concluded 
between the country to which the foreigner belongs or in which he has habitual residence and China, or under 
an international treaty to which both countries are party, shall be protected in accordance with this Law. 
Works of foreigners or stateless persons first published in the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall 
enjoy copyright in accordance with this Law.  
Any work of a foreigner or stateless person who belongs to a country which has not concluded an agreement 
with China, or which is not a party to an international treaty with China first published in a country which is a 
party to an international treaty with China, or published both in such a member state and non member state, 
shall be protected in accordance with this Law.”  





foreigner or stateless person which is eligible to enjoy copyright under an agreement concluded 
between the PRC and the country to which the foreigner belongs or in which he has habitual residence, 
or under an international treaty to which the PRC is a party, shall be protected according to the 
Regulation on Computer Software.
1151
 Integrated circuit layout designs created by a foreigner shall 
enjoy exclusive rights of layout design according to the Regulation on Integrated Circuits, if the 
country to which the foreigner belongs has concluded a relevant agreement on the protection of layout 
design with the PRC, or adheres to the international treaties concerning the protection of layout design 
to which the PRC is also a member.
1152 
 
Rules on the application of the CRL in terms of related rights are given in the Implementation 
Regulation on CRL. According to these rules protection is granted to: performances of a foreigner or 
stateless person that took place in the territory of the PRC;
1153
 the rights granted to a foreigner or 
stateless person in their performance in accordance with an international treaty to which the PRC is a 
member;
1154
 a phonogram fixed or published in the territory of the PRC by a foreigner or stateless 
person;
1155
 rights granted to a foreigner or stateless person in their fixation or publication of a 
phonogram in accordance with an international treaty to which the PRC is a member;
1156
 and rights 
granted to a foreign broadcasting organization or TV station in their broadcast or TV programs in 




Since the PRC is a member to several international copyright treaties, the State Council enacted a 
Regulation on Implementation of International Copyright Treaties
1158
 in 1992 (Implementation 
Regulation 1992) so as to further implement the Berne Convention and other bilateral copyright 
treaties among domestic laws.
1159
 This Regulation defines what constitutes foreign works. According 
to Article 4, foreign works protected under the Regulation include: 1. works of an author or one of the 
authors, other copyright holder or one of the copyright holders who is a citizen of, or has habitual 
residence in, a member state of international treaties; 2. works which have been first published or 
published at the same time in a member state of international treaties; 3. commissioned works, 
commissioned by Sino-foreign joint-ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises and foreign 





In order to better adjudicate civil disputes about copyright, the SPC issued 2000 Online Copyright 
Interpretation and 2002 Copyright Interpretation, which however contain only substantive copyright 
rules and jurisdictional provisions, but no choice-of-law rules.  
 
From the above description, it can be seen that those provisions concerning the legal position of 
foreign authors are formulated in the texts as provisions concerning “foreign works”. In other words, 
they determine the application of PRC national rules on the legal position of a foreigner with regard to 
copyright and related rights, and they are not choice-of-law rules designating an applicable legal 
system, whether PRC or foreign. Therefore, it is submitted that PRC copyright and related rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




 Art. 6(3) of the Regulation on Computer Software. 
1152
 Art. 3(3) of the Regulation on Integrate Circuit. 
1153
 Art. 33(1) of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. 
1154
 Art. 33(2) of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. 
1155
 Art. 34(1) of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. 
1156
 Art. 34(2) of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. 
1157
 Art. 35 of the Implementation Regulation on CRL. 
1158
 实施国际著作权条约的规定 promulgated on 25 September 1992 by the State Council of the PRC and 
entered into force on 30 September 1992. 
1159
 Art. 3 of the Implementation Regulation 1992.  
1160
 Art. 4 of the Implementation Regulation 1992.  
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legislation does not contain any choice-of-law rules for international situations, as what is the case in 




5.3.1.2.2 GPCL and 1988 GPCL Opinions 
Prior to the PIL Statute, the GPCL, one of the basic laws in the PRC legal system, was the main source 
of choice-of-law rules. It contains one Chapter -- Chapter eight, dealing with the law applicable to 
foreign-related civil relations. Except the general principle and the public interests defense, Chapter 
eight prescribes choice-of-law rules for a limited range of topics i.e. capacity for civil conduct,
1162
 











 as well as intestate succession.
1168
 Clearly, Chapter eight 
pays no attention to IP rights-related civil disputes, including copyright and related rights.  
 
As will be discussed in the following section, for copyright infringement disputes, reference was 
normally made to the choice-of-law rules for general tort claims, namely applying the traditional lex 
loci delicti rule in handling compensation claims arising from a tortious act, together with possibility 
of applying the law of the common nationality or domicile of the parties if they have one. As to the 
concept of the lex loci delicti, the 1988 GPCL Opinions state that the place where an infringing act is 
committed is deemed to include both the place where the infringing act occurs and the place where the 
damage occurs. If the laws of these two places should contradict each other, the court has discretion to 
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 Stig Strömholm (supra n 6) 40-53. 
1162
 Art. 143 of the GPCL states “If a citizen of the People’s Republic of China settles in a foreign country, the 
law of that country may be applicable as regards his capacity for civil conduct.” (中华人民共和国公民定居国
外的，他的民事行为能力可以适用定居国法律。) 
1163
 Art. 144 of the GPCL states “The ownership of immovable property shall be bound by the law of the place 
where it is situated.” (不动产的所有权，适用不动产所在地法律。) 
1164
 Art. 145 of the GPCL states “The parties to a contract involving foreign interests may choose the law 
applicable to the settlement of their contractual disputes, except as otherwise stipulated by law. If the parties to 
a contract involving foreign interests have not made a choice, the law of the country to which the contract is 
most closely connected shall be applied.” (涉外合同的当事人可以选择处理合同争议所适用的法律，法律另
有规定的除外。涉外合同的当事人没有选择的，适用与合同有最密切联系的国家的法律。) 
1165
 Art. 146 of the GPCL states “The law of the place where an infringing act is committed shall apply in 
handling compensation claims for any damage caused by the act. If both parties are citizens of the same country 
or have established domicile in another country, the law of their own country or the country of domicile may be 
applied. 
An act committed outside the People’s Republic of China shall not be treated as an infringing act if under the 





 Art. 147 of the GPCL states “The marriage of a citizen of the People’s Republic of China to a foreigner shall 
be bound by the law of the place where they get married, while a divorce shall be bound by the law of the place 
where a court accepts the case.” (中华人民共和国公民和外国人结婚适用婚姻缔结地法律，离婚适用受理
案件的法院所在地法律。) 
1167
 Art. 148 of the GPCL states “Maintenance of a spouse after divorce shall be bound by the law of the country 
to which the spouse is most closely connected.” (扶养适用与被扶养人有最密切联系的国家的法律。) 
1168
 Art. 149 of the GPCL states “In the statutory succession of an estate, movable property shall be bound by the 
law of the decedent’s last place of residence, and immovable property shall be bound by the law of the place 
where the property is situated.” (遗产的法定继承，动产适用被继承人死亡时住所地法律，不动产适用不动
产所在地法律。) 
1169




In short, the PRC legislation, prior to the PIL Statute, does not provide any explicit choice-of-law rule 
for cross-border copyright disputes. Reference to the rules for general tort claims may be made as to 
certain IP claims. However, such rules neither incorporate the principle of party autonomy, nor an 
exception clause for adjusting the result of the application of choice-of-law rules by designating the 




5.3.1.2.3 Beijing High People’s Court Answers  
Upon the increasing needs of adjudicating foreign-related copyright disputes, in 2004 the Beijing High 
People’s Court published Answers to Certain Issues Concerning the Law Applicable to the Foreign-
involved Intellectual Property Right Civil Dispute Cases (hereinafter Beijing Answers).
 1171
 The 
Beijing Answers are administrative in nature, which aim at offering guidance and reference to the 
lower People’s Courts in Beijing Municipality region, namely No.1 and No.2 Intermediary People’s 
Courts, Haidian District and Chaoyang District People’s Courts.1172 Due to their administrative nature, 
the Beijing Answers do not have binding force. As mentioned in the preface of the Beijing Answers, if 
the laws, regulations and the SPC’s judicial interpretation that are published after these Answers are 
inconsistent with the rules contained in these Answers, those laws, regulations and the SPC’s judicial 
interpretation shall prevail. Nevertheless, the Beijing Answers do provide interesting views on the law 
applicable to foreign-related copyright disputes, from which one can see how the Beijing High 
People’s Court, one of the PRC courts hearing most IP disputes, deals with foreign-related copyright 
disputes. Additionally, the Beijing Answers will have direct or indirect judicial influences on its lower 
courts, and possibly courts in other regions.  
 
The Beijing Answers provide clear choice-of-law rules for cross-border copyright disputes. Regarding 
the issues of the existence, contents and ownership of copyright which is vested in a work published 
by foreigners outside the PRC, the Answers state that the protection of foreigners’ work should be 
governed by the law of country where the work exists. Accordingly, when a foreigner claims 
copyright protection in the PRC for a work published in a foreign country, the issues of the existence, 
contents and ownership of the copyright shall be ascertained in accordance with PRC Copyright Law.
 
1173
 Furthermore, in a situation where an act infringing a copyright occurs outside the PRC and both 
parties to the dispute are PRC nationals, or legal entities or domicile in the PRC, the Answers refer to 
the common nationality or domicile rule enshrined in Article 146 of the GPCL, and answer that PRC 
copyright legislation may be applied to such disputes.
1174
 Thus, the Beijing Answers distinguish the 
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 It is to be noted that this Chinese Statute has undergone significant changes as to general tort claims. For 
details, Ning ZHAO (supra n 769) 309-10. 
1171关于涉外知识产权民事案件法律适用若干问题的解答 , promulgated and entered into effect on 28 
February 2004.  
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 These courts are the addressees mentioned in the Answers. 
1173











(“Question 18: In copyright infringement and unfair competition disputes, which law should be applicable if 
both parties are Chinese nationals, legal persons or having domicile in China while the infringing act commits 
outside the PRC?  
Answer 18: According Art. 146(1) of the GPCL, if both parties have the same nationality, or domicile in the 
same country, that country’s law should be applicable to adjudicate the claims for compensation for infringing 
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infringement aspect from other aspects of copyright disputes, such as the existence, contents and 
ownership and deals with them separately. As for the former, the traditional lex loci delicti should 
apply and the common lex patriae or lex domicilii may apply in the event where both parties share the 
same nationality or they establish residence in the same country, whereas for the latter, the Beijing 
Answers adopt the lex loci protectionis rule. It is nevertheless notable that the Answers explicitly state 
that the choice-of-law analysis does not need to be carried out for foreign-related copyright disputes, 
because foreign works entitled to protection under the PRC CRL are considered as domestic works 
and therefore governed by the PRC CRL. Under such a circumstance, if a foreigner claims PRC 
copyright protection in a civil dispute, it is PRC law that applies to the issues concerning copyright, 
other than foreign law. Nevertheless, the Beijing Answers require the acknowledgement of the 
application of PRC law in such disputes so as to clarify the position taken by PRC judiciary in dealing 




5.3.2 International treaties in PRC laws 
5.3.2.1 Position of international treaties in PRC legal system 
The current PRC Constitution and basic laws do not contain any provision as to the legal status of 
international treaties or their place in the hierarchy of the PRC domestic legal system. As observed by 
some Chinese scholars, international treaties, even after ratification, accession or approval, do not in a 
strict sense automatically become part of national law and consequently do not automatically have 
domestic law effect.
1176
 In practice, international treaties to which the PRC is a party could, however, 
under certain conditions have a legal basis to be in the PRC domestic legal system and therefore have 
binding force in domestic law.
1177
 The CPL and the GPCL provide for the prevailing force of 
international treaties over domestic law on the condition that there is a difference between the relevant 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
acts. Therefore, in copyright infringement and unfair competition disputes, if both parties are PRC nationals, 
legal persons or domiciliaries of PRC while the infringing acts were committed outside the PRC, then the PRC 
Copyright Law or Anti-unfair Competition Law etc. should apply.”) [Translated by NZ] 
1175








适用我国法律。(Question 11: Is it necessary to apply choice-of-law rules in a case where foreigners claim 
Chinese patent, trademark and copyright protection? 
Answer 11: (…) Similarly, Chinese Copyright Law protects foreigners’ work, which also assimilates foreign 
work to Chinese works, and grant therefore copyright to these works in accordance with the Chinese Copyright 
Law. Thus, when adjudicating a civil dispute claiming Chinese patent, trademark and copyright protection by 
foreigners, if this dispute concerns only the questions of patent, trademark and copyright, the Chinese law should 
be applicable. Since there is no possibility of applying foreign laws in such cases, there is no necessity to apply 
any choice-of-law rule. 
However, it is still necessary to mention the choice-of-law issue in international intellectual property protection, 
people’s courts should make clear that Chinese law applies in these cases. ) [Translated by NZ] 
1176
 Hanqin XUE and Qian JIN (supra n 1101) 300. 
1177
 Id, 303-05. 
1178
 Art. 236 of the CPL provides that “(i)f an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s 
Republic of China contains provisions that differ from provisions of this Law, the provisions of the international 
treaty shall apply, except for those on which China has made reservations.” ; Art. 142 of the GPCL,“If any 




5.3.2.2 The PRC CRL and international treaties 
The PRC CRL does not contain a provision similar to those in the GPCL and the CPL. As described in 
the preceding section, the CRL merely provides conditions for granting copyright protection for 
foreign authors and their works: either based on publication in the PRC or the conclusion by the 
foreigner’s country of an agreement with the PRC or its accession to international treaties of which the 
PRC is also a member.
1179
 The PRC is a party to four international copyright and related treaties, 
namely the Berne Convention, the UCC, the Geneva Phonograms Convention 1971 and the TRIPs 
Agreement. These treaties specify under what conditions an author or a maker is entitled to claim 
protection in other states privy to the treaties concerned, and require member states to incorporate 
treaty protection standards into their domestic laws. Thus, in a cross-border copyright dispute, a 
foreigner and his works which are eligible for PRC copyright protection can only claim protection in 
accordance with the PRC CRL and other relevant regulations, except where, as laid down in the CPL 
and the GPCL, there is a difference between the provisions provided in the domestic law and those in 
the treaties concerned. Under such a circumstance, the protection provided in the treaties can be 
claimed.   
 
It is, however, noteworthy that not all treaties can be directly invoked by People’s Courts. The Berne 
Convention and the UCC are the treaties specified by the GPCL, and can therefore be directly applied 
by People’s Courts when there is a conflict between domestic rules and treaty provisions, with the 
exception of a reservation to the treaty made by the PRC. On the contrary, the TRIPs Agreement does 
not have a direct application effect. It is an international agreement administered by the WTO, which 
sets down minimum standards for many forms of IP regulation, including copyright and related rights. 
When the PRC joined the WTO in 2001, it promised to  
“ensure that its laws and regulations pertaining to or affecting trade were in conformity with the 
WTO Agreement and with its commitments so as to fully perform its international obligations. 
For this purpose, China had commenced a plan to systematically revise its relevant domestic 
laws. Therefore, the WTO Agreement would be implemented by China in an effective and 
uniform manner through revising its existing domestic laws and enabling new ones fully in 
compliance with the WTO Agreement.”1180  
Obviously, the way by which the PRC implements the TRIPs Agreement can only be by revision of 
existing domestic laws and enactment of new ones, rather than according an effect of direct 
application of the Agreement. Furthermore, the TRIPs Agreement also requires enactment of rules on 
the enforcement of IP rights, which is considered as having “public law” effect. Thus, as long as the 
PRC legislature is performing those responsibilities, there is no need to rely on the TRIPs Agreement. 
The Beijing Answers reaffirm this position by stating that the provisions of that Agreement cannot be 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
from those in the civil laws of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall 
apply, unless the provisions are ones on which the People’s Republic of China has declared reservations. 
International practice may be applied to matters for which neither the law of the People’s Republic of China nor 
any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China has any provisions.”  
1179
 See supra, section 5.3.1.2.1 PRC Copyright Law (CRL), related legislation and judicial interpretations. 
1180
 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 1 October 2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002144.pdf> accessed on 2 October 
2012, para 67. 
1181
 Question 14 of the Beijing Answers,  “十四、审理涉外知识产权民事案件，能否引用《与贸易有关的知
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It may be asked: as between the Berne Convention and the UCC which convention should take 
precedence if both of them can be applied by People’s Courts? Article 17 of the UCC and its 
declarations clarify the prevalence of the Berne Convention. According to it the UCC “shall not in any 
way affect the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works or 
membership in the Union created by that Convention”, 1182 and the UCC  
“shall not be applicable to the relationships among countries of the Berne Union in so far as it 
relates to the protection of works having as their country of origin, within the meaning of the 
Berne Convention, a country of the Berne Union”.1183  
This position is reiterated in the Beijing Answers that the Berne Convention should prevail over the 





5.3.2.3 Bilateral treaties 
In addition to multilateral treaties, the PRC concluded a number of bilateral treaties with respect to IP 
rights protection. One of the most influential bilateral “treaties” is the memorandum of understanding 
with the US government on intellectual property protection, signed in January 1992 (hereinafter MOU 
on IP protection).
1185
 This instrument provides copyright protection for all American works and other 
foreign works. Moreover, it reaffirms the prevalence of the Berne Convention over PRC domestic 
laws when there is any inconsistency between the Berne Convention and PRC law, unless the PRC has 
made treaty reservations as to it. In general, bilateral treaties
1186
 can be directly quoted by People’s 
Courts in adjudicating a copyright dispute, without referring to the PRC CRL.  
 
5.3.2.4 Judgments 
Several judgments rendered by People’s Courts can demonstrate how international treaties are applied 
in copyright disputes. 
 
In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Beijing Superstore for Cultural and Arts Publications 
and AV Products Inc.,
1187
 the plaintiff claimed copyright protection under the PRC CRL on the bases 
of the MOU on IP Protection and the Berne Convention. The court upheld the plaintiff’s claims by 
stating that the plaintiff’s films were under the protection of the PRC CRL, because the PRC and the 
USA are the parties to the Berne Convention and the MOU on IP Protection, even though the 
copyrights had first attached in the USA. Similarly, the Beijing High Court held in an appeal case Walt 
Disney Company Ltd. v Beijing Publishing House and Others that works of USA nationals were under 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  就包括 TRIPS 协议在内的世贸协定，我国只是承诺以制定或者修改国内法律的方式予以履行，并未
赋予其在国内的直接适用效力。因此，不能直接援用该规则作为裁判的依据。” 
1182
 Art. 17(1) of the UCC Convention. 
1183
 Appendix declaration relating to Art. 17 of the UCC Convention, (c). 
1184
 Question 16 of the Beijing Answers, “十六、在案件当事人所属国均为《伯尔尼公约》、《世界版权公







 The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the PRC and the Government of the United 
Sates of American on the Protection of Intellectual Property concluded on 17 January 1992. 
1186
 In 1995, the National Copyright Administration of the PRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding of 
Copyright and Related rights Cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand. 
1187
 The First Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, first instance ((1996)一中初知字第 62号); 
see also Hanqin XUE and Qian JIN (supra n 1101) 313. 
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These two cases demonstrate that the People’s Courts could directly apply the MOU on IP Protection 
and the Berne Convention to copyright disputes between parties from the USA and the PRC. As to 
those between a PRC party and foreign parties other than the USA, it is indicated that the Berne 
Convention could also be referred to, provided that the country of the foreign parties involved is a 




In the event a provision of PRC law has been found inconsistent with those of the Berne Convention, 
People’s Courts have accorded prevailing effect to the latter. Such an inconsistency can be viewed e.g. 
in the context of protecting works of applied art: the Berne Convention explicitly states that literary 
and artistic works include works of applied art,
1190
 while the PRC CRL is to the contrary and does not 
protect such works. As a result, the duration of protection for works of applied art will be at issue. 
Nevertheless, this issue was resolved in the Implementation Regulation 1992 during the accession of 
the PRC to the Berne Convention. As provided in Article 6 of the Regulation, “(t)he term of protection 
of foreign works of applied art shall be 25 years from the completion of such works. [Translated by 
NZ]”,1191 which is in line with what the Berne Convention prescribes. 
 
Accordingly, in a dispute concerning whether works of applied art which had been granted copyright 
protection under foreign law may claim copyright protection under PRC law,
 
the court invoked the 
Berne Convention and the Implementation Regulation 1992, and granted PRC copyright protection to 
the foreign works of applied art.
1192
 Strictly speaking, the court did not directly rely on the Berne 
Convention in this case because granting copyright protection to foreign works of applied art had been 
established in PRC domestic law via the Implementation Regulation 1992, and in that case the Berne 
Convention was merely referred to in passing. The same approach has also been taken by another 
court in a case involving foreign works of applied art where the court even held that the fact that the 
rights owner had made an application to protect the industrial design for his works according to PRC 
                                                          
1188
 The High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, second instance ((1995) 高知终字第 23 号); see also 
Hanqin XUE and Qian JIN (supra n 1101) 313. 
1189
 The First Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Sony Computer Entertainment Incorporated 
(Japan) v. Yantai Hong Zheng Guang Dian Media Co. Ltd. & Guangchun SUN, first instance ((2006) 一中民初
字第 5951号); the Intermediary People’s Court of Guangzhou City, Guang Dong Province, Kim Jae-in & CLKO 
Entertainment Co. Ltd. (South Korea) v. Guangzhou City Yuexiu District Zhujiang Co. Ltd., first instance 
((2004) 穗中法民三知初字第 294 号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, 
VMA-GETZMANNGMBHVerfahrenstechnik (Germany) v. Shanghai Sower Mechanical & Electrical Equipment 
Co. Ltd., first instance ((2005) 沪二中民五 (知 )初字第 226 号 ); the High People’s Court of Shanghai 
Municipality, Discreet Logic, Inc. (Canada) v. Shanghai Zhongle Films and Culture Co. Ltd., second instance 
((2004) 沪高民三(知)终字第 19号); the High People’s Court of Sichuan Province, GCCL (Chengdu) & Brugg 
Group (Switzerland) v. Si Chuan Wanhao Industry Co. Ltd., second instance ((2001) 川经终字第 197号); the 
Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, A.B.C. Speciality Foods Limited (UK) v. Huang 
Yamin, first instance ((2008) 二中民初字第 00288 号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing 
Municipality, Okbaby s.r.l. (Italy) v. Cixi Honeyway Baby Products Co. Ltd. & Beijing Leyou Dakang Technical 
Co. Ltd., first instance ((2008) 二中民初字第 12293号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing 
Municipality, Universal International Music B.V. (the Netherlands) v. Beijing Alibaba Information & 
Technology Co. Ltd., first instance ((2007) 二中民初字第 02626号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of 
Beijing Municipality, Jean Paul GAULITER (France) v. Shantou Shi Jiarou Refined Deci Co. Ltd. & Liting 
ZHAO, first instance ((2006) 二中民初字第 7070号) (Jean Paul GAULITER First Instance) and etc.  
1190
 Art. 2(1) of the Berne Convention. 
1191
 “第六条 对外国实用艺术作品的保护期，为自该作品完成起二十五年。” 
1192
 The Intermediary People’s Court of Qingdao, Goldlok Toys Manufactory Co., Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Qingdao 
Yufeng Trading Company, first instance ((2003) 青民三初字第 52号). (Goldlok). 
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Still further, some courts have directly invoked the Berne Convention in situations where the wording 
of the then-existing PRC CRL was ambiguous. The Tsuburaya 
1194
 case involved the question whether 
the defendant’s acts of manufacturing alarm clocks by using the plaintiff’s work – a cartoon film 
image “Ultraman” - without permission from the plaintiff constituted infringement of the plaintiff’s 
copyright. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s work - the image of “Ultraman” - and the allegedly 
infringing alarm clocks were different types of works. The former is a literary and artistic work and 
should be protected in accordance with the Berne Convention and the PRC CRL, whereas the latter 
was contended to belong under industrial design, which should be regulated under the protection of the 
Paris Convention and the PRC Patent Law. In determining whether the clocks infringed the plaintiff’s 
reproduction rights, the court of first instance looked into the 1990 PRC Copyright Law, which was 
still in force when the plaintiff lodged the claim. Article 52 of that law provided that  
“(t)he term ‘reproduction’ as used in this Law shall not cover the construction or the 
manufacture of industrial products on the basis of drawings of engineering designs and product 
designs, and descriptions thereof”.  
According to this, copying a two-dimensional work into a three-dimensional work would not 
constitute reproduction under the 1990 PRC CRL. The court did not stop there and further turned to 
Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention,
1195
 which grants a reproduction right having a wide scope. By 
invoking that article, the court held that the defendant’s acts of manufacturing and selling those clocks 
without the authorization of the plaintiff infringed the plaintiff’s right to reproduce the image of 
“Ultraman”. This decision was upheld by the court of second instance. It is additionally to be noted 
that if this dispute were to be adjudicated in accordance with the 2001 PRC CRL, there would be no 
need to invoke the Berne Convention because the amended law includes a broader comprehension of 
what constitutes reproduction, and according to this law the dispute at hand - copying a two 
dimensional work into a three dimensional work - would certainly constitute reproduction. 
 
Thus, international treaties play an important role in the PRC legal system. Although the PRC 
Constitution and laws do not state the legal status of international treaties and their place in the 
hierarchy of the PRC domestic legal system, treaties can be invoked when there is inconsistency 
between them and PRC domestic law, unless the PRC has declared a treaty reservation. Such an 
invocation can be evidenced in judicial practice when foreign-involved copyright and related rights 
protection are at stake because it is common for People’s Courts to invoke PRC law protection for 
foreigners and foreign works by referring to the Berne Convention
1196
 and the UCC,
1197
 provided that 
the PRC law does not contradict the relevant provisions of these Conventions. 
 
5.4 Judicial practices at People’s Court in copyright disputes involving foreign elements 
Prior to the PIL Statute, PRC law did not provide any choice-of-law rules for foreign-related copyright 
and related rights disputes. The only reference that could be made would be Article 146 of the GPCL 
and Article 187 of the 1988 GPCL Opinion, dealing exclusively with compensation claims in tort 
cases. According to these provisions, the traditional lex loci delicti rule for tort claims, i.e. the law of 
                                                          
1193
 The High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Ent Lego (Switzerland) v. Kegao Tianjian Toys Ltd. & 
Beijing Fuxin Shopping Centre, second instance ((2002) 高民终字第 279号). 
1194
 The High People’s Court of Guang Dong Province, Tsuburaya Production (Japan) v. Guangzhou Lianhe 
Technology Electronic Clock Factory, second instance ((2002)粤高法民三终字第 84号). (Tsuburaya). 
1195
 “Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of 
authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.” The PRC did not make reservation on Art. 
9 of the Berne Convention. 
1196
 See cases infra in n 1205, 1206. 
1197The High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Olympia Co. Ltd. (South Korea) v. Beijing Olympia 
Thermal Equipment Development Co. Ltd., second instance ((2000) 高知终字第 10号).  
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the place where the infringing act occurred or the law of the place where the damage occurred should 
apply as they do to all tort claims with foreign elements, including copyright and related rights 
infringement. If these two laws should contradict each other, People’s Courts shall have the discretion 
to choose the law applicable. As a subsidiary rule, the law of the common domicile or nationalities of 
the parties could apply, if both parties are the citizens of the same country or have established domicile 
in the same country.  
 
Since there was no specific choice-of-law rule for foreign-related copyright disputes under PRC laws 
before the enactment of the PIL Statute, it is not surprising that judicial practice in this regard was 
inconsistent. Looking through the available judgments, one can easily see that the issue of choice-of-





5.4.1 The applied choice-of-law rules 
It can be observed in the available judgments that in only a few cases have People’s Courts analysed 
choice-of-law problems. In these cases the courts had taken three approaches to determine the law 
applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes: the lex loci protectionis, the lex loci 
delicti, and the closest connection rule. Some examples follow. 
 
5.4.1.1 The lex loci protectionis 
Dryden & Groenendal
1199
 concerned a dispute over publication of the book the Learning Revolution 
(1997 edition) in the PRC. The questions raised were about the status of the plaintiffs’ right and under 
which law this status should be determined. In answering these questions, the court stated that since 
the plaintiffs claimed their copyright protection in the PRC, the content, scope and the initial 
ownership of the right should be governed by the PRC CRL, which is the law of the place where the 
protection is claimed. The court continued by ruling that the law of the place where the right is 
claimed should also govern the issue of infringement of copyright for the reason that the alleged 
infringing acts, namely publication and distribution of the book, were claimed to occur in the PRC and 
the PRC CRL should therefore apply for determination of the alleged infringement claims.  
 
5.4.1.2 The closest connection rule 
In the Tsuburaya case, the court of second instance ruled that PRC laws should apply to that 
infringement dispute. In order to reach such a conclusion, the court listed a number of places involved 
in the dispute: the place of infringement was in the PRC, the defendant was a company established 
under PRC law and a PRC court had jurisdiction. Although the court did not specifically mention the 
application of the closest connection rule, the way in which the court laid down the connecting factors 
and deduced the applicable law therefrom pointed to the application of the closest connection rule, 
despite the fact that the closest connection rule had not yet been codified in the then PRC choice-of-




                                                          
1198
 It is to mention that in the past, judgments rendered by People’s Courts were not published. Recognizing the 
needs to improve judicial transparency, the SPC advocated that courts publish their decisions online. In addition 
to the websites of the courts, there are several judicial databases available for tracing judicial decisions. As a 
result, the availability and accessibility of Chinese judgments have been enhanced dramatically since 2002. But 
in no way are all judgments available.  
1199
 The High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Gorden Dryden and Jeannette Groenendal v. Li Hua 
Education Software Technology Ltd. And Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore first instance ((2000) 高知初字第 88号). 
1200
 Supra, n 1194.  
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5.4.1.3 The lex loci delicti 
More People’s Courts have applied the lex loci delicti in foreign-related copyright disputes. As an 
example, in a dispute where the defendant allegedly communicated the plaintiff’s video recordings to 
the public without the latter’s permission,1201 both trial and appeal courts concluded that since the 
alleged tortious act occurred in the PRC, according to the lex loci delicti rule provided in Article 
146(1) of the GPCL, PRC law shall apply to determine the infringement claims and the remedies 
available. In other disputes, the People’s Courts held that PRC law should also govern the issues of the 
existence
1202
 and the initial ownership
1203
 of copyright, simply because the infringing acts took place in 
the PRC.  
 
 5.4.2 No choice-of-law analysis 
On the other hand, in the vast majority of cases, People’s Courts did not perform a choice-of-law 
analysis. In such cases, PRC courts either directly applied PRC law and rendered judgments 
thereon,
1204
 or applied PRC law by making reference to international treaties like the Berne 
Convention and the UCC. It is to be noted that when making reference to the Berne Convention some 
courts pinpoint its principle of national treatment and hold that a foreigner and his works originating 
from one of the Berne Union states will be protected under the PRC CRL.
1205
 Meanwhile, other courts 
have taken a step further by mentioning that Article 2(2) of the PRC CRL provides protection to 
                                                          
1201
 The High People’s Court of Si Chuan Province, Warner Music Hong Kong Limited v. Chengdu Haoledi 
Entertainment Co. Ltd., second instance ((2005) 川民终字第 426号). (Warner Music Hong Kong) 
1202
 The Intermediary People’s Court of Chengdu City, Si Chuang Province, Warner Music Hong Kong Limited 
v. Si Chuan Province Hao Ge Chang Bu Ting Entertainment Co. Ltd., first instance ((2005) 成民初字第 277号
); the Intermediary People’s Court of Shen Yang City, Warner Music Hong Kong Limited v. Shen Yang Xin Jin 
Gang Trading Co. Ltd. & Shen Yang Xin Jin Gang Trading Co. Ltd. Sorisam Xi Shun District KaraOk Centre, 
first instance ((2005) 深民四知初字第 66号) (Sorisam KaraOK Centre). 
1203
 Sorisam KaraOK Centre; Goldlok; the High People’s Court of Yun Nan Province, Warner Music Hong 
Kong Limited v. Kun Ming Haoledi Music Entertainment Co. Ltd., second instance ((2005) 云高民三终字第 68
号); the Intermediary People’s Court of Hang Zhou City, Zhe Jiang Province, Nexon Corporation (South Korea) 
v. Hang Zhou Keji Culture Exchange Co. Ltd., first instance ((2008) 杭民三字第 235号). 
1204
 The Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Linfair Recording Limited (Taiwan) v. 
Beijing Tianyu Communication Equipment Co. Ltd., first instance ((2008) 二中民字第 4128 号 ); the 
Intermediary People’s Court of Shen Yang City, Feixiang Culture Limited (Taiwan) v. Shen Yang Northern 
Culture Communication Co. Ltd., first instance ((2004) 沈民四知初字第 46 号); the Second Intermediary 
People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, GEA Hovex B.V. (the Netherlands) v. Zhen Zhou Jinghua Starch 
Engineering Technology Development Co. Ltd., first instance ((2005) 二中民初字第 602 号); the Second 
Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Applause Pictures Limited (Hong Kong) v. Wu Zhou Cable 
TV Communication Co. Ltd., first instance ((2006) 二中民初字第 465号); the Second Intermediary Court of 
Beijing Municipality, Porsche AG. (Germany) v. Beijing Taihe Yate Automobile After-Sale Service Co. Ltd., first 
instance ((2007) 二中民初字第 01764 号); the Intermediary People’s Court of Shen Yang City, Go East 
Entertainment Co. Ltd. v. Liao Ning Broadcast, TV, Music and Videos Publisher Co. Ltd. & Fo Shan Jinzhu 
Laser Digital Storage Chip Co. Ltd., first instance ((2002) 沈民四初字第 71号); the First Intermediary People’s 
Court of Beijing Municipality, ThinSoft Ptd Ltd. (Singapore) v. Beijing Jinyilan Digital Technology Centre, first 
instance ((2006) 一中民初字第 5954 号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, 
Ingrid ZHANG v. International Culture Publishing Company, first instance ((2007) 二中民初字第 15994号), 
and the High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, second instance ((2008) 高民终字第 305号) and etc. 
1205
 The Intermediary People’s Court of Fu Zhou City, Fu Jian Province, Fu Jian Shunchang Hongrun Precision 
Instrument Co. Ltd. v. Getty Images Beijing Photo Technology Co. Ltd., first instance ((2008) 榕民初字第 652
号); the High People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, 3B Scientific GmbH v. Shanghai Honglian Medical 
Equipment Co. Ltd., second instance ((2006) 沪高民三(知)终字第 79号); the High People’s Court of Fu Jian 
Province, Kenwood Corporation v. Fu Jian Guanwei Telecommunication Technology Co. Ltd., second instance 
((2007) 闽民终字第 385号); the Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Autodesk Inc. v. 
Beijing Longwa Construction Decoration Co. Ltd., first instance ((2003) 二中民初字第 6227号). 
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foreign works on the condition that the creator of a work is a national of, or habitually resides in, a 




Clearly, these courts were aware of the involvement of foreign factors in the disputes. By referring to 
the Berne Convention, especially its national treatment principle, the courts granted copyright 
protection to foreign works in PRC. Nevertheless, as analysed in the foregoing, the principle of 
national treatment and Article 2(2) of the PRC CRL are the rules concerning the legal status of foreign 
authors and their works. These national eligibility provisions merely provide standing on the basis of 
points of attachment - connecting factors - by which the works of authors become eligible for 
protection in the PRC. Accordingly, these provisions establish who is entitled to bring suit in the PRC 
for which works and do not function as choice-of-law rules designating the law applicable to cross-
border copyright disputes.  
 
5.4.2.1 Initial ownership of copyright 
Given the importance of the issue of initial ownership of copyright, one may have to surmise how 
PRC courts dealt with this issue when no choice-of-law analysis had been carried out. Did they decide 
it according to PRC law or the law of the origin of the work? Whichever law they applied, how did 
they arrive at the application of that law? 
 
As described in the above section, certain PRC courts applied either the lex loci protectionis
1207
 or the 
lex loci delicti
1208
 to determine the initial ownership of copyright. In the disputes where the initial 
ownership issue was at stake and no choice-of-law was analysed, the People’s Courts adopted two 
main approaches.  
 
First, courts directly applied PRC law. Two consecutive cases: Beaute Prestige International (France) 
v. Shan Tou Shi Jiarou Refined Deci Co. Ltd. & Liting ZHAO,
1209
 and Jean Paul GAULTIER v. Shan 
Tou Shi Jiarou Refined Deci Co. Ltd. & Liting ZHAO,
1210
 concerned copyright protection of the “Le 
Classique” and “Le Male” perfume bottles in the PRC against the same defendant. One of the main 
issues was to identify the copyright owner of the “Le Classique” and “Le Male” perfume bottles so as 
to establish their legal standing to sue in the cases. In the first case, the court of first instance applied 
PRC law and determined that Jean Paul GAULTIER was the creator of the bottles and therefore 
owned the copyright under PRC law. As for the claimant Beaute Prestige International, since it was 
neither the creator of the bottles nor the transferee of the copyright ownership to the bottles, it did not 
have legal standing to sue. On appeal, the legal issue of, among other things, whether the claimant 
Beaute Prestige International owned copyright to the perfume bottles was brought before the Beijing 
High Court. The court affirmed the rulings of the court of first instance and applied the PRC CRL to 
determine the initial ownership of the perfume bottles. Before reaching this decision, the court first 
referred to the Berne memberships of both the PRC and France. In a subsequent case, in which Jean 
Paul GAULTIER filed a claim against the same defendants on the same grounds, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff’s work enjoys copyright protection under the PRC CRL because the plaintiff is a 
                                                          
1206
The Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Beijing 
Alebaba Information Technology Co. Ltd., first instance ((2007) 二中民初字第 02628 号 ); the First 
Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Sony Computer Entertainment Incorporated v. Yan Tai 
Hongzheng Photoelectric Media Co. Ltd., first instance ((2006) 一中民初字第 5951号); the First Intermediary 
People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, Hadrian Manufacturing Inc. (Canada) v. Shanghai Fuchun Rongqiang 
Estate Co. Ltd., second instance ((2007) 沪一中民五(知)终字第 12 号); the Intermediary People’s Court of 
Qing Dao City, Shang Dong Province, Autodesk Inc. v. Qing Dao Outemei Transportation Equipment Co. Ltd., 
first instance ((2007) 青民三初字第 134号). 
1207
 Dryden & Groenendal (supra n 1199). 
1208
 For cases, see supra fn 1203. 
1209
 The High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, second instance ((2005) 高民终字第 1564号). 
1210
 Jean Paul GAULITER First Instance.  
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French national, and France and the PRC are member states of the Berne Convention, and of the 
TRIPs agreement. As the PRC CRL protects three-dimensional fine art having the character of 
originality and creativity, the perfume bottles are works protected by copyright under the PRC CRL 
and Jean Paul GAULTIER, the creator of the bottles, was entitled to copyright protection under the 
PRC CRL. Just like in most foreign-related copyright disputes, although both courts noted the 
involvement of foreign elements in these cases, they did not conduct any choice-of-law analysis and 
directly applied PRC law to determine the initial ownership of the copyright.  
 
Second, certain PRC courts adopted the lex originis approach, or considered the ownership granted by 
the law of origin as sort of evidence and verified it in their rulings. For the first kind, an example can 
be seen in a copyright infringement dispute concerning building design drawings.
1211
 For the question 
whether two claimants Christoph Ingenhoven and Jurgen Overdiek, who were the partners of the 
German firm Ingenhoven Overdiek und Partner, could initiate a claim for copyright protection on their 
own in the PRC, the court looked into German law and found that German law entitled the claimants 
to initiate such claims in the PRC in their own names on behalf of the firm. Clearly, although the court 
did not specifically refer to application of the lex originis, it used the lex originis to determine the 
initial ownership of the copyright. 
 
In other cases, e.g. Tsuburaya v. Shanghai Youth Articles,
1212
 where the right to authorship was 
disputed, the court, in determining whether the claimant owned the copyright to the film work 
“Ultraman”, ruled in the affirmative based on the certificates of copyright in relation to the film work 
“Ultraman” and the preceding judgments concerning the ownership of the image of “Ultraman”. Note 
that the court did not determine the claimant’s ownership in accordance with PRC law, rather, it 
considered the claimant’s ownership granted according to Japanese law as part of the evidence and 
confirmed this evidence of ownership in its ruling. Such a method can also be found in the 3dsMax 
software case,
1213
 in which the court recognized the copyright registration on the disputed software that 
was filed in the USA and found that the claimant owned a copyright to that software. In these two 
cases, the courts did not apply the lex originis rule as such, rather they adopted the way of recognizing 
the ownership of copyright granted in the country of origin, considered such ownership as a form of 
evidence, and based on such recognition, confirmed the initial ownership of the copyright.  
 
5.4.3 Results 
Based on the above case law and analysis, two points can be summarized: first, most People’s Courts 
did not analyse choice-of-law issues in foreign-related copyright disputes; second, People’s Courts did 
not (or hardly) apply foreign laws to such disputes.  
 
For the second point, it can be seen that PRC courts apply only PRC law to govern the extent and 
content of copyright, as well as infringement claims and relevant remedies. Some provisions of 
international treaties, namely the Berne Convention and the MOU with the USA also constitute 
sources of law in the PRC legal system. Thus, by no means do PRC courts apply foreign laws to 
                                                          
1211
 The First Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Christoph Ingenhoven &Jurgen Overdiek 
(Germany) v. Beijing Crystal Stone Computer Graphics Development Co., Ltd., first instance ((2001) 一中知初
字第 82号), see ‘A Research on the Application of Law in Foreign Related Intellectual Property Civil Disputes
关于涉外知识产权民事案件法律适用的调查研究’ [in Chinese] in Intellectual Property Tribunal of Beijing 
High People’s Court (ed), Studies on Intellectual Property Litigation 知识产权诉讼实务研究 [in Chinese] 
(Intellectual Property Publisher, Beijing 2008) 309-10. 
1212
 The First Intermediary People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, Tsuburaya Production (Japan) v. Shanghai 
Huaihai Youth Articles Co., Ltd., first instance ((2004) 沪一中民五（知）初字第 198号). 
1213
 The Second Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, Autodesk, Inc., v. Beijing Longfa Building 
Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd., first instance ((2003) 二中民初字第 6227号). 
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govern those issues for foreign-involved copyright and related rights disputes. In fact, such a practice 




Some attention should, however, be paid to the issue of initial ownership of copyright, because certain 
courts, without having the choice-of-law problem analysed, applied either PRC law directly or the law 
of origin to determine initial ownership. For the latter situation, some courts looked into the law of 
origin and determined the issue accordingly, while others recognized the ownership of copyright that 
was granted in the country of origin and treated it as evidence leading to their rulings that confirmed 
such ownership in the PRC. In these small numbers of cases, it can arguably be submitted that the 
courts used the lex originis approach leading to the application of foreign law. 
 
As will be analysed below, the practices according to which People’s Courts did not (or hardly) apply 
foreign laws and ignored choice-of-law analysis could be explained by several reasons, which are in 
fact interwoven.  
 
5.5 Reasons for PRC judicial practice in foreign-related copyright disputes 
As mentioned in the preceding section, only some cases contain choice-of-law analysis, while in the 
vast majority of cases, the courts directly applied PRC law and rendered their judgments thereon 
without analysing the choice-of-law problem. As to such a practice, several reasons may be identified 
for purposes of discussion. 
 
5.5.1 Reasons for not analysing choice-of-law 
5.5.1.1 Lack of awareness of the choice-of-law issue 
Private international law in the PRC legal system is of recent vintage. The existence and development 
of PIL in the PRC are due to the economic development of the PRC and the increased contacts with 
foreign countries in the most recent three and half decades. Against this background, it is not difficult 
to understand that some People’s Courts and practitioners are not, or are less, aware of choice-of-law 
issues, not to mention that the protection of IP rights is also rather new in the PRC. 
 
The choice-of-law problem should be analysed whenever there is a foreign element involved in civil 
and commercial litigation. As explained in Article 304 of the 1992 Civil Procedural Law Opinions, a 
foreign element in civil relations means that: 1) one party or both parties to the dispute are foreign 
nationals, stateless persons, foreign enterprises or organizations; 2) the legal facts that establish, 
modify or terminate the civil legal relations between parties arose in foreign territories; or 3) the 
disputed object of the lawsuit is located in a foreign country.
1215
 Accordingly, when a foreign element 
is involved in copyright and related rights disputes, e.g. there are foreign parties involved, or the 
places of exploitation or infringement are outside the PRC, People’s Courts should perform a choice-
of-law analysis. Such a practice has, however, been lacking in foreign-related copyright disputes. In 
cases where the infringement occurred outside the PRC, the courts have ignored the existence of 
foreign elements, let alone the choice-of-law analysis, and directly applied PRC law to adjudicate 
these disputes and therefore give PRC law extra-territorial effect. 
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In the Beijing Film Academy
1216
case, the courts had to rule on an alleged copyright infringement 
allegedly committed both in the PRC and in France in a case between two PRC parties. The novelist 
Zengqi WANG, the author of the novel “Shou Jie”, had assigned the right of adaptation of his novel 
“Shou Jie” to the plaintiff. According to the assignment contract, the plaintiff received the exclusive 
right to adapt this novel for a film and a TV series. A group of students of the defendant Academy 
adapted this novel for a film, as a project for graduation. Their film, upon completion, was exhibited 
once in the cinema belongs to the defendant for students. Afterward, the defendant brought the film to 
the Rencontres Henri Langlois Film Festival in France, where the film was exhibited to the public, 
including local residents to whom tickets were sold. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed 
the plaintiff’s exclusive right of adaption by adapting and then publicly showing the alleged infringing 
film both in the PRC and in France without its prior consent. The defendant argued it only made fair 
use of the work, as it was intended as a project for the students’ graduation. The court of first instance 
judgment did not point out the foreign element involved in the dispute, namely that one of the alleged 
infringements occurred in France. It directly applied PRC law and held that showing the alleged film 
within the Academy did not constitute infringement, whereas showing it in France, which fell outside 
the scope of fair use, did constitute infringement of the plaintiff’s right of adaptation. Neither did the 
appellate court categorize this dispute as a foreign-related dispute, but it also applied PRC law and 
upheld the court of first instance judgment. Clearly, both courts applied the PRC CRL to determine 
whether the defendant’s act done outside the territory of the PRC infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. 
By doing so, the courts granted the PRC CRL extra-territorial effect.  
 
Although those courts’ non-awareness of the choice-of-law issue attracted criticism,1217 some scholars 
did applaud these judgments. They agreed with the application of PRC law to this dispute because 
they suspected that the application of PRC law was based on the common nationality rule.
1218
 Some 
considered that the reason why the foreign factors were overlooked was due to the fact that the alleged 
infringing act occurred first in the PRC and then in France, which were intended to suggest that the 
infringing acts committed within and outside of the PRC were actually the same event.
1219
 Still others 
argued that the application of PRC law in this case was in order to protect PRC interests. Because 
applying French law, which is the law of the place where the infringing act occurred, to the assessment 
of infringement, especially the calculation of damages, would not conform to PRC social standards. 
Such arguments cannot, however, be sustained. The involvement of foreign elements in this dispute 
should have been pointed out and the choice-of-law issue should, in any event, have been analysed. 
Omission to mention those elements could only demonstrate the courts’ and parties’ incompetence and 
non-awareness of them. Also, the argument about protecting PRC social interests shows a lack of 
understanding about private international law. Although damages calculated based on French law 
could be much higher than those rendered under PRC laws, the invocation of public policy by 
People’s Courts could prevent the imposition of higher damages, if the public policy exception were 
so interpreted. Moreover, application of PRC law to the infringement that occurred in France would 
affect the valid interests of the rights owner, especially given the different levels of copyright 
protection between the PRC and France, and the different levels of interests involved in the alleged 
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work on the Chinese and French markets.
1220
 The application of PRC law in this case could arguably 
be supported by the common nationality exception, because Article 146(1) of the GPCL has provided 
so.  
 
In any event, the lack of awareness of choice-of-law in this case was undeniable, and such a lack of 
awareness by courts and litigants was also corroborated in the following case where a defendant and 
place of infringement were both foreign. 
 
In the JVC Records
1221
 case, the PRC plaintiff sued PRC and Japanese defendants for producing and 
distributing CDs containing the plaintiff’s music both in the PRC and Japan without mentioning the 
name of the plaintiff and without paying any royalty to the plaintiff. The court did recognize the 
foreign element - a Japanese co-defendant - in the case and treated it as a case involving foreign 
elements. The court did not, however, conduct any choice-of-law analysis. Instead, it directly applied 
PRC laws and ruled that the Japanese defendants who produced and distributed in Japan CDs 
containing the plaintiff’s music infringed the plaintiff’s copyright and related rights. The reason why 
the court ignored the other foreign element - one of the places of infringement was in Japan - is 
unknown. The fact that the court categorized this case as a foreign-related one but did not conduct a 
choice-of-law analysis evidenced a lack of awareness about choice-of-law issues.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that such a lack of awareness can be also encountered in other fields 
of law:
1222
 as reported by data provided in 2008, 16% of the judgments that involved foreign elements 
did not analyse the choice-of-law issue.
1223
 Additionally, out of 147 such judgments, 132 of them 
applied PRC law.
1224
 With the aim of better adjudicating foreign-involved commercial cases, the SPC 
had emphasized the importance of recognizing choice-of-law issues in its 2003 Announcement about 
Chinese People’s Courts’ Practice in the Application of Laws in Foreign Elements Involved 
Commercial Cases.
 1225
 In addition, it advised People’s Courts to analyse choice-of-law issues and to 
include legal reasoning about them in their judgments. As a result, the practices of directly applying 
PRC laws and of stating the law applicable without reasoning are not allowed.
1226
 It should be 
acknowledged that the quality of judgments rendered by People’s Courts has been improving in recent 
years.
1227
 In those foreign-involved copyright disputes where the only foreign element that was 
involved was a foreign litigant, most People’s Courts pointed out the involvement of the foreign 
parties.
1228
 Identifying the involvement of foreign parties was, however, not aimed at choosing the law 
applicable to the disputes, rather it established the legal standing of the foreign parties in those 
lawsuits. Such a practice is not only caused by a lack of awareness of the issue of choice-of-law, but 
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also by the theoretical misunderstanding of the territoriality principle of copyright, and the additional 
lack of awareness of the choice-of-law issues involved specifically in foreign-related copyright 
disputes. 
 
In addition, the structure of People’s Courts may also be a reason for that lack of awareness. Currently, 
among the higher People’s Courts normally Civil Tribunal Three (also called the IP Tribunal) deals 
exclusively with IP disputes. The advantage of having such a specialized court is obvious. The 
disadvantage, however, would become evident in foreign-related IP disputes where Civil Tribunal 
Three courts may drift away from international perspectives, i.e. those tribunals may overlook foreign 
elements involved in the case and the existence of the choice-of-law issue and as a result adjudicate 
the dispute as a domestic one by directly applying PRC law. From this, it can be deduced that between 
choosing to benefit from the IP expertise of Civil Tribunal Three or to grant procedural justice by 
specialised People’s Courts that would deal with international disputes, the former has been preferred. 
 
 5.5.1.2 Theoretical misunderstanding of the territoriality of copyright and its influence on 
choice-of-law issues 
“Territoriality” is a commonly recognized principle in IP rights. As to the understanding of the 
relationship between this principle and the choice-of-law issue, there are two different groups of 
opinion among Chinese scholars. 
 
One group of scholars put forward that territoriality is a specific characteristic of copyright that is 
related to its historical development. Due to the historical development of copyright from the medieval 
“privileges” granted by rulers in Europe until the evolvement into “modern” copyright laws, those 
scholars contend that the territorial character is specific to copyright, and as a result copyright will be 
valid only within the territory of the country where the law grants such protection.
1229
 Additionally, 
they argue that the fact that the existence/establishment of copyright is vested according to the law of a 
state instills copyright with a public law nature. Consequently, foreign-related copyright that bears a 
public law character should not be a subject of a choice-of-law problem, just as other public laws like 
criminal law and tax law would never encounter a choice-of-law problem.
1230
 Furthermore, the 
independence principle of copyright enshrined in the Berne Convention proves the territorial nature of 
copyright. Consequently, there is no conflict of laws that exists in foreign-related copyright 
disputes.
1231
 Moreover, some scholars reason that the principle of national treatment assimilates 
foreign works into the country converting them to national ones, and accordingly there would be no 
choice-of-law issue involved in foreign-related copyright disputes.
1232
 It is further concluded that, due 
to the territorial character of copyright, copyright granted in one country cannot be recognized in 
others,
1233
 and therefore no choice-of-law issue would exist in foreign-related copyright disputes as to 
the issues of infringement and initial ownership.
1234
 Holding on to the strict territoriality principle, 
another scholar maintains that the choice-of-law issue would not arise as long as the territoriality 
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Another group of scholars argues to the contrary in support of the existence of the choice-of-law 
problem in foreign-related copyright disputes.
1236
 Some commentators among them contend that this is 
due to disappearance of the territoriality principle. Such arguments are supported by observing that the 




 or the need for recognition of intellectual 
property extraterritorially
1239
 have made a break-out away from the classical territoriality principle. As 
observed by some academics, the existence of the choice-of-law issue is due to the fact that the 
territoriality principle faded away, along with the wider application of the principle of national 
treatment. As a result, IP rights have gained indirect extra-territorial effect.
1240
 Yet others consider that 
the concept of strict territoriality is no longer a specific character of IP rights because it is, to a certain 
extent, disappearing within the framework of international conventions; meanwhile, foreign and 
international legislative and judicial usage has confirmed the existence and importance of choice-of-




Apparently, judicial practice at People’s Courts that directly applied PRC law without considering the 
choice-of-law issue, was derived from a strict understanding of the territorial character of copyright. 
This strict understanding led to a conclusion among the judiciary that no choice-of-law issue exists in 
foreign-related copyright disputes. Although higher PRC judiciary keeps on emphasizing the 
importance of analysing the choice-of-law issue in foreign-related civil and commercial disputes, their 
fundamental misunderstanding of territoriality denies the existence of a choice-of-law problem in 
foreign-related copyright claims. In fact, the view that the choice-of-law problem does not exist in 
foreign-related copyright disputes is also shared by Judge JIANG, the former head of the IP Section in 
the SPC. He stated in a National Judges Forum that there is no need to apply foreign law in foreign-
related IP disputes because the territorial character of IP rights leads to the application of PRC law. He 
further concluded that adjudication of such disputes does not need to observe the formalities of 
describing and analysing the choice-of-law issue.
1242
 Opinions from the high judicial courts have not 
only misplaced the issue, but also demonstrated a lack of the communication between the judiciary 
and academia in the PRC, where most of the latter advocate focusing attention on issues of choice-of-
law in foreign-related copyright disputes. What People’s Courts should have done was, for such 
disputes, to follow the standard procedure for dealing with a foreign-related civil dispute, i.e. first 
identify any foreign elements involved, analyse the choice-of-law issue, and apply the law designated 
thereby. 
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5.5.2 Reasons for non-application of foreign laws 
For this chapter, an attempt was made to research as many judgments as possible. In all the judgments 
that are accessible, almost no foreign law has been applied by People’s Courts. As mentioned in the 
previous section, except for some cases where foreign law was applied to the initial ownership issue, 
People’s Courts applied only PRC law along with some provisions of international treaties in 
situations where the provisions of PRC law and those of international treaties were not consistent with 
each other, provided that the PRC had not made a treaty reservation on those provisions. Reasons for 
the non-application of foreign law in the vast majority of foreign-related copyright disputes can be 
articulated as described next. 
 
5.5.2.1 No necessity to apply foreign laws 
This reason is interwoven with the reason for misunderstanding the “territoriality” principle. As 
analysed, People’s Courts have employed a strict territorial approach, which leads to the conclusion 
that the choice-of-law problem does not exist in foreign-related copyright disputes. Based on such a 
conclusion, People’s Courts ruled that a foreign-related copyright dispute heard by a People’s Court 
should be adjudicated in accordance with PRC law. This point of view is also explained in the Beijing 
Answers. It explicitly states that in a civil dispute about copyright, if the foreign party claims 
copyright protection in the PRC, it is not necessary to refer to any choice-of-law rule because, under 
this circumstance, it is PRC law that should apply, not foreign law.
1243
 A Beijing High People’s Court 
judge supported this view by stating that the non-application of foreign law in foreign-related IP rights 
disputes stems from the territorial character of IP rights.
1244
 The same judge, however, commented in 
the Beijing Film Academy case that the court of first instance should have applied French law to 
adjudicate the infringing act that occurred in France.
1245
 This inconsistency again shows the 
misunderstanding about the territoriality principle in IP rights. The SPC shares the same opinion as the 
Beijing Answers. Judge JIANG pointed out that there is no necessity to apply foreign law to foreign-





5.5.2.2 The result of applying choice-of-law rules  
In the copyright cases where choice-of-law issues were analysed, the People’s Courts selected PRC 
law as the governing law. This was because the choice-of-law approach taken by those courts 
designated the application of PRC law, such as, when some courts applied the lex loci delicti rule, it 
was because the place of infringement was in the PRC so that PRC law was the applicable law.
1247
 
Furthermore, as shown in the Dryden & Groenendal case, supra, the court held that since the plaintiffs 
claimed copyright protection in the PRC, the content, scope, initial ownership of their rights and the 
infringement claim should be determined according to PRC law since it is the law of the place for 
which the protection is claimed. Under this circumstance, the lex loci protectionis rule led also to the 
application of PRC law. In the Tsuburaya case, supra, the court ruled that PRC law should apply to 
the infringement dispute because there were more connecting factors pointing to the PRC, such as the 
place of infringement, the place of the defendant’s establishment and the location of the court. Thus, 
an indicated application of the closest connection rule led to the application of PRC law. 
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5.5.2.3 The preference of PRC judges for applying PRC law 
In addition to the above reasons, the fact that People’s Courts directly applied PRC law seems to 
explain the attempt of PRC judges applying PRC law in foreign-related copyright disputes. In fact, 
such an attempt can be also seen in the disputes about other subjects. A statistical report on analysing 
PRC judicial practices in foreign-related civil and commercial disputes
1248
 demonstrated that 87% of 
foreign-related civil and commercial disputes had been adjudicated according to PRC law, and another 
13% of those cases according to international treaties, international customs, foreign law and the laws 
of Hong Kong and Macao.
1249
 This data coincides with those published in the yearly review of judicial 
practice in PRC PIL where it shows that, in 2001
1250
, 88% of cases applied PRC law; the same in 
2002;
1251
 88% in 2003;
1252
 94% in 2004;
1253
 92% in 2005;
1254
 96% in 2006;
1255
 97% in 2007;
1256
 97% in 
2008
1257
 and 96.9% in 2009.
1258
 A closer look at this data reveals an increasing trend by PRC courts to 
apply PRC law. The reasons for the preference of PRC law may be analysed for the following 
considerations: the difficulty of proving and applying foreign law, the ease of applying PRC law, 
which PRC judges know best, and absence of argument on the issue of the applicable law from the 
parties.
1259
 Nevertheless, it could be mentioned that judges’ natural preferences for applying the lex 
fori are not uncommon in other countries’ judicial practices.1260  
 
The practice at People’s Courts shows that, in adjudicating foreign-related copyright and related rights 
disputes, most courts did not analyse the choice-of-law issue involved, and even in the judgments 
where this issue had been analysed, the approaches taken by courts have varied. Furthermore, 
regardless whether or not the choice-of-law issue has been discussed in the judgments, all cases have 
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actually turned out to be governed by PRC law or some provisions of the Berne Convention, except 
for some cases where foreign law governed initial ownership. The reasons for such judicial practices 
may have their source in a misunderstanding of the territoriality principle because, according to the 
judiciary, the strict territorial character of copyright means there is no possibility of applying foreign 
law and therefore no existence of a choice-of-law issue in foreign-related copyright disputes. In any 
event, the practices of lacking the awareness of the choice-of-law issue and applying only PRC law are 
not unique in the PRC judicial practices and can be found in other fields of PRC law, as well. To a 
large extent, this practice is rather the rule than an exception. 
 
5.6 Legislative development in choice-of-law rules in foreign-related copyright dispute in 
the PRC  
5.6.1 General structure 
5.6.1.1 Separate chapter on IP rights 
While the PRC judiciary continues to ignore the existence of the choice-of-law issue in foreign-related 
IP rights disputes, the legislature and scholars have made attempts to regulate the matter: the Model 
Law, the drafts of the Statute on the Law Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations, as well as 
discussion papers submitted by the Chinese scholars have focused special attention on the matter of 
choice-of-law in foreign-related IP rights disputes, including copyright and related rights. During the 
legislative process that led to the above Statute, a discussion whether foreign-related IP rights disputes 
should be dealt with separately was carried out. Some scholars entertained opinions that there is no 
necessity of introducing specific provisions for IP rights, because IP is just a type of property, and as a 
result the issues related to IP rights can be dealt with in the section on property rights. It was also 
argued that since the infringement of IP rights is no more than a tort claim, it does not need to be 
treated differently from general tort claims.
1261
 It is fortunate that by recognizing the specific nature of 
IP rights and their importance in an international context, the legislature rejected such opinions and 
regulates IP rights related issues in a separate chapter. 
 
Although the majority favored separating IP rights from property rights, the question of where to 
position the Chapter on IP rights in that Statute also raised some concerns. Some scholars considered 
that it is more logical to put this Chapter subsequent to the Chapter on property rights, because IP has 
some similarity with standard property and can be treated as a special type of property.
1262
 This is also 
the approach taken by the Model Law. In the final versions of the PIL Statute, the Chapter on IP 
rights, because it is a special subject, was put after the Chapter on Obligations. 
 
5.6.1.2 No distinction made between copyright and industrial property rights 
It may be noted that the PIL Statute does not make a distinction between copyright and industrial 
property rights, and as a result the choice-of-law rules provided therein are equally applicable to 
copyright and industrial property rights. In this respect, the PIL Statute differs from the Model Law 
and the First Draft of the Statute because the latter two categorized and separated the types of IP rights 
and introduced choice-of-law rules for the main types of IP rights.  In comparison, the Model Law 
provides the most detailed choice-of-law rules as to IP rights. It not only categorizes specific types of 
                                                          
1261
 Chengzhi WANG, ‘Draft Statute on the Law Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations: Analysis on 
Intellectual Property Provisions 涉外民事关系法律适用法（草案）- 知识产权法条分析’ [in Chinese], paper 
presented at the Annual Conference of the Chinese Society of Private International Law 2010 Tianjin, PRC 中国
国际私法学会 2010年年会暨涉外民事关系法律适用法研讨会论文集. 
1262
 Jintang XU, ‘Several Issues on Chinese Legislation on Private International Law 关于我国国际私法立法的
几个问题’ [in Chinese] paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Chinese Society of Private International 
Law 2010, Tianjin, PRC 中国国际私法学会 2010年年会暨涉外民事关系法律适用法研讨会论文集. 
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 and other 
intellectual property,
1266
 but also sets forth specific types of issues and claims in relation to IP rights, 









 The First Draft only categorized and divided different types of IP rights 
into copyright (Article 57), patents (Article 58), trademarks (Article 59), and IP rights other than 
copyright, patents and trademarks (Article 60).  
 
The legislative method of distinguishing certain types of IP rights was, however, not followed in the 
subsequent drafts and the PIL Statute. It has been argued that distinguishing them would maintain the 
integrity of the choice-of-law rules applied in IP related disputes, while not affecting the application of 
other choice-of-law rules.
1271
 As observed by some scholars, since different types of intellectual 
property are sometimes intertwined, differentiating them would cause difficulty in characterizing them 
when choice-of-law problems are at stake.
1272
 For example, when a dispute concerning certain signs 
that are protected both under copyright law and trademark law is raised, shall the dispute be 
categorized as a copyright dispute and therefore provided with a choice-of-law rule as to copyright 
disputes, or be categorized as a trademark dispute accompanied by choice-of-law rules as to 
trademark?  
 
Although difficulty in characterizing could be encountered sometimes, it is a fact that the conditions 
for the existence and creation of different types of IP are so different that they could not just be 
ignored only for the sake of avoiding a difficulty in characterization. As discussed in the first Chapter 
of this dissertation, copyright and related rights bear an important characteristic – the non-formality 
requirement, and such non-formality is required by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Contrary to 
that, the creation of industrial property rights does require registration in the country where the rights 
                                                          
1263 Art. 93 of the Model Law “The existence, content and validity of the patent right are governed by the law of 
the place of application专利权的成立、内容和效力，适用专利申请地法。” 
1264
 Art. 94 of the Model Law “The existence, content and validity of the trademark right are governed by the law 
of the place of registration商标权的成立、内容和效力，适用注册登记地法” 
1265 Art. 95 of the Model Law “The existence, content and validity of the copyright are governed by the law of 
the place where the right is claimed著作权的成立、内容和效力，适用权利主张地法。” 
1266 Art. 96 of the Model Law “The existence, content and validity of other relevant rights included in the scope 
of intellectual property are governed by the law of the place where the rights are registered or claimed 属于知识
产权范围的其他有关权利，其成立、内容和效力，适用权利登记地法或者权利主张地法。” 
1267
 Art. 92 of the Model Law “The scope of intellectual property shall be decided in accordance with relevant 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the PRC and the relevant law of the PRC知识产权的范围，依
照中华人民共和国缔结或者参加的有关国际条约和中华人民共和国的有关法律确定。” 
1268
 Art. 97 of the Model Law “Intellectual property contracts are governed by the provisions of this law relating 
to contracts有关知识产权的合同，适用本法关于合同的规定。” 
1269
 Art. 98 of the Model Law “The intellectual property acquired by the employee in hi terms of reference is 
governed by the law regulating the employment contract有关受雇人在职务范围内取得的知识产权，适用调
整雇佣合同的法律。” 
1270 
Art. 99 of the Model Law “The legal remedy in torts in intellectual property is governed by the law of the 
place where the protection is sought知识产权侵权的法律救济，适用请求保护地法。” 
1271
 Jin HUANG and Rujiao JIANG, Understanding Act of the People’s Republic of China on the Application of 
Laws over Foreign-related Civil Relationships 中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法释疑与分析 [in 
Chinese], (Beijing, Law Press China 2011) 272; similarly, Changhai YANG, Discussion of the Conflict of Laws 
on Intellectual Property Rights 知识产权冲突法论 [in Chinese] (Xiamen, Xiameng University Press 2011) 345-
46 (who is of opinions that the differentiation of IP rights is not necessary in the matters of existence, validity, 
content, duration and termination of IP rights, but the differentiation is necessary when the initial ownership of 
IP rights are disputed). 
1272
 Xiang XU, argument put forward at the Advanced Symposium on the Statute on the Law Applicable to 
Foreign-related Civil Relations, documented in ‘Review of the Advanced Symposium on the Statute on the Law 
Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations in 2008 2008年涉外民事关系法律适用法高级研讨会综述’ [in 
Chinese] (2009) 12 CYPIL&CL中国国际私法与比较法年刊. 
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are intended to be created. Only when industrial property rights fulfill the registration requirement in a 
certain country, will they be valid and be granted protection in that particular country. Accordingly, 
they will not be valid for protection in a country where those rights are not registered. From the 
perspective of choice-of-law, the distinct registration requirement marks one of the key differences 
between IP rights without registration, such as copyright and related rights, and those with registration, 
e.g. patents and trademarks. Therefore, when the issues of creation, scope and extent of IP rights are at 
stake, different choice-of-law solutions should be provided for copyright and related rights on the one 
hand, and industrial property rights on the other. To do so not only respects the specific characteristics 
of IP rights, but also provides clarity and legal certainty in dealing with these rights, because for 
registered rights, once they are registered, the place of registration will be certain and the protection of 
that country will be granted. Accordingly, the designation to the law of that country would be the 
proper solution to the claims involving the issues of creation, scope and extent of the registered rights. 
For copyright and related rights, as will be analysed below, a separate choice-of-law rule designating 





5.6.1.3 IP rights related matters 
The IP rights related matters had been changed in the course of the legislative procedure of the PIL 
Statute. The Model Law is still the one providing the most detailed rules in this respect. As mentioned 
in the preceding sections, the material claims of IP rights, i.e. claims intrinsically related to IP rights, 
such as the existence, content and validity of IP rights, as well as IP rights related issues such as 
contractual IP rights claims, torts in IP and job-related IP are dealt with. Such a wide scope of subject 
matters was, however, not followed in the drafts, the discussion papers or the PIL Statute. 
 
The First Draft laid down only the choice-of-law provisions for material claims of IP rights, more 
specifically, the issues of the obtainment, content and effect of IP rights. Although there is no 
provision for IP rights related issues, it is considered that they should be referred to the general rules 
for certain specific subjects, e.g. infringement of IP rights is included under general tort claims and 
provided with the lex loci delicti rule (Article 78), supplemented by the exceptions of the closest 
connection rule (Article 79), the common nationality rule (Article 80), and limited party autonomy 
(Article 81). In other words, in this draft, IP rights related issues were not given any special attention. 
That situation has been changed in the subsequent discussion papers, the Draft Statute 2010
1274
 and the 
PIL Statute under which specific IP related issues, i.e. contractual claims and infringement are 
specifically dealt with.  
 
5.6.2 Prescribed choice-of-law rules 
The PRC PIL Statute provides specific choice-of-law rules for IP rights claims. 
“Chapter 7 Intellectual Property Rights 
Article 48 
Ownership and contents of intellectual property rights are governed by the law of the State for 
which protection is claimed. 
Article 49 
The parties may, by agreement, choose the law which is applicable to the assignment and 
licensing of intellectual property rights. In the absence of such a choice, the assignment and 
licensing of intellectual property rights shall be governed by the provisions of this Law 
concerning the law applicable to contracts. 
Article 50 
                                                          
1273
 Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261). 
1274
 Published on 28 August 2010 after the second reading, available at: <www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1116/2010-
08/28/content_1593162.htm> accessed on 2 October 2012 (Draft Statute 2010). 
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Infringement of intellectual property rights is governed by the law of the State for which 
protection is claimed. The parties may also, by agreement, choose the law of the forum after the 
infringing act has occurred.”12751276 
 
5.6.2.1 Ownership and contents 
The Statute provides that the law of the country for which protection is claimed shall govern the 
ownership and contents of IP rights (Article 48). As far as copyright is concerned, the process of 
drafting this article has demonstrated the legislator’s hesitation about choosing which approach to 
follow. Should it be a territorial or a universal approach?  
 
5.6.2.1.1 First Draft 
In the First Draft, the legislator chose the creator’s law as the law applicable to the existence, content 
and validity of copyright.
1277
 This provision was criticized as a wrong solution because it neglected the 
territorial character of copyright.
1278 It was also unclear as to what the creator’s law meant: was it the 
national law of the creator or the law of the place where the creator habitually resides? Furthermore, 
the legislator did not state whether timing is required in identifying the creator’s law, e.g. the creator’s 
law at the time of the creation or once the creation is completed?  
 
5.6.2.1.2 Draft Statute 
In the Draft Statute, the legislator changed its approach by providing that “[f]or intellectual property 
rights, they should be governed by the law of the country of protection, or the law of the country of 
origin”. This provision deserves even more criticism. First, the regulated subject matter was unclear. 
As stated in its wording, the legislator mentioned only “intellectual property rights” as the subject 
matter, but did not clarify what matters were actually included in that. Since the legislator drafted two 
other provisions concerning transfer and infringement of IP rights, it can be deduced that the subject 
matter “intellectual property rights” stated by the legislator in this provision was intended to include 
the material claims of IP rights. Still, it was ambiguous about what exact issues the legislator intended 
to have regulated here: in terms of copyright and related rights, the initial ownership or the extent of 
protection or the termination of the right? Second, the choice-of-law rules provided by the legislator 
were so broad that they would cause legal uncertainty in practice. The legislator provided alternative 
choice-of-law rules for IP rights: the law of the country of protection or the law of the country of 
origin. Since the Draft Statute neither differentiated the types of IP rights, nor clarified the regulated 
subjects of IP rights, it would be very confusing for litigants to predict which law would govern their 
IP rights. It would be even more confusing when it would concern copyright and related rights 
because, as analysed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, there are still controversies in European 
countries about the law to be applied to the issues of existence, content, scope and initial ownership of 
copyright, and the two opposing principles of territoriality or universality are adopted for these issues. 
Thus, if the legislator were to set down opposing rules of the lex loci protectionis or the lex originis for 
such issues, it would not only be illogical, but also leave much discretion to the courts and cause legal 
uncertainty about the applicable law.  
 
5.6.2.1.3 Discussion papers 
                                                          
1275
 “第七章 知识产权 
         第四十八条 知识产权的归属和内容，适用被请求保护地法律。 
         第四十九条 当事人可以协议选择知识产权转让和许可使用适用的法律。当事人没有选择的，适用
本法对合同的有关规定。 
         第五十条 知识产权的侵权责任，适用被请求保护地法律，当事人也可以在侵权行为发生后协议选
择适用法院地法律。” 
1276
 Translated by NZ. For an English translation of the Statute, see Ning Zhao (supra n 769) 312-14. 
1277
 Art. 57 of the First Draft. 
1278
 Changhai YANG (supra n 1271) 345; contra Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261). 
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The Chinese Society of Private International Law (hereinafter CSPIL) has been actively involved in 
consulting about the PIL Statute, and produced several discussion papers
1279
 that suggested different 
approaches.
1280
 First, these papers recommended separate choice-of-law rules for initial ownership of 
IP rights. In this respect, the law of the country for which protection of the IP product is claimed is 
suggested as a general rule.
1281
 For collaborated works and commissioned works, as well as works 
made during employment, the law of the contract governing such collaboration, commission or 
employment relations would apply. The recommended rules should have been welcomed in the final 
version of the Statute because, as far as copyright and related rights are concerned, the lex loci 
protectionis is the logical solution for determining initial ownership of copyright and related rights. 
Furthermore, providing choice-of-law rules for the complex issue of identifying initial ownership in 
specific relations such as collaboration, commission and employment is a big step that the CSPIL has 
taken towards achieving legal certainty and predictability. As will be analysed in the following 
paragraphs, it is indeed a pity that choice-of-law rules for determining the initial ownership in 
collaborated, commissioned works are still lacking in the PIL Statute. It should, nevertheless, be 
mentioned that the discussion papers also should have taken into account the situation where no 
agreement has been made between the parties. 
 
The discussion papers advocated application of the lex loci protectionis rule to other material claims of 
IP rights. The CSPIL defined such claims as consisting of the existence, validity, qualification, scope 
and categorization of IP rights.
1282
 It has at one place further divided the existence and validity of IP 
rights and the qualification, scope and categorization of IP rights into two provisions,
1283
 the choice-of-
law rule provided therein are, however, the same: the lex loci protectionis. The reason for the further 
division is unknown. It may have something to do with the consideration that this could better 
categorize the subject matters and provide clarity in terms of the application of the choice-of-law rules. 
In any event, such a further division was not necessary because, insofar as copyright and related rights 
are concerned, applying the lex loci protectionis to material claims respects the territorial character of 
copyright, and the scope of its application should be broader to encompass the existence, validity, 
qualification, scope and categorization of the rights in one provision. 
 
It is to be noted that these discussion papers use a concept called “intellectual product” rather than 
“intellectual property”. This will cause doubts from the stand point of accuracy. “Intellectual property” 
is a widely used and recognized concept. It refers to a number of distinct types of creations of the 
mind, for which a set of exclusive rights are recognized, and these exclusive rights include both 
economic and moral rights. While the concept of intellectual product used by the CSPIL refers to 
                                                          
1279
 Discussion drafts include San Ya Discussion Paper, Beijing Discussion Paper, Hangzhou Discussion Paper. 
And the final legislative suggestion was provided on 1 March 2010. 
1280
 Arts. 68-71 of the Hangzhou Discussion Paper; Arts. 55-57 of the Beijing Discussion Paper; Arts. 55-57 of 
the Sanya Discussion Paper produced. 
1281
 Art. 70 of the Hangzhou Discussion Paper. “知识产权的原始权属关系依如下规定确定准据法：(1) 除另
有规定外，知识产权的原始权属关系适用知识产品被主张保护地法。(2) 对于合作完成的知识产品，知
识产权的原始权属关系适用该合作创造合同的准据法。(3) 对于因雇佣或委托完成的知识产品，知识产
权的原始权属关系适用该雇佣合同或委托合同的准据法。” (The law applicable to the initial ownership of 
an intellectual property right shall be determined as follows: 1. Unless otherwise provided, the initial ownership 
of an intellectual property right shall be determined by the law of the place for which the protection of the 
intellectual product is claimed. 2. As for collaborated works, the initial ownership of IP rights shall be governed 
by the law applicable to the collaboration contract. 3. As for commissioned works or works made during 
employment, the initial ownership of IP rights is governed by the law of the commission contract or employment 
contract.) [Translated by NZ] 
1282
 Art. 55 of the Beijing Discussion Paper “知识产权的成立，效力及其定性，客体范围和类别适用知识产
品被主张保护地法的法律。” (The existence, validity, and the qualification, scope and categorization of 
intellectual property rights shall be determined by the law of the place for which the protection of the intellectual 
product is claimed. [Translated by NZ] 
1283
 Art. 68 of the Hangzhou Discussion Paper concerns the qualification, scope and categorization of IP rights 
and Art. 69 for the existence and validity of IP rights. 
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products of the mind, the concept itself may however seem more related to physical things, and 
therefore arguably undermines the intangible nature of works of the mind. In addition, it can be seen 
that the use of the words “intellectual property” and “intellectual product” are inconsistent because, on 
the one hand “intellectual property rights” are recognized by providing rules for them, while on the 
other it requires the application of the law of the place for which protection of “intellectual product” is 
claimed. The logic of this could barely be explicable. Thus, for the sake of accuracy, the wording 
“intellectual property” should be used. 
 
5.6.2.1.4 The lex loci protectionis or the lex originis for initial ownership of copyright 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the applicable law for initial ownership of copyright and related 
rights has been and still is intensively debated, either in scholarly writings, in legal practice, or in 
contributions made by academic groups. The lex loci protectionis approach has been criticized for the 
difficulties encountered in the context of international exploitation of a copyrighted work, because the 
distributive application of the law of each country concerned may cause inconsistency in this respect, 
and provide no foreseeability as to the rights owner of the work.
1284
 In this context, the universality 
based lex originis rule is suggested, i.e. to apply one single national copyright law to determine initial 
ownership of copyright and related rights throughout the world. In such a way international 
exploitation of copyrighted works could be promoted. Nevertheless, the application of the lex originis 
rule has drawbacks. First, the definition of lex originis is not clear. The connecting factor to the 
country of origin is often referred to those provided in Article 5(4)(c) of the Berne Convention. Still, 
that causes confusion in terms of its application. The concept of country of origin concerns nationality, 
habitual residence and the first publication. As discussed in the preceding chapters, when using the 
place of the first publication as the determinative factor in identifying the country of origin, one may 
speculate about works not yet published. Even for those works that have been published, concerns 
may still arise when they have been published simultaneously in several countries, in particular when 
they have been uploaded to the Internet. Under these circumstances, the place of the first publication 
would be very difficult, if even possible, to identify.
1285
 Also, the place of the first publication could be 
subject to manipulation by, e.g. large media corporations as a technique of making sure a work made 




Neither will the law of the creator’s country or habitual residence at the time of creation be a proper 
choice-of-law rule, since application of such a rule will not be consistent with the territorial character 
of the right, especially when some fundamental value of the right is at stake. Metzger correctly pointed 
out, although a country might apply the lex originis to the initial ownership of a work, in practice its 




In addition, the different lex originis approaches adopted by two academic groups: ALI – the law of 
the creator’s residence at the time of the creation of the work; and Japanese-Korean – the law of the 
state in which the work is initially created, demonstrate the difficulty of achieving a consensus as to 
the definition of lex originis. 
 
Applying the lex originis to the issue of initial ownership of copyright and related rights also raises 
some doubts about its legitimacy because, as discussed in Chapter 1, copyright law comprises a 
system of policies that balance the interests of the rights owner against those of public as a whole, and 
it represents the cultural, social and economic policy of the country that grants such rights. Since the 
lex originis focuses on the law of one country that would then be universally recognized by others, one 
may doubt that the value or the interests balanced by one particular country according to that country’s 
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 M.M. van Eechoud 2003 (supra n 15) 179-80; Rochelle Dreyfuss’s presentation (summarized by Frank 
Beckstein) (supra n 943)  24; Paul Goldstein 2001 (supra n 57) 103 et seq. 
1285
 Dorothee Thum 2005 (supra n ) 278-79, 282. 
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 Fawcett and Torremans 2011 (supra n 13) para 13.94. 
1287
 Axel Metzger 2010 (supra n 768) 160-61. 
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social and economic needs would have to be recognized by another.
1288
 Furthermore, as discussed in 
the section that follows this one, the territoriality of copyright and related rights will remain for multi-
state infringement disputes. In this context, the application of the lex loci protectionis to the initial 
ownership issue will ensure the uniform application of the same law. Consequently, the territorially-
based lex loci protectionis rule is the more appropriate approach for determining the initial ownership 
of copyright. 
 
The legislative process that led to Article 48 of the PIL Statute witnessed a legislative shift from a 
universal approach to a territorial approach. The final incorporation into the PIL Statute of the lex loci 
protectionis for issues of initial ownership and the content of copyright and related rights should be 
welcome because it affirms the general territorial character of copyright and related rights, and 
respects the economic and cultural policy of the country of protection.
1289
 Notably, this approach is in 
line with codifications and judicial practice in other jurisdictions.
1290
 Furthermore, adopting the lex loci 
protectionis for those matters duly takes into consideration the fact that the PRC is still a copyright-
importing country, and it moves in the direction of implementing national strategic decisions to 
strengthen IP rights protection. 
 
5.6.2.2 Infringement 
For infringements of IP rights, the PIL Statute adopts the lex loci protectionis as the basic rule and 
equips it with a moderate deviation – in the form of limited party autonomy: the parties may make an 
ex post choice for the lex fori (Article 50). These rules are comparatively liberal because as described 
in Chapter 3, it is still highly controversial whether party autonomy should be allowed for IP rights 
infringement claims, given the specific nature of IP rights.  
 
In this respect, the legislative process in the PRC was, however, going in a different direction. Rather 
than discussing which choice-of-law rule should be adopted in the PIL Statute, some scholars were 
questioning the need to provide specific rules for infringement of IP rights.
1291
 According to one of 
them, applying the lex loci protectionis or the possibility of a limited party autonomy in infringement 
of IP rights repeats the general tort rules.
1292
 He also wondered whether it is necessary to allow limited 
party autonomy in IP rights infringement cases. As for the lex loci protectionis rule, although he 
admitted its wider scope of application, he doubted, given the influence of the lex loci delicti in tort 
claims, whether in practice courts would put aside the lex loci delicti and apply laws other than the lex 
loci delicti, e.g. the law of the place of registration of the registered rights. Furthermore, even if the lex 
loci protectionis were applied in such claims, the closest connection rule provided in Article 2 (Article 
3 of the Draft Statute 2010) could be used to circumvent its application. Still further, as to the fact that 
a common nationality or common domicile rule is provided as an exception to the general tort claims 
rule, but not as to the IP infringement claims rule, he raised a question whether parties who have the 
same nationality in an IP infringement dispute may invoke the common nationality exception. Further 
along the lines of this question, he contended that the lack of an order of preference as to general tort 
and IP infringement claims will cause confusion in practice.
1293
 Hence, he was of the opinion that it 
was unnecessary to introduce specific choice-of-law rules for IP rights infringement. 
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 This argument has been raised by Dário Moura Vicente in terms of applying the lex originis to the creation, 
scope of the rights. See Dário Moura Vicente (supra n 15) 261-62. 
1289
 Contra, Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261); Changhai YANG (supra n 1271) 345-46 (who is in favour of the 
universality principle in the aspect of the initial ownership of unregistered rights). 
1290
 Swiss PIL Art. 110(1); Belgian PIL Art. 93, with the exception of industrial property rights; German courts 
endorse the lex loci protectionis (Schutzland principle) governing also the initial ownership of copyright; CLIP 
Principles Art. 3:201(1); Rome II has been criticized for not addressing this issue, for details, see Nerina 
Boschiero (supra n 338) 102-03. 
1291
 Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261); contra Changhai YANG (supra n 1271) 300-18. 
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 Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261). 
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 Chengzhi WANG (supra n 1261). 
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The same opinion was put forward in the discussion papers produced by the CSPIL. They introduced 
no specific choice-of-law rule for such claims and instead referred to rules for general tort claims. 
They recommended the lex loci delicti as a general rule with the exceptions of the closest connection 





5.6.2.2.1 The needs for specific choice-of-law rules for IP rights infringement disputes  
It is to be pointed out, however, that there is a need to provide specific choice-of-law rules for IP 
rights infringement disputes, including copyright and related rights. This is due to the specific nature 
of IP rights because they are territorially limited, and they are vested by a specific country’s law. As 
argued in the preceding chapters, it is more appropriate to apply the lex loci protectionis to 
infringement of IP rights because such an application would not only respect the territorial nature of IP 
rights, but also offer the advantage in practice that it does not require identifying the place of 
infringement. In spite of that, an unlimited party autonomy cannot be allowed as to IP infringement 
claims because it is commonly recognized that certain issues that are inherently related to the existence 
of IP Rights are not susceptible to contracting out by the parties.
1295
 In fact, most jurisdictions are 
reluctant to accept party autonomy in this respect; in particular, Rome II has made an express 
exclusion.
1296
 Again, due to the territoriality principle, the common nationality or common domicile 
exception cannot be accepted in IP infringement claims since the connecting factor of the common 
nationality or domicile may have nothing to do with the IP rights themselves. Furthermore, the 
traditional lex specialis derogat legi generali principle will eliminate the expressed doubt about lack of 
placing of general tort and IP infringement on a hierarchic scale. As a matter of fact, providing specific 
choice-of-law rules for IP rights infringement disputes will provide clear guidance to courts for 
adjudicating them. 
 
Codifying the lex loci protectionis as the general rule for infringement of copyright and related rights 
will not only respect the territorial nature of these rights, but will also protect the legitimate rights of 
the rights owner and serve the reasonable expectations of the parties because in most foreign-related IP 
infringement disputes, the place for which protection is claimed is often the place of the residence of 
the defendant, or the defendant’s principal place of business.1297 Furthermore, in online copyright 
infringement cases, the place of protection will be relatively easier to locate than the place of 
infringement. The same holds true in the cases where one infringing act is subsequently repeated in 
more than one country. Under such circumstances, the lex loci protectionis will be the more suitable 
rule.
1298





5.6.2.2.2 The needs for limited party autonomy for IP rights infringement disputes 
Introducing a limited degree of party autonomy to infringement of IP rights, including copyright and 
related rights cases, was inspired by the Swiss PIL Act, under which an ex post choice of the lex fori 
can be chosen during the course of such claims.
1300
 In addition to providing the parties with the 
advantage of legal certainty, such limited party autonomy can enhance judicial efficiency because 
once the parties agree on the application of the lex fori in this respect, the claim could be quickly 
resolved by a court. Along similar lines, this rule may solve the problem of the distributive application 
of the laws caused by the application of the lex loci protectionis in multi-state infringement cases, 
including infringements committed on the Internet, since in such cases the parties may choose one 
single law to simplify the legal proceedings. Furthermore, permitting limited party autonomy in 
                                                          
1294
 The Sanya Discussion Paper and the Beijing Discussion Paper. 
1295
 Marta Pertegás 2006 A (supra n 339) 237; ALI Principles, § 302 and CLIP Principles Art. 3:606 allow for 
the freedom of choice for the remedies in infringement claims. 
1296
 Art. 8(3). For criticism, see Nerina  Boschiero (supra n) 107-10; D. van Engelen 2008 (supra n 760) 446-47. 
1297
 Jin HUANG and Rujiao JIANG (supra n 1271) 291. 
1298
 Id, 291-92. 
1299
 Art. 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation; Art. 93 of the Belgian PIL; Art. 110(1) of the Swiss PIL. 
1300
 Art. 110(2). 
Choice-of-law in Cross-border Copyright and Related Rights Disputes 
 196
infringement claims will not contradict the sovereign interests of a country.
1301
 Still further, 
introducing this rule can overcome another potential disadvantage of the lex loci protectionis rule in IP 
infringement disputes, i.e. in the situation of an infringing act that occurs outside the place of 
protection, where the looser connection between the infringement and the place of protection may 
subject an application of the lex loci protectionis to question.
1302
 On the contrary, electing the lex fori 
in such circumstances will serve convenience and circumvent the rigidity of strictly applying the lex 




It is also to be noted that, differing from its Swiss source of inspiration, the PIL Statute does not limit 
the scope of party autonomy in patrimonial claims arising from the infringement of IP rights. One may 
wonder whether this is too far-reaching because it is generally accepted that certain characteristics that 
are inherent to IP rights are not susceptible to agreement by private parties.
1304
 The practical 
consequence of adopting limited party autonomy in copyright and related rights infringement claims 
will also raise some doubts. The legislature apparently expected that, after the dispute has arisen, the 
parties would agree on PRC law to govern their disputes. Since PRC law will not be a choice enabling 
both parties to prevail, one could hardly ever imagine that any party would agree to that. 
 
5.6.3 Characteristics of the prescribed choice-of-law rules 
Insofar as copyright and related rights are concerned, the choice-of-law rules prescribed in the PIL 
Statute have some important characteristics.  
 
First and foremost, the PRC legislature recognized the existence of choice-of-law problems in cross-
border copyright and related rights disputes. As described in section 4 of this Chapter, PRC courts 
have generally followed the practice that no foreign law should apply in such disputes, irrespective of 
the issues involved in them. This is mostly the result of their ignorance about the existence of the 
choice-of-law problem. Contrary to that, PRC academia and legislators recognized this problem and 
prescribed specific choice-of-law solutions for it. 
 
By prescribing the lex loci protectionis as the basic rule, the PIL Statute respects the territorial 
character of copyright and related rights. Accordingly, when material claims of copyright and related 
rights, specifically the content and infringement of copyright and related rights are in dispute, the 
principle that the law of the country for which protection of such right is claimed shall apply.  
 
For the more controversial issue of initial ownership of copyright and related rights, the final adoption 
of the lex loci protectionis rule confirmed that in the conflict of territoriality versus universality, 
territoriality prevailed in the PRC legislature. Furthermore, when a dispute concerns both infringement 
and material claims of copyright and related rights, prescribing the lex loci protectionis for both 
material claims and infringement of these rights ensures the uniform application of the same law. 
 
In addition, contrary to the opinions and practices of the PRC judiciary, the application of the lex loci 
protectionis affords a possibility of applying foreign law in cross-border copyright and related rights 
claims, because if the protection of such rights is claimed in a foreign country, the lex loci protectionis 
will designate the application of that foreign law. This may then strengthen the confidence of foreign 
parties to bring a claim in front of a PRC court, and, in turn, facilitate international exploitation and 
protection of copyright and related rights.  
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Last but not least, the PIL Statute prescribes that in cross-border copyright infringement disputes, the 
parties may choose the lex fori after the infringing act has occurred. Adopting such a rule set a 
milestone in PRC PIL history. This is not only because of the fact that leeway to mutually agree on the 
applicable law has never before been prescribed in the PRC for general tort claims, but also because 
whether party autonomy should be allowed at all in IP rights infringement disputes is still intensively 
debated worldwide. 
 
In short, the choice-of-law rules legislated for copyright and related rights are classic in the sense that 
the traditional territorial approach has been adopted, and as part of it the lex loci protectionis has been 
provided as a basic rule. This legislation is also current because a moderate deviation, i.e. limited party 
autonomy, has been introduced for claims of infringement of copyright and related rights. 
Nevertheless, there are still rooms for improvement with the rules provided in the PIL Statute, and 
therefore solutions need to be suggested. 
 
5.6.4 Remaining problems and suggested solutions 
With the inspiration from EU laws, European countries’ national laws and the three sets of academic 
contributions, problems in the following five aspects will be analysed and provided with solutions. 
 
5.6.4.1 Scope of the PIL Statute 
The Report on Draft Statute 2010 explained that the reason for dealing with ownership, content and 
infringement of IP rights in the PIL Statute is because in practice they are the most often disputed 
issues.
1305
 However, the issues of the existence, validity, duration and termination of these rights, 
which are not dealt with by the PIL Statute, are also often encountered in IP disputes. The explicit 
scope of the PIL Statute means that these issues fall outside its scope and are therefore not subject to 
the rules provided in its Article 48. It is nevertheless submitted that these issues should be governed by 
the lex loci protectionis not only because of the general attitude of the legislature towards the 
territorial approach, but also for the consideration of being logically consistent. The existence, content, 
validity and duration of copyright are closely related to each other: for example, the content of the 
right is linked to the decision to grant it, since that determines what exactly is granted and it could 
hardly ever be imagined that one law would govern the existence and validity of a copyright, and 
another govern its content. Thus, applying the same law - the law of the country for which protection 
is claimed - to the scope of the right, the type of work that is protected, and the identification of the 
creator of the work is a sensible, simple and harmonious approach. 
 
5.6.4.2 Initial ownership  
As far as ownership of IP rights is concerned, the PIL Statute, unlike the discussion papers submitted 
by the CSPIL, does not offer detailed solutions. It provides only the general rule of the lex loci 
protectionis without mentioning special situations involving, e.g., collaborated works and works being 
created under commission or employment contracts. One then has to figure out the method by which 
the initial ownership of a work arising from such special relationships should be determined. In this 
respect, one may reasonably propose either of two alternative approaches: first, keep the general rule 
of the lex loci protectionis, as provided in the PIL Statute, or second, characterize the initial ownership 
issue as one linked to the special relationship and, as a result, apply the law governing that relationship 
to the initial ownership of the works created in the course of the relationship. Both approaches have 
their pros and cons.  
 
For the first one, applying the lex loci protectionis to the initial ownership issue is concomitant with 
the territorial character of copyright and related rights and consistent with the economic and cultural 
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policy of the country of protection. Additionally, since it is generally agreed that other material claims 
of copyright will also be governed by the lex loci protectionis, applying the lex loci protectionis to 
initial ownership of copyright will have the advantage that, when copyright protection is claimed in a 
certain country, it will always be that country’s law that applies and always that same law that will 
apply to the material claims of copyright. However, in the context of international exploitation of a 
work, the application of the lex loci protectionis will lead to a distributive application of the law of 
each country concerned and thereby lead to conflicts in terms of who the initial owner of the work is. 
As has been covered in Chapter 1 supra, there are two different copyright protection systems in the 
world: the copyright system and the author’s right system. The application of multiple individual 
national laws to the initial ownership of a copyright may lead to a situation, e.g., where the creator (the 
employee) is considered as the initial rights owner in one country, but not so in another because the 
law of the latter country treats the employer as the initial rights owner. Such inconsistency may result 
in undue complexity in practice for international exploitation and distribution of copyrighted works. 
 
The second approach would apply the law governing the special relationship. This has to do with the 
rationale that creating a work is mostly a task performed by the employee or the person commissioned, 
which is the most important aspect of the relationship, presenting a close link between it and the initial 
ownership issue so that it is reasonable to apply the law governing the relationship to the initial 
ownership issue. As some scholars pointed out, this approach characterizes the issue of initial 
ownership of e.g. an employee-created work, as an employment-related contract issue.
1306
 The 
advantage of this approach is that it can prevent the distributive application of the law of each country 
of protection, because only one law – the law governing the special relationship - will govern the issue 
of initial ownership.
1307
 This law may not, however, be in line with the territoriality of copyright. 
Application of a law governing the relationship may also jeopardize the interest of the real creator of 
the work, namely the employee or the commissioned person because employers, having a dominant 
position in the relationship, may have the bargaining power to manipulate the law of the contract to be 
more favourable to them, e.g. choosing the law of a certain country that adopted the works-made-for-




It should be taken into account that the second alternative, applying the law of the contractual 
relationship to determine the initial ownership of the copyrighted works created under such contractual 
relationship, is preferable from the standpoint of international exploitation and protection of copyright 
and related rights. That is because, in such an approach, only one law will apply to the ownership 
issue, and it will therefore ensure legal certainty and foreseeability about the applicable law. This 
approach will also meet reasonable expectations of the parties because the creation of the work 
constitutes the purpose of such a relationship and is closely connected with that relationship. The 
parties involved in such a relationship may expect that the law governing their relationship will also 
determine the identity of the initial owner of the work. Additionally, this approach will respect for the 
relationship formed between the parties. It is noteworthy that adopting such an approach is not to deny 
the territoriality of copyright; instead, it would apply only in an exceptional situation where works are 
created under a special relationship. As a result, the lex loci protectionis rule prescribed in the PRC 
PIL Statute effectively remains as the general rule and a deviation as to the works created under 
special relationships will be an exception. 
 
In this context, reference needs to be made to the choice-of-law rules that will be applied to such 
relationships. When PRC judges hear such cases, they will, to begin, classify such relationships for 
purposes of identifying corresponding choice-of-law rules under PRC law. Employment relationships 
and commission relationships are contractual in nature, since the PIL Statute prescribes choice-of-law 
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rules for contractual relationships in general and for labour contracts
1309
 specifically. So these 
relationships should be discussed separately in so far as application of the choice-of-law rules is 
concerned. 
 
5.6.4.2.1 Works created pursuant to a commission relationship 
The law of the contract for the commission will determine the question who will enjoy initial 
ownership of the work - the commissioning person or the commissioned author. As expressly stated in 
Article 41
1310
 of the PIL Statute, party autonomy is endorsed for general contractual obligations and, as 
a result, the law chosen by the parties to apply to the contract will also govern the initial ownership of 
the concerned copyrighted work. In the absence of choice by the parties, the PIL Statute provides the 
modern rule turning to the place of the habitual residence of the party who effects the characteristic 
performance of a contract for the connecting factor, and applies the law of that place to govern the 
substance of the contract. In this context, if the parties have not agreed on the law applicable to their 
commission contract, the law of the state where the commissioned author has his habitual residence 
will apply. This rule has also been set forth in Article 5(13) of the Rules of the SPC on Several 
Questions Regarding the Application of Laws in the Trial of Cases of Contractual Disputes in Foreign-
involved Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter SPC Rules 2007),
1311
 under which there is a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the law which is applicable to commission contracts, i.e. the law of 
the commissioned person’s domicile shall apply. In addition, the PIL Statute states that other laws 
with which the contract has its closest connection may also apply. The reason for adding this rule was 
to emphasize the principle of the closest connection, which is often used for contractual claims.
1312
 The 
wording of this provision seems to imply that the characteristic performance doctrine and the closest 
connection rule are on an equal footing and therefore could be applied alternatively. However, since it 
is not always easy to identify what constitutes the characteristic performance of a contract, treating the 
closest connection rule as a further exception is probably more reasonable. Furthermore, doing so will 
introduce the flexibility that is necessary to implement the purpose of balancing commercial interests 
and adapting to the needs of commerce.
1313
 Thus, as a further exception to the characteristic 
performance rule, the law of the country with which the commission arrangement has the closest 
connection should apply to such even more exceptional cases to determine the initial ownership of 
works created pursuant to a commission contract. 
 
5.6.4.2.2 Works created pursuant to an employment relationship 
The initial ownership of works created by an employee should be governed by the law governing the 
contract for that employment. In this respect, reference can be made to Article 43 of the PIL Statute 
concerning the law applicable to labour contracts.
1314
 The Statute does not acknowledge party 
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 “The parties may, by agreement, choose the law which is applicable to their contract. In the absence of such a 
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autonomy for labour contracts. In order to protect the interests of employees, the Statute stipulates that 
a labour contract is governed by the law of the place where the employee carries out his work. In such 
a way, the Statute ensures that employees will enjoy the protection of the law of their place of work. If 
the place of work cannot be ascertained, recourse to the employer’s principal place of business should 
be had. As for dispatched labour, the law of the country where the dispatched labour is arranged may 
also apply. Clearly, the protection provided to employees in the PIL Statute is achieved by simply 
ensuring the foreseeability of the applicable law rather than achieving substantive justice. 
Correspondingly, for the matter of initial ownership, the law of the place where the employee carries 
out his work shall apply. When this place cannot be ascertained, the law of the employer’s principal 
place of business shall apply.  
 
Since Article 43 of the PIL Statute does not accept party autonomy for labour contracts, the risk that 
an employer, with a dominant position in the relationship may manipulate the law of the contract to be 
more favourable to them, e.g. choosing the law of a certain country endorsing the works-made-for-hire 
doctrine and granting all economic rights and moral rights, if any, to themselves can be reduced. As to 
a labour contract that contains a choice-of-law agreement, the choice made is deemed invalid. 
 
It is of note that Article 43 may have a limited scope of application, because the PRC Labour Law
1315
 
and the PRC Labour Contract Law
1316
 require mandatory application of PRC law in terms of the 
establishment of labour relationships in a form of contract between employees and organizations such 
as enterprises, individual-owned economic organizations and private non-enterprise units in the PRC 
(employers).
1317
 That then leads to a question as to the circumstances under which Article 43 shall 
apply. One Chinese scholar pointed out that this provision has a very limited scope of application 
since the employer governed by the PRC Labour Law and Labour Contract Law includes both 
enterprises incorporated pursuant to PRC law and enterprises which have their places of business 
located in the PRC, including foreign enterprises, and accordingly a labour contract concluded by the 
employee with such an enterprise will be exclusively governed by PRC law.
1318
 Furthermore, for a 
foreigner employed by a PRC enterprise, upon the foreigner’s receipt of a working permit, the 
permitted labour contract should also be exclusively governed by PRC Labour Contract Law.
1319
 
Under such circumstances, Article 43 of the Statute will not play a substantial role when such labour 
contracts apply. Thus, this provision applies, according to that scholar,
1320
 only to the labour contract 
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concluded between a dispatched worker and a foreign enterprise in the situation where such labour 
relationship is facilitated by an agent such as a Foreign Enterprises Service Company.
1321
 Nevertheless, 
in a recent judgment regarding a dispute about the labour contract concluded between a foreigner and 
a PRC legal entity, the court identified the foreign element involved in the contract: a foreign national, 
and referred to Article 43 of the Statute and designated the application of PRC law accordingly.
1322
 In 
that case, given the fact that the employer was a PRC legal entity, the court did not invoke the 
mandatory application of PRC Labour Contract Law in the way this scholar commented. Although the 
court finally did apply PRC Labour Law to this dispute, such an application was based on the 
designation made pursuant to Article 43 of the Statute. Therefore, the scope of the application of 
Article 43 in determining the law of labour contracts will still need to be further clarified by PRC 
courts. 
 
5.6.4.2.3 Collaborated works 
If there is a cooperation agreement between co-authors in different countries, the law governing that 
relationship can determine the initial ownership of their collaborated works. As a contractual 
obligation falls within the scope of the PRC PIL Statute, the law applicable to such contracts will be 
referred to in Article 41 of the Statute, i.e. respecting the parties’ choice as a general rule and in the 
absence of such a choice the law of the place of the habitual residence of the party who effects the 
characteristic performance of a contract shall apply. As discussed in the foregoing subsection on 
commissioned works, the closest connection rule will be applied as an exception. 
 
Although applying the law that governs a contract to the issue of initial ownership of the copyrighted 
work created under the relationship formed by that contract has the advantage of ensuring legal 
certainty, foreseeability and meeting the expectations of the parties, one may still argue that, if the 
creation of the work forms the core of the employment or commission relationship, why cannot the 
specific issue of initial ownership be directly left to the parties’ agreement, i.e. why not recognize it 
when the parties directly agree in their contract about who will be the initial owner of the work? This 
could, of course, be a solution. However, since it is unlikely that all agreements would contain a clause 
specifically determining the initial ownership of the work, as to those agreements that do not contain 
such a choice, a potential dispute on the initial ownership issue will still be on the horizon. Under such 
a circumstance, a choice-of-law solution would still have to be sought. Furthermore, if the employer or 
the commissioning person were to be a large producer of copyrighted works and occupy a dominant 
position in such a relationship, the initial ownership decision will mostly be under the control of that 
employer or commissioning person. Such an agreement on the ownership issue may jeopardize the 
best interests of the employee or the commissioned person who actually creates the work but normally 
holds a less favorable bargaining position. Thus, having a choice-of-law solution may be more 
justifiable in the sense that the commissioning person or the employer under such circumstances could 
not as easily take advantage of a dominant position to become the owner of the copyright as they 
might every well do in an agreement they impose.    
 
5.6.4.3 Scope of party autonomy 
Adopting limited party autonomy – an ex post choice of the lex fori - to copyright and related rights 
disputes introduces flexibility and enhances judicial efficiency, especially as to multi-state 
infringement disputes where the problem of the distributive application of large numbers of relevant 
laws will be likely to arise. Such party autonomy can also ameliorate the rigidity of the lex loci 
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protectionis rule when applied to copyright and related rights infringement disputes in situations 




Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the legislature ought to make the scope of the application of 
party autonomy more clear. Given the territorial character of copyright, it is generally believed that 
private party agreements as to some aspects of infringement claims e.g., agreements that certain acts 
should be deemed to constitute infringements, should not be permitted because that would be dealing 
with the economic and cultural policy of a country, which cannot be delegated to be contracted out by 
the parties. Instead, for the sake of greater judicial efficiency and to respect parties’ autonomy, the 
aspect of computing monetary relief could be agreed to by the parties and to then be governed by the 
lex fori. To do so would also enhance the practical applicability of this rule, because the parties, during 
or after the trial of  an infringement dispute, may also then agree on the amount of damages that the 
infringing party must pay to the infringed party in order to settle the claim. 
 
5.6.4.4 Multi-state infringement problems 
Determining the law applicable to an infringing act that subsequently affects several countries has 
always been difficult. This observation applies equally to cross-border copyright and related rights 
disputes. In the analogue or off-line world, multi-state infringement occurs, for example, when a book 
or a film is distributed in several countries without the permission of the rights owner. Under such 
circumstances, the application of the lex loci protectionis rule will, as already discussed, lead to a 
distributive application of the law of each state for which protection is claimed. From a practical point 
of view, it will not only be burdensome and costly to determine, verify and apply all the national laws 
that are involved, but also the end result may be hard to predict and a result that contradicts reasonable 
expectations may occur. In can, nevertheless, be admitted that the lex loci protectionis rule adopted in 
the PIL Statute may still play a positive role in the analogue world where cross border communication 
can still only be made to certain definite place(s). The problem of distributive application becomes 
magnified when the means of exploitation or distribution of a copyrighted work is transformed to acts 
on the Internet that have global effect, because in that context the alleged infringement occurs virtually 
everywhere - the so-called ubiquitous infringement. The distributive application of a multitude of laws 
will certainly be a disadvantage when attempting to apply them through the lex loci protectionis in 




Many scholars and academic groups have advocated adopting an approach of identifying one law or a 
small number of laws to govern an entire set of multi-state infringement claims.
1325
 The proposed 
solutions have been focused on whether the closest connection rule should be adopted, and if so, the 
law of state having the closest connection with the multi-state infringement should be applied.
1326
 
Indeed, while this approach can overcome problems arising from the distributive application of 
numerous laws and therefore also enhance judicial efficiency, it nevertheless has certain flaws when it 
comes to its application. First, determining the state having the closest connection with a multi-state 
infringement will be subject to the discretion of judges in individual cases and will not provide the 
parties with predictability and legal certainty. In this respect, some academic groups, such as the CLIP 
Group, the American Law Institute projects list the factors that should be taken into account, such as 
the habitual residence of the parties, the extent and the place of the activities of the parties, and so on. 
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However, as discussed in Chapter 4, their points of departure differ in terms of favouring rights 
owners more or leaning more in favour of alleged infringers. Thus, the end result of taking such 
factors into account may still be unforeseeable for the parties. Additionally, adopting a closest 
connection approach may not have a statutory basis under PRC law. Under the PIL Statute, the closest 
connection rule is to be applied only when its provisions so state, or in a situation where the Statute 
and other laws do not specify a choice-of-law rule for a certain foreign-related civil relationship.
1327
 
Such rules mean that an IP rights infringement that has been expressly covered by the Statute could 
not be dealt with by recourse to the closest connection rule. In addition, the PRC legislature’s 
preference for legal certainty
1328
 may also lead to questions about acceptability of the closest 
connection rule for multi-state infringement disputes. 
 
This writer submits that, even though multi-state infringement will be occurring more often along with 
increased development of high technology, the underlying territoriality principle should still be 
respected. In other words, the lex loci protectionis rule should always remain as the general rule even 
for multi-state infringement claims. However, in the interests of efficiency and enhancing cross-border 
exploitation of copyrighted works, a certain amount of flexibility can be introduced when such claims 
are alleged. In the context of that, the closest connection rule would need to be applied, but only as an 
exception in those situations where the countries involved cannot be specifically identified. This 
approach will present a major challenge to the PRC’s choice-of-law rules because People’s Courts will 
have to identify the connecting factors to the infringement involved in a dispute and use them to 
choose a single law to apply to the entire infringing activity. When determining the state having the 
closest connection, People’s Courts will need to consider the infringement in dispute as a whole and 
take into consideration the following factors: 1. the habitual residences or the principal places of 
business of the parties; 2. the place(s) where the substantial activities furthering the multi-state 
infringement were committed; 3. the place(s) where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial 
in relation to the infringement in its entirety. In addition, a previously-formed relationship among the 
parties, such as, in the context of copyright, co-authorship or works being made under commission or 
employment should also be points of attachment in multi-state infringement, because the parties in 
such relationships should be able to predict the law governing their relationships will also govern the 
multi-state infringement claims. Pinpointing these factors means focusing on the factual details of a 
multi-state infringement in dispute. Additionally, given the close relation that the issues of the 
existence, scope and duration of the right have with the infringement of the right, this rule should also 
apply to such issues when they are raised as preliminary or incidental issues in multi-state 
infringement disputes.  
 
Suggesting the closest connection rule for multi-state infringement claims will present a major 
challenge for judicial treatment of the PRC’s choice-of-law rules, because People’s Courts will have to 
identify and weigh the connecting factors involved in order to choose a single country’s law to apply 
to an entire infringement. In other words, this rule will allow some latitude to the PRC courts in 
deciding the applicable law. Given the fact that the PRC is a civil law country having statutory law, 
how to apply the rule of the “closest connection” and give effect to its application will raise concerns. 
 
The “closest connection” rule is, however, not new to the PRC statute, or to judicial practice at 
People’s Courts. Prior to enactment of the PIL Statute, this rule was used mainly for contractual claims 
and has been extended to others step-by-step.
1329
 The level of importance of this rule has been, along 
with the adoption of the PIL Statute, raised from a specific provision to a principle of general 
application. As set down in Article 2 of the Statute, in those cases where the Statute and other laws do 
                                                          
1327
 Art. 2(2) “Where this Law or other laws do not specify the law which is applicable to a certain foreign-
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not specify a choice-of-law rule for a certain foreign-related civil relation, the law to which the 
foreign-related civil relation has the closest connection shall apply. Although the principle is worded 
as a subsidiary rule in this provision, the fact that it is embodied and applied in the subsequent 
provisions of the Statute provides a reason to regard it as one of the basic principles of the Statute. 
Moreover, the Report on Draft Statute 2010 demonstrated the desire of the PRC legislature to adopt it 
as a basic one.
1330
 The research on the PRC’s judicial practice in this respect also demonstrated that the 
“closest connection” rule has remained popular in People’s Courts.1331 Thus, the ‘closest connection’ 
has been and can still be accepted by the PRC legislature and judiciary.  
 
Attention may be given to consequences of the application of this rule. PRC courts have the intention 
to apply PRC law because “the courts generally only consider the connection between China and the 
dispute at issue to see if the connection is close enough to justify that China has the closest 
connection”.1332 Due to the lack of legal reasoning in judgments, it is difficult to see how PRC judges 
have reached the application of PRC law by analysing the closest connection with the dispute. The 
same problem may also arise in the context of multi-state copyright and related rights infringement 
disputes, since PRC courts may only apply PRC law when identifying the one law governing the entire 
infringement dispute. In order to prevent such blunt application in such claims, some factual 
connecting factors for the determination of the closest connection, as discussed above, should be 
emphasized. 
 
Thus, the lex loci protectionis rule is still the basic rule in infringement disputes of copyright and 
related rights. A rule designed for multi-state infringement claims should only be used for exceptional 
cases. Thus, a definition needs to be introduced in order to clarify when and under what conditions an 
exception rule for multi-state infringement can be invoked. In this respect, in situations where 
infringing activities were actually facilitated through ubiquitous media, which led to infringements 
arguably committed in every country which the facilitated infringement could have reached, and if the 
countries alleged in these infringement claims cannot be specifically identified, then the court may 
apply the law of the country having the closest connection to these claims. 
 
It should nevertheless be mentioned that, although the rules suggested above may not provide full 
legal certainty and foreseeability as to the applicable law, the efficiency interests that such rules 
augment will outweigh the legal certainty drawback. 
 
5.6.4.5 Separation of copyright and related rights from industrial property rights 
As already discussed, special characteristics of copyright and related rights should be addressed 
specifically from the perspective of choice-of-law. First, this is because of the non-registration 
requirement endorsed in international copyright and related rights treaties. Because of non-registration, 
copyright and related rights could not be attached to any physical place that would constitute a 
connecting factor in identifying the law applicable to a dispute, unlike what the registration or 
deposition procedures do for registered industrial property rights. In addition, by nature, literary, 
scientific and artistic works are ubiquitous in the sense that they are independent of physical links with 
any territory and, because of that, they cannot be situated in a given country. Thus, copyright and 
related rights need to be differentiated from other IP rights that require registration in terms of finding 
a governing law, in particular in the aspect of the rights as such, e.g. the initial ownership and extent of 
protection.  
 
                                                          
1330
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5.6.5 How and where to recommend new solutions 
Since the PRC PIL Statute has laid down specific rules for IP rights claims, one may wonder how and 
where to introduce the above-suggested solutions. Nevertheless, these solutions can be adopted by 
means of a binding judicial interpretation by the SPC. As discussed in section 5.1.2.1, the SPC has a 
quasi-law-making function. In the situation where the law is not clear or too general, the SPC is 
authorized to draft judicial interpretations to clarify rules or to fill in gaps left by the statutes. This may 
sound odd to some, but in any event the judicial interpretations issued by the SPC are a particular 
feature of the PRC legal system. In fact, in reality one can better grasp the legislative intention, or so 
to say, the political intention of the Chinese Communist Party by reading the judicial interpretations of 
the SPC, because in the PRC, the legal system is indistinguishable from the political system, and 
accordingly the laws that are effectively implemented are not necessarily made by the legal system, 
but rather they reflect the political priorities of the Chinese Communist Party.  
 
Such phenomena can also be encountered with respect to substantive copyright and related rights 
protection. As analysed in Chapter 2, international copyright and related right treaties mainly prescribe 
substantive law protection for those rights. As a member state of several international copyright and 
related rights treaties, the PRC fulfills its international obligations either by amending its existing law 
or by adopting new legislation. If a foreign professional looks at the rhetoric or the language of the 
PRC Copyright Law, he or she would most probably not be able to form a sufficient understanding of 
that law because the law making and implementation processes of the PRC Copyright Law are 
primarily controlled by policies that reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s attitudes towards the role 
of culture and the economy, and to gain insight in the actual policies in copyright and related rights 
protection in the PRC, one has to look into the implementing rules together with the judicial 
interpretations made by the SPC. 
 
It is then to be expected that in the course of implementing the PRC PIL Statute, the Judicial 
Committee of the SPC will deliberate the rules set out therein and drafts a judicial interpretation for it. 
Hopefully, it will also introduce the solutions proposed in this dissertation. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter begins by introducing the PRC’s legal system and judicial structure. Further, by looking 
at copyright legislation and choice-of-law rules that had been effective before the enactment of the 
PRC PIL Statute, this chapter demonstrates that there were no choice-of-law rules specifically for 
cross-border copyright and related rights claims under PRC law. A further analysis of judgments 
rendered by People’s Courts shows that without clear legislative guidance, those courts had been 
deciding foreign-related copyright cases inconsistently. Most of the judgments did not contain any 
choice-of-law analysis, and mostly all of them decided they were governed by PRC law. The reasons 
for such practices were, as pointed out in this chapter, mainly because of the strict understanding of 
the territoriality principle, the lack of awareness of the choice-of-law issues in such claims, and the 
PRC judges’ natural preference for the use of PRC law. This chapter also analyses the legal endeavour 
made by the PRC legislature that led to the adoption of the PIL Statute in 2010. This Statute 
prescribed specific choice-of-law rules for IP rights disputes by providing for the application of lex 
loci protectionis to the content, initial ownership and infringement of IP disputes. For the latter, it sets 
down the possibility of limited party autonomy. As analysed further in the chapter, there are still 
problems remaining in this particular subject, and with inspiration from EU laws, European countries’ 
national laws and the three sets of academic contributions, solutions are proposed. 
 
In summary, this chapter argues that in consideration of legal practices and existing choice-of-law 
rules, when the SPC drafts a judicial interpretation in relation to implementation of this Statute, more 
rules providing clarity and flexibility in cross-border copyright and related rights claims should be 
introduced, in such a way cross-border exploitation of copyright and related rights will be enhanced. 
 
 






In the modern context, choice-of-law rules for cross-border copyright and related rights disputes must 
be special. Different rationales for enacting copyright legislation coupled with the growing economic 
importance of copyright-based industry make this necessary. 
 
Moreover, although copyrights are a category of property, their specific characters as IP rights have to 
be distinguished from rights to tangible property. Copyrights have limited duration, and their 
exclusivity is less inviolate. In addition to this, their intangibility and ubiquitous existence obviate 




Formulating choice-of-law rules for cross-border copyright and related rights disputes is more 
complex than for types of IP requiring registration, i.e. patents, trade marks and designs. This is 
because a copyright needs no registration or government action in order to come into legal existence, 
as prescribed in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Thus, in the aspect of choice-of-law, copyright 
and related rights should be differentiated from other IP rights that require registration and should be 




The phrase “international copyright law” is a misnomer. There is no such thing. The attempt to 
internationally harmonize disparate copyright laws actually provided “bundles” of rights concerning 
copyright and related rights. It is not really possible to totally harmonize substantive copyright law in 
international copyright and related right treaties. 
 
The heavily debated issue whether national treatment is a choice-of-law provision should be answered 
negatively. That is because national treatment is actually an anti-discrimination measure - a measure 
that requires foreign and domestic authors to be treated in the same way -, and it has no impact on 
choice-of-law issues. From the historical perspective, the drafters of the Berne Convention aimed only 
at providing protection for a work of foreign origin or one having a foreign author, and it does not 
demonstrate that they also intended to provide choice-of-law provisions. Neither does Article 5(2) of 
the Berne Convention state the application of the laws of the country where protection is claimed to be 
a choice-of-law rule. As has been observed, this provision is no more than “another illustration of the 
efforts to abolish discrimination against foreign authors.”1333  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that with the limited exception of Article 14bis(2)(c) of the Berne 





Throughout the relevant historic times, the territoriality principle has been constant, but tension 
between that principle and globalization has been increasing with extraterritorial exploitation and 
application of copyright. The continuing vitality of the territoriality principle is a necessity, and it 
should remain subsisting. Notwithstanding that necessity, the territoriality principle still cannot be 
equated with the rule of lex loci protectionis; however, the rule of lex loci protectionis and the 
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territoriality principle are compatible to the extent that, the territoriality principle, under a widely-




The EU Rome II Regulation adopts the lex loci protectionis for IP rights infringement claims without 
providing any flexibility. This raises concerns about its effectiveness. First, party autonomy is 
regrettably absent because of the rationale of protecting the public interests. In this respect, European 
legal scholars have intensively advocated a limited freedom of choice-of-law for the parties, since it 
would increase legal certainty and foreseeability about the law, demonstrate respect for the parties’ 
choice, and increase judicial efficiency in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes. Second, 
multi-state IP rights infringement cases have not been given attention. Because applying the lex loci 
protectionis in such cases will lead to a distributive application of the laws of the different countries 
for which protection is claimed, multi-state copyright infringement disputes should be provided with 
specific choice-of-law solutions, especially considering the ever-increasing cross-border exploitation 
of copyrighted works, in particular by means of high technology. 
 
The Rome II Regulation arguably deals only with non-contractual obligations arising from IP rights 
infringements. As a result, the matters of the existence, scope, duration and termination of IP rights as 
well as the initial ownership of copyright fall outside the scope of Rome II. A survey on selected 
European states’ laws and practices for those matters demonstrates that there is a lack of consensus on 
the applied choice-of-law rules. Additionally, none of these jurisdictions distinguishes copyright and 
related rights from IP rights that require registration, with the exception of the Belgian PIL with regard 




Three academic groups with international standing as to IP have made proposals for principles, which 
have the character of “soft law”: the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles and the Japanese-Korean 
Principles. There are differences among the three, but they all use territoriality as a basic principle and 
apply the same lex loci protectionis rule to determine the existence, creation, duration, termination and 
infringement of copyright and related rights claims, while advocating moderate departures from the 
territoriality principle for them. These deviations include, in one way or another, allowing party 
autonomy, proposing solutions for multi-state claims, and accepting universality in initial ownership 
of copyright and related rights (the ALI Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles). The solutions 
proposed in these Principles may serve as a source of inspirations for the PRC legislature and judiciary 




Prior to the enactment of the PRC PIL Statute, PRC law had no clear provision on how choice-of-law 
problems in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes should be dealt with. In judicial 
practice, People’s Courts had hardly ever recognized or analysed these problems, a circumstance that 
was mainly attributed to misunderstanding about the territorial character of copyright and the 
ignorance of choice-of-law issues. Even when the choice-of-law problem had been recognized or 
analysed, the approaches taken were still varied and unpredictable. The final results of cases, however, 
have been almost the same: the application of PRC law. 
 
By recognizing the choice-of-law problem that had evolved in cross-border IP rights protection cases 
and providing for them in the PIL Statute, the PRC legislature reversed previous judicial practice. But 
it still maintains the traditional territoriality principle: providing a wider scope of application of the lex 
loci protectionis to apply it to matters of ownership and content of IP rights, as well as IP rights 
infringement. Adopting the lex loci protectionis rule offers the possibility of applying foreign law, and 
also provides legal certainty for rights users or rights owners. Moreover, it may strengthen the 
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confidence of foreign parties to bring a claim in front of a PRC court. That may, in turn, facilitate 
international exploitation and protection of copyright and related rights.  
 
The Statute expressly provides that IP rights infringement claims could also be dealt with in the way 
that the parties wish by submitting them to PRC law after the infringing act has occurred. Despite the 
fact that the efficiency and the practical consequence of this rule may still need to be tested in the 
future, to say the least, the advance made by the PRC PIL Statute represents the trend in development 
of choice-of-law in this field. 
 
Furthermore, for the issue of initial ownership of copyright and related rights the PRC PIL Statute 
chooses territoriality over universality. The Statute confirms the principle that the regulatory choices 
reflected in national copyright laws will prevail in all cases concerning the use of works within the 
borders of that state, i.e. respecting the territorial character of copyright and related rights. It ensures 
the application of the same substantive law when there are also infringement claims at stake. In this 





Finally, as to the research question put forward at the beginning of this dissertation “whether the rules 
adopted in the PIL Statute will fit into the picture of enhancing cross-border exploitation of copyright 
and related rights from the perspective of choice-of-law”, this writer answers that the choice-of-law 
rules prescribed by the PRC legislature were to serve the purposes of enhancing international IP rights 
protection, however, the legislature overlooked certain aspects of the rights that are also essential in 
promoting international copyright protection, such as multi-state copyright infringement disputes. 
Thus, it is suggested that the PRC legislature and judiciary should tackle certain problems that still 
remain. With the comparative inspiration drawn from the EU law, selected European states’ laws and 
judicial practices, as well as three sets of academic contributions, solutions to these problems are 
proposed.  
 
(1) the PIL Statute lacks explicit choice-of-law solutions for the problems of multi-state copyright 
infringement, including ubiquitous infringement that often arises in the context of the Internet. For 
such a solution, a definition of what constitutes multi-state infringement would need to be established 
with a view to clarifying that the set of rules for it can only be used for exceptional situations and 
cannot cancel out the general rule of the lex loci protectionis. Then, in addition to the already 
prescribed ex post party autonomy rule in the Statute, the legislature may consider introducing a 
closest connection rule designating the one law that is most closely connected to the infringement. 
Further, given the close relation between the issues of existence, scope, duration of the right and the 
infringement of the right, such rules should also apply to those issues when they are raised as 
preliminary or incidental issues in multi-state infringement disputes. 
 
(2) the Statute lacks an express choice-of-law provision relating to the initial ownership of works 
created in the course of employment or pursuant to a commission arrangement, or for collaborated 
works. To identify the initial owner of such works the law governing such relationships should apply. 
That would be based on the rationale that creating the work is mostly to be performed by the employee 
or the person commissioned. The initial ownership issue has a close link with these relationships and 
can justly be treated as an issue related to them. Applying the law of that contract can prevent 
distributive application of the law of each country of protection and overcome territorial splitting of 
the ownership of such works because only the law of the contract will govern the issue of initial 
ownership. 
 
(3) the scope of party autonomy in the Statute, i.e. an ex post choice of PRC law, should be further 
clarified. Certain aspects of infringement claims should not be subject to the parties’ contracting 
power. For the sake of accuracy and clarity, party autonomy should be limited to the extent that it only 
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allows the parties to make an ex post choice of the lex fori in computing money damages resulting 
from infringing acts. 
 
(4) in the PRC PIL Statute the scope of the lex loci protectionis rule is not clear enough. The scope of 
lex loci protectionis needs to be clarified, and should expressly include the matters of existence, 
validity, duration and termination of the right. That will not only respect the territoriality principle of 
copyright and related rights, but also provide clarity as to the law that is applicable for the parties and 
judiciary. 
 
(5) copyright and related rights are not separately dealt with. Separation of copyright and related rights 
from other IP rights that require registration should be introduced because that would facilitate more 
finely tuned choice-of-law solutions for potential conflicts that are purely within the context of 
copyright and related rights. 
 
In performance of the special role of the SPC in the PRC legal system, the SPC will deliberate the 
rules set out in the PIL Statute and draft a judicial interpretation with regard to the implementation of 
the Statute. The above solutions are submitted for its consideration. Those solutions aim at ensuring 
the general application of the lex loci protectionis rules to cross-border copyright and related rights 
disputes while carefully introducing a certain amount of flexibility, i.e. providing for moderate 
departures from this rule by restricting them to situations only where such departures are really 
necessary, e.g. in multi-state infringement disputes, and prescribing the definition and conditions for 
allowing them only where the solutions and legal consequences are clear. These solutions will enhance 
the effectiveness of the rules and reach a balanced result between the needs of legal certainty and 
foreseeability, on one hand, and individual justice, on the other. However, only time and experience 
with more cases will show the practical significance of the choice-of-law rules provided in the PIL 
Statute, as well as the usefulness of proposing the above solutions for SPC consideration. 
 
The solutions suggested above may be articulated in the following articles: 
 
“Article a: 
The existence, content, validity, duration and termination of copyright and related rights are governed 
by the law of the country for which protection is claimed. 
 
Article b: 
1) The initial ownership of copyright and related rights is governed by the law of the country for 
which protection is claimed.  
2) If copyright and related rights were vested pursuant to a contractual relationship, in particular a 
labour contract, a commission contract or a contract concerning collaborated works, the initial 
ownership of such works shall be governed by the provisions of this Law
1334
 concerning the law 
applicable to labour contracts or contractual obligations, respectively. 
 
Article c: 
1) Infringement of copyright and related rights is governed by the law of the country for which 
protection is claimed.  
2) After infringing acts have occurred, the parties may, by agreement, choose the law of the forum to 
govern the issue of monetary damages awardable by reason of the infringement. 
3) If infringing acts were facilitated through ubiquitous media, leading to infringement arguably 
committed in every country which the facilitated infringement has reached, and, if the application of 
the law pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article would encounter undue difficulty in terms of identifying 
the countries generally alleged to be affected by such infringement, the law of the country with which 
the infringement has the closest connection shall apply.  
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 The PIL Statute. 
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In determining the country with which the infringement has the closest connection, the following 
factors may be taken into consideration: 
i. the habitual residences or the principal places of business of the parties;  
ii. the places where the substantial activities furthering the multi-state infringement have been 
committed;  
iii. the places where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial in relation to the 
infringement in its entirety;  
iv. the place where the parties’ previous relationship, if any, has been centred. 
This rule also applies to the issues of the existence, content, validity, duration and termination of 
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SUMMARY 
 
The growth of the economic importance of the copyright-based industry, the development of new 
technologies that facilitate exploitation of copyrighted works, and the increase in international trade in 
copyrighted items, underline the importance of effective protection of copyright and related rights. 
Since the laws that provide such protection differ internationally, the question which law is applicable 
to cross-border disputes about copyright and related rights is relevant in this context. National states, 
international communities, and academia have gradually been recognizing this question. Some states 
have codified specific choice-of-law rules for cross-border IP rights disputes. For example, the 
legislator of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently prescribed rules for IP rights in 
general in its Law on the Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations (PIL Statute). 
Similarly the European Union has codified them in the Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (the Rome II Regulation). However, the approaches adopted and the scope of 
the enacted rules still vary.  
 
Inspired by these developments, this dissertation puts forward a research question of whether the rules 
adopted in the PRC PIL Statute will fit into the picture of enhancing cross-border exploitation of 
copyright and related rights from the perspective of choice-of-law. In answering this question, the 
dissertation proposes choice-of-law solutions concerning copyright and related rights claims to the 
PRC legislature and judiciary.  
 
To this end, the dissertation reviews five topics related to copyright and choice-of-law rules, which is 
necessary for obtaining a full understanding of the background of the research question and the 
proposed solutions. These areas are: 
 the characteristics that copyright and related rights have which distinguish them from other IP 
rights and from standard property rights in tangible things, and which lead to differences in 
identifying the law applicable to copyright and related rights disputes (Chapter 1); 
 what the international treaties on those rights provide, the historical development of these 
treaties, and whether they contain any choice-of-law solutions for cross-border copyright and 
related rights disputes (Chapter 2); 
 how European Union law and the laws of selected European states designate the law 
applicable to such disputes, and the inspiration they can bring to the PRC legislature and 
judiciary in this regard (Chapter 3); 
 approaches of selected academic institutions and how they can similarly inspire the PRC 
legislature and judiciary (Chapter 4); and  
 the background of PRC legal institutions, how PRC law and judicial practice previously dealt 
with choice-of-law issues in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, the rules 
provided in the PRC PIL Statute, and how these rules could be improved with regard to 
copyright and related rights disputes (Chapter 5). 
 
Chapter 1 begins by describing the idea of copyright as legal protection from unauthorized use of all 
kinds of expressions of an author. Copyright offers the author this protection by granting him the 
exclusive right for a specified time period. Although this provides the author with an absolute 
subjective right which operates erga omnes like standard property rights to tangible things, there are 
also characteristics of copyright that distinguish it from such property rights. These characteristics 
include its limited duration, intangibility, i.e. not definable or identifiable by reference to physical 
parameters, and an exclusivity that is far less inviolate than standard property.  
 
The chapter then provides an overview of rationales of copyright and its legal justifications. As to the 
rationales, four main theories have been studied: the property right theory, personality right theory, sui 
generis right theory, and monopoly right theory. As to the legal justifications for granting copyright, 
several legal justifications have been boiled down to two: a justice argument that focuses on the 
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individual author who as a matter of justice must be protected in his work (this argument is generally 
used within the European civil law tradition); and an utility argument that focuses on the public 
usefulness of copyright and promoting the public interest through exclusive rights incentives for 
authors to create and disseminate their creations. (this argument is generally used within the Anglo-
American common law tradition). Subsequently, the chapter describes the exceptions from and 
limitations on copyright protection. In this respect, it discusses that due to the policy considerations of 
every country, these exceptions and limitations differ from country to country. Based on the above 
discussions, this chapter demonstrates that differences in rationales and legal justifications are found 
throughout in various aspects of copyright, such as the creation, scope and initial ownership of 
copyright. These differences are the results of differing social, political and cultural policies that 
particular legal orders have, and as a result, the extent of copyright protection varies from one country 
to another. 
 
Thereafter, the chapter discusses the impacts of technological developments on copyright, and the 
challenges that bring to it. Not only do technological developments expand the scope of copyright 
subjects, they also enhance reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works. Given such impacts 
and challenges, the dissertation submits that, with differing rationales that underpin potentially 
applicable copyright laws, when cross-border copyright and related rights disputes arise, the possible 
outcomes with regard to which national law applies can be expected to differ. 
 
The Chapter then moves on to deal with some particularities of copyright and its interplay with choice-
of-law issues. First, in the context of choice-of-law issues, tangible property is usually definable with 
reasonable clarity by reference to location, i.e., its situs. The situs has always been the most important 
factor for resolving choice-of-law issues concerning tangible property. However, since copyright is 
intangible, it is not susceptible to treatment by this factor. Other characters that make choice-of-law 
rules for cross-border copyright disputes special are the territoriality principle (on the basis of which 
copyright law must be limited to the territory of the legislative body that enacted it), and the effects of 
international copyright treaties, which for instance provide the non-formality of copyright, as 
prescribed in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention (for the purpose of letting a copyright come into its 
legal existence upon the completion of the work). Particularly the requirement of non-formality 
differentiates copyright from patent and trademark, and therefore specific choice-of-law rules for 
copyright and related rights claims are necessary. The chapter further contends that, although 
copyright law are made by states to be effective only within their territorial borders, the territoriality 
principle should not be too readily equated with the rule that the applicable law should be that of the 
state for which protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis) because the strict interpretation of the 
territoriality principle would mean giving no effect to foreign laws, whereas the lex loci protectionis 
rule may afford some leeway for the just application of foreign law. 
 
Chapter 2 begins by describing historical development of copyright protection from the pre-18
th
 
century privileges systems, to statutory private law, then to bilateral treaties and finally to 
multinational treaties. This description demonstrates that international copyright protection was 
promoted by cross-border exploitation of copyrighted works. The growth of copyright protection 
tracked the development of technology. The chapter then looks into international copyright and related 
rights treaties: the Berne Convention that got under way in 1886, the Universal Copyright Convention, 
the Rome Convention 1961, and the more recent WCT, WPPT, WAPT and the WTO Trade Related 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement. These treaties provide substantive copyright protection 
internationally by requiring minimum standards. Nevertheless, they harmonize only certain aspects of 
national copyright and related rights laws, and, as a result, there are still significant differences in 
protection from country to country. The international harmonization of copyright law in these treaties 
in fact sets up “bundles” of national copyright protections, rather than a single, uniform level of 
protection. Consequently, the territoriality principle remains important in copyright and related rights.  
 
This chapter then argues that in the context of cross-border copyright and related rights claims, choice-
of-law rules rather than international substantive copyright treaty provisions are needed since the 
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application of the appropriate choice-of-law rule designating national substantive copyright laws will 
respect the cultural and economic considerations underpinning each country’s copyright laws.   
 
Subsequently, the chapter analyses the principle of national treatment employed in the Berne 
Convention and later treaties. The chapter argues that this principle is an anti-discrimination measure 
that requires foreign and domestic authors to be treated in the same way, and has no impact on the 
choice-of-law issue. This point of contention is based on the argument that the national treatment 
principle only defines the scope of the domestic copyright laws of the protecting country and confines 
its effect to that context. Also, from the historical perspective, the drafters of the Berne Convention 
aimed only at providing protection to a work of foreign origin or having a foreign author, and nothing 
they were considering involved a choice-of-law issue. As rightly put forward by some scholars, the 
only relevance this principle has with respect to a potential choice-of-law rule might be that it excludes 
application of the lex originis (e.g. the law of the country of first publication of the work, or the 
national law of the creator). As to the much debated issue whether Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention containing “… shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection 
is claimed” should be treated as a choice-of-law rule, the chapter argues that this provision does not 
refer to choice-of-law. This argument is based on the considerations of this provision’s function and its 
scope of application, as well as the consistency of this provision’s interpretation within the whole of 
the Berne Convention. In the end, the chapter concludes that none of the international copyright 
treaties directly or expressly refer to choice-of-law rules, with the limited exception of Article 
14bis(2)(c) of the Berne Convention. 
 
Having concluded in Chapter 2 that international copyright and related rights treaties do not directly or 
expressly ordain choice-of-law rules (with one limited exception), Chapter 3 examines EU laws and 
European countries’ national laws and judicial practices in this aspect, and from them it attempts to 
provide inspiration for the Chinese legislature and judiciary. It first discusses the relevant recent 
“Europeanization” of PIL rules. It then observes that a series of EU directives that have the purpose of 
harmonizing certain aspects of copyright within the EU do not directly and expressly deal with choice-
of-law rules. Similarly, Article 18 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union that enshrines 
as the duty of each Member State to grant to a national of another Member State the protection under 
copyright or related rights which the former State grants to its own nationals (anti-discrimination 
principle) should not be considered as a choice-of-law rule, since it does not function to identify the 
law applicable to cross-border copyright or related rights claims.  
 
The EU Rome II Regulation prescribes specific choice-of-law provisions to non-contractual 
obligations arising from IP rights infringement claims – the lex loci protectionis, excepting for 
Community IP rights, with express exclusion of parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to such 
claims. The chapter observes that, although Rome II attempts to reach a balance between the need for 
legal certainty on the one hand and the kind of flexibility needed to accomplish justice in individual 
cases on the other, such a balance is absent in the choice-of-law rules prescribed for IP rights 
infringement claims. For such claims, the EU legislature chose predictability and certainty over 
flexibility. Applying a rigid lex loci protectionis rule without any exceptions, such as allowing party 
autonomy or specific rules for multi-state infringement claims, will affect the effectiveness of these 
European rules. Apart from that, the chapter argues that the scope of Rome II covers only infringement 
claims of IP rights, but not the intrinsic aspects of IP rights. This line of contention is based on the 
wording of Rome II, the logic of applying these rules, and the consideration that it is still controversial 
which choice-of-law rules should be applied to these issues of copyright and related rights, such as 
initial ownership.  
 
Based on the argument that Rome II covers only infringement claims of IP rights, the chapter carries 
out a comparison of European national choice-of-law rules and judicial practices with respect to the 
issues of the existence, content, duration, termination and initial ownership of copyright and related 
rights claims. As the comparison demonstrates, the lex loci protectionis is the rule in pre-dominant use 
among these European states for the issues of existence, content, duration and termination of copyright 
and related rights, even though the interpretations of the lex loci protectionis differ among these states, 
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i.e. some states interpret it as referring to the law of the place where infringement occurs while others 
interpret it as the place where copyright protection is claimed. Nevertheless, certain states apply the lex 
originis to these issues. The lex originis, as an alternative to the lex loci protectionis, is also used by 
some states to determine the initial ownership issue. This demonstrates that there clearly is no 
consensus on the choice-of-law rules to the aforementioned issues.  
 
As a possible source of inspiration for the PRC legislature and judiciary, this chapter concludes that 
certain points should be kept in mind:  
 given the specific characteristics of IP rights, the matter of identifying the law applicable to IP 
rights disputes is dealt with specifically in the Rome II Regulation. Although Rome II does not 
provide specific rules to copyright and related rights, this is understandable because Rome II 
deals only with infringement claims of IP rights, as for such claims, it is not necessary to 
distinguish copyright from other types of IP rights;  
 the Rome II Regulation adopts the traditional rule of lex loci protectionis for IP rights 
infringement claims. As recommended by some scholars, for such disputes, not only should 
the lex loci protectionis be applied, but also certain leeway should be introduced, at least with 
a limited degree of party autonomy and a solution to multi-state infringement disputes; 
 there have been debates about the lex loci protectionis’s scope of application in the Rome II 
Regulation, thus, a clear scope of the application of the rule should be provided, for the sake 
of clarity and legal certainty; and 
 since the selected European states adopt different approaches in dealing with choice-of-law 
rules to the issues intrinsically related to copyright and related rights, it is better to have clear 
choice-of-law rules to such issues introduced. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the choice-of-law rules for copyright and related rights that have been proposed 
by three academically-linked groups with international standing: the American Law Institute IP 
Conflict of Laws Project (ALI Principles), the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws for 
Intellectual Property (CLIP Principles) and the Japanese-Korean Principles. In particular, the chapter 
examines and compares the rules for the issue of infringement of IP rights, the issue of IP rights’ 
scope, duration and content, as well as the issue of initial ownership of a copyright. The comparison 
demonstrates that in spite of fundamental differences among them as to certain issues, they all 
maintain territoriality as the basic principle and at the same time provide pragmatic approaches for 
determining the law applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes.  
 
The chapter submits that the PRC legislature and judiciary can draw the following inspiration from the 
three sets of Principles: 
 all three sets of Principles maintain the basic principle of territoriality, i.e. the lex loci 
protectionis rule applies to the issues of the existence, scope and duration of copyright and 
related rights, as well as infringement of such rights; 
 as what all three sets of Principles propose, copyright and related rights, not bearing a 
character that requires registration and coming into existence upon the creation of a work, 
should be given special attention when the choice-of-law issue is involved; 
 all three sets of Principles propose limited party autonomy to infringement of IP rights, 
although the extent of  accepting such autonomy and their scope of application vary; 
 all three sets of Principles take into consideration of difficulty in multi-state infringement or in 
ubiquitous infringement disputes. Their approaches of applying the one state’s law that has the 
closest connection with the dispute or infringement can be a source of inspiration. To define 
the closest connection, these Principles have suggested different connecting factors. This is 
because each set of Principles has a different perspective. In this respect, the PRC legislature 
and judiciary should introduce specific rules for such infringement disputes; and 
 the three sets of Principles have proposed either a territorial approach (the CLIP Principles) or 
a universal approach (the ALI Principles and the Japanese-Korean Principles) to the issue of 
initial ownership of copyright and related rights. The differences in their approach have also 
reflected in the choice-of-law rules for the initial ownership of a copyrighted work arising 
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from certain relationships, such as employment. In this respect, the PRC legislature should be 
clear with its approach and also provide choice-of-law rules for copyrighted works arising 
from certain relationships.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with PRC law and judicial practice for identifying the law applicable to cross-border 
copyright and related rights disputes. It first briefly introduces the PRC legal system, describing that 
the PRC has a codified legal system strongly influenced by civil law traditions, that although the 
judgments delivered by lower People’s Courts are not considered as official sources of law, the 
judgments of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) are factually respected by lower courts and used as 
guidelines, and that the SPC has a quasi law-making role (for example, through its ‘judicial 
interpretations’). The chapter then discusses that prior to enactment of the PIL Statute, the PRC 
choice-of-law rules were scattered in different acts and judicial interpretations published by the SPC. 
For the topic of which law shall apply to cross-border copyright disputes, there was no explicit rule 
before the PIL Statute. As a result, People’s Courts had decided such issues in an inconsistent way. As 
a survey of PRC judicial judgments demonstrates, most cases did not contain any choice-of-law 
analysis, and even in a small number of cases where the choice-of-law issue was analysed, the 
approaches taken by courts were not the same. Some courts applied the lex loci protectionis, others 
applied the lex loci delicti, and sometimes the closest connection rule was indicated. Another striking 
point was that there was hardly any application of foreign laws. More specifically, People’s Courts 
applied only PRC law and some provisions of the Berne Convention. The chapter then analyses the 
reasons for these phenomenon: mainly, a lack of awareness of the choice-of-law issue, and the strict 
understanding of the “territoriality” principle of copyright, which led to the belief that there was no 
choice-of-law problem in foreign-related copyright disputes. The latter reason also explains why 
People’s Courts applied only PRC law in copyright disputes. Moreover, the PRC judges’ natural 
preference for applying PRC law led to the application of PRC law. 
 
Chapter 5 continues with a description of the legislative efforts of the PRC that led to the adoption of 
explicit choice-of-law rules for cross-border IP rights claims in the PIL Statute, and then discusses the 
rules provided therein. The Statute adopts the lex loci protectionis as a general rule for determining the 
issues of ownership, content and infringement of rights. As to the latter, it provides for flexibility by 
allowing the parties to agree on the lex fori after the infringing act has occurred. The chapter argues 
that the PRC legislature should be applauded for adopting these specific rules for IP rights claims, for 
respecting the traditional principle of territoriality and for accepting limited party autonomy in 
infringement claims. It nevertheless points out that there are still certain drawbacks. First, the PIL 
Statute does not distinguish the types of IP rights protection and does not provide more finely-tuned 
rules to copyright and related rights. Second, the scope of the application of the lex loci protectionis is 
still limited, which might raise a concern how to deal with other material claims of IP rights, such as 
existence, duration and termination of rights. Third, although the Statute provides for a specific rule as 
to the issue of initial ownership of copyright, it does not provide guidance on works created under 
special relationships like employment. Fourth, the scope of party autonomy in infringement of IP 
rights is broad, and it covers certain aspects that should not be subject to the parties’ agreement. 
Finally, the Statute does not address the problem arising from the required use of the territorial 
approach in multi-state infringement disputes.  
 
Based on the observations and analyses made in the five chapters, the final chapter of the dissertation 
concludes that choice-of-law rules for copyright and related rights claims need to be dealt with 
specifically. Doing so will not only respect the territorial character of copyright reflecting the 
economic, cultural and social policies of the state that grants the rights, but will also respect the non-
formality character of copyright, which distinguishes it from other types of IP rights that require 
governmental approval. Thus, adopting specific choice-of-law rules for copyright and related rights 
disputes will facilitate more finely-tuned solutions for potential conflicts that are purely within the 
context of copyright and related rights. Having argued that the international copyright and related 
rights treaties do not ordain any choice-of-law rules, the dissertation concludes that without 
internationally harmonized choice-of-law rules, states adhering to these treaties should apply their own 
domestic, or where applicable, regional choice-of-law rules. Accordingly, when PRC People’s Courts 
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are confronted with choice-of-law questions in cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, they 
should not refer to the international treaties but rely on the choice-of-law rules adopted in the PIL 
Statute. Furthermore, from the studies on EU law (in particular the Rome II Regulation), the selected 
European states’ national laws and practices, and the three sets of “soft law” Principles, in the aspect 
of identifying the law applicable to cross-border copyright and related rights disputes, the dissertation 
points out the peculiarities that these laws, practices and proposed rules have which may be 
inspirational for the PRC legislature and judiciary. In response to the drawbacks examined in Chapter 
5, the dissertation proposes certain solutions that are reasonable and practical for choice-of-law in 
cross-border copyright and related rights disputes. In that way the effectiveness of these rules will be 
enhanced and a balanced result between the needs of legal certainty and foreseeability on the one 
hand, and individual justice on the other, can be reached. 
 
First, it is proposed that the PRC legislature should address choice-of-law solutions for cross-border 
copyright and related rights disputes specifically.  
 
Second, it is proposed that the scope of the lex loci protectionis rule that was adopted in the PIL 
Statute should be clarified to include the matters of existence, validity, duration and termination of the 
right. That will not only respect the territoriality principle of copyright and related rights, but also 
provide clarity as to the law that is applicable to such matters for the parties and judiciary. 
 
Third, it is proposed that the PRC legislature should introduce choice-of-law provisions relating to the 
initial ownership of works created in special relationships: such as in the course of employment or 
pursuant to a commission arrangement. In this respect, this dissertation proposes to apply the law 
governing such relationships to identify the initial owner of such works. That would be based on the 
rationale that creating the work is mostly to be performed by the employee or the person 
commissioned. The initial ownership issue has a close link with these relationships and can justly be 
treated as an issue related to them. Applying the law governing the relationship can prevent 
distributive application of the law of each country affording protection and overcome territorial 
splitting of the ownership because only the law of the contract will govern the issue of initial 
ownership. 
 
Fourth, it is proposed that the scope of party autonomy in the Statute, i.e. an ex post choice of PRC 
law, should be further clarified. Certain aspects of infringement claims should not be subject to the 
parties’ contracting power. For the sake of accuracy and clarity, party autonomy should be limited to 
the extent that it only allows the parties to make an ex post choice of the lex fori in computing 
damages resulting from infringing acts. 
 
Fifth, it is proposed that multi-state copyright infringement disputes be provided with a solution 
deviating from the territoriality approach. With the consideration that flexibility should be introduced 
where it is necessary, and not to cancel out the general rule of the lex loci protectionis, the dissertation 
proposes a definition of what constitutes multi-state infringement disputes. By linking the specific 
rules for multi-state infringement disputes to this definition, the scope of these rules is restricted to 
exceptional situations. In addition to the already prescribed ex post party autonomy rule in the Statute, 
this dissertation proposes the legislature to consider introducing a closest connection rule designating 
the one law that is most closely connected to the infringement. Further, given the close relation 
between the issues of existence, scope, and duration of copyright and the issue of infringement of the 
right, the aforementioned rules should also be applied to these issues when they are raised as 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
De economische groei van de op het auteursrecht gebaseerde industrie, de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
technologieën die de exploitatie van auteursrechtelijk beschermde werken vergemakkelijken, en de 
toename van de internationale handel in auteursrechtelijk beschermde producten, onderstrepen het 
belang van een goede bescherming van het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten. Aangezien het recht 
dat die bescherming biedt internationaal uiteenloopt, is hierbij het conflictenrechtelijke vraagstuk welk 
recht van toepassing is bij grensoverschrijdende geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten van 
belang. Diverse landen, internationale gemeenschappen, en academische instituten hebben dit 
geleidelijk aan erkend. Sommige landen hebben specifieke regels over het toepasselijk recht 
(conflictregels) bij grensoverschrijdende geschillen over intellectuele eigendom gecodificeerd. Zo 
heeft de Volksrepubliek China recentelijk conflictregels over intellectuele eigendom vastgelegd in 
haar Wet over de toepassing van recht in civiele relaties met buitenlandse aspecten (het PIL Statuut). 
De Europese Unie legde op vergelijkbare wijze regels vast in haar Verordening over het recht dat van 
toepassing is op niet-contractuele verbintenissen (de Verordening Rome II). Desalniettemin variëren 
de gekozen aanpak en de reikwijdte van de tot stand gekomen regels vaak sterk. 
 
Geïnspireerd door deze ontwikkelingen, staat in dit proefschrift de onderzoeksvraag centraal of de 
regels over toepasselijk recht in het PIL Statuut passen in het beeld van het verbeteren van de 
grensoverschrijdende exploitatie van het auteursrecht en naburige rechten vanuit conflictenrechtelijk 
oogpunt. Bij het beantwoorden van deze vraag stelt het proefschrift aan de Chinese wetgever en 
rechter conflictenrechtelijke oplossingen voor ten aanzien van vorderingen met betrekking tot 
auteursrecht en naburige rechten.  
 
Hiertoe behandelt het proefschrift vijf aan het auteursrecht en het conflictenrecht gerelateerde 
onderwerpen, wat noodzakelijk is om een volledig begrip te verkrijgen van de achtergrond van de 
onderzoeksvraag en de voorgestelde oplossingen. Deze onderwerpen zijn: 
 de kenmerken die het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten onderscheiden van andere 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten en van eigendomsrechten in stoffelijke objecten, en die 
aanleiding geven tot verschillen bij de aanwijzing van het toepasselijk recht bij geschillen 
(hoofdstuk 1); 
 de regels die internationale verdragen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten verschaffen, de 
historische ontwikkeling van die verdragen, en of zij voor grensoverschrijdende geschillen 
over auteursrecht en naburige rechten conflictenrechtelijke oplossingen bieden (hoofdstuk 2); 
 hoe het Europees recht en het nationaal recht van een selectie van Europese landen het 
toepasselijk recht aanwijzen in zulke geschillen, en welke inspiratie zij in dit opzicht kunnen 
bieden aan de Chinese wetgever en rechter (hoofdstuk 3); 
 de benaderingen van een selectie van academische instituten, en hoe die op vergelijkbare 
wijze de Chinese wetgever en rechter kunnen inspireren (hoofdstuk 4); en  
 de achtergrond van Chinese juridische instellingen, hoe de Chinese wetgeving en 
jurisprudentie in het verleden omging met conflictenrechtelijke vraagstukken in 
grensoverschrijdende auteursrechtgeschillen, de inhoud van de conflictregels in het PIL 
Statuut, en hoe deze conflictregels kunnen worden verbeterd ten aanzien van 
auteursrechtgeschillen (hoofdstuk 5). 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een beschrijving van het idee van het auteursrecht als juridische bescherming 
tegen het ongeoorloofd gebruik van de geestelijke voortbrengselen (werken) van een auteur (maker). 
Het auteursrecht biedt de maker deze bescherming door hem voor een bepaalde periode een exclusief 
recht te verlenen. Hoewel de maker hiermee een absoluut subjectief recht met erga omnes werking 
heeft als bij eigendomsrechten ten aanzien van stoffelijke objecten, heeft het auteursrecht ook 
eigenschappen die het onderscheiden van die rechten. Deze eigenschappen zijn onder andere zijn 
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beperkte duur, onstoffelijkheid (i.e. het is niet te omschrijven of te identificeren onder verwijzing naar 
fysieke parameters), en een exclusiviteit die veel minder onaantastbaar is als bij standaard eigendom. 
 
Het hoofdstuk verschaft vervolgens een overzicht van theorieën over de grondslag van het auteursrecht 
en de juridische rechtvaardigingen voor dit recht. Met betrekking tot de grondslag zijn vier belangrijke 
theorieën bestudeerd: de eigendomsrechtentheorie, de persoonlijkheidsrechttheorie, de sui generis 
rechtstheorie, en de monopolietheorie. De diverse juridische rechtvaardigingen voor de toekenning van 
het auteursrecht zijn te herleiden tot twee: een rechtvaardigheidsargumentatie die is gericht op de 
individuele maker die vanuit rechtvaardigheid beschermd moet worden in zijn werk (deze 
argumentatie wordt doorgaans gehanteerd in de Europees-continentale ‘civil law’ rechtstraditie), en 
een utilistische argumentatie die is gericht op het maatschappelijke nut van het auteursrecht en op het 
bevorderen van het publieke belang door de prikkels van een uitsluitend recht voor makers om hun 
werk te scheppen en te verspreiden (deze argumentatie wordt doorgaans gehanteerd in de 
Anglo-Amerikaanse ‘common law’ rechtstraditie). Daaropvolgend gaat het hoofdstuk in op de 
uitzonderingen op en grenzen aan auteursrechtbescherming. Het beschrijft hoe deze uitzonderingen en 
grenzen als gevolg van nationale beleidsoverwegingen per land verschillen. Op basis van het 
bovenstaande toont het hoofdstuk aan dat de verschillen in de theorieën over de grondslag van het 
auteursrecht en de juridische rechtvaardigingen voor dit recht hun weerslag hebben op diverse 
aspecten van het auteursrecht, zoals het scheppen van het werk, het bereik van het auteursrecht, en de 
initiële rechthebbende van dit recht. Deze verschillen zijn het gevolg van het uiteenlopend sociaal, 
politiek en cultureel beleid dat specifieke rechtsorden hebben, en als gevolg daarvan verschilt de mate 
van auteursrechtbescherming van land tot land. 
 
Daarna bespreekt het hoofdstuk de gevolgen van technologische ontwikkelingen voor het auteursrecht, 
en de uitdagingen die dit meebrengt. Technologische ontwikkelingen zorgen niet alleen voor een 
uitbreiding van het terrein van auteursrechtelijke onderwerpen, zij verhogen ook de verveelvoudiging 
en verspreiding van auteursrechtelijk beschermd werk. Gelet op zulke gevolgen en uitdagingen, 
betoogt het proefschrift dat, met variërende grondslagen voor potentieel toepasselijke 
auteursrechtwetten, bij grensoverschrijdende auteursrechtgeschillen verschillende uitkomsten zijn te 
verwachten ten aanzien van de vraag welk nationaal recht van toepassing is. 
 
Het hoofdstuk behandelt daaropvolgend een aantal bijzonderheden van het auteursrecht en hun 
wisselwerking met conflictenrechtelijke vraagstukken. Allereerst, is in de context van 
conflictrechtelijke vraagstukken stoffelijke eigendom doorgaans met redelijke helderheid te definiëren 
onder verwijzing naar locatie, zijn situs. Deze situs is altijd de belangrijkste aanknopingsfactor 
geweest voor het oplossen van conflictenrechtelijke vraagstukken met betrekking tot stoffelijke 
eigendom. Het auteursrecht is echter onstoffelijk, en daardoor niet vatbaar voor behandeling met 
behulp van deze factor. Verdere bijzondere kenmerken van conflictregels voor grensoverschrijdende 
auteursrechtelijke geschillen zijn de toepassing van het territorialiteitsbeginsel (op grond waarvan het 
bereik van het auteursrecht beperkt moet blijven tot het grondgebied van het wetgevende lichaam dat 
het heeft vastgesteld) en de effecten van internationale auteursrechtelijke verdragen, zoals het 
voorschrift van artikel 5 tweede lid, van de Berner Conventie, dat voor het genot en de uitoefening van 
het auteursrecht geen formaliteiten gelden (teneinde het ontstaan van het auteursrecht te doen 
samenvallen met de voltooiing van het werk waarop het rust). Met name dat laatste vereiste 
onderscheidt dit recht van het octrooirecht en het merkenrecht, en als gevolg ervan zijn bijzondere 
conflictregels voor auteursrecht en naburige rechten vereist. Verder stelt het hoofdstuk dat, hoewel 
landen auteursrechtwetten ontwikkelen met het oog op bescherming binnen hun grondgebied, het 
territorialiteitsbeginsel niet te gemakkelijk moet worden gelijkgesteld met de lex loci protectionis-
regel (op basis waarvan het recht van het land waar de bescherming wordt ingeroepen, dient te worden 
toegepast), omdat bij strikte interpretatie van het territorialiteitsbeginsel geen uitvoering zal worden 
geven aan buitenlandse wetten, terwijl de lex loci protectionis-regel wel ruimte biedt voor de 
gerechtvaardigde toepassing van buitenlands recht. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een beschrijving van de historische ontwikkeling van 
auteursrechtbescherming via de privilegesystemen van vóór de achttiende eeuw, wettelijk vastgelegd 
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privaatrecht, bilaterale verdragen, en uiteindelijk multilaterale verdragen. De beschrijving toont aan 
dat de internationale auteursrechtbescherming werd bevorderd door de grensoverschrijdende 
exploitatie van auteursrechtelijk beschermde werken. De groei van de auteursrechtbescherming volgde 
de ontwikkeling van technologie. Het hoofdstuk gaat vervolgens in op de internationale verdragen 
over auteursrecht en naburige rechten: de Berner Conventie van 1886, de Universele Auteursrecht 
Conventie van 1952, de Conventie van Rome van 1961, de meer recente WCT, WPPT en WAPT, 
alsmede de TRIPs-overeenkomst van de Wereldhandelsorganisatie. Deze verdragen verschaffen op 
internationaal niveau materieelrechtelijke auteursrechtbescherming door het vereisen van 
minimumnormen. Niettemin harmoniseren zij slechts bepaalde aspecten van nationale wetten over 
auteursrecht en naburige rechten. Als gevolg daarvan zijn er tussen landen nog steeds belangrijke 
verschillen in bescherming. De internationale harmonisatie van het auteursrecht in deze verdragen 
bewerkstelligt in feite ‘bundels’ van nationale auteursrechtbescherming, in plaats van één enkel 
uniform niveau van bescherming. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat het territorialiteitsbeginsel belangrijk blijft 
bij auteursrecht en naburige rechten. 
 
Het hoofdstuk betoogt dan dat binnen het kader van grensoverschrijdende vorderingen met betrekking 
tot auteursrecht en naburige rechten, conflictregels meer dan internationale auteursrechtelijke 
verdragsbepalingen benodigd zijn, aangezien de toepassing van de juiste conflictregel die het 
toepasselijke nationale materiële auteursrecht aanwijst, de aan het auteursrecht van een land ten 
grondslag liggende culturele en economische overwegingen eerbiedigt.  
  
Vervolgens analyseert het hoofdstuk het beginsel van nationale behandeling dat is toegepast in de 
Berner Conventie en latere verdragen. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat dit beginsel een antidiscriminatie-
maatregel is, die vereist dat buitenlandse en nationale makers van een werk gelijk behandeld worden, 
maar geen invloed heeft op het vraagstuk van het toepasselijk recht. Deze stelling berust op het 
argument dat het beginsel van nationale behandeling alleen het bereik bepaalt van de nationale 
auteursrechtwetten van het land dat bescherming biedt, en zijn werking tot dat verband beperkt. 
Historisch gezien, beoogden de opstellers van de Berner Conventie bovendien slechts bescherming te 
bieden aan een werk van buitenlandse oorsprong of van een buitenlandse maker, en stond hen hierbij 
in het geheel geen conflictenrechtelijk vraagstuk voor ogen. Zoals terecht is opgemerkt door sommige 
rechtsgeleerden, kan de enige relevantie van het beginsel van nationale behandeling voor een 
potentiële conflictregel eruit bestaan dat het de toepassing uitsluit van de lex originis (bijvoorbeeld de 
wet van het land waar de eerste openbaarmaking van een werk heeft plaatsgevonden, of het nationale 
recht van het land van de maker van het werk). Ten aanzien van het veelbesproken vraagstuk of artikel 
5, tweede lid, tweede volzin, van de Berner Conventie, waarin de toepassing van de wetgeving van het 
land waar de bescherming wordt ingeroepen wordt vermeld, als conflictregel dient te worden 
behandeld, stelt het hoofdstuk dat deze bepaling geen betrekking heeft op conflictenrecht. Deze 
stelling is gebaseerd op de overwegingen achter de functie van de bepaling, zijn toepassingsbereik, en 
de consistentie van de interpretatie van deze bepaling binnen het geheel van de Berner Conventie. Het 
hoofdstuk sluit af met de conclusie dat geen van de internationale auteursrechtverdragen direct of 
uitdrukkelijk betrekking heeft op conflictregels, met de beperkte uitzondering van artikel 14bis, 
tweede lid, onder c, van de Berner Conventie. 
 
Na in hoofdstuk 2 te hebben geconcludeerd dat internationale verdragen over auteursrecht en naburige 
rechten op een enkele uitzondering na niet direct of uitdrukkelijk conflictregels voorschrijven, 
onderzoekt hoofdstuk 3 het Europees recht en het nationale recht van een selectie van Europese 
landen in dat opzicht, en probeert het uit dat recht inspiratie voor de Chinese wetgever en rechter te 
putten. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt eerst de betrekkelijk recente ‘europeanisatie’ van internationaal 
privaatrechtelijke regels. Vervolgens merkt het hoofdstuk op dat een serie van Europese richtlijnen die 
beogen bepaalde aspecten van het auteursrecht binnen de Europese Unie te harmoniseren, niet direct 
en uitdrukkelijk ingaan op conflictregels. Evenmin dient artikel 18 van het Verdrag betreffende de 
werking van de Europese Unie, waaruit voor iedere lidstaat de plicht voortvloeit om aan burgers van 
een andere lidstaat gelijke auteursrechtbescherming toe te kennen als aan haar eigen burgers 
(antidiscriminatiebeginsel), te worden beschouwd als conflictregel, aangezien dit artikel niet fungeert 
ter aanwijzing van het toepasselijk recht bij grensoverschrijdende auteursrechtvorderingen.  
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De Europeesrechtelijke Verordening Rome II geeft bijzondere conflictenrechtelijke voorzieningen 
voor niet-contractuele verbintenissen die voortvloeien uit een inbreuk op een intellectuele 
eigendomsrecht: de lex loci protectionis, met een uitzondering voor communautaire intellectuele 
eigendomsrechten, en onder expliciete uitsluiting van een rechtskeuze door partijen. Het hoofdstuk 
beschouwt dat, ofschoon de Verordening Rome II een evenwicht poogt te bereiken tussen enerzijds 
rechtszekerheid en anderzijds het soort van flexibiliteit dat is vereist om recht te doen in individuele 
gevallen, dit evenwicht afwezig is in de conflictregels die zijn voorgeschreven voor inbreuken op 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten. Voor zulke inbreuken heeft de Europese wetgever voorzienbaarheid 
en zekerheid boven flexibiliteit verkozen. De toepassing van een starre lex loci protectionis-regel 
zonder enige uitzonderingsmogelijkheden, zoals de mogelijkheid van een rechtskeuze of bijzondere 
regels voor vorderingen met betrekking tot een inbreuk in meerdere staten, zal de doeltreffendheid van 
deze Europese regels aantasten. Afgezien daarvan, stelt het hoofdstuk dat het bereik van de 
Verordening Rome II slechts inbreukvorderingen met betrekking tot intellectuele eigendomsrechten 
omvat, en niet de aspecten die aan deze rechten als zodanig zijn verbonden. Deze stelling is gebaseerd 
op de bewoordingen van de Verordening, de toepassingslogica van de daarin opgenomen regels, en de 
overweging dat het nog steeds omstreden is welke conflictregels dienen te worden toegepast op deze 
auteursrechtelijke vraagstukken, zoals dat van wie als initieel rechthebbende van het auteursrecht heeft 
te gelden. 
 
Op basis van de stelling dat het bereik van de Verordening Rome II slechts inbreukvorderingen met 
betrekking tot intellectuele eigendomsrechten omvat, voert het hoofdstuk een vergelijking uit van het 
nationale conflictenrecht van een aantal Europese landen met betrekking tot de vraagstukken van het 
ontstaan, de inhoud, duur en beëindiging van het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten, en van wie als 
initieel rechthebbende van een auteursrecht heeft te gelden. De vergelijking toont aan dat in deze 
Europese landen overheersend de lex loci protectionis wordt gebruikt als regel voor de vraagstukken 
van het ontstaan, de inhoud, de duur, en de beëindiging van het auteursrecht en naburige rechten, 
hoewel de interpretatie van de lex loci protectionis per land verschilt, i.e. sommige landen gaan uit van 
een interpretatie waarbij de regel verwijst naar de het recht van de plaats waar de inbreuk plaatsvindt, 
terwijl andere landen ervan uitgaan dat de regel verwijst naar de plaats waar auteursrechtbescherming 
wordt ingeroepen. Er zijn echter ook bepaalde landen die ten aanzien van deze vraagstukken de lex 
originis toepassen. De lex originis wordt bovendien door sommige landen als alternatief voor de lex 
loci protectionis gebruikt voor het vraagstuk wie als initieel rechthebbende heeft te gelden. Hieruit 
blijkt dat er duidelijk geen consensus is over de conflictregels rondom de voorgenoemde 
vraagstukken.  
 
Als mogelijke bron van inspiratie voor de Chinese wetgever en rechter, concludeert het hoofdstuk dat 
rekening moet worden gehouden met onderstaande punten:  
 vanwege de bijzondere kenmerken van intellectuele eigendomsrechten, wordt het onderwerp 
van de aanwijzing van het toepasselijk recht bij geschillen over intellectuele eigendom in de 
Verordening Rome II aangepakt met bijzondere regels. Hoewel de Verordening geen nader 
gespecificeerde voorschriften bevat over het auteursrecht en naburige rechten, is dit 
begrijpelijk omdat zij slechts betrekking heeft op inbreukvorderingen met betrekking tot 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten, en voor zulke vorderingen is het niet nodig het auteursrecht te 
onderscheiden van andere soorten van intellectuele eigendomsrechten; 
 de Verordening Rome II hanteert de traditionele lex loci protectionis-regel ten aanzien van 
inbreukvorderingen met betrekking tot een intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Zoals aanbevolen 
door sommige rechtsgeleerden, moet in zulke gevallen niet slechts de lex loci protectionis 
worden toegepast, maar ook een zekere ruimte bestaan om ten minste enige partijautonomie 
toe te staan en een oplossing voor geschillen over een inbreuk in meerdere staten te bieden; 
 er zijn discussies geweest over de reikwijdte van de lex loci protectionis binnen de 
Verordening Rome II. In verband daarmee moet omwille van de duidelijkheid en 
rechtszekerheid een helder toepassingsbereik van de regel worden verschaft; en 
 aangezien de onderzochte Europese landen verschillende benaderingen hanteren bij de 
omgang met conflictregels over vraagstukken rondom aspecten van het auteursrecht en 
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naburige rechten die aan de rechten als zodanig zijn verbonden, is het beter om duidelijke 
conflictregels voor zulke vraagstukken te introduceren.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de conflictenrechtelijke regels voor auteursrecht en naburige rechten die zijn 
voorgesteld door drie academische onderzoeksgroepen van internationale allure: die van het 
‘American Law Instituut IP Conflict of Laws Project’ (ALI-Principles) en de ‘European Max Planck 
Group on Conflict of Laws for Intellectual Property’ (CLIP-Principles), alsmede de ‘Japanese-Korean 
Principles’. In het bijzonder onderzoekt en vergelijkt het hoofdstuk de regels ten aanzien van 
vraagstukken over een inbreuk op een intellectuele eigendomsrecht, over het bereik, de duur en de 
inhoud van het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten, en over wie als de initieel rechthebbende van het 
auteursrecht heeft te gelden. Daarbij wordt aangetoond dat, ondanks fundamentele verschillen tussen 
de verschillende sets van Principles met betrekking tot bepaalde onderwerpen, zij allemaal 
territorialiteit als het basisbeginsel hanteren en tegelijkertijd pragmatische benaderingen voor de 
aanwijzing van het toepasselijk recht in grensoverschrijdende geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige 
rechten verschaffen. Het hoofdstuk geeft aan dat de Chinese wetgever en rechter de volgende 
inspiratie uit de drie sets van Principles kunnen putten: 
 de drie sets van Principles hanteren allemaal het basisbeginsel van territorialiteit, i.e. dat de lex 
loci protectionis van toepassing is op de vraagstukken van het ontstaan, het bereik en de duur 
van het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten, alsmede op het vraagstuk van een inbreuk op zo’n 
recht; 
 in overeenstemming met wat alle drie sets van Principles voorstellen, moet aan het 
conflictenrecht ten aanzien van het auteursrecht en naburige rechten, die zonder formaliteiten 
ontstaan door het maken van een werk, bijzondere aandacht worden besteed; 
 alle drie sets van Principles stellen een beperkte partijautonomie voor ten aanzien van een 
inbreuk op een intellectuele eigendomsrecht, hoewel de toegestane mate van autonomie 
varieert; 
 alle drie sets van Principles houden rekening met de moeilijkheden bij geschillen over een 
inbreuk in meerdere staten of een zogenaamde ‘alomtegenwoordige inbreuk’. Hun benadering 
om het recht van het land dat de nauwste verbondenheid heeft met het geschil of de inbreuk 
toe te passen, kan een inspiratiebron vormen. Voor wat betreft de omschrijving van nauwste 
verbondenheid, bevatten de afzonderlijke sets van Principles ieder vanuit hun eigen 
achtergrond verschillende aanknopingsfactoren. Tegen deze achtergrond zouden de Chinese 
wetgever en rechter ook bijzondere conflictregels voor dit soort geschillen moeten bieden; en 
 de drie sets van Principles hebben een territoriale benadering (CLIP Principles) of een 
universele benadering (de ALI Principles en Japanese-Korean Principles) voorgesteld voor het 
vraagstuk wie als initieel rechthebbende van een auteursrecht heeft te gelden. Dit verschil in 
benadering komt ook terug in de bijzondere conflictregels ten aanzien van de initieel 
rechthebbende op een auteursrechtelijk werk dat tot stand wordt gebracht in bepaalde relaties, 
zoals een arbeidsrelatie. De Chinese wetgever dient bij deze vraagstukken duidelijk te zijn in 
zijn benadering en tevens bijzondere conflictregels vast te leggen voor auteursrechtelijk 
beschermde werken die tot stand zijn gebracht in een bepaalde relatie.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt het conflictenrecht van de Volksrepubliek China ten aanzien van 
grensoverschrijdende conflicten over auteursrecht en naburige rechten. Het introduceert daarbij eerst 
het Chinese rechtssysteem. Daarbij beschrijft het dat China een sterk door de Europees-continentale 
‘civil law’-traditie beïnvloed gecodificeerd rechtssysteem heeft, dat de uitspraken van lagere gerechten 
niet worden beschouwd als officiële rechtsbron, dat de uitspraken van het Volkshooggerechtshof (de 
hoogste rechter in China) in de praktijk door de lagere gerechten in acht worden genomen en worden 
gebruikt als richtlijnen, en dat het Volkshooggerechtshof tevens aan wetgeving gerelateerde taken 
heeft (bijvoorbeeld via de vaststelling van ‘rechterlijke interpretaties’). Het hoofdstuk bespreekt dan 
dat het Chinese conflictenrecht vóór de inwerkingtreding van het PIL Statuut was verspreid over 
verschillende wetten en rechterlijke interpretaties van het Volkshooggerechtshof. Er was toen ook 
geen expliciete regel voor het vraagstuk welk recht toepasselijk is in grensoverschrijdende 
auteursrechtgeschillen. Dit had tot gevolg dat de jurisprudentie over dat vraagstuk inconsistent was. 
Zoals uit een onderzoek blijkt, bevatten de meeste uitspraken toentertijd geen conflictenrechtelijke 
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analyse, en in het kleine aantal gevallen waar wel zo’n analyse had plaatsvonden was sprake van een 
wisselende aanpak. In sommige gevallen vond de lex loci protectionis toepassing, in andere de lex loci 
delicti, en in weer andere gevallen werd aanknoping gezocht bij het beginsel van de nauwste 
verbondenheid. Een ander opvallend punt was dat buitenlandse wetten nauwelijks werden toegepast; 
de gerechten pasten slechts het Chinees recht en enkele bepalingen van de Berner Conventie toe. Het 
hoofdstuk analyseert vervolgens de oorzaken van deze fenomenen: hoofdzakelijk een gebrek aan besef 
van het conflictenrechtelijk probleem, alsmede een strikte uitleg van het auteursrechtelijk 
territorialiteitsbeginsel, wat leidde tot de overtuiging dat er geen conflictenrechtelijk probleem in 
grensoverschrijdende auteursrechtgeschillen was. Dit laatste verklaart ook waarom de gerechten 
slechts Chinees recht in auteursrechtgeschillen toepasten. Daarenboven zal de natuurlijke voorkeur 
van Chinese rechters voor het toepassen van Chinees recht ook hebben geleid tot de toepassing van 
Chinees recht.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 vervolgt met een beschrijving van de wetgevende inspanningen van China die hebben 
geleid tot de vaststelling van expliciete conflictregels voor grensoverschrijdende vorderingen met 
betrekking tot intellectuele eigendom in het PIL Statuut, en bespreekt dan de regels die dat Statuut 
bevat. Het PIL Statuut heeft de lex loci protectionis aangenomen als hoofdregel voor de vraagstukken 
van het eigenaarschap en de inhoud van intellectuele eigendomsrechten en de inbreuken op die 
rechten. Met betrekking tot het laatste vraagstuk verschaft het PIL Statuut flexibiliteit door partijen 
nadat de inbreuk heeft plaatsgevonden een rechtskeuze toe te staan voor de lex fori. Het hoofdstuk 
betoogt dat de Chinese wetgever voor het vaststellen van deze bijzondere regels over intellectuele 
eigendom, het respecteren van het traditionele territorialiteitsbeginsel, en het toestaan van een beperkte 
partijautonomie bij inbreukvorderingen, moet worden toegejuicht. Het hoofdstuk wijst er echter ook 
op dat er nog bepaalde nadelen zijn. Ten eerste onderscheidt het PIL Statuut niet naar soorten van 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten en verschaft het geen nader verfijnde regels voor auteursrecht en 
naburige rechten. Ten tweede is het toepassingsbereik van de lex loci protectionis nog beperkt, wat de 
vraag oproept hoe om te gaan met andere materiële vorderingen met betrekking tot intellectuele 
eigendomsrechten, zoals over het ontstaan, de duur, en de beëindiging van deze rechten. Ten derde 
verschaft het PIL Statuut weliswaar een bijzondere regel met betrekking tot de initieel rechthebbende 
van een auteursrecht, maar geeft het geen richtsnoeren voor werken die tot stand zijn gebracht binnen 
een bijzondere relatie (zoals een arbeidsrelatie). Ten vierde is het bereik van de partijautonomie bij 
inbreuken op intellectuele eigendomsrechten breed, en beslaat het bepaalde onderdelen die niet onder 
de autonomie van partijen behoren te vallen. Ten slotte biedt het PIL Statuut geen oplossingen voor 
het probleem dat voortvloeit uit het vereiste gebruik van de territoriale benadering in geschillen 
rondom inbreuken in verschillende staten. 
 
Op basis van de waarnemingen en analyses uit de voorafgaande hoofdstukken, concludeert het laatste 
hoofdstuk van het proefschrift dat conflictenrechtelijke vraagstukken rondom auteursrecht en 
naburige rechten met bijzondere regels moeten worden aangepakt. Dit zal niet alleen het territoriale 
karakter van het auteursrecht eerbiedigen (dat het economische, culturele en sociale beleid van het 
land dat het recht heeft toegekend weerspiegelt), maar ook het non-formele karakter van dit recht (wat 
het onderscheidt van intellectuele eigendomsrechten die overheidsgoedkeuring behoeven). Op deze 
wijze biedt het vaststellen van bijzondere conflictregels voor geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige 
rechten de mogelijkheid voor meer verfijnde oplossingen ten aanzien van mogelijke conflicten die zich 
tot de context van het auteursrecht en naburige rechten beperken. Naar aanleiding van het betoog dat 
de internationale verdragen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten geen conflictregels voorschrijven, 
concludeert het proefschrift verder dat zonder internationaal geharmoniseerde conflictregels de landen 
die aan deze verdragen zijn gebonden hun nationale conflictregels moeten toepassen (of waar van 
toepassing: hun regionale conflictregels). Dienovereenkomstig dienen de Chinese rechters bij 
grensoverschrijdende geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten niet te verwijzen naar 
internationale verdragen, maar te vertrouwen op de conflictregels uit het PIL Statuut. Vanuit het 
onderzoek naar het Europees recht (met name de Verordening Rome II), het nationale recht van een 
aantal Europese staten en de inhoud van de drie sets van ‘soft law-Principles’ rondom de aanwijzing 
van het toepasselijk recht bij grensoverschrijdende geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten, 
wijst het proefschrift bovendien op enige bijzonderheden van de daarbij onderzochte wetten, 
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jurisprudentie en Principles, die inspiratie kunnen bieden aan de Chinese wetgever en rechter. In 
reactie op de onderzochte nadelen in hoofdstuk 5, stelt het proefschrift enige oplossingen voor die 
redelijk en praktisch zijn voor het toepasselijk recht in grensoverschrijdende geschillen over 
auteursrecht en naburige rechten. Op deze wijze kan de doeltreffendheid van de conflictregels worden 
verbeterd en een evenwichtig resultaat worden bereikt tussen de behoefte aan enerzijds 
rechtszekerheid en voorspelbaarheid, en anderzijds de noodzaak recht te doen in individuele gevallen.  
 
Ten eerste wordt voorgesteld dat de Chinese wetgever oplossingen biedt voor conflictenrechtelijke 
vraagstukken bij grensoverschrijdende geschillen over auteursrecht en naburige rechten via bijzondere 
regels. 
 
Ten tweede wordt voorgesteld de reikwijdte van de lex loci protectionis-regel uit het PIL Statuut te 
verduidelijken om de vraagstukken van het ontstaan, de geldigheid, de duur, en de beëindiging van het 
auteursrecht en naburige rechten te omsluiten. Daarmee wordt niet alleen het territorialiteitsbeginsel 
van het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten in acht genomen, maar ook duidelijkheid geboden aan de 
rechter en de partijen over het toepasselijk recht bij die vraagstukken. 
 
Ten derde wordt de Chinese wetgever in overweging gegeven bijzondere conflictenrechtelijke 
bepalingen op te nemen met betrekking tot het vraagstuk wie als initieel rechthebbende heeft te gelden 
van werken die tot stand zijn gebracht binnen een bijzondere relatie, zoals een arbeids- of 
opdrachtsrelatie. Daarbij stelt het proefschrift voor het recht dat de relatie beheerst toe te passen om de 
initieel rechthebbende van zulke werken aan te wijzen. Dit kan worden gebaseerd op de overweging 
dat het tot stand brengen van het werk voornamelijk wordt verricht door de werknemer of de 
opdrachtnemer. De vraag wie als initieel rechthebbende heeft te gelden, heeft een nauwe band met de 
genoemde relaties en kan met recht worden behandeld als een daaraan gerelateerd vraagstuk. Het 
toepassen van het recht dat de relatie beheerst, kan voorts distributieve toepassing van het nationale 
recht van ieder land dat bescherming biedt voorkomen, en het hoofd bieden aan territoriale opsplitsing 
van het eigenaarschap, aangezien slechts het recht van het land van de relatie het vraagstuk van de 
initieel rechthebbende zal beheersen.  
 
Ten vierde wordt voorgesteld het bereik van de partijautonomie in het PIL Statuut (i.e. een ex post 
rechtskeuze voor Chinees recht) nader te verduidelijken. Bepaalde aspecten van inbreukvorderingen 
behoren niet aan de contractsvrijheid van partijen te worden overgelaten. Ten behoeve van de 
nauwkeurigheid en duidelijkheid moet de partijautonomie zodanig worden beperkt dat het partijen 
slechts is toegestaan ex post een rechtskeuze te maken voor de lex fori voor zover het gaat om de 
berekening van de schade die voortvloeit uit een inbreuk. 
 
Ten vijfde wordt voorgesteld dat bij geschillen rondom een inbreuk in meerdere staten op een 
auteursrecht en naburige rechten, een conflictenrechtelijke oplossing moet worden geboden die afwijkt 
van de territorialiteitsbenadering. Vanuit de overweging dat flexibiliteit moet worden gehanteerd waar 
dit noodzakelijk is, en niet om de algemene regel van de lex loci protectionis ongedaan te maken, stelt 
het proefschrift een omschrijving voor van wat onder een inbreuk in meerdere staten kan worden 
verstaan. Door de bijzondere regels voor geschillen rondom een inbreuk in meerdere staten te 
koppelen aan deze omschrijving, wordt de reikwijdte van deze regels beperkt tot 
uitzonderingssituaties. Naast de reeds voorgestelde ex post rechtskeuzeregel, stelt het proefschrift aan 
de Chinese wetgever voor om te overwegen voor een inbreuk in meerdere staten een regel van 
nauwste verbondenheid op te nemen die het recht aanwijst dat het nauwste verbonden is aan deze 
inbreuk. Gelet op de nauwe band tussen de vraagstukken van het ontstaan, het bereik, en de duur van 
het auteursrecht en van inbreuken op dat recht, moeten de voorgenoemde regels ook worden toegepast 
als deze vraagstukken naar voren komen bij een prealabele of incidentele vraag bij geschillen over een 
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